Khamenei's Nuclear Fatwa: A Fiction From The Start
Analysis: For two decades, Iran's Supreme Leader's "nuclear fatwa" has served as a shield for Tehran's denial of nuclear weapon ambitions. But how trustworthy can this fatwa really be?
Analysis: For two decades, Iran's Supreme Leader's "nuclear fatwa" has served as a shield for Tehran's denial of nuclear weapon ambitions. But how trustworthy can this fatwa really be?
"According to the [Supreme] Leader’s opinion, going in this direction [making the atomic bomb] is now forbidden, because he is a mujtahid [religious scholar]; maybe he will change [his opinion] tomorrow," Shahid Beheshti University President Mahmood-Reza Aghamiri said recently in an interview.
The nuclear engineer went on to posit that if Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s “opinion” changed – Iran would indeed have the capacity to build a nuclear weapon.
Amidst the ongoing tensions between the regime and Israel, following the killing of seven members of the IRGC’s Quds Force in Damascus and the subsequent pressure from anti-Israeli Islamists on Tehran to respond, the raising of the fatwa has heightened concerns regionally and internationally about the potential spread of war.
Contrary to widespread perception, a fatwa itself is not a legal document – but, an advisory opinion on Islamic law offered by a high-ranking cleric. It is not set in stone and can be changed at any time.
But nonetheless, when examining Khamenei's "nuclear fatwa", three questions have remained unanswered for public opinion from the outset: Was the opinion expressed by Khamenei really a fatwa? Is Ali Khamenei in the position of issuing fatwas? And, how and for what purpose was this opinion sold to the global community under the title of a fatwa?
Fatwa, opinion or statement?
His statement to the nuclear disarmament conference on April 10, 2010, was presented as Khamenei's "nuclear fatwa". Typically, heads of state issue statements or messages to conferences, not fatwas. The content of this message bears no resemblance to the fatwas issued by Shia jurists throughout history. Khamenei's statement opens with "we believe," a phrase not traditionally used by Islamic jurists to begin their fatwas. It reads:
"We believe that besides nuclear weapons, other types of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and biological weapons also pose a serious threat to humanity. The Iranian nation … feels more than any other nation the danger that is caused by the production and stockpiling of such weapons… We consider the use of such weapons as haram [forbidden] and believe that everyone must make efforts to secure humanity against this great disaster.”
Shia jurists do not include public opinions within the text of a fatwa. In the Shia jurisprudence tradition, jurists typically also do not provide reasons for their fatwas within the body of the text itself, contrasting with Khamenei's approach of arguing for his opinion in this statement. It is also in contrast with other fatwas, given the rarity of fatwas issued on this particular topic. Integrating this opinion into any of the 52 chapters of Shia jurisprudence, as outlined in classical Shia texts, proves difficult.
Mufti or leader?
Before and after becoming the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei never held the authoritative position required to issue fatwas. His appointment to the leadership by the Assembly of Experts occurred in the absence of a high-ranking mujtahid knowledgeable in governance – indeed, he was not a source of emulation.
For this very reason, the constitution was revised (Article 5) so that a non-mufti can also become a leader. At the time, one of the prominent Shia jurists in Qom, Hossein Ali Montazeri rejected him being a mufti: "He [Khamenei] is not at the level of religious authority; he has no right to issue a fatwa." Some religious organizations in Qom have similarly rejected his position as a mufti.
The history of this “fatwa”
In 2003, at the onset of Iran's nuclear crisis, Khamenei first declared the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons as forbidden. Six years later, during a more complex phase of this crisis in February 2008, he reiterated this prohibition in a public speech.
The statement, which was presented as Khamenei's fatwa, was drawn from earlier documents and released during a period of increased global scrutiny for Tehran. This occurred as the international community focused on revelations concerning diverse aspects of Iran's nuclear program, leading the UN Security Council to pass successive resolutions against it. Between 2006 and 2010, six sanctions resolutions targeting Tehran's nuclear endeavors were enacted, and Khamenei's purported fatwa was released in 2010 amidst this backdrop.
Framing this opinion as a fatwa aimed to alleviate pressure by invoking religious beliefs that would persuade the audience of its credibility. Of course, the international community had not yet fully understood the blurred lines between religious and political leadership in Iran, with some viewing Khamenei as the country's spiritual leader.
This fatwa also pursued two other goals: to make the nuclear program appear peaceful, which was doubted by the international community, and to provide legitimacy for the project of building the Islamic Empire, of which nuclearization was considered an integral part.
The authorities even tried to formalize this fake fatwa by incorporating it into a United Nations resolution. By presenting Khamenei's opinion as a fatwa, the orchestrators showed deep insight into international dynamics. Aware of the pressures on Iran, they aimed to lessen these by strategically blending religious rhetoric with political maneuvers, targeting global perceptions and responses to Iran's nuclear ambitions.
The market for this fatwa
Initially, this alleged fatwa did not garner significant attention from the media and Western politicians. However, from 2013 to 2015, during the JCPOA negotiations, it was frequently cited and mentioned by the media, think tanks, and American officials.
The book "The Undisclosed Secret" by former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and colleagues about the nuclear negotiations reveals in various sections how the Iranian negotiating team leveraged this fatwa to steer the JCPOA in their favor.
This is what US Secretary of State John Kerry said about the fake fatwa in 2014, showing a degree of naiveté on the issue :
“I have great respect for a fatwa. A fatwa is a very highly regarded message of religious importance. And when any fatwa is issued, I think people take it seriously, and so do we, even though it's not our practice. But we have great respect for what it means… the art, the requirement here, is to translate the fatwa into a legally binding, globally recognized, international understanding. … President Obama and I both are extremely welcoming and grateful for the fact that the supreme leader has issued a fatwa”
Thus, the embassies and offices of the Islamic Republic abroad, particularly the representative office in New York, which has focused on building a lobby over the last two decades, have played an undeniable role in the production, distribution, and promotion of the Supreme Leader’s opinion as a fatwa.
Speculations are arising amidst calls from Iranian hardliners for a rapid and decisive reaction to the Israeli strike on April 1, targeting the Islamic Republic's Consulate in Damascus, resulting in the deaths of two top IRGC Quds Force generals and five other officers.
Meanwhile, Iranian officials and military commanders have maintained their stance that Iran will retaliate at a time of its choosing.
Conversely, reports in some Arab media outlets suggest that Iran might refrain from seeking revenge on Israel if Tel Aviv backs away from the notion of attacking Rafah in its conflict with Hamas.
In an editorial on April 8, Masih Mohajeri, the influential managing editor of Jomhouri Eslami daily, a newspaper that was founded by Ali Khamenei in 1979, asked: "Why Russia, which controls the Syrian airspace does not prevent air strikes on Iranian targets in Syria?" Also implicating Syria and possibly Iranian infiltrators in tipping off the Israelis, Mohajeri wrote: "We have had too many losses in Syria during the past months and this is certainly because of the treason by infiltrators."
Since December, Israel has eliminated 18 high ranking IRGC officers in Syria, in what appears to be a systematic campaign to limit the danger of Iranian proxies on its borders. Almost all the IRGC generals and officers stationed in Syria and Lebanon are tasked with directing and coordinating a mixture of Afghan, Iraqi, Syria and Lebanese proxy forces.
"We had warned about this repeatedly during the past months, but no one seems to have heard the warnings. Have Iranian officials ever asked themselves why such attacks never take place against Russian forces in Syria and why Russia's advanced air defense does not prevent Israel's crimes against Iran?"Jomhouri Eslami wrote.
The editorial emphasized that slogans like "replacing fallen officers with fresh blood" overlook the significant investment Iran has made in the expertise, skill, and efficiency of the highly trained officers who were lost. The publication highlighted Iran's robust intelligence and security capabilities, suggesting that these assets should be utilized to prevent such tragic losses in the future.
Advocating for a comprehensive review of Iran's security apparatus, the editorial posed critical questions: "Instead of boasting after each attack, why not prioritize preventive measures? Isn't it time to reassess our security posture?"
Meanwhile on social media, Ehsan Arian, an Iranian who appears to be an opposition activist with more than 23k followers, wrote more clearly about Syria's possible role in tipping off the Israelis. Arian wrote that it was clear since 2019 that Bashar al-Assad was simply tolerating the IRGC Qods Force's presence in Syria rather than welcoming it.
He suggested that Iranian security agencies have briefed the Supreme Council of National Security about the involvement of Syrian insiders and certain elements within the Iranian regime in the Israeli airstrikes targeting Iranian commanders and military advisers in Syria.
Iran had previously urged Syria to conduct a joint investigation into this matter following the killing of Seyed Razi Musavi in December. However, it seems that Iran has discovered that Syria's Intelligence organization and Presidential Guards impeded the investigation, as stated in the tweet from April 9.
The lengthy tweet continued to assert that subsequently, Iran and Hezbollah conducted a separate investigation, which revealed the involvement of Iranian infiltrators and Syrian agents. If these reports are confirmed, it is unlikely that Bashar Assad was unaware of them.
The tweet, however, did not dismiss the potential role of Russian forces collaborating with Syrian officers. Hezbollah acknowledges that many of its members killed in Israeli airstrikes since October 7 had some form of contact with Russian and Syrian intelligence, according to the tweet.
Other reports on social media also say Syrian officers who wish Iran to leave Syria give away the whereabouts of Iranian officers to Israelis.
Niloufar Bayani and Houman Jowkar’s release from Tehran’s Evin Prison Monday was followed by the release of two others, Sepideh Kashani and Taher Ghadiriyan, on Tuesday.
However, many Iranians expressed outrage on social media that these individuals were jailed and tortured for six years as spies and then pardoned. If they were spies, why the government released them, they asked.
In total eight members of the Persian World Heritage Foundation (PWHF) -- were arrested by the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) Intelligence Organization (SAS) during moderate President Hasan Rouhani’s second term in January and February 2018.
Three of the remaining members of the group – Sam Rajabi, Amir-Hossein Khaleghi and Abdolreza Kouhpayeh – had been released from prison before after serving their sentences. Another member, Morad Tahbaz, a co-founder of PWHF who had the citizenship of both the United States and Britain besides his Iranian citizenship, was believed to be held hostage as leverage in deals with the US. He was freed during a prisoner exchange with the United States in September 2023.
PWHF, an NGO dedicated to the conservation of wildlife in Iran, was founded by Iranian-Canadian Professor Kavous Seyed-Emami, who was also arrested. Two weeks after his arrest, however, his family was told he had committed suicide in his cell at the age of 63.
Tehran Prosecutor Jafari-Dolatabadi in February 2018 claimed the detainees had collected sensitive information on Iran's missile bases for the CIA and Mossad under the guise of environmental conservation activities such as installation of wildlife monitoring cameras. Based on interrogations by SAS, they were accused of espionage.
“But considering the existence of satellites and spying systems around Iran and in its skies the question arises as to why anyone would use cameras for spying. What danger or problems could that cause!?” a conservative newspaper, Farhikhtegan, asked after the announcement that the environmentalists were pardoned.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, members of the European Parliament, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International repeatedly urged Iran to release the environmentalists from prison at the time.
Vice-President and Head of the Department of Environment, Isa Kalantari, said at the time that his department and the Intelligence Ministry had investigated the matter and had found no evidence of spying in the activities of the environmentalists.
Speaking to Iran International after Bayani and Jowkar’s release from prison Monday, Kaveh Madani, Director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, also attributed the IRGC’s arrest of the environmentalists to the conflicts between the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization and the Ministry of Intelligence and the former’s schemes against officials of the Rouhani administration.
“It is not easy to explain why they are being freed at this particular time,” Madani added.
At least five of the environmentalists, who were sentenced from four to ten-years in prison in February 2020 after secret trials, went on hunger strike during their imprisonment. Most of them were held in complete isolation, for as long as nine months in Bayani’s case. They often did not even have access to their court-appointed attorneys.
The environmentalists were tortured to agree to ‘confessions’ scripted by interrogators. Two of the accused – Tahbaz and Bayani – made confessions against themselves and others but both retracted their confessions later.
In letters smuggled out of prison Bayani alleged psychological torture including threats of rape. Her letters, first made public by the BBC’s Persian Service, included a claim she was shown torture equipment and syringes that interrogators said could paralyze or kill her.
The lawyer representing Kashani, said his client had faced similar treatment. Kashani’s husband and co-defendant Houman Jowkar, was said to have been brutally beaten and then paraded in front of her covered in blood. Jowkar sustained serious injuries, including a broken head and injuries to his face when his glasses were smashed onto his face.
A source who spoke to Iran International in June 2022 said IRGC interrogators had secretly filmed Tara Tahbaz, the daughter of Morad Tahbaz, at a café in New York and shown it to him in prison in 2018, threatening to kill Tara if her father did not agree to accept the scripted confessions. They also contacted Tara and made threats against her.