The IRGC-affiliated Fars news website claimed a turnout of more than 40% after polls closed at midnight in Iran's controversial elections, despite numerous reports indicating lackluster participation.
The Fars reportestablished a narrative that other outlets hesitated to challenge. Shortly after vote counting commenced, the state news agency IRNA also claimed a turnout of 41%. Compared to the official participation rate of 42.57% in 2020, the government figures aimed to demonstrate that the Mahsa Movement has had minimal impact on the regime's legitimacy and popularity, even with less than 50% of eligible voters participating.
The regime's propaganda apparatus and election officials had worked diligently to gradually legitimize this inflated number in the public eye. In late February, IRIB reported survey results indicating a 43% voter turnout expectation. ISPA's data three days before election day echoed this sentiment, projecting a 41% turnout. Thus, the claim of "more than 40%" seemed a calculated attempt to maintain the consistency of past rigged elections, without resorting to an overt falsehood like 60%. This modest deception aligns with a regime that boasts of 50 million attendees at its anniversary, presenting a relatively modest distortion.
Just hours before Fars News released its turnout figures, the Tehran governor implicitly threatened to prosecute anyone discussing turnout before the IRGC's outlet did so: "Anyone who comments on the participation rate in the elections is speculating individually and bears the responsibility alone."
However, the claim of "more than 40%" seems dubious for two reasons. First, three pre-election surveys indicated national participation rates of 35% or less. Internal estimates by Mohammad Reza Bahonar put national participation at 35%, with Tehran at 17%. Gamaan's latest survey suggested only 25 to 30% of eligible voters intended to participate. Additionally, Statis Consulting's survey projected a record-low turnout of 34%. The average of these figures, at 33%, is significantly lower than both the Fars News and IRNA numbers, with the margin of error typically between 1-3 percent.
Even the statistics indicating 35%, 30%, or 34% participation in what many view as sham elections should be viewed skeptically. In a police state, where individuals fear surveillance, some may falsely claim participation over the phone, rendering such polls unreliable.
Another reason for skepticism lies in the lack of enthusiasm evident before election day, with reports of empty polling stations during supposed peak times.
Officials maintained the participation rate of Tehran at ballot boxes compared to the previous term (24%), implying political continuity from four years ago. However, the reported increase in participation in Alborz province (up to 30%), adjacent to Tehran, seems implausible given the region's activism during the 2022 protests.
Regarding the new Majles composition, it was evident from the start that the Guardian Council, Khamenei's office, and IRGC sought to maintain the status quo. Disqualifications were intended to secure this outcome, and early results confirm this expectation.
Two unexpected developments emerged: Mohammad Reza Bahonar's loss in Kerman province, potentially challenging parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf for the speakership, and former president Mohammad Khatami's decision to refrain from visiting polling stations, despite his ongoing encouragement for people to vote following the 2009 presidential elections.
While the Iranian regime heavily relies on Beijing as its primary oil customer, the actual data on bilateral economic relations appears less promising for the sanctions-stricken country.
China's foreign trade statistics for 2023 reveal that Beijing's largest trade volume is with the European Union, reaching $783 billion last year. Following the EU are major economies such as the US ($664 billion), Japan ($318 billion), South Korea, and others.
This overall picture will most probably not appeal to the Iranian regime sympathizers who have frequently lauded Tehran-Beijing ties as a sign of Iran’s foreign policy success; they have to be very patient to get to Iran’s name on the list.
Iran's placement as China's 38th trading partner, with trade volume not exceeding $32 billion, falls significantly behind several neighboring and regional rivals. Saudi Arabia, for instance, boasts a trade volume with China of $107 billion, followed by the UAE, Iraq, Turkey, and Oman.
Next in the region are the UAE ($95 billion), Iraq ($50 billion), Turkey ($43 billion) and Oman ($35 billion). Qatar, Kuwait, Pakistan and Egypt are the only regional countries whose volume of trade with China is less than Iran’s.
Iran Economist news website covered China’s foreign trade data in 2023 and Iran’s meager share in it, ironically calling it “the new achievement” of the Iranian government.
Faraz Daily, an online newspaper, warned that decline in trade with China is just a symptom which reflects a much enormous problem: Iran’s decline share of the world trade. According to the newspaper, Iran’s share of world trade has alarmingly decreased to %0.24 in 2022.
Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, economist and the founder of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, a think-tank focusing on economic diplomacy in the Middle East and Central Asia, remarked on X that “Chinese exports to Iran have fallen significantly since their 2014 peak” while Beijing’s trade with Moscow has grown.
Many observers contend that China has over the past years considered Iran as an instrument through which it can boost its leverage in the region. According to Amin Saikal, emeritus professor of Middle Eastern, Central Asian and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University, “in befriending Iran and Afghan theocracies, China has positioned itself to be able to extend its influence across West Asia, given Tehran’s formidable proxy presence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.”
Despite this, Iranian officials have made numerous concessions to China, including granting contracts for infrastructure projects in Tehran, a move criticized by Ahmad Khorram, former Roads and Transportation Minister, as detrimental to local expertise.
Earlier this month, Tehran’s municipality announced that China will soon start building housing units in the capital. Mayor Alireza Zakani said several contracts have been signed with Chinese companies to revamp the capital’s infrastructure, including construction and transportation projects, at the expense of local businesses amidst a crippling economic crisis.
Rejecting the deal as an insult to the local expertise, Ahmad Khorram, former Roads and Transportation Minister, warned that “we have given China privileges that are unprecedented in our country.” According to the former minister, Tehran provides Beijing with all these privileges to guarantee its support in the UN Security Council.
Both China and Russia have collaborated with the US over banning Iran’s nuclear program and were the first countries to back the Security Council’s resolutions against Iran, he stressed.