China Imports More Iranian Oil Now Than It Did Before Sanctions
China's has boosted Iranian oil imports to record levels in recent months, exceeding a 2017 peak before the US imposed sanctions, tanker tracking data confirms.
China's has boosted Iranian oil imports to record levels in recent months, exceeding a 2017 peak before the US imposed sanctions, tanker tracking data confirms.
Higher imports by China comes amid talks between Tehran and world powers to revive a 2015 nuclear deal that will lift US sanctions on Iranian oil exports. The talks have intensified in recent weeks.
Iran International reported in February that China’s customs grossly underreported its oil imports from Iran.
When the United States imposed full sanctions on Iran’s oil exports in May 2019, China continued to buy 100,000-200,000 bpd until the third quarter of 2020. Before the US presidential elections, reports emerged that Iran was shipping more crude to China and the volume steadily increased, reaching the current levels.
Throughout last year, major American business publications such as The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg were reporting that China had substantially increased its oil imports from Iran, which could undercut Washington’s leverage in the nuclear talks.
Analysts say the return of Iranian oil will ease tight global supplies and cool crude prices that have touched $100 a barrel following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But Iran excess production capacity is limited as it is already exporting more than one million barrels per day.
Chinese imports exceeded 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) for January, according to estimates of three tanker trackers, surpassing the 623,000 bpd peak recorded by Chinese customs in 2017 before former US President Donald Trump reimposed sanctions in 2018 on Iranian oil exports.
One tracker estimated imports amounted to 780,000 bpd in November-December on average.
US President Joe Biden's administration has so far chosen not to enforce the sanctions against Chinese individuals and companies amid the negotiations on reviving the 2015 deal.
Record Chinese purchases of Iranian oil would mean less supply will be available to Tehran's previous buyers like Indian and European refiners should the sanctions be removed, traders said according to Reuters.
It would also mean that cheaper Iranian oil will continue to crowd out rival supplies from Brazil and West Africa, they said.
When asked for a comment by Reuters, China's foreign ministry declined to go into details but reiterated that Beijing opposes Washington's long-arm jurisdiction and urges Washington to remove unilateral sanctions.
Iranian officials have boasted in recent weeks that they have substantially increased oil export and defeated US policy of ‘maximum pressure’ imposed by former president Donald Trump.
A US State Department spokesperson said Washington is aware of China's Iranian oil purchases and has broached the subject with Beijing.
“China is an important trading partner for Iran, so, of course, our discussions with China on how best to get a mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA include discussions of sanctions enforcement," said the spokesperson, referring to the 2015 nuclear deal formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Demand From Teapots
At the forefront of China's buying are its independent refiners, or "teapots", who, traders said, are being enticed by the discounted prices, especially as their domestic refining margins got pinched under tight regulatory scrutiny.
"We're seeing more plants taking Iranian oil, because they are cheaper," a China-based executive involved in the business told Reuters, referring to the independent refiners.
Traders said January Iranian cargoes were transacted $5 a barrel below benchmark Brent LCOc1. Those prices were steady versus late 2021 but more attractive against competing supply from Brazil that was priced at $7 premium over Brent, they said.
Consulting firm Petro-Logistics, which tracks oil flows, said Iran's crude exports surged in December to over 1 million bpd, the highest level in almost three years.
"Iran's oil exports are mostly going to China, often through convoluted routes and transshipments, with small volumes going to Syria each month," said CEO Daniel Gerber.
Petro-Logistics sees total Iranian oil exports at close to 800,000 bpd in January and 700,000 bpd in February. But OilX, another data analytics firm, pegged Iranian exports at more than 1 million bpd for both January and February.
Iranian officials recently confirmed that they offer discounts to customers.
If the 2015 nuclear deal is revived, Iran is expected to divert sales away from the Chinese independent refiners, but the Islamic republic is unlikely to turn off the tap to these customers, source of more than $20 billion in revenue over the past two years.
"Iran may not have the full confidence how long the new deal could last. Chinese teapots have proven an essential outlet during the worst times and Iran would want to keep that channel open," said the China-based oil sector executive.
With reporting by Reuters
Over the weekend, Western countries moved to expand economic sanctions against Russia that threw tens of thousands of troops with tanks and air power to conquer Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin’s decision was the most serious challenge to Western security perhaps since World War II.
Finally, Western countries agreed to remove several Russian banks from the international banking system SWIFT, an action that was also taken against Iran in the past decade.
While, unlike the Iran case, Russian oil and gas have not been sanctioned, experts agree that banking and other sanctions will impact its energy exports and revenues Moscow depends on.
Western sanctions threaten to substantially weaken the Russian ruble, as well as the health of its banks. They could also trigger high double-digit inflation, a sharp recession and serious unemployment, with their inevitable political consequences. These in combination could turn into a systemic affliction that would be hard for Russia to shake off even after the crisis end in some sort of positive resolution.
Iran’s example is there to see. Although international sanctions were lifted in early 2016 after a nuclear deal was signed and Iran was able to take a deep breath, its international trade and banking were far from normal.
Iranians complained for two years that foreign companies were reluctant to deal with them, banks would not easily cooperate to facilitate trade deals and even ordinary Iranian expats encountered problems in other countries to extend visas, open bank accounts and receive credit lines.
Residual sanctions syndrome
This is what we can call ‘residual sanctions syndrome’. One of the most important aftereffects of international sanctions is loss of credit worthiness in the world financial system, even after sanctions are formally lifted. Institutions are extremely cautious to lend money and most importantly foreign investors avoid a country that experienced Western sanctions.
Again, Iran is a good example. The two-year period from 2016-2018 when most economic sanctions were removed, Iran had a hard time to get major deals and joint ventures. While the country needed tens of billions of dollars in investment, it was able to secure just a few billion dollars.
When Donald Trump became president and criticized the nuclear agreement in 2017, the few investors, such as the French energy giant Total, which had carefully tip-toed into Iran after sanctions had been removed, immediately slowed down investment and eventually withdrew when the US began reimposing sanctions.
Economic sanctions in today’s global economy are also complicated matters and even after they are removed many financial and business actors are not sure what provisions and regulations have been relaxed and how to make decisions without risking legal complications.
One aspect of the residual sanctions syndrome is the persistence of the underlying political factor(s) that led to a sanctions’ regime in the first place. Iran did come to an agreement with the United States and its allies over limiting its nuclear program, but it was still perceived as a pariah state because of its anti-Western foreign policy and its continued overt and covert destabilizing actions in the Middle East.
The psychological aftereffects of sanctions tend to be strong if the sanctioned party is expected to re-exhibit erratic behavior. Would-be investors and trade partners know that there is an inherent risk of doing business with an actor that was once pressured by sanctions and is likely to repeat undesirable actions either driven by aggressive impulses, ideology or militarism.
Even if Putin resolves the Ukraine issue with an agreement and the immediate causes of sanctions are resolved, Russia will lose trustworthiness with business decision makers who simply cannot be sure when the next crisis will come.