Iran rebukes Russia over its policy shift on Zangezur corridor

The event brought together Iran experts, researchers, and human rights advocates to address the critical challenges and strategies for transitioning the country from authoritarianism to democracy in the event of the Islamic Republic's demise.

In recent years, especially following the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ uprising ignited by the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini while in police custody for an alleged hijab violation, anti-Islamic Republic sentiment has surged among Iranians, with a vast majority now calling for the regime's overthrow. As a result, the question of what Iran’s future might look like post-regime change has become a central topic of debate among Iran researchers, political scientists, rights activists, and experts across various fields.

This conference series seeks to provide a platform for dialogue between Iranian citizens and experts, exploring solutions through the examination of different transition models that aim to guarantee the rights of all Iranians.

"The Islamic Republic is an unstable regime. They may manage to continue for a few more years through repression, but sooner or later, they will fall. What is important is what happens afterward, and the political forces and the public must be prepared in advance," IHR’s director, Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam told Iran International in an interview on the event’s sidelines.

Social dynamics expert Forough Kanani highlighted the importance of preparing for the post-regime transition. "We are still in the stage of overthrowing the regime… from my perspective, the movement [Woman, Life, Freedom] hasn't ended…once we bring this movement to an end and achieve the results we seek, the transitional period comes next, which we hope will be as short and, most importantly, as institutionalized as possible when establishing new legal structures," she said during her speech.

Kanani also discussed the role of international powers during the transition period, referencing the Swedish government's release of Hamid Nouri, an Iranian prison official convicted of war crimes, who was returned to Iran earlier this year in a prisoner swap deal. "In the future, Iran won't have a government that would release someone like him," she stated.

Furthermore, Kanani emphasized the threat posed by the second generation of Islamic Republic loyalists. "The oligarchy within the Islamic Republic, some of whom are likely not genuinely religious, remains loyal due to financial dependencies created by the economic chaos typical of the Islamic Republic. We must consider the second generation, the children of the Islamic Republic, who are likely to become professors or economic leaders in Europe or even at the same university where you and I might be. These individuals pose a significant threat to the establishment of democracy in a free Iran after the overthrow. They have the money, and they know the power structures well."

In another session, human rights lawyer Shadi Manesh emphasized the importance of inclusivity for minority groups in shaping the legal frameworks for Iran's future, particularly during the transition period.

Manesh further pointed out the lack of a unified approach among Iranian opposition groups. "To date, we have not seen any guideline, manifesto, or document from any group or opposition that has been published and endorsed by a significant part of society," she remarked. She emphasized the need for a collaborative movement that transcends isolated efforts, urging that, "We still haven’t learned how to come out of our isolated silos and design an important movement in collaboration with others that includes all groups under our umbrella." This, she argued, is essential for ensuring a truly inclusive and effective transition.

Other speakers at the event included Shahram Kholdi, a professor of Middle East history and international relations, and Behnam Daraeizadeh, a journalist and human rights researcher. These experts provided insights into the legal structures needed to ensure a smooth transition and long-term stability in governance.

In a focused panel, experts including political scientist Ammar Maleki, sociological researcher Forough Kananian, agroecologist Mansour Sohrabi, and psychiatrist and women's rights activist Simin Sabri discussed strategies for governing Iran during the transition period. In another panel, speakers Jalal Ejadi, a social scientist; Pooyan Tamimi Arab, a religion scholar; Fariba Borhanzehi, a human rights activist; and Parvaneh Andache, a medical doctor and rights activist, discussed citizens' rights in a diverse society.

In June 2023, Israel's public broadcaster Kan exposed the IRGC Quds Force's Unit 700, a secret unit responsible for smuggling supplies and logistics, particularly military equipment, to Iran's proxies in Syria and Lebanon.

The UK Foreign Office on Monday introduced sanctions on the Unit 700, accusing it of involvement "in hostile activity by an armed group backed by the Government of Iran, namely through conduct which facilitates (or is intended to facilitate) or gives assistance to the planning or conducting of activity which is intended to cause the destabilization of the United Kingdom or any other country."

Gal Farsat, a former Quds Force official with significant ties in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, is said to be running the Unit 700, according to Israel's public broadcaster.

The British sanctions also targeted three Iranian individual for their engagement in "hostile" activities that destabilized Britain, Israel, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon.

Hamid Fazeli, the former head of Iran's Space Organization and head of Unit 340 of the IRGC's Quds Force, is one of the three individuals sanctioned over his involvement in supporting armed groups intending to destabilize Israel.

Iran International reported in June that Fazeli directs the oversight of rocket launches by Harakat Al-Nujaba (HaN), a strategic and integral arm of the Quds Force, which carries out its military activities under the IRGC's supervision.

The UK also sanctioned Behnam Shahriyari over his alleged involvement in assisting the planning or conducting of activity intended to destabilize Israel, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon.

Shahriyari was sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2011 for "acting for or on behalf of Liner Transport Kish (LTK), an IRGC-linked shipping company that was designated by Treasury in December 2010 for providing material support, including weapons, to Hezbollah on behalf of the IRGC."

Abdolfatah Ahvazian was also sanctioned by Britain for his involvement in “threatening, planning or conducting activity which is intended to cause the destabilization of the United Kingdom or any other country.”

Ahvazian, an advisor to IRGC Quds Force commander, "assumed a direct role in providing and coordinating IRGC material support to Hamas, including for the construction of the Hamas tunnel network in Gaza," according to the US-based advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

"Ahvazian has disclosed he had foreknowledge of Hamas preparations for the October 7, 2023, massacre in Israel when, on November 23, he revealed the Palestinian terror group had 'prepared 8,000 people over the course of one year for this [Al-Aqsa Storm] operation,'" the UANI said in January.

In October 2023, MI5, the UK’s security service, warned that amid the war between Iran-backed Hamas and Israel, Tehran may be exploring new ways to threaten the security of Britain.

Despite a host of old and new sanctions against IRGC commanders, Britain has refused to designate IRGC as a terrorist organization.

Meanwhile, a prominent conservative politician has expressed satisfaction with President Masoud Pezeshkian's selection of cabinet ministers, noting that Iranian conservatives are pleased with his choices.

Ali Soufi, a well-known "reformist" commentator has told Nameh News website in Tehranthat during the presidential election campaign in June, the Paydari Party and its candidate Saeed Jalili went out of their way to attack candidate Pezeshkian. They also pressured conservative candidate and current Parliament Speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to withdraw in favor of Jalili, but Ghalibaf refused to cooperate with the ultraconservatives.

Soufi added that Iran's relatively moderate conservatives uphold the concept of an Islamic Republic, while the ultraconservatives advocate for the establishment of a totalitarian Islamic government.

Jalili and the Paydari Party continued their campaign against Pezeshkian and Ghalibaf even after the election. Jalili went so far as to threaten Pezeshkian, warning that his self-declared "shadow government" would make life difficult for him if he didn't follow Jalili's directives, according to Soufi. However, the overwhelming vote of confidence from the Majles for Pezeshkian's cabinet led Jalili and his party to feel defeated. Despite this setback, they persisted with their critical remarks, though with diminished intensity.

Soufi noted that this episode definitively highlighted the divide between the majority of conservatives and the ultraconservative Paydari party. He added that it is highly unlikely Paydari will ever rejoin the conservative camp, as their core ideologies are fundamentally different.

Some Iranian analysts suggested that Supreme Leader Khamenei may have played a role in isolating and sidelining the Paydari Party, effectively ending its political influence. However, others argue that Khamenei has never outright dismantled any political faction before.

The apparent isolation and marginalization of Paydari likely does not signify a fundamental shift in Khamenei's approach. He has repeatedly balanced and rebalanced his loyalists, often shelving them for years before reactivating them, as he did with the "reformists."

In another development, Hamid Reza Taraqqi of the traditional conservative Islamic Coalition Party told Nameh News that conservatives at the Iranian parliament (Majles) are now generally happy with the Pezeshkian administration which, of course, could come under criticism if it fails to obey Khamenei's guidelines and to solve some of the country's problems.

Taraqqi emphasized that Pezeshkian and his cabinet, having risen to power with the backing of "reformists," have demonstrated a commitment to inclusivity by not limiting the administration to their own political faction. He further suggested that it is now time for conservatives to adapt to the new government's vision for the country and its future.

He added that since Khamenei has urged everyone to support Pezeshkian's success, the conservatives will naturally heed his advice and assist the government. "Even their occasional criticism of the administration is intended to be constructive," Taraqqi noted.

In a subtle reference to Paydari's radicalism, Taraqqi further emphasized that, given the challenges the Islamic government faces with Israel and the United States, and the widespread dissatisfaction among Iranians over the economy, all political factions should steer clear of radical actions.

Owji, who led what is arguably the most critical ministry in Iran, is accused of having “misled” the public with “fake statistics and concocted data.”

Rouydad24 did not mince words last week, suggesting that the former Minister's behavior could cause some “to question [his] mental stability.” The publication lambasted Owji for wasting four years of resources with no tangible achievements, describing his tenure as one filled with empty rhetoric.

Following the death of Iran's former President Ebrahim Raisi and the apparent exit of the ultraconservative Paydari Front—the radical party that gained prominence during his term—some observers note that the press is seizing this moment with newfound assertiveness, though it's uncertain how long this will last. With a seemingly reduced fear of repercussions compared to Raisi's presidency, the media are now more openly exposing the shortcomings of the previous administration’s oil policies.

In his final remarks as Oil Minister, Owji claimed that his ministry had made fundamental strides in addressing the gas imbalance and managing the country's growing energy consumption.

Rouydad24, however, cited experts who challenged the validity of Owji's statement. “Not a single word in his speech corresponds to reality. The Raisi administration’s performance in the gas industry was a complete failure, even according to official statistics,” one critique stated.

Weighing in on the criticism, Nasrollah Zarei, a former deputy in the oil ministry under President Hassan Rouhani, offered his analysis of Owji’s claims.

“The key elements in the discussion of the imbalance in energy products or carriers are, most importantly, natural gas and gasoline. When Owji boasted about increasing natural gas production, the truth was quite the opposite—natural gas production in Iran actually decreased under his watch,” Zarei stated.

He further added, “The claimed increase in natural gas consumption due to industrial and residential growth was nothing but a lie. The reality is that there has been no significant increase in these sectors.”

Zarei also pointed out that the imbalance in natural gas was due not to an increase in consumption, as Owji suggested, but to a decrease in production—a direct result of unmet plans, unexecuted projects, and the failure to implement necessary measures on time.

“This issue is particularly true for gas fields like South Pars, where natural declines in pressure were not adequately managed,” Zarei explained, underlining the systemic failures of the previous administration.

The former administration’s claim to have completed Phase 14 of South Pars, a key gas project, using domestic capabilities, was another point of contention. Zarei criticized this narrative, stating, “The majority of the work on Phase 14 had been completed during Rouhani’s presidency. What Owji did was merely superficial. It had no real impact on production.”

The daily Entekhab also took aim at the former administration's oil sales policies.

The outlet detailed how Iran’s oil exports, particularly to China, were carried out under heavy discounts due to sanctions. While Owji said that Iran was exporting oil to 17 countries, the reality was that China remained the primary, if not the only, significant buyer. Even then, these sales were heavily discounted, with Iran selling its oil at $15 less per barrel than Omani oil, leading to significant financial losses for the country.

Majid Ansari, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, disclosed in July 2024 that, under international sanctions, the Islamic Republic was offering daily discounts of $26 million to its sole oil buyer, China. In a video published by the Jamaran website, Ansari stated, “We asked at what price are you selling? They give a discount of 15 to 30 dollars per barrel, with an average of 20 dollars per barrel… That means $26 million a day from the money of the Iranian people.”

That sentiment was echoed by Masoud Daneshmand, a shipping industry expert, who elaborated on the scale of Iran’s losses in an interview with Entekhab.

“We are currently selling oil to China and giving a discount of 8 to 10 dollars per barrel, but they say they will buy our oil, but keep the money in yuan, which we must use to buy goods from them. If we want to free our money and buy from another country, there will be about a 16% currency transfer cost. With the discount we give on oil, this results in about a 25% loss in our transactions with the Chinese,” Daneshmand explained. He further confirmed Ansari’s estimates, stating, “The number Ansari mentions—at least $10 billion a year—is the loss being imposed on the Iranian people.”

Despite Owji’s efforts to downplay the extent of the discounts, the data indicates otherwise. Under the previous administration, Iran’s oil sales were not merely about offering discounts; they symbolized a broader failure to seize investment opportunities, resulting in reduced production and the decline of the country’s oil industry infrastructure.

Another industry expert who talked to Entekhab commented on Iran’s daily losses from oil sanctions back in February 2022.

Seyed Hamid Hosseini explained to the outlet, “We have a daily loss due to the inability to sell oil, and some of it is also the costs imposed on us because of the sanctions. The combination of these two determines the loss. We have an annual financial turnover of $100 billion through imports and exports, and we pay about 10 to 20 percent in additional costs for transportation, money transfers, discounts to customers, and other expenses; therefore, we lose about $10 to $15 billion this way.”

The media’s post-Raisi revelations, bolstered by expert analysis, paint a stark portrait of Owji’s tenure as Oil Minister.

As Iran navigates an uncertain future, with the potential for stricter sanctions enforcement hinging on the results of the upcoming US elections, the shadow of the previous administration’s failed oil policies is poised to linger --- casting its influence over both Supreme Leader Khamenei's leadership and the newly elected President's term.

“Clarify the reason for your son’s attendance at an official government meeting,” prominent sociologist Mohammad Fazeli who was among the first to join Pezeshkian’s campaign as an adviser took to X to demand from the Vice President.

Fazeli warned that Pezeshkian’s government is bound to be disgraced if nepotism and the interference of family members in government affairs does not stop. “The likes of me did not pledge their honor to the people so that the likes of Mr. Aref’s son roam freely in and around the government,” he added.

Controversies over Hamid-Reza Aref, 46, first began in 2017 when speaking about his education and career achievements he referred to the “good genes” he inherited from his parents in an online interview. At the time, Aref who served as vice president to the reformist President Mohammad Khatami from 2001 to 2005 was the head of the minority Reform faction in the parliament.

Since then, the phrase ‘having good genes’ has become synonymous with ‘family politics,’ referring to members of influential official and clerical families who enjoy privileges by virtue of their birth—privileges that have existed since the founding of the Islamic Republic. For example, Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini, son of the Republic's founder Ruhollah Khomeini, held no official position but served as his father’s top aide until his death.

“Everyone has a weakness, [Mohammad-Reza] Aref’s weakness is the good family gene … One should take their complaint to Pezeshkian who appointed him to the post,” one of the critics tweeted. 

Hamid-Reza Aref has also recently been accused of using his privileged position to install Faezeh Dolati who has had close family connections as his father’s adviser and aide. The appointment has particularly irritated reformists because Dolati’s husband, a former state television presenter, is known as a hardliner.

In recent years, the term ‘good genes’ has become synonymous with ‘aghazadeh,’ a label used to describe the privileged offspring of regime officials and insiders. These individuals leverage their fathers’ influence and privileges to amass power and immense wealth, often beyond the reach of ordinary citizens, through access to insider information, preferential treatment (rente), and legal immunity.

‘Aghazadeh’ draws from ‘agha’, a mundane word meaning sire/or mister in modern Farsi. In clerical circles, however, agha can also refer to men of high religious authority and influence. Thus, politicians and officials who want to emphasize their obedience to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei often simply refer to him as ‘Agha’.

‘Aghazadegi’ drawn from ‘aghazadeh’, has accordingly come to refer to nepotism as a phenomenon in general. Aghazadeh is also an established last name which some families including the family of the former oil minister Gholamreza Aghazadeh have used since using last names became mandatory in 1924.

A Bloomberg report Friday that claimed another ‘aghazadeh’, the son of Iran’s former National Security Chief Ali Shamkhani is a significant figure in global oil markets has exacerbated the concerns over ‘aghazadegi’.

The Bloomberg report shed new light on Hossein Shamkhani’s recent ventures, including a Dubai-based company that is engaged in pushing vast quantities of Iranian and Russian oil into international markets by rebranding crude oil and various petroleum products in third-party jurisdictions such as the UAE as well as oil from countries not subject to sanctions.

Gholam-Ali Jafarzadeh, a former lawmaker, alleged on Saturday that ‘aghazadehs’ benefit from sanctions because they "earn nine percent of the proceedings from the sale of every shipment of oil."

“They sell the oil to China but take African currencies. That was why [former President Ebrahim] Raisi had to go to Africa and buy their commodities,” he alleged.

Over the years, the privileges enjoyed by regime insiders have become glaringly apparent to the general public, significantly undermining the legitimacy of the Islamic governing system. The common perception is that 500 to 1,000 elite families control Iran, hoarding the nation's wealth, while half the population struggles at the poverty level.