Debate Over Ukraine Reflects Divisions Among Political Elite In Iran
As debate about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues in Iran, divisions reflect the political dispositions of various factions over Tehran’s foreign policy.
As debate about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues in Iran, divisions reflect the political dispositions of various factions over Tehran’s foreign policy.
Pro-Moscow positions are abundant in hardliner media outlets close to the core of the regime, such as Kayhan and Iran newspapers, while reformist daily Arman on Saturday and Sunday reflected anti-Russia views that normally do not find their way into the media.
Many ordinary Iranians and opponents of the Islamic Republic invariably support Ukraine and condemn the government pro-Russia policies on social media.
Other reformist media such as Sharq and Etemad newspapers carve out a position in between the two extremes. They often harshly criticize Moscow for its violation of international law, but invariably remind that the United States is no better when you look at its track record in places such as Afghanistan and the Middle east.
Reformists criticize President Ebrahim Raisi’s administration for tacitly blaming NATO and the United States for Russia’s actions, while also criticizing the US to remain politically correct given the regimes animosity toward Washington.
A good example of a reformist approach to the issue was reflected in an article in the Etemad daily by commentator Abbas Abdi who tried to strike a balance by blaming both Russia and the United States for the crisis in Ukraine. He said: "In the agreement about the nuclear disarmament of Ukraine and guaranteeing its territorial integrity in the 1990s, Russia undertook not to invade Ukraine and the agreement was also guaranteed by the United States. How responsible should a guarantor be?"
Abdi wrote in another part of the article: "Iranian hardliners say we should learn a lesson from this crisis in which the United States has not stood by its commitment [to Ukraine]. That is right. But don't Iran's hardliners want to take a lesson from Russia's behavior? Russia had guaranteed that no country would be allowed to invade Ukraine. I wish you take this lesson and rely on the people's support rather than relying on foreigners."
Abdi further wrote that Iran's position about Russia's invasion of Ukraine leaves the impression that it is not an independent state. He argued that Iran behaved in a way as if it had no other choice but to support Moscow. He hinted that Raisi’s supportive phone call to Vladimir Putin did not portray Iran as an independent country.
Abdi asked, "Why are we in such a position? We are in this position because of the same reason that Ukraine's president counted on the West in his confrontation with Russia. In the same way, Iran should not count on Russia or China in its confrontation with the West as they follow their own interests. And interests will push ethics and international commitments to the margins."
On the pro-Moscow front, Hossein Abbaszadeh Meshkini, the spokesman for the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Relations Committee opined in an interview with Didban Iran that "Russia's attack on Ukraine was a deterrent measure to prevent an extensive war in Europe at the same scale as World War II."
Abbaszadeh further claimed that Moscow's “preventative” measure has been taken within the frameworks of the UN Charter. He claimed that the West's occupation of Afghanistan and Syria as well as everyday developments in the Middle East follow the same logic. He stressed that Russia is concerned about the expansion of NATO toward the Russian borders, adding that no independent country would tolerate NATO's presence at its borders.
He said Russia has been repeatedly sanctioned by the EU and the United States and it cannot tolerate NATO's presence at its borders. Abbaszadeh reiterated the regime’s position by saying that "We believe Russia and Ukraine can solve their problems through diplomacy which offers a less costly solution."
Over the weekend, Western countries moved to expand economic sanctions against Russia that threw tens of thousands of troops with tanks and air power to conquer Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s decision was the most serious challenge to Western security perhaps since World War II.
Finally, Western countries agreed to remove several Russian banks from the international banking system SWIFT, an action that was also taken against Iran in the past decade.
While, unlike the Iran case, Russian oil and gas have not been sanctioned, experts agree that banking and other sanctions will impact its energy exports and revenues Moscow depends on.
Western sanctions threaten to substantially weaken the Russian ruble, as well as the health of its banks. They could also trigger high double-digit inflation, a sharp recession and serious unemployment, with their inevitable political consequences. These in combination could turn into a systemic affliction that would be hard for Russia to shake off even after the crisis end in some sort of positive resolution.
Iran’s example is there to see. Although international sanctions were lifted in early 2016 after a nuclear deal was signed and Iran was able to take a deep breath, its international trade and banking were far from normal.
Iranians complained for two years that foreign companies were reluctant to deal with them, banks would not easily cooperate to facilitate trade deals and even ordinary Iranian expats encountered problems in other countries to extend visas, open bank accounts and receive credit lines.
Residual sanctions syndrome
This is what we can call ‘residual sanctions syndrome’. One of the most important aftereffects of international sanctions is loss of credit worthiness in the world financial system, even after sanctions are formally lifted. Institutions are extremely cautious to lend money and most importantly foreign investors avoid a country that experienced Western sanctions.
Again, Iran is a good example. The two-year period from 2016-2018 when most economic sanctions were removed, Iran had a hard time to get major deals and joint ventures. While the country needed tens of billions of dollars in investment, it was able to secure just a few billion dollars.
When Donald Trump became president and criticized the nuclear agreement in 2017, the few investors, such as the French energy giant Total, which had carefully tip-toed into Iran after sanctions had been removed, immediately slowed down investment and eventually withdrew when the US began reimposing sanctions.
Economic sanctions in today’s global economy are also complicated matters and even after they are removed many financial and business actors are not sure what provisions and regulations have been relaxed and how to make decisions without risking legal complications.
One aspect of the residual sanctions syndrome is the persistence of the underlying political factor(s) that led to a sanctions’ regime in the first place. Iran did come to an agreement with the United States and its allies over limiting its nuclear program, but it was still perceived as a pariah state because of its anti-Western foreign policy and its continued overt and covert destabilizing actions in the Middle East.
The psychological aftereffects of sanctions tend to be strong if the sanctioned party is expected to re-exhibit erratic behavior. Would-be investors and trade partners know that there is an inherent risk of doing business with an actor that was once pressured by sanctions and is likely to repeat undesirable actions either driven by aggressive impulses, ideology or militarism.
Even if Putin resolves the Ukraine issue with an agreement and the immediate causes of sanctions are resolved, Russia will lose trustworthiness with business decision makers who simply cannot be sure when the next crisis will come.