Senior Research Analyst, NUFDI
With the supreme leader’s retreat from view since the 12-Day War with Israel, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) appear to have taken on his role as political disciplinarian, nudging senior figures to keep their feuds out of public view.
It’s a task Ali Khamenei once handled directly — intervening to rein in factions and reassert unity — but his low profile in recent weeks has left a vacuum.
Not long before this “visible invisibility,” Khamenei publicly warned against the perils of political loose talk.
“Our shortcomings, our tongue wagging, our pointless bickering, our lack of patience, our incorrect analysis of the situation, sometimes change the course of history,” he said on April 24.
At the time, the remarks were read as a reprimand to officials for lax security and for letting their rivalries spill into the open, weakening Tehran’s hand in dealings with adversaries, above all Israel and the United States.
Now, those same dynamics are on display again, but it’s the IRGC playing nanny, sweeping up the shards of political infighting while Khamenei focuses elsewhere.
The clerical establishment is trying to thread an impossible needle: secure sanctions relief, or at least stave off a European “snapback” of UN sanctions, through diplomacy, while rebuilding its triple deterrence— missile and drone stockpiles, its proxy network, and uranium enrichment program.
Fracas One: ‘golden calf’
On August 5, Saeed Jalili, a Khamenei representative to the Supreme National Security Council and a prominent hardliner, lashed out at advocates of renewed talks with Washington, calling them “golden calf worshippers”—a scriptural reference denoting impatience and betrayal.
Jalili, who lost to Masoud Pezeshkian in the 2024 presidential race, has long opposed engagement with the West. But this time his remarks drew fire not just from reformists, but also from the hardest core of Iran’s power: the IRGC.
The IRGC-linked daily Javan warned that airing strategic disputes in public was “harmful,” while the Guards-affiliated Tasnim news agency cautioned against “radicalism.”
Only Raja News, tied to the sidelined family of late president Ebrahim Raisi, backed Jalili — a move likely aimed at clawing back influence.
Under sustained pressure, Jalili retreated on August 12, posting on X that failing to negotiate when opportunities arise would “cause losses,” citing Khamenei’s April endorsement of Oman-mediated nuclear talks with the U.S.
Fracas Two: no way but to talk
From the other side of the political spectrum, President Pezeshkian triggered the next flare-up on August 10.
“You reject engaging in talks. What’s your alternative? Do you want to fight? Fine, [the adversaries will] strike again. Then you have to repair the damage… These are not issues to be approached emotionally,” he told critics.
Reformist outlets hailed his “realism” and “honesty,” while hardline media accused him of advocating “surrender.” Again, the IRGC intervened.
Aziz Ghazanfari, a senior political chief, praised Pezeshkian’s “honesty and purity,” but warned that “not everything should be said in public” and urged him to stick to pre-approved, scripted comments.
Whether the IRGC can keep senior politicians’ “tongue wagging” in check—and prevent Khamenei’s carefully balanced machinations from unravelling—may determine whether Tehran’s strategy holds or fractures again.
In just three weeks, Larijani has traversed the highest corridors of Moscow, Baghdad, and Beirut.
The veteran conservative met Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in Moscow late July. This week, met Iraqi leaders, laid a wreath at the site of Qassem Soleimani’s killing, and visited Lebanon amid a push to disarm Tehran-allied Hezbollah.
Once sidelined from presidential politics, the former parliament speaker and IRGC founding member is now back at the centre of power—chairing the new Defence Council and is dispatched abroad to steady alliances and project resilience at a moment of regional strain and looming succession.
The itinerary reflects his rebirth: Moscow for geopolitical depth, Baghdad to reinforce Iran-aligned proxies, Beirut to guard influence amid Western-backed disarmament moves.
Syria lies outside the traditional axis: Assad has fallen, Jolani governs Damascus and IRGC forces have withdrawn, yet some Iranian influence endures through discreet networks and shadow intermediaries.
War mode reloaded
Larijani’s revival is no accident but a deliberate restoration of wartime instincts.
During the Iran–Iraq War, real power shifted from Khamenei’s ceremonial presidency to Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, the acting Deputy Commander-in-Chief.
The slight was deeply felt by Khamenei, who spent much of his second presidential term at the front, forging bonds with commanders like Soleimani—ties that became the backbone of the Beyt-e Rahbari after he became Supreme Leader in 1989.
Khamenei disappeared from public view during Israeli strikes on Iran in June. The so-called 12-day war, in which many of his key protégés were killed, reinforced Khamenei’s long-held belief in relying on loyal men willing to risk all to preserve him.
That’s where Larijani enters the picture.
Unqualified no more
A former chief nuclear negotiator, he was deemed unfit to run for the presidency as late as 2024. Now, he has been placed at the helm of the Defence Council, positioned as both succession strategist and potential wartime coordinator.
Precedent underpins this orchestration.
In 2011, Ahmadinejad’s 11-day disappearance during a succession standoff left a vacuum between the presidency and the Leader’s office.
As speaker and a member of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Larijani navigated the crisis amid speculation that IRGC-linked governance was filling the gap.
Today, Khamenei is again turning to the tools that preserved the theocracy in its formative years: centralised command, crisis-tested operatives, and the fusion of media, military, and diplomacy.Beirut’s standoff illustrates the stakes.
Lebanon test case
The US plan to disarm Hezbollah—paired with Israeli withdrawal and reconstruction aid—has exposed Lebanon’s political fault lines.
On the eve of Larijani’s arrival, Hezbollah denounced the plan as a “grave sin” and rejected it in cabinet, while the Lebanese army was tasked with drafting legislation to give the state a monopoly on arms.
Former President Michel Aoun and others have called for “arms under state authority” through dialogue, while Hezbollah insists on Israeli withdrawal first, warning it will resist any state compulsion.
Amid these fractures, Larijani’s mission is not the defence of state sovereignty but the calculus of regime survival—Khamenei’s answer from the past to a future laden with uncertainty.
Larijani is not simply a returning statesman but a recycled instrument from the Islamic Republic’s most turbulent chapters, tasked now with holding the line until the next hand—willing or not—seizes the tiller.