The morning Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran felt eerily similar to the morning Qasem Soleimani was assassinated. We woke up, picked up our phones, and read the news in shock. We imagined the worst—war. The anxiety was there, but not as intense as the last time.
It was unclear what had caused Haniyeh’s death. “A projectile,” they said. But how? What type? From where? We didn’t know. We weren’t even sure where his residence was. Some said it was the Saadabad Palace, adding to the creeping anxiety. What if the Palace, a historic landmark, was damaged?
It was just too much. A friend wrote that he had diarrhea from the shock and stress. The fear of war looming –again. Not as intense as the fear we had when Soleimani was killed, but a gut-churning fear nevertheless.
The difference this time was that it wasn’t the first time. We had seen it before: the cries of retaliation, the promise of Harsh Revenge. Only in April, we felt we had to brace for a full-blown war after Israel hit Iran’s consulate in Syria. But the full-blown war never came. Missiles were launched; missiles were intercepted; and life went on as ‘normal’. The utter madness that is our normal in Iran.
So now, many Iranians simply joke away the bellicosity. It’s a defense mechanism that seems to work –until it doesn’t.
"Wars start with smaller clashes., with skirmishes. We all know that.” Masoud is 49 and works as a clerk for an organization half owned by the state. He thinks the younger generation should take the wisdom of his generation more seriously. “One side strikes, the other responds, and this tit-for-tat continues until it reaches a point where it can no longer be stopped. And that would be a dark day for all of us.” Those who remember the eight-year horror of the war with Iraq are often more cautious when discussing the prospect of another one. “I don’t like this regime either, but when I hear talks of an attack overthrowing the ‘system’ but not harming the people, I dread their naivety."
This may be a common line of argument among the older generation. But it’s by no means universal. In fact, some of the more radical voices you get to hear around you are that of the ‘fed-up’ elderly: pensioners like Mahmoud, who have “seen it all”, and cannot help letting out a Persian proverb every other sentence.
“Die once, mourn once,” he says, holding up his index finger to illustrate ‘once’. "We cannot go on forever with this government. It’s been oppressing us and destabilizing the region for years. We have no effective opposition. The only option left is to target their bases and erase them from the face of earth without harming civilians."
Few speak publicly in favor of foreign military intervention. But those few may now cite the “surgical elimination” of Haniyeh –as does Mahmoud– as “evidence” that the Islamic Republic can be “taken out cleanly”, and we should therefore not fear a Syria-fication of Iran. This, as far as I can tell, is still a minority, if not fringe, view. But it also looks as if the ‘targeted assassinations’ –from Soleimani to [Iran’s nuclear mastermind Mohsen] Fakhrizadeh, and now Haniyeh– may have emboldened a few more Iranians to casually call for such actions.
The day after Haniyeh was killed, I overheard a conversation in a grocery store that illustrates this sentiment brilliantly. A middle-aged woman was complaining about the constant rise of prices. "Forty thousand tomans [$0.70] for a 100gr pack of butter?” she exclaimed. “It’s gone up because of the killing [of Haniyeh]. It’ll go higher with the next one,” the grocer said. “The next one is the main one, God willing,” the woman replied. The grocer reminded her that such words could cause her trouble. There was no need to explain further. We all knew who she meant by the ‘main one’, a term used for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The assassination, like many other events, one has to admit, has led to a wave of conspiracy theories. “It's not that they can't kill Iran’s leaders, they don’t want to,” a friend said after I told her about the exchange in the grocery store. “They need the Islamic Republic to be there as the scarecrow of the region."
And then there are those who see the Haniyeh assassination as proof that Israel could have eliminated Hamas with much less civilian casualties if it wanted to. Sohrab, a graduate student in social sciences, is one such voice. “They killed ten of thousands in Gaza under the pretext that Hamas uses civilians as human shields, claiming they had no choice,” he says.. “But we just saw how easily they can hit their target without harming a single civilian. I think the killings in Gaza are more deliberate than they’d like to admit."
The past year or two has been crazy even by Iran’s standards. The current Iranian calendar year is not even past the halfway mark, and we’ve had a president killed in a helicopter crash and a top figure in the Axis of Resistance assassinated in Tehran. After Raisi’s death, the Persian social media turned into a river of jokes. That has not been the case this time. Perhaps because the former was an entirely domestic affair. No one feared a war to break out. This time, the drum beats are constant and loud. “The world will witness our power –and soon enough,” an official just said on the state TV.
Still –and as far as I can tell– few are as scared as they were when Soleimani was killed. But it’s tense. We’re all waiting to see how the Harsh Revenge pans out this time. Most concerned are those with tickets for air travel –and those whose loved ones are supposed to fly in for a long-anticipated, short summer vacation. This shouldn’t be the ‘normal’ life for anyone. It is here, though, and there’s very little we can do about it.
Yet, there are numerous reports that may provide clues for experts to speculate on how the operation was carried out – and whether it involved advanced weaponry or a sophisticated drone strike.
Where and when?
In one of its statements, the IRGC announced that the attack resulting in Haniyeh's death occurred at two in the morning and stated that he was killed by "a projectile from the air" while stationed at one of the "special residences for war veterans in northern Tehran."
Hours later, the Iran-aligned Lebanese network Al-Mayadeen reported that the missile used to attack Haniyeh's residence was launched not from within Iran, but from another country.
Since then, however, Israel’s Channel 12 reported that Iranian officials were coming to the conclusion that the projectile was actually fired from within the country’s borders.
Where did Haniyeh reside in Tehran?
Although the Iranian state’s Fars news agency reported that Haniyeh was staying at a special residence for war veterans in northern Tehran, little is known about the building.
Some unofficial sources inside Iran, have suggested that Haniyeh could have been killed near the Saadabad Palace – a historic royal complex located in the northern part of Iran’s capital. Boasting hundreds of acres, the complex has been used by the Islamic Republic for various official events for many years.
Some reports have also suggested that the Basij al-Zahra camp in the northwest of this complex was Haniyeh’s residence.
During President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's administration, leading up to the Islamic Summit Conference in Tehran in 1991, a building was reportedly constructed at Saadabad Palace to accommodate special guests. This facility might have been used to host distinguished visitors, although specific details about Haniyeh’s residence there are not well-documented.
Was there an explosion?
Some local witnesses reported hearing an explosion in the Saadabad area early Wednesday morning.
State-run media outlet Tejarat Online published a story that suggested that the explosion's sound was "so loud that it triggered all the car alarms and was heard throughout northern Tehran, with smoke and dust from the explosion covering the area."
According to sources connected to Hamas, the building targeted in the attack was also occupied by his bodyguard, Ziad Nakhalah, the leader of Islamic Jihad, along with a Hamas delegation.
So far, however, there have been no reports indicating that these individuals were harmed.
In addition, no reports have emerged about other residents of the building being injured, leaving the door open to assume that despite the precision of any operation to kill Haniyeh, the explosion's power and intensity were likely limited.
Missile vs drone?
Although the IRGC's statement referred to "a projectile from the air," the origin of the projectile remains unclear.
Sky News Arabia reported that based on its Iranian sources, that the building Haniyeh was in, was targeted by a missile fired from a nearby building.
Aerial projectiles can be launched from either fighter jets or military drones. For such strikes, military aircraft would typically utilize the airspace of neighboring countries. While using the airspace of other countries without authorization and conducting operations near border areas is challenging, it is not impossible.
In Israel’s April attack on the 8th Tactical Airbase in Isfahan, American officials confirmed that Israeli aircraft launched three missiles from outside Iran's borders targeting a radar site protecting the Natanz nuclear facility. Iranian officials, however, attributed the incident to enemy drones at this military base.
According to Israeli Channel 14 military correspondent Hallel Bitton Rosen, however, the attack was not carried out by launching a missile, but with another weapon that exploded close to him.
Drawing on Israel’s past operations, the country has a history of conducting drone attacks on Iranian soil.
In February 2023, the Wall Street Journal reported that Israel was responsible for a drone attack on a Defense Ministry workshop complex in Isfahan and an explosion at a munitions center in the city. Iranian officials described the attack as "unsuccessful" and stated that it caused only limited damage.
What are some experts saying?
Israel has not claimed responsibility for the attack, but one Israeli and two US officials told Axios that Israel was behind the strike.
About two hours before Haniyeh’s death, Richard Goldberg, a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, appeared to allude to the attack, saying "The Israeli Air Force is demonstrating its range tonight."
After the news of the killing of the Hamas leader broke, Goldberg, in reference to Israel striking Iran previously, posted on X: "If you can hit a radar next to a nuclear site, you can hit a house in Tehran. Ayatollah is exposed."
Major Andrew Fox, a researcher at the Jackson Institute and a former British paratrooper, told Iran International English that the attack might have been carried out with a missile launched from outside Iran. According to him, the Caspian Sea, given its proximity to Tehran, is a suitable option for this operation.
Fox, drawing on his experience and emphasizing that such missiles are guided with precise laser technology, said: "A soldier on the ground targets the laser pointer exactly at the point where he wants the missile to hit, guiding the missile to the impact point."
The expert also noted that Israel has missiles designed to use the kinetic energy from the speed and weight of the warhead for lethality. This explains why, in some missile attacks, fewer casualties and less noise are observed compared to those with explosive warheads.
Ronen Solomon, an Israeli intelligence and security analyst, highlighted the proximity of Baku and Tel Aviv, as well as Azerbaijan’s common border with Iran. He suggested that the use of Azerbaijani airspace for the attack is highly likely due to the short distance and the presence of Israeli weapons in the region.
These attacks became more frequent after July 2020, when a massive explosion occurred at the Natanz uranium enrichment site in central Iran, destroying one of the buildings. In November of that year, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a key figure in Iran’s nuclear program, was assassinated in a roadside attack near Tehran. Western and Israeli intelligence had long suspected Fakhrizadeh of being the architect of Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program.
Fakhrizadeh’s elimination rattled most echelons of the Iranian government, with different agencies subtly blaming one another for shortcomings that had led to the incident. It strengthened existing concerns that Israel had a strong network within Iran capable of using sophisticated weapons, having detailed information about the movement of key targets, and could pull off a complicated assassination and disappear without a trace.
However, spectacular attacks did not end with the killing of the top nuclear operative.
Since Fakhrizadeh’s assassination, which reportedly involved a high-tech, remote-operated machine gun, numerous small and large-scale attacks have continued to target various sites. While Israel has never acknowledged its involvement, it is widely believed that many incidents at military and industrial sites were the result of Israeli sabotage or drone attacks.
This latest attack occurred days after Iran’s Minister of Intelligence hailed the "dismantling of Mossad's infiltration network" as a pivotal achievement of former president Ebrahim Raisi's administration.
Esmail Khatib remarked last week, "Mossad's infiltration network had been assassinating our scientific figures and sabotaging critical centers. Under the thirteenth administration, this network and its access and capabilities have been eliminated."
Despite the persistent denials by Iranian officials, the series of targeted killings and sabotage reached such a critical point in 2021 that a former Minister of Intelligence, Ali Younesi, had expressed grave concern over the infiltration of Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad, into various sectors of the country, warning that officials should be "worried for their lives."
Younesi stated in 2021 that over the past "10, 15, or 20 years," while the country has been purged of all groups he labeled as "terrorist," there has been a significant failure in addressing the infiltration by foreign intelligence services, particularly those of Israel.
He emphasized that in the "last ten years, Mossad's infiltration into various sectors of the country is so extensive that all officials of the Islamic Republic should be worried for their lives."
In April 2021, another explosion at Natanz, this time in an underground part of the sprawling installation, hit the power supply for centrifuges and caused extensive damage that reportedly needed months of repairs. Some reports said that thousands of uranium enriching machines, called centrifuges, were destroyed.
Coupled with physical attacks, Israel allegedly launched many cyberattacks that created massive disruptions in Iran. In October 2021 a cyberattack knocked out a government database that issues fuel subsidized fuel cards to the population.
In May 2022, Revolutionary Guard intelligence operative Colonel Hassan Khodaei was shot five times outside of his home in Tehran. In May and June, following the assassination, two scientists reportedly died from poison in their food. Ayoub Entezari, an aerospace engineer, worked on missile turbines for a military research center in Yazd, central Iran.
Suicide drones were used to attack a military facility in Isfahan on January 28, 2023. Senior intelligence sources told Western media and that Israel’s Mossad was involved in the attack. It was reported that the site was an advanced weapon-production facility.
What is embarrassing and dangerous for the Iranian regime is the apparent extensive infiltration of Israeli networks in Iran. Ismail Haniyeh’s targeted killing on July 31 will go down in history as one of the most remarkable military-intelligence coups by Israel in the past eight decades.
In the second round, Pezeshkian’s campaign depicted his hardline rival as an existential threat to the livelihood of the nation. More people turned out for the run-off and Pezeshkian defeated the ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili. But he lost to those who boycotted the election. In the end, many more stayed at home than voted for the ‘reformist’ candidate.
So, the question is: how did Pezeshkian win despite failing to persuade the majority that he could deliver the reforms he promised? The answer, I argue in this piece, is the ethnic vote. (All data featured in this piece comes from official sources, and there are reasons to doubt their veracity. But that would be the subject for another article).
Ethnically, Iran is a highly diverse society. While the official language is Persian, millions of people have different mother tongues, such as Azari, Kurdish, Baluchi, and Arabic. These minorities often lack representation, particularly many Kurds and almost all Baluchis who are Sunnis, whereas most other groups, including the Arabic and Azeri speakers, are Shia.
Pezeshkian seems to come from a Azeri-speaking family, but he was born and raised among Kurds. Most minorities, ethnic and religious, picked him over Jalili, especially the Baluchis and the Kurds. But the focus here is on the Azari-speaking voters. (Note that most Turkish-speaking Iranians are Shia, which helps us single out the ethnic element.)
The figure below illustrates the role of the Azari speakers in Pezeshkian's victory. The horizontal axis represents the ratio of Azari speakers in each province. Azari belongs to the family of Turkic languages, which is also heavily influenced by Persian. Within Iran, people usually call it “Torki”, which means Turkish. The vertical axis represents the vote shares in the run-off, as a percentage of eligible voters in each province.
To better understand what seems to be a strong ethnic factor, we can consult the chart below, which shows the Azari or Turkish speaking population in each province.
Pezeshkian secured the highest share of vote in such provinces as East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Zanjan and Ardabil, where the majority are Azari (Turkish) speakers. In contrast, Jalili had an overall advantage in provinces with the lowest Azari-speaking populations. This does not mean that Jalili is popular among Persian-speaking Iranians. It seems to suggest that he did better than Pezeshkian in provinces with minimal ethnic minority presence.
The quantitative index of the Pearson Correlation Coefficient (PCC) is illuminating in this regard. The PCC index indicates the strength of the linear relationship and dependency between two variables. In the following diagram, each candidate’s vote share (in each province) is the dependent variable, and the relative size of the Turkish-speaking population (in that province) is the independent variable.
The correlation coefficient for Pezeshkian is 0.7 (70%), while for Jalili it is -0.47 ( -47). A positive value indicates that an increase in the independent variable leads to an increase in the dependent variable, whereas a negative value suggests that an increase in one variable results in a decrease in the other. The linear relationship for Pezeshkian's votes is strong and positive, suggesting that his share of vote (in most cases) rises as the Azari speaking population in a province increases. In contrast, the relationship for Jalili is weak and negative. (Same for Kurdish, Baloch, and Turkmen speakers).
One counterargument could be that the data should be interpreted differently: that the Persian-speaking population didn’t like Pezeshkian and voted for Jalili. But the low turnout in such provinces seem to refute this hypothesis. Moreover, in most of these provinces, Pezeshkian gained more in vote share as the turnout rose in the run-off.
To underline the crucial role of the Azari (Turkish) speaking Iranians in the second round of the election, we can compare the results with that of the 2017 presidential election –where Hassan Rouhani tried to attract the ethnic vote.
As seen above, Rouhani’s vote is more homogeneous across provinces, and the ‘Azari variable’ is less pronounced. Rouhani did receive more votes in provinces with majority Azari-speaking populations. But he also did so in the non-ethnic regions (except for Zanjan, where Raisi had more votes.)
The Pearson correlation coefficient for Rouhani is 5%, while for Raisi it is -10%. This indicates that the strength of the linear relationship between the two variables is much weaker. Azari speaking Iranians didn’t like Raisi, but their preference had much less impact on the final result that it did in 2024. It was insignificant statistically.
In the 2024 run-off, if we look at the Azari speaking provinces only, Pezeshkian got 2.8 million more votes than Jalili. That’s almost a million more than their vote difference in the first round. However, if we look at the six provinces where Persian is predominant, Jalili got about 830,000 more votes than Pezeshkian. In the first round, that number was about 275,000. In other words, the increase in the vote margin between Pezeshkian and Jalili in the second round is 3.7 times greater than the change observed in the six other provinces. Jalili’s advantage in Isfahan can be attributed to the low turnout (less than 50%). In Yazd, and Kerman, where official turnout in the run-off was above 50%, the changes may suggest a dramatic decline in the social standing of the reformists. In Khorasan Razavi, Jalili’s success may be due to local connections (he was born there). His lead (551,000 votes) is notably large and unexpected. In 2017, the picture was markedly different. Rouhani's advantage over Raisi in the six provinces mentioned above was 2.2 times greater than that of the four provinces with Azari speaking majorities.
Pezeshkian’s campaign may depict his presidency as a ‘reformist’ triumph. Previous ‘reform’ moments (1997, 2001, 2013, and 2017) were marked by national fervor and high turnout, neither of which transpired in 2024. Pezeshkian may name a few ‘reformists’ to his cabinet, and some may even call his administration a ‘reform government.’ The president himself acknowledges his indebtedness to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. However, the real story of Iran’s 2024 elections may very well be the ethnic vote.