Malley May Have Shared Documents with Unauthorized Individuals

Azar Mansouri, the current head of the Reforms Front and secretary general of the Union of Islamic Iran People’s Party (Etehad-e Mellat-e Iran-e Eslami), indicated in a tweet on Tuesday that reformists are expecting clear signals from the authorities that the elections will be fair, free, competitive, meaningful, and effective. She added that is important to see if the “dominant will”, apparently referring to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, wishes “maximal participation” in the upcoming elections.

As Khamenei’s hardliner loyalists have barred others from competing in the last three national elections, voters have turned away from ballot boxes. Turnout has dropped to below 40 percent according to non-official estimates.

Reformists including former President Mohammad Khatami refused to vote in the March 1 elections of the Parliament and Assembly of Experts.

For the first time in his political career, Khatami not only refrained from voting in the parliament and Assembly of Experts elections, despite Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's repeated declarations that voting is a religious duty, but also defended his decision in solidarity with the majority of Iranians who are angry with the country's governance, in a speech to his advisors on March 6.

In the past few days, however, there have been indications that reformists are seriously considering a return to the ballot boxes if given adequate guarantees that their participation will not serve the ruling establishment and “heat the election oven” to “bake someone else’s bread”.

‘Reformists’ appear determined not to support any candidate outside their own camp in this election, unlike in 2013 and 2017 when they rallied around moderate conservative Hassan Rouhani.

In an editorial in the reformist Etemad newspaper Tuesday, prominent Reformist commentator Abbas Abdi maintained that the populace may be willing to vote again, after shunning the ballot in the past three elections, provided that they are given “a certain level of meaningful choice”.

Ali Shakouri-Rad, the former secretary general of the Etehad-e Mellat Party, has also said that his party has decided to encourage people to participate in the elections provided that a candidate endorsed by the Reforms Front, the umbrella ‘reformist’ coalition, is allowed to run.

Shakouri-Rad who represents his influential party in the Reforms Front said his party has endorsed Mohammad Sadr and Mohammadreza Zafarghandi as potential candidates to the reformists decision-making body.

Sadr, 73, is a nephew of the late Iranian-Lebanese Shia politician Musa al-Sadr and a diplomat. He was appointed as a member of the Expediency Council by Khamenei in 2017 and was reinstated by him in 2022. 

Sadr was one of the founding members of the Islamic Iranian Participation Party (IIPF) before 2009 and one of the most vocal critics of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy.

Sadr said Tuesday that the leader of the Reforms Front, former President Khatami, suggested to him to run but he has not yet made a decision.

Mohammadreza Zafarghandi, a former secretary-general of the non-profit Iran Medical Council, has been a vocal critic of hardliners and Ebrahim Raisi’s government. Zafarghandi is also one of the veteran members of the Islamic Association of the Iranian Medical Community. The association is part of the Reforms Front.

Since Tuesday, several figures including the ultra-hardliner Mayor of Tehran, Alireza Zakani, former President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s son Mohsen Hashemi who is a member of the centrist Servants of Construction (Kargozaran) Party have denied an intention to run.

However, Mehrdad Bazrpash, 45, a hardliner who once served as a member of populist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s “young advisers” during his tenure as mayor of Tehran, was named by Meysam Nadi, head of the election headquarters of the Strategic Network of Friends of the Islamic Revolution (Sharyaan), as one of the group’s “principal options”.

Iranian media such as Borna News claim Ali-Akbar Salehi, Iran's foreign minister under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and nuclear chief under Hassan Rouhani, has also indicated his interest in running for the presidency, although he will be over the maximum age (75) allowed by law to run by two months.

"The presidential election law does not provide for appeals against disqualifications, and the decision of the Guardian Council is final," Hadi Tahan Nazif stated Wednesday in a televised interview on the June 28 polls. 

He claimed that the rule is not unique to the upcoming snap election following the sudden death of Ebrahim Raisi this month, but is the standard procedure under normal circumstances as well.

Earlier this month, former President Hassan Rouhani criticized the Khamenei-appointed Guardian Council for undermining democracy and reducing the people's role in elections by vetoing candidates with opposing political views. 

"This is not a defense of myself, but the defense of the system's republican (and Islamic) foundations, a defense of the institution of presidency which as the direct representative of all Iranians should not be weakened any more than this," Rouhani wrote in an open letter. 

The former president, barred from running in the March 1 elections for the Assembly of Experts, addressed his letter to the "Iranian Nation," which was published on his personal website.

The 12-member Guardian Council, half of whom are clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader versed in Sharia law, and the other half laymen or clerics appointed by the chief justice, also a Supreme Leader appointee, has increasingly expanded its role in disqualifying election candidates. 

The disqualifications routinely target not only opponents and dissidents but now also prominent insiders who fall out of favor with the hardline regime.

Former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani was barred by the Guardian Council from running against Ebrahim Raisi in 2021, allegedly because his daughter resides in the United States. Despite Supreme Leader Khamenei calling his disqualification an "injustice" before the elections, he did not reinstate Larijani through a state edict, as many had expected.

In a video posted to social media, the man is seen making a death gesture according to one of the demonstrators in attendance, Siamak Aram, who said the man in the video directed the death gesture right at him.

"He threatened me with death by moving his hand across his throat to indicate he would cut my throat," said Aram.

The video was taken on May 22 at a rally outside a memorial service hosted by the Islamic Education Center (IEC) in Maryland for the "occasion of the martyrdom" of President Ebrahim Raisi and Iran's late foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who both died in a helicopter crash last week. The center posted "condolences and sympathies" notes on their deaths.

Aram, an activist from Iran who left in 2011 to avoid the Islamic Republic's reach, yet this week's incident he said, proved the arm of Iran's repression extends all the way to the United States.

"I didn't expect to feel the same experience I had in Iran, here in United States. It was...15 miles away from White House and the capital," he said.

The man, later identified by Aram as Soltan-Mohammadi, allegedly is an employee of the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is part of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington DC, which is the de facto consular representation of Iran in the US.

Iran International has reached out to Soltan-Mohammadi for comment but has not heard back.

Jason Brodsky, the policy director of United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) told Iran International "the fact that he was an employee of the Islamic Republic's Interests Section raises tremendous concerns for me."

"The Islamic Republic has a very checkered past of trying to engage in transnational repression in Western capitals," said Brodsky.

In August 2023, a Fox New Digital report revealed a three-page GOP letter detailing Iranian regime-linked mosques and centers in Maryland, Texas, Michigan and Virginia. It claimed that the Islamic Education Center in Maryland, secured funding from what it says is the Iranian regime-controlled Alavi Foundation and Washington-based Iranian Iman, Abolfazi Bahram Nahidian.

"It is unacceptable for an employee of the Islamic Republic's Interests Section in the United States to threaten an Iranian American on US soil. The Iranian- American community was using their First Amendment right, to protest, as we have in this country. And we cannot allow authoritarian states like the Islamic Republic to try to trample on those rights on American soil," said Brodsky.

The incident allegedly involving Soltan-Mohammadi is just "a microcosm of a much larger Iran policy problem," said Behnam Ben Taleblu, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).

He said the Biden administration's policy towards Iran has been rooted in a belief that pressure drives the threats - rather than pressure being a tool to solve the threats.

The alleged death threats, according to Ben Taleblu, should serve as a wake- up call.

"I'm surprised and also worried. This is something that Iranian Americans and in general, Americans need to be concerned about, that foreign governments can actually benefit from diplomatic cover and adjudicate their fights with diaspora members, dissidents, and even just citizens of a different country on foreign soil," said Ben Taleblu.

He said, the core of the issue is the emboldenment the regime feels, not just in the US but across the Western world.

Just last Friday, the Islamic Republic's loyalists violently attacked a group of Iranian dissidents who were celebrating Ebrahim Raisi's death in London, injuring at least four people.

Ben Taleblu said the Islamic Republic's "threats vectors are evolving in drastic ways."

Earlier this year, two Canadian men with ties to Hells Angels were charged in what US authorities called a “murder-for-hire scheme” allegedly coordinated in Iran to kill Iranian dissidents in Maryland.

Ben Taleblu and Brodsky both commented to Iran International that the US State Department needs investigate and take action.

Iran International has reached out to the State Department, which would not provide comment at this time.

The Office of the Special Envoy for Iran posted to X Tuesday that it is "concerned to see reports of Iranian regime supporters threatening and attacking peaceful protesters worldwide."

Aram said he's just looking for justice.

He said he went to court Tuesday to send a message and exercise his democratic right.

"I hope that we could carry a very clear message that the rule of law prevails here. I wanted to make this message clear and also give the hope to the other dissidents of the Islamic regime," he said.

The court order prohibits Soltan-Mohammadi "from making any contact, threats, or approaching [Siamak Aram] my place of residence and employment," according to Aram whose lawyer posted the order to Instagram.

"You cannot be the member of the government. And also at the same time, making death threats to the citizens. Because if he was in power and if I was in Iran...he would execute the threat."

Shamkhani is an old-guard military figure who served as the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council until last year. In that role, he oversaw negotiations to mend relations with Saudi Arabia. This background lends credibility to reports that Khamenei has chosen him to handle the nuclear issue, prompting significant reactions.

On Tuesday, however, several Iran-based news websites rehashed an interview from two weeks ago, in which Mahmoud Vaezi, the chief of staff to former President Hassan Rouhani, suggests Shamkhani was against the idea of reviving the JCPOA nuclear agreement, after it was ditched by Donald Trump.

"[Iran’s] Supreme National Security Council Secretariat during Shamkhani's term took a line of non-revival,” Vaezi says in his interview. “If the secretariat had been aligned [with Rouhani’s administration], the nuclear deal would have been revived at that time."

The reason why some outlets in Iran have highlighted this line from Vaezi’s interview remains unclear. It could be an effort by those in favor of a deal—and closer cooperation with the US in general—to undermine Shamkhani before his official announcement in the new role. Alternatively, if the appointment is already finalized, it might be an attempt to put Shamkhani on the defensive from the start. Either way, this appears to be another instance of factional politics that ultimately reinforces Khamenei's position as the ultimate arbiter.

Khamenei has the final say on all matters of security, intelligence and foreign policy. Many view his key appointments as windows into his thinking and an indicator of the direction that Iran would most likely take in the short to medium term. Those opposed to Khameni’s choice of direction can do little but to shoot the messengers –high ranking officials whose role is the implementation of policies developed in Khamenei's office, and who, more often than not, are where they are by virtue of their subservience.

Vaezi’s interview provides a glimpse of this factionalism and the dynamics of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"Some individuals and the secretary in the secretariat adopted different methods. Some pursued policies that were not even discussed in the council meetings,” he says of the alleged disruptive impact of Shamkhani and his team during the negotiations to revive the nuclear agreement with the Biden administration. “As far as the nuclear deal is concerned, they had a line that it should not happen. They didn’t say it explicitly, but their behavior indicated this."

Vaezi then reveals why the situation could not have been rectified, why, in other words, it was out of President Rouhani’s hands.

“To replace the Secretary, there has to be an agreement between the President and the Supreme Leader,” he says in the interview. “That agreement didn't come about. Mr. Rouhani tried several times, about 5-6 times during his four years [second term]."

The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seem to have halted following the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister on May 19 when their helicopter crashed. But rumors persist –just as they have on a number of occasions in the past few years– that back-channel, indirect talks are underway between Iran and the US.

Shamkhani’s appointment as the 'chief negotiator' has yet to be officially confirmed. If and when it is, it will be significant primarily for what it reveals about the intentions of the true chief negotiator, Ali Khamenei.

Before the internal election, the prevailing assumption in the Iranian political landscape was that Ghalibaf had around 70 supporters in Parliament. This was 30 fewer than the ultra-conservative Paydari Party, which backed Qom MP Mojtaba Zolnour in the election for Speaker and the presidium.

This turned out to be not accurate as Ghalibaf won 198 votes out of a total of 290. Whatever the true number of Ghalibaf and Paydari's supporters are at the Majles, the group loosely characterized as "independents" is now better known to have a real weight in the legislature.

This group can potentially swing either way when it comes to the ratification of bills, which will only become law after endorsement by the conservative-dominated Guardian Council. However, this flexibility will remain only until the "independents," or a significant portion of them, form a new faction with predefined political preferences. 

Meanwhile, the results revealed that traditional conservatives, once considered a major force in parliament, wielded little political influence. Their representative, former foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki, received only 5 votes, one of which was certainly his own. This outcome was a surprising and disgraceful blow to their perceived strength.

In the previous parliament, traditional conservatives had 11 members and were believed to have the capacity to garner support for their proposals. However, they failed to present any new ideas and merely followed the hardliners in their efforts to crack down on women's hijab and social media.

Ghalibaf won the Speaker's seat despite widespread smear campaigns by his political rivals and the public's dissatisfaction over his inefficiency in the previous parliament. It remains unclear whether his re-election was influenced by "political decisions from higher up," as many politicians have speculated about the support for Ghalibaf from Khamenei's inner circle.

According to the Khabar Online website, Ghalibaf can now begin his presidential campaign, confident in the safety net provided by his position in the Majles in case his presidential ambitions do not materialize.

He participated in the internal election of the Majles despite numerous calls from lawmakers for him to step back and choose between the presidential race and the competition for the Speaker's seat. However, Ghalibaf opted to continue campaigning on both fronts. In a last-minute shift, Ghalibaf, who had been forging an alliance with the Paydari faction based on trading concessions as in the previous round, instead formed an alliance with the "independents."

Not only this new idea worked, but it gave new leverage to the "independents" as a parliamentary force to be reckoned with. This is particularly important as the "independents" officially declared their support for Ghalibaf minutes before the vote.

Another significance of the election on Tuesday is in the vast difference between the number of votes won by Ghalibaf and his Paydari Party rival Zolnour. Whether Ghalibaf can effectively benefit from this edge during the next four years is another story.

There were 24 void votes, which represented the "independents" who did not support any of the three candidates.

The two deputy speakers came from Paydari, Ali Nikzad with 142 votes, and Haji Babaei with 154. However, although members of the presidium are not known to exert any influence on the proceedings of the Majles, according to Khabar Online, Ghalibaf's supporters have the upper hand in the presidium.