Does Biden Calling Iran Nuclear Deal Dead Reveal Real US Thinking?

This video, which was published on Twitter for the first time by Damon Maghsoudi, a software engineer living in the United States, was recorded on the sidelines of the November 4th election campaign in California.

In this video, an Iranian-American woman asks Biden to declare the West's nuclear agreement with Iran, known as the JCPOA, is “dead”.

In response, the US President clearly confirmed that the JCPOA is “dead”, but he he said he cannot announce it for “a lot of reasons”.

The Iranian woman than tells Biden, “We just don’t want any deals with the mullahs, they don't represent us,” and he replies, “I know they don't represent you, but they will have a nuclear weapon that they will represent.”

Although Biden does not give a direct answer about the “reasons” why Washington refuses to officially announce this, but concerns about Iran’s progress towards obtaining a nuclear weapon could be the main reason for leaving the door open with the Islamic Republic.

However, analysts have been saying for weeks that the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the West have reached an impasse.

Massimo Aparo, IAEA deputy director general, led a delegation billed by Iran as addressing “outstanding issues,” widely taken to refer to an impasse over uranium traces found by the agency in Iran in sites not declared as nuclear-related. The IAEA said Sunday it planned no public statement, and the Iranian news agency ISNA merely reported meetings – which included Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran – had addressed “future joint cooperation and programs, in addition to safeguarding issues.”

The IAEA has been seeking clarity over the uranium traces, found last year in sites linked to Iran’s nuclear work before 2003. The agency argues Tehran should provide satisfactory answers as part of its ‘safeguards’ obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

But the IAEA probe has become entangled with efforts to restore the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement, the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). Tehran has said the IAEA should drop is enquiry which it says began only after Israel in 2018 made a raft of allegations during efforts to back United States President Donald Trump in withdrawing the US from the JCPOA and imposing draconian sanctions on Iran.

The 35-member IAEA board in June and November passed US-drafted motions condemning Iran over not satisfying the agency. Opposing the move, China and Russia said it would stymie talks to restore the JCPOA.

Speaking at the third Tehran Dialogue Forum, Kharrazi who is the head of a foreign policy outfit at Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s office, referred to Iran’s “high-level” nuclear capabilities, but maintained that “we do not intend to produce an atomic bomb, because we do not regard it as a component of our security.”

Iran’s English-language media did not mention Kharrazi’s comments about the ability to build nuclear weapons, but semi-official Persian media covered it as headlines.

Kharrazi said that during his tenure as foreign minister (1997-2005) the European powers did not agree for Iran to have a few uranium enrichment centrifuges, but now Iran has a vast infrastructure to produce fissile material.

“With Iran’s resistance and the efforts of Iranian scientists, we now have 19,000 centrifuges working [to enrich uranium],” the former foreign minister said.

Kharrazi reiterated previous Iranian claims that the country’s ruler Khamenei is against the production of nuclear weapons because it will not bring security. He argued that if Iran becomes a nuclear weapons power, others in the region will start an “arms race and trying to produce nuclear weapons.”

While denying the intention to produce atomic bombs, Kharrazi said, “We are of course aware of the issue that having the nuclear technology in itself is a deterrent.”

Kharrazi then insisted that Iran is ready to return to its commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal, the JCPOA, if the West also honors its commitments. “Related to recent negotiations, the issue of inspections and claims by the agency [IAEA] remain,” he said and expressed hope that these can be resolved.

Iran began violating the terms of the JCPOA after the United States pulled out of the agreement in 2018 and imposed economic sanctions. It now enriches uranium up to the 60-percent level, which is short step away from the 90-percent enrichment it would need to produce nuclear weapons.

Iran’s economic situation is fast deteriorating, with its currency losing 50 percent of its value in the past 15 months, and especially since protests began in September.

Negotiations to revive the JCPOA also reached an impasse in late August, and this is a negative factor impacting the economy, as lack of an agreement leads to general pessimism in the country.

The harsh and deadly suppression of protests in the past three months has led to another complication in the nuclear talks, as Western governments have become less willing to renew a deal that would provide tens of billions of dollars to a regime which has killed nearly 500 people and jailed around 20,000.

Their reasons reflect the danger of alternative approaches, the unpredictable consequences of a military strike on Iran, and the belief that there is still time to alter Tehran's course: even if it is inching toward making fissile material it is not there yet, nor has it mastered the technology to build a bomb, according to officials.

"I think that we do not have a better option than the JCPOA to ensure that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons," Josep Borrell, the European Union's foreign policy chief, said last week in Brussels after a meeting of EU officials. Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action under which Tehran reined in its nuclear program in return for relief from economic sanctions.

"We have to continue engaging as much as possible in trying to revive this deal."

The uphill climb to revive the pact has grown steeper this year. Iran has brutally cracked down on popular protests, Iranian drones have allegedly made their way to aid Russia's war in Ukraine and Tehran has accelerated its nuclear program, all of which raise the political price to giving Iran sanctions relief.

"Every day you see more and more pundits saying this is the worst time for reviving the deal and we should just be putting pressure on the wretched regime there," said Robert Einhorn, a nonproliferation expert at the Brookings Institution think tank.

"There is a kind of resignation, even among the strong proponents of revival. Their hearts would be for paying the political price for a revival, but their heads tell them it would be really tough," he added.

90% ENRICHMENT A RED LINE?

In 2018 former US President Donald Trump reneged on the 2015 deal that, in a key provision, limited Tehran's enrichment of uranium to a purity of 3.67%, far below the 90% considered bomb grade.

Trump reimposed U.S. sanctions on Iran, leading Tehran to resume previously banned nuclear work and reviving U.S., European and Israeli fears that Iran may seek an atomic bomb. Iran denies any such ambition.

Iran is now enriching uranium to 60%, including at Fordow, a site buried under a mountain, making it harder to destroy through bombardment.

Obtaining fissile material is considered the greatest obstacle to making a nuclear weapon but there are others, notably the technical challenge of designing a bomb.

A US intelligence estimate disclosed in late 2007 assessed with high confidence that Iran was working to develop nuclear weapons until the fall of 2003, when it halted the weapons work.

Diplomats said they believed Iran had not begun enriching to 90%, which they said they viewed as a red line.

"If Iran were to clearly restart its military program and enrich at 90% then the entire debate changes in the United States, Europe and Israel," said a Western diplomat, saying the diplomatic path would remain open unless that happened. US politicians have grown more hostile to cutting a deal because of Iran's ruthless crackdown on protests that began after a 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman, Mahsa Amini, died in September in the custody of Iran's morality police.

U.S. President Joe Biden's administration has intensified sanctions against Iran in recent months, targeting Chinese entities facilitating sales of Iranian crude and penalizing Iranian officials for human rights abuses.

Still, even though negotiations are stalled Enrique Mora, the European diplomat who coordinates the nuclear talks, "keeps talking to all sides," said a senior Biden administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

"We will continue with the pressure while keeping the door open for a return to diplomacy," US special envoy for Iran Robert Malley told reporters in Paris last month, adding that if Iran crossed "a new threshold in its nuclear program, obviously the response will be different." He did not elaborate.

Iran has linked a revival of the deal to the closure of investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into uranium traces at three sites. The United States and its allies have not agreed to that condition.

DIPLOMACY MAY LIVE EVEN IF JCPOA DIES

Several Western diplomats said they did not believe there was any imminent consideration of military action against Iran and suggested a strike could simply reinforce any Iranian desire to obtain nuclear weapons and risk Iranian retaliation.

"I do not think ... anybody is envisaging a military option in the near-term," said the Western diplomat. "The solution isn't going to be military and I don't hear a lot of people calling for one."

A third diplomat said he thought it practically impossible for Israel to bomb Iran without Western support.

Even if the 2015 nuclear deal cannot be resurrected, the senior Biden administration official said other diplomatic solutions might be possible.

"Whether, when and how the JCPOA can be revived is a difficult question," he said. "But even if, at some point, the JCPOA were to die, that would not mean that diplomacy would be buried at the same time."

Source Reuters - By Arshad Mohammed and John Irish

The United States, France, and the United Kingdom are arguing that Russia and Iran are violating UN Security Council Resolution 2231 by Tehran sending military drones to Moscow. While US spokesman Vedant Patel told a press briefing Friday that he was “not going to get ahead of the UN internal deliberations,” there has been chatter for months that the US wants to restore UN sanctions against Iran under a ‘snapback’ procedure in the JCPOA.

What is ‘snapback,’ and why does it matter?

The JCPOA lifted international sanctions against Iran in return for strict limits on the Iranian nuclear program. Under the terms of the JCPOA, the sanctions can ‘snapback’ if Iran violates the agreement.

Is Iran violating the agreement?

Iran began breaching JCPOA limits – for example enriching uranium to 60 percent rather than the permitted 3.67 percent, and by using more advanced centrifuges – in 2019, the year after President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the 2015 agreement and imposed ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions.

So why is ‘snapback’ being raised now?

It has come up because France, Germany, the US and the UK have told the UN that Iran’s supply of military drones to Russia for use in Ukraine breaches a clause in Resolution 2231 required prior UNSC approval (up to October 2023) for the transfer to and from Iran of certain military equipment and weapons. These powers say Iran’s supply of drones violates that clause – and this has raised the possibility of snapback, under which multilateral sanctions would come back onto Tehran.

Does the drone supply for sure violate Resolution 2231?

That is yet to be decided. Monday’s meeting may produce a view from the UN secretariat as to whether Russia and Iran are violating Resolution 2231 – following up a request for an investigation made in a letter sent in October by the US, France, Germany and the UK.

Snapback relates to “significant non-performance of commitments.” Resolution 2231 refers to a 79-page document submitted at the time by the US – S/2015/546– that listed categories of weapons needing prior Security Council approval. S/2015/546 refers to drones “capable of delivering at least a 50kg payload to a range of at least 300km,” and while Iranian-made drones can have a range of over 1,000km they carry a slightly lighter payload. There would be a clearer violation if Iran transferred Fateh-110 and Zulfiqar missiles.

How would ‘snapback’ work?

Any party to the JCPOA can move snapback within the ‘JCPOA Commission.’ If after 30 days, the issue is not resolved, then UN sanctions would come back into effect. For the issue to be resolved, a UNSC member would need to move at the Security Council that sanctions not come back into play, and this could be vetoed by any other member.

This was the basis for the claims from President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry at the time the JCPOA was signed that Russia, or China, could not stop snapback. It’s as if the veto power is reversed.

But can the US move ‘snapback’? Didn’t it leave the JCPOA?

When the Trump administration tried to move snapback in 2020, other JCPOA members, including the three European signatories (France, Germany, and the UK) said it couldn’t because it had left the agreement.

But this interpretation has been challenged. Gabriel Noronha, an Iran advisor 2019-21 to Trump, argued in tweets November that the US could still move snapback.

What would be the practical effect of snapback?

Some say the ‘bark’ would be worse than the ‘bite.’ For Europe to reimpose sanctions on Iran would make little difference given its trade has massively reduced under US ‘maximum pressure,’ under which the US can penalize any third party for dealings with Iran, and which has left Tehran unable to access billions frozen around the world. Russia and China will argue that the US left the JCPOA and is in no position to cite it to justify any actions.

What are US intentions?

State Department Spokesman Ned Price has been unenthusiastic when asked about snapback, although his references November to a possible Russian veto were speedily rebutted by Noronha. US officials have referred to various other means of restricting Iran-Russia links, including US sanctions on Iranian defense companies and generals.

Washington may be less concerned over Iranian-made drones – which are useful to Russia but less effective in the conflict than the publicity suggests – than over the possible transfer of missiles. US strategy is to run down Russia’s military capacities.

How is the Ukraine war affecting talks to revive the JCPOA?

One reason for the US not to move snapback may be the logic, inherent in the JCPOA, that the nuclear file should be kept largely separate from other issues. Given JCPOA critics argue such separation is difficult, if not impossible, the Biden administration is saying it can take stringent measures against Iran – over missiles, or treatment of protests – while remaining open to reviving the JCPOA. Only time will tell if they are right.