Iran Prisoner Deal 'Dangerous Precedent,' Warns Ex-Secretary Pompeo

According to the Jerusalem Post, the attacks, orchestrated by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, were aimed at thwarting Moshe's efforts to enhance relations between the two nations and elevate Israel's standing in the region.

"I see that their goal was not only to kill me physically but to kill the idea as well," Moshe stated, emphasizing the assailants' broader objectives.

Moshe, a Georgian Jew who immigrated to Israel in the 1970s and later returned to Georgia as the Jewish Agency's first representative to the Soviet Union, has been instrumental in bridging connections between Israel and former Soviet republics. His organization, Beit Israel (Israeli House), operates in 18 countries, facilitating cultural and diplomatic exchange.

The failed assassination attempts took place outside Beit Israel's office on Tbilisi's main street and were thwarted by intervention by Georgian security forces. Investigative findings indicated that the attackers intended to stage a gruesome spectacle at the entrance, by daubing Moshe's blood on the Israeli flag.

Despite the plots, Moshe remains dedicated to his mission. "The attempt of the murderers did not succeed," he said.

Geopolitical experts speculate that Iran views the South Caucasus, comprising Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as strategically significant due to its proximity to the country. Iran is the sole Middle Eastern nation with diplomatic presence in all South Caucasus states. Iran's interests have drawn concern, as evidenced by its alleged involvement in attacks against Israeli targets.

Mossad recently disclosed additional information regarding a terrorist cell orchestrated by Iran with intentions to target Israeli businessmen in Cyprus.

Subsequently, Israel announced that its operatives within Iran effectively apprehended the individual believed to be responsible for the planned assault.

On the fifth day of a sit-in protest that has moved from outside the White House to the US State Department's premises, the family of Shahab Dalili, is calling for his release as part of the Tehran-Washington agreement.

On Monday, Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel of the US State Department addressed the situation during a press conference, casting doubt on whether Dalili's case falls under the category of "wrongfully detained.”

Dalili, a former captain of Iran Shipping Company and a US resident, was arrested during a trip to Tehran in 2016 for his father's funeral, after which he was apprehended by Iranian security forces.

Patel said, “and what I would say in the case of Mr. Dalili is that that case has not yet been determined wrongfully detained. We obviously don’t discuss the specific details of individual cases who have not been deemed wrongfully detained.”

This contradicts previous remarks by US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, who said on August 19ththat there were no other American citizens imprisoned in Iran apart from the five known detainees.

Shahab Dalili's son, Darin Dalili, expressed disappointment and disagreement with the Deputy Spokesperson's statement, deeming it "incorrect." In response to the family's concerns, Patel clarified that the US was actively investigating Dalili's case and had engaged in discussions with the family regarding his situation.

Undeterred by the conflicting messages, the family continue their sit-in outside the US State Department.

Tehran's municipality controlled by Regime hardliners has installed numerous billboards across the capital accusing the Pahlavi dynasty -- the last monarchs of Iran -- of “selling out the homeland,” a claim that is historically wrong but indicative that the regime feels threatened by popular nostalgia about the Pahlavi era. 

The regime’s propaganda line is also echoed by several officials, such as government spokesman Ali Bahadori Jahromi, who shared a collage of news pieces dating back to mid-August 1971 when Bahrain declared independence. However, the independence was not from Iran; but from the United Kingdom. 

Bahrain was a dependency of the Persian Empire when in 1783 the Bani Utbah tribe led by Al Khalifa invaded the territory from their base in current-day Qatar. Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Khalifa -- the progenitor of the dynasty, known as Ahmed the Conqueror, expelled the Iran-installed governor. His successors kept Bahrain under their control over the next decades, and Tehran’s loose grip was completely lost in 1861, when Britain acknowledged Al Khalifa family as its rulers.

Since the treaty with Britain, until independence in 1971, Bahrain was virtually a British protectorate, where the British king was the supreme authority and members of the Sunni Muslim ruling family held the main political and military posts. Although August 15 is the date when Bahrain gained its independence from Britain, the kingdom celebrates December 16 as its National Day, the date of Emir Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa’s ascension to the throne in 1961.

The Pahlavi dynasty, founded by Reza Shah Pahlavi, replaced the Qajar dynasty in 1925. Since then, both Reza Shah and after that his son Mohammad-Reza Shah tried to reclaim Bahrain and negotiated with the British on several occasions but to no avail. Different Iranian governments and the Pahlavi kings themselves repeated the claim over Bahrain and even passed a bill in 1957 to officially announce Bahrain as one of the provinces of Iran, but in practice the legal status of the Arab-majority archipelago remained the same. 

Mohammad-Reza Shah, who was also engaged in a similar battle for three Iranian islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, finally announced during a trip to India in 1969 that if the people of Bahrain were not willing to become part of Iran again, Tehran would withdraw its territorial claims. The Shah emphasized that Iran is not seeking to use force for the annexation of Bahrain. “I want to say that if the people of Bahrain do not wish to join our country we shall never resort to force, because it is against the policy of our government to use force ... Our policy and philosophy is to oppose occupation of other territories by force."

Following a United Nations survey – a controversial poll sometimes referred to as a "referendum" -- on whether islanders preferred independence or Iranian control, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 278 on May 11, 1970, and subsequently Bahrain became independent from the United Kingdom. Despite opposition by several Iranian lawmakers at the time, the government accepted the decision and Iran was the first country to congratulate Bahrain for its independence in August 1971. 

About three months later, the Imperial Iranian Navy seized the three Persian Gulf islands shortly after the withdrawal of British forces from the Persian Gulf while the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah claimed the Greater and Lesser Tunbs and the Emirate of Sharjah claimed Abu Musa. Both emirates then acceded to the newly formed United Arab Emirates, but they still reiterate claims over the islands every now and then. 

Today, the Islamic Republic regime does not talk about the historical events that led to the independence of Bahrain and only uses it as a ploy to tarnish the Pahlavis, whose popularity has been rising again among the Iranians. During anti-regime protests – especially the current wave sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody – people chant in support of late kings Reza and Mohammad-Reza, while the exiled prince Reza Pahlavi has become a leading opposition figure touring the globe to make the voice of Iranians heard. 

The smear campaign against the Pahlavis is in line with the regime’s new tactics of soft war, labeled by Iran’s ruler Ali Khamenei as ‘vindication jihad’ (jihad tabyyin). In recent years, Khamenei has applied the phrase to efforts both in the media and on social media platforms to provide new interpretations – as well as fake history in case of Bahrain – to portray the regime better than what it really is. 

This is part of the regime's strategy to stoke anticipation, giving the impression that noteworthy developments might unfold. However, the electorate's disillusionment stems from the heavily manipulated elections of 2020 and 2021, which ushered in one of the most ineffectual parliaments and governments in recent national history.

Analysts in Tehran attribute the public's indifference to the government's insistence on limiting election choices to ultraconservative candidates, combined with the political system's inability to address a multitude of crises. This ambivalence is akin to perceiving the elections as transpiring in a different realm. The people's sentiment is perhaps best captured by the Persian proverb, which roughly translates to "If the pot is not boiling for me, let them cook whatever filthy beast they want to cook."

In their daily efforts to "heat up the stove," the media seized the opportunity on Sunday to bring familiar names to the forefront. Speculation emerged that Ali Motahari, a controversial conservative former legislator known for cautiously criticizing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, might contend for a parliamentary seat. Etemad Online wrote that Motahari is one of the nearly 30,000 people who have taken part in early candidate registration. 

Another round of conjecture circled on Sunday, this time involving former Majles Speaker Ali Larijani as a potential candidate. After weeks of oscillating reports regarding his intentions, a political figure close to Larijani, Behrouz Nemati, revealed that Larijani himself wouldn't run, but he intends to endorse a slate of like-minded candidates.

Larijani's reluctance to participate in the elections, following his highly questionable disqualification in the 2021 presidential race, was evident. However, if he were to run for a position, it would likely be for Iran's presidency, given his prior leadership of the Parliament. The role of Speaker, once easily attainable due to Khamenei's support, now poses a greater challenge for him.

Notwithstanding, Nemati called on the public to turn out in significant numbers to contribute to a high-turnout election, thereby bolstering the regime's legitimacy, which has been eroded, particularly after the 2022 nationwide protests.

On the same day, former reformist President Mohammad Khatami was quoted as having said that the country's leaders call on the reformists to participate in the upcoming elections but they take every step to make sure that reformists are not allowed to run. Khatami, who was meeting with leading reformists, referred to media attacks from hardliners targeting his recent calls for reforms to save the regime.

Discussing the verbal assaults from the hardline daily Kayhan and other ultraconservative figures, Khatami observed, "The government now interprets suggestions for reform as some kind of deviation."

Meanwhile, Mohammad-Reza Aref, a former vice-president under Khatami's leadership, is expected to run, despite his past perceived inactivity in the parliament. Shunned by other reformists for his aloof behavior when he was the leader of the reform caucus in the parliament, now Aref can hardly be categorized as a reformist.

Although certain media outlets prematurely assess the composition of the forthcoming parliament, most politicians recognize that unless Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei alters his stance within the next five months, there will likely be limited room for moderate or reformist candidates. 

The government may attempt to portray certain figures in the next parliament as less hardline or even persuade select individuals within the ultraconservative camp to make occasional controversial statements, simulating diversity and drawing attention.

The depth of disillusionment regarding a free and equitable election is so pronounced that even figures like Mohammad Javad Bahonar, formerly regarded as a hardline conservative, lament that the regime no longer views them as insiders. As the regime fans the flames of anticipation, few authentic politicians would willingly become fuel for the fire.

Iranian media reported the passing of Mohammad Jahangiri, a member of the Shahcheragh security forces who had sustained injuries in the attack on Sunday. Despite undergoing two surgeries, Jahangiri succumbed to his wounds due to a gunshot injury to the abdomen, as reported by ISNA.

Amidst the unfolding situation, a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) accused Israeli Tuesday of involvement in the attack.

Yadollah Bouali, Commander of the IRGC in Fars Province where the incident took place, disclosed on Tuesday that the shooter operated within a wider network, suggesting that the network's activities span across multiple countries and maintain links to Israel. Bouali also claimed the network operated over a month in Shiraz before targeting the shrine.

He claimed that "More than 10 individuals have been apprehended thus far," and emphasized that the perpetrator was equipped with one of the "most sophisticated firearms."

Earlier, the Mizan News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Republic's judiciary, had reported the detention of eight foreign suspects associated with the incident.

Additionally, on Monday, Ramzan Sharif, the IRGC spokesperson, refuted claims attributing the attack to an Afghan national, noting that the suspect's nationality would be disclosed in due course.

In a parallel development, the Chief Justice of Fars Province identified the attacker as Rahmatollah Nowruzov, and said he is a Tajik national.

This incident bears a striking resemblance to a previous incident in October, when a gunman, identified as a Tajikistan citizen, entered the shrine, opened fire, and subsequently lost his life after being shot. The October incident coincided with anti-regime protests, raising speculation and accusations of orchestrated tactics by the government. In a similar vein, Iran publicly executed two Afghan nationals in July, accused of aiding the primary perpetrator of the October attack.