Banisadr, President Ousted By Iran Clerics, Dies After 40 Years In Exile

An announcement by the Treasury said the Mammut Industrial Group, also known as Mammut Industries and its subsidiaries were no longer under United States sanctions.

Mammut Industries and three of its main executives/shareholders were put in the sanctions list in were sanctioned in September 2020 by the Trump administrationpursuant to Executive Order 13382, issued by President George Bush in 2005, targeting “weapons of mass destruction and their proliferators and supporters.” The executive order threatened fines, imprisonment, and freezing assets.

The Mammut Industrial Group and its subsidiaries are private companies with thousands of employees in Iran, were accused by the US to have supplied "military-grade, dual-use goods" to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization and specifically, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which makes liquid-propelled missiles.

In early July, the three individuals, Behzad Daniel Ferdows, Mehrzad Manuel Ferdows, and Mohammad-Reza Dezfulian were all excluded from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

At the time, the Treasury in a statement said that "These delistings do not reflect any change in US government sanctions policy towards Iran,” a Treasury spokesman told Reuters anonymously. “They have nothing to do with ongoing JCPOA negotiations in Vienna.”

The Biden Administration, refuting former president Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, announced its intention to return to the agreement. A round of talks began in Vienna with the participation of the remaining signatories of the deal, with the US indirectly negotiating with Iran on the sidelines.

After six rounds of talks Iran suspended the meetings in June saying its new president needed time to form a government. But two months after Ebrahim Raisi (Raeesi) came to office, Tehran is still not ready to resume negotiations.

The United States and its European allies have become concerned and have been urging Iran to return to the negotiating table, citing Tehran’s continued enrichment of uranium.

The Treasury’s announcement on Friday did not provide any explanation for the removal of Mammut and its subsidiaries, simply listing the delisted entities with their legal names and addresses.

Banisadr, a lay political activist who came to support Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini during the Iranian revolution in 1978, was elected president in February 1980, while clerics were consolidating their power at the expense of leftist and nationalist revolutionary groups.

Banisadr also served as overall war commander once Iraq suddenly attacked Iran in September 1980.

As tensions increased between leftists and clerics, Banisadr was seen as a non-clerical politician loyal to Khomeini, the founder of the revolution, but also supporting the right of all groups to operate without hindrance.

As street clashes increased between the clerical forces and opposition groups led by the Mujahedin-e Khalq, Banisadr was forced to flee the country an live in exile in Paris for 40 years.

Banisadr cofounded the National Council of Resistance of Iran in 1981 with the Mujahedin-e Khalq Islamic-leftist opposition group.

During his one-day visit to Bushehr, in southern Iran, Raisi (Raeesi) said the current 1,000-megawatt (MW) capacity of Iran’s sole nuclear power plant would be tripled with further development, and that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran was committed to increasing production from nuclear power to 10,000 MW.

Construction began in 2017 on two new nuclear reactors, due for completion in 2024 and 2026 at Bushehr with a projected combined capacity of 2,100 MW. The work follows a 2014 agreement between Iran and Rosatom, Russia's State Atomic Energy Corporation, which carried out most of the construction of the first reactor and provided fuel when it began operating in 2011.

With electricity generation at around 50,000-56,000 MW in the past few years, rising no more than 2,000 MW a year, Iran has struggled to meet consumption that has been rising and is encouraged by subsidized prices.

With an annual average of 300 sunny days in over two-thirds of the country Iran has great potential for solar energy, but renewables including hydro-power account for 7 percent of Iran’s energy generation compared to 90 percent from natural gas.

It is not clear why the government does not invest in renewable energy instead of nuclear reactors, especially given the frequent occurrence of earthquakes in the country that could pose a ganger to nuclear plants.

Iran’s daily electricity consumption reached 64,000 MW June this year, leaving a shortfall of around 10,000 MW. With first international and later United States sanctions during most of the past decade, the government has struggled to renew ageing power plants and grid amid estimates that 10 percent of electricity is lost during transmission. Drought this this year has brought a reduction in hydroelectric power, 15 percent of which comes from dams.

The situation has resulted in higher electricity imports from neighboring countries and a reduction in electricity exports to limit outages in cities and damage to industries including agro-food.

There has been controversy over cryptocurrency mining, which makes heavy demand on electricity. Some argue that around 7 percent of global cryptocurrency mining takes place in Iran, due to one of the world’s cheapest electricity tariffs and the advantages e-currencies offer in enabling trade away from United States scrutiny. Estimates of energy demand from this miningrange from 300 MW to 3,000 MW.

The Human Rights Activists’ News Agency (HRANA) reported that violent inmates attacked the political prisoners in ward 2 of the Greater Tehran Penitentiary injuring several. A few were taken to the prison’s infirmary for their injuries.

Ahmad-Reza Haeri, a former political prisoner tweeted that the guards did not intervene and left the gates locked as the attack was taking place, despite pleas of help from the political prisoners.

Many male and female political prisoners have complained in the past that interrogators or prison officials had threatened them with having violent inmates attack them.

Haeri also reported that the political inmates have been moved to an unknown location and have no contact with the outside world.

Hrana said that political prisoners in the Greater Tehran Penitentiary had complained before of being kept with violent inmates despite laws to separate the prisoners.

The conflict has killed an estimated quarter of a million people and left millions more homeless.

On September 21, officials from Saudi Arabia and Iran – the Middle East’s two biggest powers and bitterest rivals – met at Baghdad airport for the fourth round of talks aimed at improving relations. Three other rounds of direct talks took place during the administration of moderate Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. There was a short hiatus in August while the new – and deeply conservative – president, Ebrahim Raisi, took office, but in recent weeks new momentum has been found.

Commenting at the beginning of October, Saudi minister of foreign affairs, Prince Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud, expressed the hope that the talks would “provide a basis to address unresolved issues between the two sides”. The following day, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman, Saeed Khatibzadeh, told reporters that all parties were “trying to start a sustainable relationship within a mutually beneficial framework”, adding that talks were “in their best state”.

The talks came just a month after the Baghdad International Conference for Cooperation and Participation brought representatives from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Egypt and others together to discuss regional security concerns. Saudi Arabia and Iran are, of course, central to regional security, but have regularly found themselves on opposing sides of regional conflicts.

While tensions between the two states have been high, in recent years there has been an acceptance among Saudi officials that Riyadh’s confrontational policy towards Iran has failed. But a great deal of work needs to be done to address not only decades of animosity but also the practicalities of ending conflict in Yemen. The semi-regular prisoner swaps will only go so far towards achieving this.

While many date the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, tensions can be traced far earlier – reflecting a series of issues pertaining to geography and the treatment of minority groups. But the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran raised the pressure. The explicitly anti-monarchical vision of Iran’s supreme leader, Ruhollah Khomeini, didn’t help matters as Saudi Arabia’s ruling al-Saud family found themselves the subject of a great deal of criticism from Iran’s clerical leadership.

In the following decades, this rivalry has begun to play out in divided societies across the Middle East such as the “proxy arenas” of Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, and particularly Syria and Yemen, often with devastating results. But it has been the conflict in Yemen – a bitter struggle that until now has shown no sign of abating – which is the biggest concern. In Yemen the Saudi-backed Hadi military coalition has been at war with the Houthi rebel movement which receives funding from Iran but honed its military skills over two decades of conflict with the Yemeni government.

As Yemen watchers have observed, the war is actually comprised of a number of different conflicts. Central to this is a conflict between government forces and the Houthi movement, but adding to this complexity is the presence of a secessionist movement in the south of Yemen. There is also tribal competition in the east and competition between different branches of the military along the Red Sea coast. These groups receive varying levels of support from external powers, including Saudi Arabia, Iran and the UAE. These different fault lines in the conflict have mapped onto the geography of the state, facilitating its fragmentation.

A resolution of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran can have a dramatic impact across the region. Yet the interplay of regional and local politics means that fighting in Yemen can hinder any regional peace agreements. Meanwhile, tensions continue thanks to the provision of funding by regional powers to local groups in pursuit of increased influence.

As a consequence, a clear mechanism to build trust – and ultimately peace – is needed to bring about an end to fighting in Yemen. This mechanism is the subject of discussions between Saudi and Iranian officials – but reports suggest that proposals have been taken to senior Houthis in Yemen.

For Saudi Arabia, any peace with Iran is dependent on a cessation of attacks on its soil from Houthi missiles. This will require Iranian guarantees that Houthi attacks on the kingdom will end. It may also require the reopening of Sana’a airport, which currently remains under blockade. In return, Iranians expect Saudi Arabia to withdraw its opposition to the nuclear deal and a resumption of diplomatic relations.

But peacebuilding is never easy. Two days after the Saudi statement about the good progress of peace talks, the interception of ballistic missiles and “bomb-laden” drones launched by the Houthis towards Saudi Arabia highlighted just how precarious things are in Yemen. So there’s still a lot of work to be done, but – seemingly for the first time since this bitter conflict flared in 2014 – there is confidence on all sides that this bloody mess can be resolved.