Despite former Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif's prior announcement that he would not hold a position in the Pezeshkian administration, he was appointed deputy for strategic affairs to the new president.
What is the capacity of this newly created position? What is Zarif's agenda in this context, and what goals will he pursue? Based on what has been said and published in Iran so far, Zarif's most likely role will be to lead influence campaigns in the West.
Deputy, adviser, or head of a study center?
The text of President Masoud Pezeshkian’s appointment letter draws multiple roles for Zarif. As the President’s deputy, Zarif will hold a portfolio equivalent to those overseeing executive, parliamentary, legal, and Sunni affairs, or similar to positions like the heads of the Atomic Energy Organization, the Management and Planning Organization, or the Environmental Protection Organization. While these organizations are not ministries, they function at a comparable level.
At the same time, Zarif is expected to advise the head of the executive branch on strategic matters. His role includes: "Leveraging the accumulated experience of the country's senior managers over the past decades and the extensive expertise of elites from think tanks and civil society institutions.” The president also noted that Zarif is “expected to monitor major domestic and international developments, assess the success in achieving the goals of the constitution, the vision document, and the general policies approved by the Supreme Leader, and report directly to me." Zarif himself acknowledges this advisory role.
Another role assigned to Zarif is to preside over a research institute. According to Pezeshkian’s letter, Zarif is tasked with "taking over the responsibility of the Presidential Strategic Research Center and transforming its missions and functions into a suitable organization for the President’s deputyship." The Presidential Strategic Research Center, part of the Iranian Presidential Institution, serves as a think tank for the administration, conducting strategic and inter-institutional studies, reviews, and research. It is responsible for introducing plans and proposals related to national strategies in political, economic, social, and cultural fields, in line with the general policies of the system.
This strategic deputy position was specifically created for Mohammad Javad Zarif, as it did not previously exist within the organizational structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Zarif's agenda
Zarif has clearly outlined the mission of this new deputy position: "No new bureaucracy or mechanisms will be created, there will be no burden on the government's budget or the people's table; no interference with existing operations; no diminishing the functions of any organization; and the role will serve as a bridge between the government, the people, think tanks, and civil institutions."
Zarif will not establish new organizations and will have an office within the presidential building. He will continue the role he played during Pezeshkian’s campaign and in the appointment of ministers: mobilizing and promoting Pezeshkian’s agenda. His job is to help the president navigate among existing power structures; a role similar to what he held as foreign minister. Additionally, in situations where the president is sidelined, Zarif will find ways to maneuver between political, security, and military forces, as he did when dealing with the notorious Qasem Soleimani, the IRGC, and the Supreme Leader’s office, to avoid becoming irrelevant.
The idea of connecting the government with the people and civil institutions seems far-fetched, as Zarif operates within the hardcore of power and has never engaged with independent civil society institutions in Iran.
Zarif's capabilities
Zarif lacks significant influence within the country, aside from a few experts at the Institute for Political and International Studies, an entity affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the senior staff of the Ministry. His real strength lies in the network he has cultivated abroad. During his decade-long stay in New York as Iran's representative at the United Nations and his 8 years as Foreign Minister, Zarif developed an extensive network of foreign contacts that Pezeshkian needs. Despite opposition from some in the parliament and the IRGC, Pezeshkian must bear the cost of maintaining Zarif's cooperation.
Zarif is a valuable partner for cooperation, often praised by a network of Iranian and non-Iranian forces in the media, think tanks, and foreign ministries in Western countries. He can shape narratives and provide analysis that aligns with the goals of Pezeshkian or the Leader’s office during critical periods. Holding a government position also shields him from suspicions of unauthorized cooperation with foreign governments, a serious legal charge in Iran. Over his eight years as Foreign Minister, Zarif demonstrated a high capacity for disinformation, outright lies, and propaganda aimed at influencing public opinion in the West.
An investigative report by Iran International and Semafor in 2023, revealed that during Zarif’s tenure as foreign minister, the Islamic Republic was able to create the Iran Experts Initiative in the United States in mid-2010s, to influence American policy centers and the US government. The operation was led and coordinated by officials working for Zarif.
A group of experts were tasked to write articles and opinion pieces, for example, that aimed to defend Tehran’s position on major issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions.
In a recent example, after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, individuals known for defending pro-Tehran positions in the West framed his assassination as a setback to the peace process and the pursuit of a ceasefire. This narrative, which aligns with the views of the Biden administration and some European countries, is used by the Islamic Republic of Iran to portray Israel as the aggressor. Zarif can focus on coordinating and amplifying these types of influence activities.
According to these reports, Niknejad and his wife were detained at Berlin airport upon their return from a one-month leave, three weeks after the closure of Islamic centers affiliated with the Islamic Republic across Germany, and were subsequently deported back to Iran.
An Iran International source told our correspondent, Ahmad Samadi, that Niknejad became involved in a confrontation with airport police after realizing he was not permitted to enter Germany.
Previously, in November 2022, Soleiman Mousavifar, the deputy head of the Islamic Center of Hamburg, was expelled for supporting Hezbollah.
Germany shut down the Khamenei-controlled Islamic Center of Hamburg and Blue Mosque in July for its role in serving as a hub of terrorist ideology, antisemitism and anti-democratic threats to the Federal Republic’s constitution order, according to the interior ministry.
When asked the closure, a German interior ministry (BMI) spokesman, Lars Harmsen, told Iran International on Thursday that “In addition to the Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg, the BMI has also banned sub-organisations and confiscated their assets. These were the following: the Islamische Akademie Deutschland, the Verein der Förderer einer iranischen-islamischen Moschee in Hamburg, the Zentrum der Islamischen Kultur in Frankfurt (Main), the Islamische Vereinigung Bayern in Munich, and the Islamisches Zentrum Berlin.”
When asked by Iran International if the confiscated assets from Iran’s regime, the Islamic Center of Hamburg and Blue Mosque and other entities, will be used to provide compensation to the Iranian victims of terrorism in Germany, the spokesman said, "Concrete plans for a future usage of the Blue Mosque and other confiscated assets can only be made by the BMI once the ban is final. Therefore, the outcome of the administrative procedure remains to be seen.”
When questioned about future closures of other Iranian regime-linked and controlled centers, mosques and associations the BMI spokesman said, “In principle, the BMI does not comment on possible further bans, regardless of whether there is reason to consider them in individual cases or not…”
Meanwhile, Iranian-German dissidents are urging the German authorities to shutter additional organizations and mosques linked to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Dr. Kazem Moussavi, the spokesman for the Green Party of Iran in exile in Germany, told Iran International “The closure of the Islamic Center of Hamburg was long overdue and necessary. The closure came too late and is insufficient. Germany’s appeasement policies toward Iran’s regime continues. “
He urged that Germany to shut down the Islamic Republic’s embassy in Berlin and the regime-linked Al-Mustafa Institute in Berlin , as well as the pro-Khamenei Islamic Community of Shiite Communities. Moussavi termed the Iranian regime embassy and other Tehran-linked entities a “security risk” for Germany.
According to Moussavi, the Al-Mustafa Institute’s director was a long-time religious teacher from the banned IAD (Islamic Academy in Germany). The Al-Mustafa Institute in Berlin is part of the Al-Mustafa International University in Iran, where foreign recruits are being ideologically trained.
“The Al-Mustafa International University is the main institution for exporting the regime's ideology to the Islamic world, the West and Germany. It has over a hundred branches worldwide with more than 40,000 students,” said Moussavi.”
He added that the organization of Islamic Community of Shiite communities has more than 150 mosques and the director of the now-defunct Islamic Center of Hamburg is the chairman of the spiritual council of the Islamic Community of Shiite Communities.
Moussavi noted that the largely pro-Iran regime German Körber Foundation is Hamburg protects and supports Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, a former Tehran diplomat who currently is employed by Princeton university. Körber’s cooperation with him legitimizes his past activities, Mousavi argued.
The Iranian-German dissident, Mina Ahadi, who is leading the Alliance Against Islamic Regime of Iran Apologists (AAIRIA) campaign in Germany to compel Körber to pull the plug on its relations with Mousavian and Iran’s government, told Iran International Germany should close the Iranian regime’s “embassy and consulate and the Islamic Community of Shiite Communities.”
She added that Germany needs to sanction the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Ahadi said there “must put more pressure” on the Körber Foundation.
“Körber must see that when it works together with the Islamic regime, they are making a fascist and anti-women government stronger,” she said.
Ahadi was pleased with the interior minister's decision to shutter the Islamic Center of Hamburg. She worked to secure the center's closure.
In 2023, German Iranians demanded that the German state government of Hesse shut down the pro-Iran regime Center for Islamic Culture in Frankfurt that honored IRGC's Qasem Soleimani.
Iran International reported, in May, on the growing pressure on Körber Foundation to sever ties with Mousavian and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In June, Iranian-Germans protested in front of Körber’s building in Hamburg.
Iranian activists in Germany say that Mousavian is "an extension of the antisemitic regime, acting as its loyal lobbyist in the US through the support of the Körber Foundation in Germany.”
When asked about the scandal-plagued Körber Foundation, the German interior ministry spokesman told Iran International "As a matter of principle, we do not comment on matters of public foundations. The Körber Foundation is not an object of observation of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution." Germany's domestic intelligence agency is called the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.
Multiple Iran International press queries sent to the Körber Foundation and its parent company, Körber AG, were not returned. Körber was founded by the former Nazi, Kurt Adolf Körber (1909-1992), who exploited concentration camp victims to advance the Holocaust and Adolf Hitler’s war goals.