Iran International
In September, Iranian state television shut down its Jam-e Jam channel, designed to convey the Islamic Republic's message to millions of expats in the diaspora.
The closure, largely overlooked by Iranian media and officials, underscored the regime's struggle to propagate its ideological messaging among Iranians who had emigrated to avoid exposure to such totalitarian and biased content.
Saeed Fanian, a former manager of Jam-e Jam, contends that the channel's shutdown highlights the breakdown of the state television organization's monopoly on TV broadcasting. He specifically pointed the finger at Vahid Jalili, the deputy chairman of IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), for lacking the necessary expertise to lead the channel.
Fanian also criticized IRIB Chief Peyman Jebelli for failing to fulfil promises to restore the broadcaster's credibility. According to Fanian, a successful television program should challenge authorities and convince the audience of its fairness -- elements he believes the state TV failed to achieve.
Fanian, an Iranian academic headed IRIB's newsroom from 1988 to 1994 and the Jam-e Jam channel from 2003 to 2009. He believes that the state television launched Jam-e Jam to confront the influence of foreign-based satellite television channels which were new in the Iranian media landscape in the 1990s.
However, with the proliferation of more foreign-based professional Persian networks after 2009, the channel lost its appeal for expatriates, who appreciated the transparent political slant of the foreign-based networks. The viewership of Jam-e Jam's three channels for Europe, US and Australia began to drop and during the past years only one of the three channels were beaming to Europe and parts of the United States. However, even Iranian officials admitted that very few Iranian expats tuned to Jam-e Jam for news or entertainment.
Toward the end of its lifetime as hardliners at home pushed their radical cultural policies, the channel stopped broadcasting Iranian music which was more or less the only interesting program on Jam-e Jam after 2009. On the other hand, the channel did not have anything to offer to Iranians who became increasingly politically minded after the disputed presidential election in 2009 and particularly with the start of major protest demonstrations in 2017. There was no trace of the protests and dissent in general on the channel whatsoever.
It was around the same time that major foreign-based channels including Iran International, BBC Persian and Manoto TV began to offer more programming on Iran's domestic politics and hot issues such as human rights violations in Iran. They catered to the needs of Iranians inside and outside of the country for accurate and unbiased information about events in the country.
In his interview, Fanian admitted that Jam-e Jam was somewhat successful before these channels appeared on the Iranian media landscape. While he still believes that Jam-e Jam's winning edge toward the end of its activity was broadcasting Iranian TV sitcoms, a recent report on Kahabr Online website indicates that the state TV lost its edge as online platforms in Iran started to produce their own series with less radical censorship.
A study cited by Khabar Online reveals that despite the state TV's monopoly on broadcasting and its extension of censorship to video-on-demand (VOD) services, TV series produced by the state were significantly less successful than those offered by VOD platforms. Notably, even though state TV provided its content for free, VOD series such as "Fatal Wound" and "Return" had nearly double the viewership of all state TV series combined. Another example is the comedy series "How Many Springs There Are in A Lifetime," which has maintained successful viewership on VOD platforms for over five months.
The decline in viewership extends to both news programs and entertainment shows on state TV and its Jam-e Jam channel, losing audiences to online platforms within Iran and foreign-based satellite television channels. Polls conducted domestically and internationally corroborate the substantial drop in state TV viewership. As a result, the government may find it increasingly difficult to justify investing funds in a propaganda machine that has lost its efficacy.
The bill outlines a projection of 1.35 million barrels per day for oil exports at an average price of €65 per barrel (approximately $71) in the upcoming fiscal year (starting March 21), representing a 10% reduction in volume and a 16% decrease in prices compared to the current year's budget. Despite these cuts, the overall forecast for oil revenues in the budget indicates only a 3% decrease from the current year, signaling a substantial increase in domestic energy prices, particularly impacting industries, businesses, and households.
Davoud Manzoor, the head of the Planning and Budget Organization, recently disclosed a 40% overestimation in oil export revenues for the current year, leading to a significant budget deficit. This suggests a shift toward raising domestic energy prices due to disappointment with oil export revenue growth, contradicting claims by Iranian oil officials, including the Minister of Oil, about an increase in the country's oil production and exports.
International reports in August and Iranian official statements had indicted that daily exports had well surpassed 1.5 million barrels, but next year’s budget projection is based on the lower number.
Data from the commodity intelligence company Kpler and energy consultancy firm Vortexa suggest that Iran's daily oil exports to China have remained below 1.05 mb/d in ten month of 2023. Despite a notable summer increase, shipments declined in the fall.
Additionally, recent US legislation intensifying sanctions on Iranian oil, if implemented, could further restrict Iran's oil exports.
The draft budget for this and the next fiscal year does not distinguish revenues from the domestic and foreign sale of oil and gas. However, the government's forecast of a 50% surge in next year’s tax revenues indicates that the Raisi administration aims to place a greater burden on the Iranian people to compensate for budget deficits.
Achieving expected oil revenues: aspiration or reality?
The Parliament Research Center has predicted that this year's government budget will face a deficit of 4,250 trillion rials ($8.5 billion based on USD rate in Iran’s open market). This equals to 20% the current year’s budget. In recent years, Iranian governments, to compensate for budget deficits, have significantly increased taxes on people, traders, and industries, in addition to borrowing heavily from financial institutions and banks.
The Raisi administration also plans to increase the sale of bonds by 36% year-on-year to 2,550 trillion rials. For better comparison, the amount of government debt from the sale of bonds for the coming year alone will be equivalent to half of the total revenues from oil and gas exports and domestic sales.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics show that government debt has sharply increased in recent years, reaching 34% of the GDP in 2022, or 118 billion dollars.
In the current fiscal year, the Iranian government has projected daily oil exports at 1.35 million barrels per day (mb/d) with a price of $71 per barrel. However, Iran's actual daily oil exports to China, its main customer, hover just above one million barrels, and despite current global oil prices reaching around $74 per barrel, Iran offers a discount of about $12 per barrel to Chinese refineries. Consequently, approximately 30% of Iran’s oil export revenues are lost due to sanctions evasion and discounted sales to Chinese refineries.
As a result, not only is it unlikely that the targeted volume of oil exports will be realized in the budget for the next fiscal year, but achieving the predicted price for Iran's oil exports is also improbable. In essence, the government is anticipated to face a considerable budget deficit in the upcoming year. The International Monetary Fund has forecasted that, to avert an Iranian budget deficit for the next fiscal year, global oil prices would need to exceed $317 per barrel.
Natural Gas Exports
In the current fiscal year, the Iranian government has set a target of 1.35 million barrels per day (mb/d) for daily oil exports, with a projected price of $71 per barrel. However, Iran's actual daily oil exports to China slightly surpass one million barrels. Despite global oil prices reaching approximately $74 per barrel, Iran provides a discount of about $12 per barrel to Chinese refineries. This results in an approximate loss of 30% of Iran’s oil export revenues due to sanctions evasion and discounted sales to Chinese refineries.
As a consequence, not only is it improbable that the targeted volume of oil exports will be achieved in the budget for the next fiscal year, but attaining the predicted price for Iran's oil exports is also unlikely. Essentially, the government is expected to confront a significant budget deficit in the upcoming year. The International Monetary Fund has forecasted that, to prevent an Iranian budget deficit for the next fiscal year, global oil prices would need to surpass $317 per barrel.
Dr. Umud Shokri, Energy Strategist and Senior Visiting Fellow at George Mason University