Iran International
Candles, vigils, sobbing and lamenting mothers, and offerings of traditional food and snacks at cemeteries on colorful tablecloths are common scenes in Iran this week.
Families of victims and ordinary people mark the 4th anniversary of the killing of at least 1,500 mostly young protesters in less than five days in November 2019.
Photos of fallen protesters are circulating widely on social media, with users posting collages of hundreds of images of young men and women who lost their lives in one of Iran's bloodiest crackdowns on dissent under the Islamic rule.
Days of intense nationwide protests, triggered by a sudden government decision to raise fuel prices, started on November 14, 2019, and marked the beginning of prolonged periods of dissent. What made the people angry was not simply a price rise. It was the painful humiliation they felt as the government did not bother to let them know in advance about the hike. In addition, when the media reported about a possible price rise, government officials denied any such plans.
The announcement came at midnight, presumably to minimize public shock. However, the morning revealed an even greater shock, as prices had tripled overnight. Iranians, anticipating a ripple effect on other prices, took to the streets in unprecedented numbers.
As many, including Iranian journalist Shahed Alvai have observed, "the crackdown was even more unprecedented. Protests took place in 104 Iranian cities in 29 provinces, and they were quickly turned into a massive anti-regime movement. Protesters ruled out reconciliation with the government and took to the streets in a scale that terrified the government."
The Revolutionary Guard’s paramilitary forces, the Basij, that was deployed to suppress the demonstrations labeled the 2019 protests as "An all-out war against the regime and the Islamic revolution." The regime's response was ruthless massacre, a method it continued to employ in subsequent nationwide protests, including those sparked by public anger with the Morality Police, after the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini after her arrest for “improper hijab” in September 2022.
During the 2019 protests in the month of Aban on the Iranian calendar (October 22 to November 21), protesters, for the first time, chanted slogans against the entire regime: "We do not want the reformists and conservatives. That is all over!" They were referring to two insider factions ruling Iran for three decades. The government recognized the severity of the threat, leading to a violent crackdown on dissent, and in the words of Iranian dissidents, "Aban continued."
Four years later, references to Aban are abundant. People are still remembering and mourning the fallen protesters who were often shot at point blank range as documented by International human rights organizations. The victims' families are still being harassed by security forces and sometimes imprisoned for several years.
In subsequent protests, the government, mindful of the international backlash to the large number of protester deaths, took pride in claiming fewer casualties in 2022. However, shotguns replaced rifles, resulting in many being wounded or blinded, and a higher number ended up in jail.
What the ruling elite did not learn was addressing the root cause of dissent: Deteriorating economic conditions in 2019 and serious political issues including demands for civil liberties and respect for human rights in 2022. Only after the nationwide protests in 2022 did government officials express a willingness to engage in dialogue with the people. However, once the streets calmed, they abandoned the call for reconciliation, adopting a rude and humiliating tone toward Iranians, particularly women, teachers, university professors, workers, and pensioners, on a daily basis.
Reformist commentator Abbas Abdi reminded the government in a commentary in Etemad newspaper that, during the 2022 protests, they used to be humble and call for dialogue with protesters. However, as soon as they believed the protests were behind them, they returned to their factory settings, speaking arrogantly.
According to Abdi, authorities interviewed 66 scholars, including himself, to understand the events and reasons behind the protests. However, he criticized the government's reluctance, stating, “As far as they are concerned, there was a security problem, and the security forces sorted it out." Abdi acknowledged that "The way the government is handling last year's protests has not changed."
Despite government assertions, numerous social media posts by political activists, often writing under an alias, insist that the Bloody Aban is not over. As Alavi pointed out, "The names, memories, and pictures of Aban 2019 live on as family members of fallen protesters keep them alive. Eyewitnesses are in prisons, and family members have not stopped seeking justice." Mahboubeh Ramezani, the mother of Pejman Gholipour, one of the young men killed in November 2019, has told the government: "You know that Aban has destroyed you and that Aban still goes on."
The controversial legislation, a clause of Article 75 of the Seventh Development Plan, mandates the Ministry of Islamic Guidance to launch a database consisting of information collected from online activities of individuals for "continuous monitoring and evaluation of cultural indicators, people’s lifestyles, media influence, and communications."
The legislation also requires government agencies and all domestic websites and platforms, including online businesses, to continuously feed their user information to the database.
Media and individuals on social media have extensively criticized the legislation that the parliament approved on November 8 but has yet to be endorsed by the constitutional watchdog, the Guardian Council.
Detractors, including legal experts, express concerns over the lack of assurance regarding the safety of individuals' sensitive personal information, despite a reference to Article 25 of the Iranian Constitution in the legislation. Article 25 explicitly prohibits the government from engaging in spying on citizens' private communications, “unless when required by law.”
Critics argue that this provision would empower any judge to override individuals' right to privacy whenever authorities, including security forces, decide to obtain private information and data derived from an individual's online activities across various platforms. This encompasses information related to travel and transportation, as well as online searches and downloads.
An earlier version of the proposed legislation explicitly outlined that the collected data would be utilized by authorities to "consolidate the Islamic-Iranian lifestyle," aiming to ensure that people's lifestyles align with the perceived Islamic standards of the regime.
In an interview with Ham-Mihan newspaper, Ali Yazdikhah, the deputy chairman of the parliament’s cultural committee, insisted that only "macro-data" would be stored in the database, emphasizing that it would not include information on individual citizens' lives and lifestyles. However, he acknowledged that data inputted into the system, such as individuals' interests or participation in religious ceremonies like Ashura, could be utilized to assess the general interest "in [Islamic] values and sanctities."
Several critics, including lawmaker Moeeneddin Saeedi, who opposes the bill, argue that the more the state engages in cultural engineering, the greater resistance it will encounter from the public. Saeedi stated, "Experience has proven that we have failed to advance indicators of culture with these [engineering] methods," he said during the debate on the parliament floor.
As an example, Saeedi pointed out that the current year's budget law stipulates that mosques conducting prayer congregations twice daily should receive financial incentives. However, he contended that the effectiveness of such measures in encouraging regular prayer is questionable, as over 75 percent of mosques in the country remain inactive due to insufficient attendance, despite the authorities' efforts to revitalize them.
Renowned journalist and social researcher Abbas Abdi told Ham-Mihan newspaper that the gathering of data for social research, if indeed the intended purpose of launching a database, is not inherently new or objectionable. However, he argued that government agencies lack the competence to carry out reliable research projects, and they are neither genuinely interested in nor adequately prepared to discover people's preferences or to publish research results to public.
He highlighted that authorities routinely withhold statistics on sensitive topics, including relationships between men and women, alcohol consumption, addiction, birth rates, age of marriage, and suicide.
“Suppose that they conduct research [based on the data available in the database] about dress code [=hijab], … They can’t publish the results because they are afraid people’s views and beliefs [will be known],” he said.
“However, if they intend to monitor people’s private lives and gather personal information, this would only be for the purpose of controlling and intimidating the public,” he added.
According to the latest data released by the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), the inflation rate in the country has surged to its highest level in the past 22 months, hitting 54.8% for the month of Mehr (ended October 22), economic website EcoIran reported, after analyzing data released by the CBI. The central bank rejected the report as false, insisting that the inflation is about 45 percent. It claimed that there were discrepancies in calculations.
EcoIran says the number is based on the Central Bank's tables, which are presented periodically to the judiciary to calculate overdue debts, fines, and dowries. The CBI rejected EcoIran’s figure as “wrong” but did not elaborate on the table presented in its document.
The Statistics Center of Iran (SCI) and the CBI claim that the rate of annual inflation has dropped to 45.5 percent, nearly the same level as a year ago, but some things cannot be denied via changing technical definitions. Food prices have risen much faster than the official inflation rate, in some instances hitting 100-percent in 2022. ILNA news agency reported this week that the decline in people's purchasing power is so steep that some workers are surviving the second half of the month with just eating "one egg a day."
The central bank and the ministry of the economy stopped issuing regular and precise economic data in 2019 as US sanctions imposed the previous year pushed an already struggling economy into a deep recession. In the absence of credible data by the Central Bank of Iran about inflation, Iran's Statistics Center became the primary official entity announcing these figures. Government officials and the central bank usually announce lower inflation figures for consumer goods.
Iran’s former chief banker Abdolnaser Hemmati, an outspoken critic of the current administration’s economic policies, said Wednesday that the government has failed to control inflation or the devaluation of the rial. He said that the measures the Raisi’s administration has taken to control the economy has led to “an economic repression and more rente in the currency market," a French term used in Persian to imply privileges resulting from undue influence.
The currency has lost its value 12-fold since 2018 when the United States withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear accord and imposed sanctions. The rial has also lost about 80 percent of its value compared to mid-2021 and close to 50 percent since December 2021.
The government is desperate to control the currency market hoping that it can artificially keep the Iranian rial high. It created multiple exchange rates for rial against the dollar and other foreign currencies, providing subsidies – or cheaper dollars – for the import of essential items. However, the system is manipulated by regime insiders or businesspeople with government connections.
Hemmati said that during the past seven months (since the start of the Iranian year in March) the CBI has supplied $20 billion via a special currency scheme known as NIMA. Exporters have to bring back hard currencies they earn to Iran and sell it at a cheaper rate to the government, which then makes it available to importers at less than than the market exchange rate. He elaborated that the 30-percent discount on the exchange rate provided in NIMA has amounted to an equivalent of $4.4 billion, claiming that about 50 to 100 percent of this amount is pocketed by intermediaries or importers with close links to the regime.
Mohammad Aram, the Deputy for Foreign Exchange at the Central Bank, announced earlier in the week that a total of $42 billion has been provided since March, a three-percent rise in comparison to the corresponding period last year. According to him, the Ministry of Industry, Mining, and Trade received $26.6 billion, the Agriculture Ministry received $10.4 billion, and the Health Ministry received $2.7 billion for importing their needs.
The US dollar is set at 285,000 to the rial in the special government scheme versus the free market where it is traded at about 510,000. The discrepancy between the two breeds corruption, as well-connected individuals and companies can buy cheap dollars through NIMA and instead of using it to finance imports, sell it on the currency market.
Numerous cases of such corruption have been revealed since 2018. The government also regularly sells dollars through the free market to currency dealers to support the beleaguered rial. Usually, these interventions have a limited and temporary effect.
Donya-e-Eqtesad, Iran’s most popular economic newspaper highlighted the paradox this week that the government is providing more foreign currency for the import of essential goods, but they are growing increasingly scarce in the market.