Iran's Rouhani Talks About The Day After Khamenei's Death
Iran’s former President Hassan Rouhani has for the first time discussed possible arrangements to handle the situation after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death.
Iran’s former President Hassan Rouhani has for the first time discussed possible arrangements to handle the situation after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's death.
He told a group of Iranian moderates including his aides in the previous government on November 20, "This round of the Assembly of Experts election, which is to be held on March 1…, is more important than the previous elections." The Assembly has the constitutional task to select the next Supreme Leader.
Using the mildest language to evade Khamenei’s and his hardliner supporters' anger, Rouhani said, "May the Supreme Leader live long, but as the time passes, the day we would never want to come is more likely to arrive and the Assembly of Experts has to decide on the naming of the next Supreme Leader."
Rouhani added that he had his doubts about whether to register his candidacy for the Assembly of Experts election and that he finally decided to run hoping that he can make an impact on the Assembly's choice in the event of Khamenei's death.
Over the past weeks, when Rouhani revealed that he was a candidate and particularly after the official announcement about the endorsement of his credentials, many conservative media and politicians expressed their opposition to his candidacy although he already is an incumbent member of the assembly. Earlier, a state TV presenter asked the Guardian Council on live television to disqualify him.
Rouhani said at the meeting with his aides that the state TV is at its lowest point in terms of popularity and people's trust.
He said he is well familiar with the hardliners who are currently in control of the government and parliament, adding they would do anything to make sure that he cannot run. However, he insisted that he would encourage everyone to take part in the elections.
Many in the reformist and moderate camp consider Rouhani as one of the three potential candidates for the Supreme Leader, along with President Ebrahim Raisi and Khamenei's son Mojtaba.
Although Iran's reformist and moderates may not like it, but under the current circumstances Rouhani is the least likely winner in this imaginary contest. He is the least popular member of the hardliner dominated Assembly of Experts. From this perspective, Raisi has a better chance to be the Islamic Republic's next leader. In fact, thanks to his naivety, he could be the ideal supreme leader for a country to be run by a powerful and ambitious entity such as the IRGC.
In an alternative scenario, suggested by some Iranian analysts, Raisi is considered the most suitable candidate to succeed former Guardian Council Secretary Ahmad Jannati at this point. This move could strategically position Raisi to carry out Khamenei's directives effectively and potentially pave the way for the ascension of Khamenei's son, Mojtaba, to power.
In recent years, Khamenei has been grooming Mojtaba for the post. Mojtaba has been teaching a much-advertised high profile advanced course at the seminary in Qom and the state TV frequently referred to his seminary credentials. The Supreme Leader should be a learned Imam according to the regime’s ideology.
Some say even Rouhani could be a player in helping Mojtaba. He said recently that the next Supreme Leader need not need be a Mojtahid (a cleric high ranking enough to confer his own religious decrees). Of course, he could expect a reward for playing the part. A reward such as a guaranteed high-ranking position to keep for life. A position in which he could distribute power and money and exercise his influence on the political apparatus without causing any nuisance for the next leader.
Unlike countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Iran lacks an official position like that of a crown prince designated as the official heir to the current Supreme Leader. This raises concerns about the country's stability, particularly in the immediate aftermath of what Rouhani referred to as "The day we would never want to come."
The House Committee on Education and the Workforce announced on November 16 that the New Jersey-based Princeton University is the subject of an investigation over the role of its controversial academic Mousavian, a former Iranian regime ambassador to Germany.
The twelve Republican lawmakers wrote: “During Mousavian’s tenure at Princeton, one of its students, Xiyue Wang, was held hostage in Iran. Given Mousavian’s experience as a former high-ranking official with the government of Iran, did Princeton ask Mousavian to assist in any way for Xiyue Wang’s release? Did Mousavian offer to use his contacts to try to free Xiyue Wang?”
The congressional representatives requested that Princeton University President Christopher L. Eisgruber answer their questions about Mousavian’s alleged failure to aid the Chinese-American scholar Wang.
Wang told Iran International that “Princeton did not use its leverage, Mousavian, to get me out and it is not using its leverage to get Elizabeth Tsurkov out.”
Tsurkov,a Russian-Israeli PhD student at Princeton University, was kidnapped by the pro-Iran regime militia Kata'ib Hezbollah in March, 2023 in Iraq.
“Based on my understanding that Mousavian did not help me I would guess he is not working to help Tsurkov, “added Wang, who was imprisoned in Iran between August, 2016 and December 2019.
He and his wife, Hua Qu, sued Princeton University in 2021. Wang and his wife claimed they suffered “severe personal injuries and other irreparable harm, with respect to Princeton’s “reckless, willful, wanton, and grossly negligent acts.”
Wang and Qu settled the lawsuit in September. The elements of the settlement have not been made public. The 45 page civil suit against Princeton, which includes 16 mentions of Mousavian, can be read here.
In his first interview with Iran International, the embattled Princeton academic Mousavian said about Wang’s accusations that “Such claims are because they do not understand Iran. It is true that I was the former spokesperson for Iran’s nuclear negotiation team and a friend of the then Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif during my service at the Iranian foreign ministry. “
Mousavian added, “However, neither Rouhani as the then president, nor Zarif as the then foreign minister had no power, influence and authority to intervene in Wang’s case. In 2009, an Iranian court sentenced the brother of President Hassan Rouhani, Hossein Fereydoun, to five years in prison.”
Wang countered that “The problem is not really whether Zarif or Rouhani could help. The problem is Mousavian decided he was not going to do anything. Iranian intelligence first confiscated my passport. And 18 days later they arrested me. During this time , I asked Princeton to ask Mousavian to help. And Mousavian decided not to do anything. When you have a person with that level of connections in your institution, you would expect he would act.”
When Iran International first asked Mousavian about the two Princeton students who were kidnapped, the former ambassador said, “I don’t know the students, but I believe any kidnapping, assassination and terror by anyone, anywhere and for any reason is a clear violation of international rules and regulations.”
Wang’s lawsuit stated, “Since joining Princeton in 2009, Mr. Mousavian has written many articles and made many media appearances where he has advocated in favor of the United States allowing Iran to obtain nuclear capabilities. Mr. Mousavian is understood to be a strong and avid supporter of the current Iranian terrorist regime. Mr. Mousavian frequently published pro-regime articles throughout Mr. Wang’s imprisonment in Evin Prison.”
Wang said, “Princeton knew I was held as a hostage as a bargaining chip and yet they were allowing Mousavian to use Princeton to promote the Iranian regime’s interests in the US, Iran and around the world.”
He asked “Why is Mousavian allowed to use his Princeton byline to criticize the US while I am in jail? Princeton, at the level of the university, is in the forefront of the pro-Iran engagement policy. Princeton’s pro-Iran engagement is not working.” He cited the case of Tsurkov, noting “When you have a student get arrested again in the span of a few years that says something.”
Wang said he was “glad” the congressional committee is investigating Princeton and Mousavian, adding they are “asking Princeton some questions that it really needs to answer. Mousavian is representing the Iranian regime unofficially. This is not academic freedom but harboring an agent. Why is Princeton giving the Iranian regime a prestigious platform for the Iranian regime’s interests? Princeton needs to come clean.”
Numerous Iran International press queries to Princeton University went unanswered.
The closure, largely overlooked by Iranian media and officials, underscored the regime's struggle to propagate its ideological messaging among Iranians who had emigrated to avoid exposure to such totalitarian and biased content.
Saeed Fanian, a former manager of Jam-e Jam, contends that the channel's shutdown highlights the breakdown of the state television organization's monopoly on TV broadcasting. He specifically pointed the finger at Vahid Jalili, the deputy chairman of IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), for lacking the necessary expertise to lead the channel.
Fanian also criticized IRIB Chief Peyman Jebelli for failing to fulfil promises to restore the broadcaster's credibility. According to Fanian, a successful television program should challenge authorities and convince the audience of its fairness -- elements he believes the state TV failed to achieve.
Fanian, an Iranian academic headed IRIB's newsroom from 1988 to 1994 and the Jam-e Jam channel from 2003 to 2009. He believes that the state television launched Jam-e Jam to confront the influence of foreign-based satellite television channels which were new in the Iranian media landscape in the 1990s.
However, with the proliferation of more foreign-based professional Persian networks after 2009, the channel lost its appeal for expatriates, who appreciated the transparent political slant of the foreign-based networks. The viewership of Jam-e Jam's three channels for Europe, US and Australia began to drop and during the past years only one of the three channels were beaming to Europe and parts of the United States. However, even Iranian officials admitted that very few Iranian expats tuned to Jam-e Jam for news or entertainment.
Toward the end of its lifetime as hardliners at home pushed their radical cultural policies, the channel stopped broadcasting Iranian music which was more or less the only interesting program on Jam-e Jam after 2009. On the other hand, the channel did not have anything to offer to Iranians who became increasingly politically minded after the disputed presidential election in 2009 and particularly with the start of major protest demonstrations in 2017. There was no trace of the protests and dissent in general on the channel whatsoever.
It was around the same time that major foreign-based channels including Iran International, BBC Persian and Manoto TV began to offer more programming on Iran's domestic politics and hot issues such as human rights violations in Iran. They catered to the needs of Iranians inside and outside of the country for accurate and unbiased information about events in the country.
In his interview, Fanian admitted that Jam-e Jam was somewhat successful before these channels appeared on the Iranian media landscape. While he still believes that Jam-e Jam's winning edge toward the end of its activity was broadcasting Iranian TV sitcoms, a recent report on Kahabr Online website indicates that the state TV lost its edge as online platforms in Iran started to produce their own series with less radical censorship.
A study cited by Khabar Online reveals that despite the state TV's monopoly on broadcasting and its extension of censorship to video-on-demand (VOD) services, TV series produced by the state were significantly less successful than those offered by VOD platforms. Notably, even though state TV provided its content for free, VOD series such as "Fatal Wound" and "Return" had nearly double the viewership of all state TV series combined. Another example is the comedy series "How Many Springs There Are in A Lifetime," which has maintained successful viewership on VOD platforms for over five months.
The decline in viewership extends to both news programs and entertainment shows on state TV and its Jam-e Jam channel, losing audiences to online platforms within Iran and foreign-based satellite television channels. Polls conducted domestically and internationally corroborate the substantial drop in state TV viewership. As a result, the government may find it increasingly difficult to justify investing funds in a propaganda machine that has lost its efficacy.