Senior visiting fellow, George Mason University
Iran has significantly increased the consumption of Mazut, a dirty fuel, in cement factories, despite widespread warnings and criticisms of its use in power plants.
Ali-Akbar Alvandian, the secretary of the Association of Employers of the Cement Industry in Iran, has reported a several-fold increase in Mazut consumption in cement factories.
Alvandian informed ILNA news agency on January 12 that the gas consumption of the country's cement factories has decreased to 6 million cubic meters per day in winter, while their usual daily consumption stands at 27 million cubic meters. He revealed that 70% of the country's cement production now relies on Mazut fuel.
Iran faces a significant natural gas shortage during the winter, leading to the utilization of the highly polluting Mazut as an alternative fuel. While one liter of Mazut can replace one cubic meter of gas, its pollution levels are substantially higher than those of natural gas.
According to the Environment Agency of the German government as well as US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the direct CO2 emissions of Mazut (fuel oil) are 33% higher than natural gas. Iran’s Mazut also contains 3.5% sulfur, which is approximately seven times higher than the required standards for ship fuel, making it far more pollutant than natural gas.
Alvandian continued, mentioning that factories located away from urban areas use Mazut as an alternative fuel, but factories near cities have excluded furnaces have reduced its use.
He further disclosed that, on a general scale, 70 percent of the country's cement production now relies on Mazut fuel. Given the daily gas requirement of 27 million cubic meters for cement factories across the country, the current delivery of six million cubic meters per day combined with the production of 70 percent of the country's cement using Mazut, indicates that approximately 13 million liters of Mazut are used daily in Iran's cement production.
A document from the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC), obtained by Iran International, reveals that Iran uses Mazut in cement factories even during the warm seasons. According to this document, the average gas delivery to cement factories during the summer was around 20 million liters per day, indicating that the sector used roughly 7 million liters of Mazut daily at full capacity.
Iran is currently grappling with a gas shortage not only in the cold seasons but also in spring and summer, leading to the utilization of Mazut as a fuel source.
Another document from the Ministry of Oil illustrates that Iran consumed 19 million liters of Mazut daily in industries and power plants during the spring and summer of the previous year. Mazut consumption in these sectors surges to 45 million liters per day in winter, with daily diesel consumption increasing by 10 million liters from summer to winter, reaching 127 million liters. This increase is attributed to a higher substitution of diesel with natural gas in the power and industrial sectors.
Alvandian has noted that the cost of cement production with Mazut is higher than the cost of production with gas, posing a dilemma for cement factories in the eastern part of the country that have switched to Mazut. He mentioned, "Cement factories are forced to source their required Mazut from the Rey and Tehran oil storage facilities, and the cost of transporting Mazut from Tehran to the eastern provinces is added to the production cost of these units."
Despite the country not experiencing the same level of cold as the previous year, gas consumption for domestic households remains unchanged compared to last year, making restrictions on gas supply to industries, including cement factories, inevitable, according to officials.
Statistics from the National Iranian Gas Company reveal that on Friday, January 12, the breakdown of gas consumption was as follows: the household sector consumed 385 million cubic meters, the transportation sector consumed 27.5 million cubic meters, the public and commercial sector consumed 60.5 million cubic meters, the agricultural sector consumed 27.5 million cubic meters, and the small industries sector consumed 60.5 million cubic meters. In total, these sectors accounted for 550 million cubic meters of gas consumption, which is 3.3 times higher than summer consumption.
The substantial increase in gas consumption in these sectors has compelled the government to significantly reduce gas supply to major industries, including cement, steel, petrochemicals, and others.
A document from the National Petrochemical Company indicates that Iran's petrochemical production capacity was 91.5 million tons last year. However, due to gas shortages in the fall and winter, as well as power outages in the summer, only two-thirds of this capacity was operational, resulting in actual petrochemical production in the country totaling only 59.7 million tons.
In a related context, Mehdi Mahdavi Abhari, the Secretary-General of the Petrochemical Employers Association, announced last week that Iran lost $800 million in petrochemical exports due to gas supply shortages last year.
The document from the National Gas Company reveals that during the summer, nearly 70 million cubic meters of gas were supplied daily to petrochemical plants, 20 million cubic meters to cement factories, 36.5 million cubic meters to steel mills, and 17.7 million cubic meters to refineries. In total, during the summer, 145.5 million cubic meters of gas were delivered to the country's major industries. However, on January 12 this year, this figure decreased to 110 million cubic meters.
Although Iran's winter is still relatively mild, last year, on some days, gas consumption in the residential, commercial, and small industrial sectors in Iran had reached nearly 650 million cubic meters. This resulted in Iran facing a daily gas deficit of 250 million cubic meters last winter.
Contrary to what has been presented so far in the discussion on succession after Ali Khamenei, this article will not speculate about the time of his death, the identity of his successor, power struggles between the clerics and the IRGC, or the role of China, Russia, and the West in the matter. Instead, we will delve into the decision-making process. Presenting two sets of facts concerning the background of power transfer from Khomeini to Khamenei and from Khamenei to the next leader, should the regime remain intact.
1989: Smooth Transition
After Khomeini's death, the succession process unfolded relatively smoothly, devoid of tension, and can be attributed to five key factors. Firstly, the presence of an influential figure like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who held sway among middle, left, and right-wing officials within the system, played a pivotal role. Rafsanjani was essentially a ‘kingmaker’ who not only influenced Khamenei's ascent to power with his unverifiable narratives but also held sway over numerous pivotal institutions, from parliament and the executive branch to state media, the police force, IRGC, and the Ministry of Information.
Secondly, a five-member board comprised of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Abdul Karim Mousavi Ardebili, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ali Khamenei, and Ahmad Khomeini made critical decisions during Khomeini's illness, exercising comprehensive control over all centers of power. This board effectively prevented marginal power centers from gaining influence, holding the reins of coercive powers after the removal of Hossein Ali Montazeri and his supporters from key positions. Montazeri had been Khamenei’s designated successor who had fallen out of favor before the leader’s death.
Among second-tier officials, there existed dozens of relatively influential figures aligned with different political factions, including Ali Meshkini, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, and Ahmad Azari Qomi on the right, and Jalaluddin Taheri, Yusuf Sanei, and Mohammad Mousavi Khoiniha on the left. Political groups were attentive to their advice, which mitigated concerns within security and military institutions regarding infighting. Additionally, only a minimal number of Islamist figures were subjected to persecution, torture, or harassment by the regime, which limited internal opposition to the new leader.
The absence of any significant social movement in the post-war period left the regime with ample latitude to designate the next leader. Consequently, both Khomeini's funeral and the Experts Assembly session that elected Khamenei, unfolded without societal tension or challenges. While the populace might not have been content with the status quo, the absence of a sizable opposing movement or dissenting voices was notable.
Furthermore, the tranquil security and political landscape in the region after the Iran-Iraq war, combined with the relative weakening of the Iranian navy by the US in the southern waters, contributed to the smooth transition of power. There was a notable absence of perceived foreign threats to the regime.
Turbulent Transition
After Khamenei's passing, the situation will not be as peaceful as before, as none of the five conditions mentioned earlier will apply. Instead, the opposite circumstances are in place. There is no one within Ali Khamenei's inner circle who possesses the stature, power, and influence of Hashemi Rafsanjani, capable of assuming the role of a "king-maker." Rafsanjani's absence poses a greater threat to the system than his presence would have. In totalitarian systems, individuals often play a more significant role compared to institutions.
Khamenei's close associates, such as the head of his office, the president, or the head of the Expediency Council, are more disliked among the people and political figures than Khamenei himself. Even cabinet members and lawmakers view them with disdain. The removal of Qasem Soleimani by President Donald Trump in 2020 had a considerable impact, as Soleimani could have been such a kingmaker. Even the reformists praised him for his role in advancing their agenda and did not consider him an adversary.
Khamenei has transferred power primarily to IRGC commanders but has consistently rotated them, preventing any one of them from developing significant influence. Figures like Hossein Salami, the commander of the IRGC, and Esmail Qaani, the commander of the Quds Force, are not taken seriously by most. Beyond the upper echelon, there is no alternative power center capable of leading state affairs. Various power centers on the periphery, in the form of factions and dormant assets, could be rapidly mobilized.
Former high-ranking officials have been either isolated or eliminated, losing their previous support base. They have been marginalized to the point of becoming detested by insiders. The well-know influencers within the regime are now the preachers, eulogists, and Basij members, all unpopular among the public. There is a lack of charismatic political figures.
In 2024, numerous political and social movements are active and prepared to exploit any power vacuum. Hundreds of thousands of young individuals, suppressed during the Mahsa movement, and families who have lost loved ones may take to the streets under the right conditions. However, the government has become more repressive and brutal. The next confrontation between the opposition and the government will likely result in more casualties on both sides. Society is in turmoil due to the regime's oppression and abuses, making it unlikely for the government to rely on silence and social passivity during the succession process.
The regime's interventions across the Middle East have led regional countries to view the Islamic Republic as a threat and welcome any domestic instability and turmoil in Iran. When Israel can remove nuclear and military officials openly and steal nuclear documents without significant repercussions, it is evident that more significant actions can be taken in a chaotic situation.
For these five reasons, there is no one to jump-start the leadership "junk car" in the event of a jurist guardian's death, allowing the next jurist guardian to seize the steering wheel. In such a situation, those seeking control will likely have to engage in internal power struggles.
Despite the limited number of leadership candidates backed by influential factions, there are imminent violent clashes between these factions for three key reasons: