Iran International
The fourth annual "Iran: Transitional Justice" conference, hosted by the Norway-based rights group Iran Human Rights (IHR), was held in Oslo on Saturday to discuss Iran's future.
The event brought together Iran experts, researchers, and human rights advocates to address the critical challenges and strategies for transitioning the country from authoritarianism to democracy in the event of the Islamic Republic's demise.
In recent years, especially following the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ uprising ignited by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in police custody for an alleged hijab violation, anti-Islamic Republic sentiment has surged among Iranians, with a vast majority now calling for the regime's overthrow. As a result, the question of what Iran’s future might look like post-regime change has become a central topic of debate among Iran researchers, political scientists, rights activists, and experts across various fields.
This conference series seeks to provide a platform for dialogue between Iranian citizens and experts, exploring solutions through the examination of different transition models that aim to guarantee the rights of all Iranians.
"The Islamic Republic is an unstable regime. They may manage to continue for a few more years through repression, but sooner or later, they will fall. What is important is what happens afterward, and the political forces and the public must be prepared in advance," IHR’s director, Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam told Iran International in an interview on the event’s sidelines.
Social dynamics expert Forough Kanani highlighted the importance of preparing for the post-regime transition. "We are still in the stage of overthrowing the regime… from my perspective, the movement [Woman, Life, Freedom] hasn't ended…once we bring this movement to an end and achieve the results we seek, the transitional period comes next, which we hope will be as short and, most importantly, as institutionalized as possible when establishing new legal structures," she said during her speech.
Kanani also discussed the role of international powers during the transition period, referencing the Swedish government's release of Hamid Nouri, an Iranian prison official convicted of war crimes, who was returned to Iran earlier this year in a prisoner swap deal. "In the future, Iran won't have a government that would release someone like him," she stated.
Furthermore, Kanani emphasized the threat posed by the second generation of Islamic Republic loyalists. "The oligarchy within the Islamic Republic, some of whom are likely not genuinely religious, remains loyal due to financial dependencies created by the economic chaos typical of the Islamic Republic. We must consider the second generation, the children of the Islamic Republic, who are likely to become professors or economic leaders in Europe or even at the same university where you and I might be. These individuals pose a significant threat to the establishment of democracy in a free Iran after the overthrow. They have the money, and they know the power structures well."
In another session, human rights lawyer Shadi Manesh emphasized the importance of inclusivity for minority groups in shaping the legal frameworks for Iran's future, particularly during the transition period.
Manesh further pointed out the lack of a unified approach among Iranian opposition groups. "To date, we have not seen any guideline, manifesto, or document from any group or opposition that has been published and endorsed by a significant part of society," she remarked. She emphasized the need for a collaborative movement that transcends isolated efforts, urging that, "We still haven’t learned how to come out of our isolated silos and design an important movement in collaboration with others that includes all groups under our umbrella." This, she argued, is essential for ensuring a truly inclusive and effective transition.
Other speakers at the event included Shahram Kholdi, a professor of Middle East history and international relations, and Behnam Daraeizadeh, a journalist and human rights researcher. These experts provided insights into the legal structures needed to ensure a smooth transition and long-term stability in governance.
In a focused panel, experts including political scientist Ammar Maleki, sociological researcher Forough Kananian, agroecologist Mansour Sohrabi, and psychiatrist and women's rights activist Simin Sabri discussed strategies for governing Iran during the transition period. In another panel, speakers Jalal Ejadi, a social scientist; Pooyan Tamimi Arab, a religion scholar; Fariba Borhanzehi, a human rights activist; and Parvaneh Andache, a medical doctor and rights activist, discussed citizens' rights in a diverse society.
Owji, who led what is arguably the most critical ministry in Iran, is accused of having “misled” the public with “fake statistics and concocted data.”
Rouydad24 did not mince words last week, suggesting that the former Minister's behavior could cause some “to question [his] mental stability.” The publication lambasted Owji for wasting four years of resources with no tangible achievements, describing his tenure as one filled with empty rhetoric.
Following the death of Iran's former President Ebrahim Raisi and the apparent exit of the ultraconservative Paydari Front—the radical party that gained prominence during his term—some observers note that the press is seizing this moment with newfound assertiveness, though it's uncertain how long this will last. With a seemingly reduced fear of repercussions compared to Raisi's presidency, the media are now more openly exposing the shortcomings of the previous administration’s oil policies.
In his final remarks as Oil Minister, Owji claimed that his ministry had made fundamental strides in addressing the gas imbalance and managing the country's growing energy consumption.
Rouydad24, however, cited experts who challenged the validity of Owji's statement. “Not a single word in his speech corresponds to reality. The Raisi administration’s performance in the gas industry was a complete failure, even according to official statistics,” one critique stated.
Weighing in on the criticism, Nasrollah Zarei, a former deputy in the oil ministry under President Hassan Rouhani, offered his analysis of Owji’s claims.
“The key elements in the discussion of the imbalance in energy products or carriers are, most importantly, natural gas and gasoline. When Owji boasted about increasing natural gas production, the truth was quite the opposite—natural gas production in Iran actually decreased under his watch,” Zarei stated.
He further added, “The claimed increase in natural gas consumption due to industrial and residential growth was nothing but a lie. The reality is that there has been no significant increase in these sectors.”
Zarei also pointed out that the imbalance in natural gas was due not to an increase in consumption, as Owji suggested, but to a decrease in production—a direct result of unmet plans, unexecuted projects, and the failure to implement necessary measures on time.
“This issue is particularly true for gas fields like South Pars, where natural declines in pressure were not adequately managed,” Zarei explained, underlining the systemic failures of the previous administration.
The former administration’s claim to have completed Phase 14 of South Pars, a key gas project, using domestic capabilities, was another point of contention. Zarei criticized this narrative, stating, “The majority of the work on Phase 14 had been completed during Rouhani’s presidency. What Owji did was merely superficial. It had no real impact on production.”
The daily Entekhab also took aim at the former administration's oil sales policies.
The outlet detailed how Iran’s oil exports, particularly to China, were carried out under heavy discounts due to sanctions. While Owji said that Iran was exporting oil to 17 countries, the reality was that China remained the primary, if not the only, significant buyer. Even then, these sales were heavily discounted, with Iran selling its oil at $15 less per barrel than Omani oil, leading to significant financial losses for the country.
Majid Ansari, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, disclosed in July 2024 that, under international sanctions, the Islamic Republic was offering daily discounts of $26 million to its sole oil buyer, China. In a video published by the Jamaran website, Ansari stated, “We asked at what price are you selling? They give a discount of 15 to 30 dollars per barrel, with an average of 20 dollars per barrel… That means $26 million a day from the money of the Iranian people.”
That sentiment was echoed by Masoud Daneshmand, a shipping industry expert, who elaborated on the scale of Iran’s losses in an interview with Entekhab.
“We are currently selling oil to China and giving a discount of 8 to 10 dollars per barrel, but they say they will buy our oil, but keep the money in yuan, which we must use to buy goods from them. If we want to free our money and buy from another country, there will be about a 16% currency transfer cost. With the discount we give on oil, this results in about a 25% loss in our transactions with the Chinese,” Daneshmand explained. He further confirmed Ansari’s estimates, stating, “The number Ansari mentions—at least $10 billion a year—is the loss being imposed on the Iranian people.”
Despite Owji’s efforts to downplay the extent of the discounts, the data indicates otherwise. Under the previous administration, Iran’s oil sales were not merely about offering discounts; they symbolized a broader failure to seize investment opportunities, resulting in reduced production and the decline of the country’s oil industry infrastructure.
Another industry expert who talked to Entekhab commented on Iran’s daily losses from oil sanctions back in February 2022.
Seyed Hamid Hosseini explained to the outlet, “We have a daily loss due to the inability to sell oil, and some of it is also the costs imposed on us because of the sanctions. The combination of these two determines the loss. We have an annual financial turnover of $100 billion through imports and exports, and we pay about 10 to 20 percent in additional costs for transportation, money transfers, discounts to customers, and other expenses; therefore, we lose about $10 to $15 billion this way.”
The media’s post-Raisi revelations, bolstered by expert analysis, paint a stark portrait of Owji’s tenure as Oil Minister.
As Iran navigates an uncertain future, with the potential for stricter sanctions enforcement hinging on the results of the upcoming US elections, the shadow of the previous administration’s failed oil policies is poised to linger --- casting its influence over both Supreme Leader Khamenei's leadership and the newly elected President's term.