Employee of Tehran's Interests Section in US Threatens Iranian-American

Shamkhani is an old-guard military figure who served as the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council until last year. In that role, he oversaw negotiations to mend relations with Saudi Arabia. This background lends credibility to reports that Khamenei has chosen him to handle the nuclear issue, prompting significant reactions.

On Tuesday, however, several Iran-based news websites rehashed an interview from two weeks ago, in which Mahmoud Vaezi, the chief of staff to former President Hassan Rouhani, suggests Shamkhani was against the idea of reviving the JCPOA nuclear agreement, after it was ditched by Donald Trump.

"[Iran’s] Supreme National Security Council Secretariat during Shamkhani's term took a line of non-revival,” Vaezi says in his interview. “If the secretariat had been aligned [with Rouhani’s administration], the nuclear deal would have been revived at that time."

The reason why some outlets in Iran have highlighted this line from Vaezi’s interview remains unclear. It could be an effort by those in favor of a deal—and closer cooperation with the US in general—to undermine Shamkhani before his official announcement in the new role. Alternatively, if the appointment is already finalized, it might be an attempt to put Shamkhani on the defensive from the start. Either way, this appears to be another instance of factional politics that ultimately reinforces Khamenei's position as the ultimate arbiter.

Khamenei has the final say on all matters of security, intelligence and foreign policy. Many view his key appointments as windows into his thinking and an indicator of the direction that Iran would most likely take in the short to medium term. Those opposed to Khameni’s choice of direction can do little but to shoot the messengers –high ranking officials whose role is the implementation of policies developed in Khamenei's office, and who, more often than not, are where they are by virtue of their subservience.

Vaezi’s interview provides a glimpse of this factionalism and the dynamics of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"Some individuals and the secretary in the secretariat adopted different methods. Some pursued policies that were not even discussed in the council meetings,” he says of the alleged disruptive impact of Shamkhani and his team during the negotiations to revive the nuclear agreement with the Biden administration. “As far as the nuclear deal is concerned, they had a line that it should not happen. They didn’t say it explicitly, but their behavior indicated this."

Vaezi then reveals why the situation could not have been rectified, why, in other words, it was out of President Rouhani’s hands.

“To replace the Secretary, there has to be an agreement between the President and the Supreme Leader,” he says in the interview. “That agreement didn't come about. Mr. Rouhani tried several times, about 5-6 times during his four years [second term]."

The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seem to have halted following the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister on May 19 when their helicopter crashed. But rumors persist –just as they have on a number of occasions in the past few years– that back-channel, indirect talks are underway between Iran and the US.

Shamkhani’s appointment as the 'chief negotiator' has yet to be officially confirmed. If and when it is, it will be significant primarily for what it reveals about the intentions of the true chief negotiator, Ali Khamenei.

Before the internal election, the prevailing assumption in the Iranian political landscape was that Ghalibaf had around 70 supporters in Parliament. This was 30 fewer than the ultra-conservative Paydari Party, which backed Qom MP Mojtaba Zolnour in the election for Speaker and the presidium.

This turned out to be not accurate as Ghalibaf won 198 votes out of a total of 290. Whatever the true number of Ghalibaf and Paydari's supporters are at the Majles, the group loosely characterized as "independents" is now better known to have a real weight in the legislature.

This group can potentially swing either way when it comes to the ratification of bills, which will only become law after endorsement by the conservative-dominated Guardian Council. However, this flexibility will remain only until the "independents," or a significant portion of them, form a new faction with predefined political preferences. 

Meanwhile, the results revealed that traditional conservatives, once considered a major force in parliament, wielded little political influence. Their representative, former foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki, received only 5 votes, one of which was certainly his own. This outcome was a surprising and disgraceful blow to their perceived strength.

In the previous parliament, traditional conservatives had 11 members and were believed to have the capacity to garner support for their proposals. However, they failed to present any new ideas and merely followed the hardliners in their efforts to crack down on women's hijab and social media.

Ghalibaf won the Speaker's seat despite widespread smear campaigns by his political rivals and the public's dissatisfaction over his inefficiency in the previous parliament. It remains unclear whether his re-election was influenced by "political decisions from higher up," as many politicians have speculated about the support for Ghalibaf from Khamenei's inner circle.

According to the Khabar Online website, Ghalibaf can now begin his presidential campaign, confident in the safety net provided by his position in the Majles in case his presidential ambitions do not materialize.

He participated in the internal election of the Majles despite numerous calls from lawmakers for him to step back and choose between the presidential race and the competition for the Speaker's seat. However, Ghalibaf opted to continue campaigning on both fronts. In a last-minute shift, Ghalibaf, who had been forging an alliance with the Paydari faction based on trading concessions as in the previous round, instead formed an alliance with the "independents."

Not only this new idea worked, but it gave new leverage to the "independents" as a parliamentary force to be reckoned with. This is particularly important as the "independents" officially declared their support for Ghalibaf minutes before the vote.

Another significance of the election on Tuesday is in the vast difference between the number of votes won by Ghalibaf and his Paydari Party rival Zolnour. Whether Ghalibaf can effectively benefit from this edge during the next four years is another story.

There were 24 void votes, which represented the "independents" who did not support any of the three candidates.

The two deputy speakers came from Paydari, Ali Nikzad with 142 votes, and Haji Babaei with 154. However, although members of the presidium are not known to exert any influence on the proceedings of the Majles, according to Khabar Online, Ghalibaf's supporters have the upper hand in the presidium.

Julian Röpke, a military analyst for the German news outlet Bild, reported that the wreckage of an Iranian Mohajer-6 drone was discovered after an apparent crash on Sunday. 

Analysis of video footage from the site revealed that the drone was armed with a Qaem-5 guided bomb, a recent development in Iranian weapons technology. The incident represents the first documented use of the weapon in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 

The Mohajer-6, primarily used by Russian forces for aerial surveillance, is believed to have been en route to the Sumy region for an attack before its unexpected crash, the cause of which remains unclear.

The Qaem-5 is part of a broader series of air-to-ground munitions designed specifically for compatibility with Iranian UAVs like the Mohajer-6 and Hamaseh. These bombs come in various forms, including laser-guided and infrared variants, with the Qaem-5 and Qaem-9 employing TV guidance systems that may also feature low-light capabilities.

Iran's Qods Aviation Industries manufactures the Mohajer-6, which has been in mass production since 2018 and is noted for its export success. The drone has a wingspan of 10 meters and is powered by either a Rotax engine or an indigenous variant, boasting capabilities suited for both reconnaissance and combat roles.

The event underscores the deepening military ties between Tehran and Moscow, evidenced by the transfer of weapons systems including kamikaze drones and now, potentially, ballistic missiles.

International concern has grown over Iran's role in bolstering Russia's military operations in Ukraine. Since mid-2022, Iran has provided Russia with over a thousand Shahed UAVs, which have been extensively used to target civilian areas and infrastructure across Ukraine. 

Abdolreza Abed, the commander of IRGC’s construction and business conglomerate, Khatam al Anbiya, challenged Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti claims that the field, off Kuwait’s coast, is within their territorial waters. Abed said that “Iran's entry into the Arash field is more essential than daily bread.”

He added, “The lack of determination and will to utilize Iran's gas resources in the Arash field has allowed neighboring countries like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to start extracting from this field, while we in Iran watch them, waiting to see when a decision will be made for Iran's presence in the Arash field.“

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have invited the Islamic Republic to negotiate over their territorial borders in the region.

The two Arab countries agreed in 2022 to jointly develop the field, which was discovered in 1967 and is estimated to have a total proven reserves of around 310 million barrels of oil and 20 trillion cubic feet of gas.

Saudi Aramco Gulf Operations Company signed a Memorandum of Understanding in December 2022 with Kuwait Gulf Oil Company (KGOC) to develop the joint field.

The development aims at producing one billion cubic feet of gas and 84,000 barrels of liquefied gas per day. The Arab countries call the field Al Durra, while Iran calls it the Arash Field.

In the dispute that dates back several decades, Iran claims any development without its consent breaks international laws, saying that 40 percent of the field is located in its territorial waters.

Here are some key figures likely to compete in the elections, pending approval by the Guardian Council, an unelected body filled with loyalists of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Saeed Jalili

On Sunday, the office of the 67-year-old hardliner announced his intention to run for the presidency. The former nuclear negotiator, who previously (and unsuccessfully) ran in 2013 against Hassan Rouhani and again in 2021 before withdrawing in favor of Raisi, formed a "shadow government" after his 2013 defeat. He maintained this "shadow government" under Raisi, where he is believed to have wielded significant influence.

Since 2008, Jalili has represented Khamenei in the Supreme National Security Council, where he was secretary from 2007 to 2013 under President Ahmadinejad. Many Iranians believe he is responsible for the failure of the 2015 nuclear deal with the West and the subsequent international sanctions.

Jalili is a devoted disciple of the late Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, whose ultra-hardliner followers wield significant influence in the parliament, Raisi's administration, and the state broadcaster (IRIB). Although he does not publicly support any political party, he is widely believed to align with the ultra-hardliner Paydari (Steadfastness) Party.

Jalili has close ties with Jebhe-ye Sobh-e Iran (Iran Morning Front), led by the controversial Ali-Akbar Raefipour, popular among ultra-hardliner youth. The group, which describes itself as "anti-Zionism, humanism, and FreeMasonry," is known for its corruption revelations against Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and his allies.

In 2021, Jalili proposed "The One Plan" to distribute energy subsidies equally to all Iranians, regardless of income, instead of the current income-based cash subsidies. He introduced the "One" unit, which could be used to buy fuel or electricity, and argued that it would allow individuals to sell saved units at any price or treat them as investments. The plan has not been implemented.

His supporters praise him as a "champion of transparency" and an anti-corruption politician with a simple lifestyle.

Masoud Pezeshkian

The ‘reformist’ lawmaker from Tabriz, East Azerbaijan's capital, announced his decision to run on Sunday. He previously registered for the presidency in 2013 but withdrew and registered again in 2020, only to be disqualified by the Guardian Council.

He claims that various people informed him he would not have been allowed to run in the March parliamentary elections without Khamenei's recommendation for approval, though he is uncertain about this.

Pezeshkian, one of the few tolerated reformists, served as health minister under Mohammad Khatami and as first deputy speaker of parliament from 2016 to 2020. The 70-year-old heart surgeon is popular in his constituency, where he has been repeatedly elected since 2008.

Pezeshkian's popularity in his constituency partly stems from his support for teaching Turki, the Turkic language spoken in his province and several others, in schools.

He occasionally criticizes authorities for extreme measures against women regarding hijab and protesters. At the time of his registration, he stated that his candidacy aimed to “increase voter turnout.”

Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf

This week, Ghalibaf won nearly 70% of the vote, defeating the ultra-hardliner Paydari Party’s Mojtaba Zolnuri (Zolnouri) and pragmatist conservative Manouchehr Mottaki, leading to his reinstatement as Speaker of the Parliament.

Ghalibaf came fourth in the March 1 parliamentary elections in Tehran, with his support for speakership dropping by 16% compared to four years ago. His win on Tuesday, however, may embolden him to run for the presidency. This victory ensures he can return to parliament and retain the speakership if he does not become president.

A perennial candidate, Ghalibaf ran unsuccessfully in the 2005 presidential election (won by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), came second to Hassan Rouhani in 2013, and withdrew in favor of Ebrahim Raisi in 2017 (Rouhani won again). He was reportedly supported by the slain IRGC Qods Force commander, Ghasem Soleimani.

The 63-year-old politician and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) commander, police chief and mayor of Tehran and his immediate family and his allies have been accused of a host of corruption, particularly by ultra-hardliners.

Ali Larijani

"Let's see what happens," said 66-year-old moderate conservative Ali Larijani, former Parliament Speaker, when asked about his intention to run on Monday. He is believed to be seeking assurances from the Supreme Leader that he will not be disqualified again.

Larijani, an insider for many years without political party affiliation, was a top figure in the Islamist political right, known as the Principlist camp. Khamenei appointed him to several high positions, including chief of the state broadcaster (IRIB) and various state councils. He served as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and Iran's top nuclear negotiator from 2005 to 2007. Currently, he is a member of the Expediency Council and an adviser to Khamenei.

Larijani was barred by the Guardian Council from running against Ebrahim Raisi in 2021, allegedly because his daughter resided in the U.S. Before the elections, Khamenei called this disqualification an "injustice" without naming him, but did not reinstate Larijani through a state edict, as many had expected.

Larijani wrote a letter to Khamenei, thanking him for criticizing the disqualification and urging the Council to exonerate him. Despite Larijani's repeated demands for the Council to reveal the real reasons for his disqualification, this never happened.

Larijani has kept a low profile since then. Before the March parliamentary vote, ultra-hardliners spread a rumor that he was trying to lead an electoral block. In a brief letter, he refuted this, stating they could not "create fake rivalry" and interest in the elections through such rumors.

Hassan Rouhani

According to Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, former chairman of the parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, former moderate president Hassan Rouhani “may not be too reluctant” to run.

Rouhani has not yet commented on the snap elections or his decision to stand.

Twice president, the 75-year-old also served as secretary and chairman of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) for 24 years. In January, the Guardian Council barred him from running for the Assembly of Experts, where he had been a member since 1992.

Rouhani is closely associated with the 2015 nuclear deal, which initially received Khamenei’s blessing and aimed to establish direct talks with the United States. Hardliner opponents label the deal a "great treason."

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Ahmadinejad, 63, has recently increased his public appearances but speaks cautiously about running. He states that his candidacy requires “comprehensive investigations” due to the “particular sensitivities” involved, possibly referring to his need for assurances that he won't be disqualified as he was in 2017.

Twice in the past few days, social media accounts representing Ahmadinejad have posted videos of him outside his house in eastern Tehran, speaking to supporters who "insist" he should run for president again. If approved, his candidacy could potentially increase voter turnout.

In February, Ahmadinejad’s former adviser Abbas Amirifar stated that Ahmadinejad was considering a 2025 presidential run but noted he would likely be disqualified by the Guardian Council if he registered.

Ahmadinejad dramatically fell out of Khamenei’s favor in 2011 after quitting work for eleven days in protest of Khamenei reinstating interior minister Heydar Moslehi, whom Ahmadinejad had fired. This led to Ahmadinejad and his supporters being harshly labeled the “deviant current” by Khamenei loyalists, who also accused him of "turning secular."

Ebrahim Raisi employed several of Ahmadinejad’s former allies in his cabinet, including Ahmad Vahidi (Interior Minister), Hossein Amir-Abdollahian (Foreign Affairs Minister), Javad Owji (Oil Minister), and Mehrdad Bazrpash (Minister of Roads and Urban Development). Bazrpash is also believed to be aspiring for the presidency.

Ahmadinejad and his core supporters are known for their own version of the apocalyptic Shia cult of the 12th Imam, Mahdi, believed to be in occultation by divine will since 941 CE.

The controversial former president, known for his Holocaust denial and enmity with Israel, has so far remained silent on the Gaza-Israel war and Iran’s own nationwide Woman, Life, Freedom protests of 2022-2023.

Ahmadinejad and his supporters are known for ruthless "revelations" against rivals. Many believe he holds corruption evidence against the ruling establishment, which he uses to intimidate authorities into tolerating him.

Sadegh Mahsouli

On Monday, the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency claimed that Sadegh Mahsouli, secretary general of the ultra-hardliner Paydari Party, has decided to run in the snap elections.

Mahsouli, a former IRGC officer and business tycoon, served in then-President Ahmadinejad’s cabinet as Minister of Interior and Minister of Welfare and Social Security. Once a close ally of the former president, Mahsouli distanced himself after Ahmadinejad's falling out with Khamenei.

While maintaining a rather low profile, Mahsouli's party extends its influence across government institutions, including President Raisi's administration. Its members, forming a significant minority in parliament, often lead amid the limited presence of established conservative and reformist parties.

Mahsouli's party faced a significant defeat in the parliamentary speakership vote on Tuesday, with its candidate, Mojtaba Zolnuri, receiving only 20% of lawmakers' votes compared to Ghalibaf's 70%.

Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi

Mohammad-Javad Azari-Jahromi, former Communications Minister under moderate Hassan Rouhani, has neither confirmed nor denied intentions to run.

On Monday, the 43-year-old stated that he wouldn't feel obligated to run if “worthy people with the ability of running the country [efficiently] enter the election scene”, while adding that people should feel personally “prepared” to run for the office.

Azari-Jahromi, an electrical engineer, dubbed the "Young Minister," advocates for fast internet access for all Iranians, free internet for students, expanded bandwidth, and lifting bans on social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Telegram, and Instagram.

Yet, many hold him responsible for the Islamic Republic’s repressive internet censorship and disruption of internet connectivity during the 2019 anti-government protests. He was designated by the US Treasury in November of the same year.