A Top Iranian Conservative Admits Unrest In Iran Is Serious
Recent protests in Iran were more widespread than in the past, an influential conservative has admitted, expressing surprise at the sharp international reaction.
Recent protests in Iran were more widespread than in the past, an influential conservative has admitted, expressing surprise at the sharp international reaction.
Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, who is a leading figure among hardliners, in a television program contradicted what the Islamic Republic has tried to portray as limited protests since September.
Bahonar, who is also a member of the regime’s Discernment Council, said that the protests were “more widespread and deeper than demonstrations in the past five years, but he still used the word “riots” to characterize the popular movement.
The clerical regime has refused to recognize that the unrest triggered by the death in custody of a young woman in September was a genuine popular expression of dissatisfaction at the multiple crises Iran faces.
However, he admitted that “certain grievances and inefficiency in the economy, politics and even culture and diplomacy exist in the country.” On a few occasions in the past one year, Bahonar who was a deputy speaker of parliament, has asked for reforming governance in the Islamic Republic, even directly appealing to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in February 2022 to support “structural changes.”
Bahonar has a proven track record in organizing and mobilizing conservative groups. He did that following the landslide victory of Iran's reformists in the 1997 presidential election and the 2000 parliamentary elections and consolidated the conservative groups. Nonetheless, he had remained conspicuously silent on major political issues until Iran’s economic situation deteriorated and President Ebrahim Raisi’s first few months in office came as a shocking disappointment to many conservatives.
In his latest statement, he repeated his previous position that "We need a second Republic," meaning that a Constitutional Assembly should be formed to determine new boundaries for the government's authority and the people's rights.
On the face of it, this is not much different from what Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the reformist opposition figure under house arrest, said Saturday. In scathing criticism of the regime, Mousavi put forth three conditions: A free and untainted referendum about the necessity to change or write a new constitution. Second, in case of a positive vote by the people, to form a constitutional assembly composed of the “real representatives of the nation” through a free and fair election. Third, a second referendum to approve the draft constitution to establish a regime based on rule of law, in conformity with human rights and the will of the people.
Although Bahonar repeated the official line that “enemies” played a major role in instigating the protests, he called for wider political participation. He argued that conservatives' political rivals should not be barred from elections as it was the case in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2020 and 2021. He also criticized the political system for weakening the country's political parties.
This runs counter to Khamenei’s policy of consolidating rule under hardliners, with a substantial number of parliament members representing the Revolutionary Guard at the expense of hundreds of other loyalists who were prevented from running in the elections.
Bahonar criticized the one-sided vote in 2020 and argued that it resulted in a low elections turnout and convinced foreign powers that the Islamic Republic has lost its legitimacy.
Referring to recent protests and noting that they have not come to an end, Bahonar said that after the protests recede, “we should not forget about the people's grievances and protests, although we tend to forget about their complaints as soon as the situation calms down."
IRGC Brigadier General Jamaleddin Aberumand, who is currently serving as an aide to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (Qalibaf) and was a former deputy commander for IRGC coordination affairs, has appropriated parts of the salaries that the IRGC meant to pay to its militias in countries such as in Syria and Yemen.
Aberoumand was the head of IRGC Bonyad Cooperative, an entity also known as the Cooperative Foundation of the Revolutionary Guard and under US Treasury Department sanctions since December 2010. He was apparently in charge of paying the salaries of IRGC Quds (Qods) Force militias-- a division responsible for extraterritorial military and clandestine operations.
Zainebiyoun Brigade -- recruited mainly from Shia Pakistanis living in Iran – and Fatemiyoun Brigade – recruited from Afghan refugees in Iran and Afghanistan – were formed in 2014 to fight in Syria along with President Bashar al-Assad forces. These forces, along with Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah forces in Lebanon are some of the forces that are in fact employed and regularly paid by the IRGC.
A senior IRGC commander, who talked to Iran International on condition of anonymity, says the Fatemiyoun, Zainebiyoun and Houthis were paid a monthly salary of $700 in 2018 but the figure has been reduced in recent years. By 2022, the militiamen are paid about $100 to $200 per month. According to this information, Hezbollah fighters receive the highest salaries among the proxy forces, at about $1,300 per month, while the maximum salary of IRGC proxy forces in Syria is $250, and the Yemeni Houthis receive $100 a month.
However, the catch is that although they are paid significantly less than their earlier salaries, Aberoumand – and probably other IRGC commanders working with him – report much higher salary expenses to the government and pocket the difference. The source told Iran International that they overcharge the government to the tune of $500-1000 per month per fighter. The amount lost in the alleged corruption scheme runs into hundreds of millions dollars a year.
According to unconfirmed reports, the Quds force has more than 200,000 forces across the Middle East although the number the IRGC is eager to admit is about half of that. Therefore, to provide the money needed for the salaries of the undeclared forces, the country manipulates the budget figures to make up for the difference.
In early 2022, an audio file of a meeting of IRGC commanders was leaked that revealed that Aberoumand played a key role in a corruption case at Tehran municipality of about 13 trillion rials ($440 million at the exchange rate then), indicating financial irregularities that took place under the watch of Ghalibaf when he was the capital’s mayor from 2005 to 2017. The irregularities may have been a way to provide for the salaries of the Quds forces. Several officials and advisors close to Ghalibaf were arrested over the case but not Aberoumand. In January 2018, a then-City Councilor Majid Farahani disclosed that $5 billion of Tehran’s municipality funds went missing during Ghalibaf’s tenure.
Part of the recording directly implicated Ghalibaf, former Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, Aberoumand, and then Chief of the IRGC Intelligence Organization Hossein Taeb in covering up the embezzlement of 80 trillion rials (around $3 billion at the time) between Tehran municipality and a firm controlled by the IRGC -- Yas Holding.
In the recording, it is revealed that Ghalibaf suggested the IRGC and Tehran Municipality sign a false contract for the same amount to justify the disappearance of the money. An official is heard saying that Khamenei had ordered 90 percent of the money earned by Yas Holding to be used to finance the Quds Force and the remaining 10 percent to go to the IRGC for its general needs.
To prevent such fiascos in the future, the current administration has come up with a new remedy in the country’s state budget. In the budget bill for the next Iranian year, which starts March 21, the government has granted new permits to some departments such as the General Staff of the Armed Forces and other regime entities to sell oil products on behalf of the government and earn some of the income.
According to the Note 1 of the bill – titled “Oil and its relations with the government” -- the National Iranian Oil Company is obligated to deliver “crude oil and gas condensates” to entities introduced by the executive bodies. As per the new measures, the General Staff of the Armed Forces is given the authority to sell and refine oil up to €4.5 billion. It means that the Armed forces can give crude oil to refineries and receive products that should be exported.
Khatami issued a long statement, as a few other reformists also issued their statements just days before the 44th anniversary of the Islamic Republic on February 11.
During the past days several reformist, moderate and conservative politicians in Iran, including former president Hassan Rouhani, Expediency Council member Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, former deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi pointed out that the government needs to surrender to demands for reforms to save the country from havoc.
However, every one of these political figures put forth his own solution which mainly revolved around amending the Constitution or ensuring its full implementation.
It was only Mousavi who called for a brand-new Constitution based on a referendum and end to ‘reformism’ as a strategy for change, but he stopped short of saying how the current political establishment should be removed first.
Khatami who has never officially acknowledged his role as the leader of the ‘reformists’ accepted that "reforms have reached a deadlock." However, he still argued that another attempt to bring about change should pursue the path of reforms, without saying how the establishment would allow free elections or free speech.
Those opponents who demand a regime change have long argued that the Islamic Republic is not “reformable”, but politicians like Khatami who have remained loyal to the concept of an Islamic republic have never accepted that their 25-year efforts to bring about meaningful change have failed.
Jamshid Barzegar, a political analyst in Europe and a contributor to Iran International TV reacted in a series of tweets to Khatami’s statement, arguing that it is an attempt to help the regime rather than a serious plan for change. He contrasted the former president’s words with those of Mousavi and said that the latter has really parted ways with ‘reformism.’
The former president also warned that Iran is facing an all-out crisis which has its roots within the country. He further called for changes in the current constitution of the Islamic Republic to cope with the shortcomings that are visible everywhere.
Others have pointed out that amending the constitution is not a solution if clerical rule is not abolished and complete freedoms are not granted.
Khatami also insisted that the general feeling in society is that the situation is bad, and Iran's enemies are taking advantage. At the same time, the government has been restricting civil liberties, he said. The result is a wide gap between the people and the government.
For the young protesters in Iran, using terms such as “enemies” would sound like repeating Khamenei’s slogans. They want to replace the Islamic Republic with a secular and democratic system, and do not believe that the United States, Europe or even Israel is an enemy.
Khatami warned that the collapse of the Islamic Republic will lead to chaos, civil war and bloodshed, an argument often used by the regime.
As his way out of the crisis he suggested strengthening national solidarity by giving a chance to all ideas, ethnic groups and religions to take part in the political dynamics through holding free and fair elections.
Khatami's third suggestion was declaring a general amnesty for all prisoners. Correcting the judicial process in Iran was his fourth suggestion. Freedom of news dissemination and supporting independent media and campaigning against all forms of corruption in the system were his fifth and sixth suggestions.
Khatami's next two suggestions were about leadership. He called for the accountability of all officials without mentioning Khamenei.
Preventing the military from intervening in political and economic affairs, changing the foreign policy, and putting an end to security organizations’ control over hiring and firing government employees were the other solutions Khatami suggested as a way out of the current crisis in Iran.
However, he did not propose a strategy or tactics to achieve these goals. It remains unclear if he would support protests or civil disobedience to force the government to relent. Short of that, many have expressed nice wishes for change, but Khamenei and his supporters have persisted in their ways of governance.