Doubts Loom Over Iranian Election Figures Amidst Discrepancies
The dust has settled on the highly engineered 2024 parliamentary election polls in Iran, prompting an evaluation of the management mechanisms and outcomes for the regime.
The dust has settled on the highly engineered 2024 parliamentary election polls in Iran, prompting an evaluation of the management mechanisms and outcomes for the regime.
Following each manipulated election in Iran, where the precise level of participation remains undisclosed, and the resulting parliament remains loyal to the Supreme Leader, it becomes feasible to discern the impact on the regime's stability.
In brief, the fraudulent elections of 2024 not only failed to alleviate doubts regarding Iran's electoral procedures but exacerbated them. While such elections carry certain advantages, including a facade of democracy, temporary regime propaganda, and the stirring of dissent among opposition factions regarding participation, these benefits come at a cost. With the increasing challenges of manipulating votes, deceiving the public, and clandestinely tampering with ballots in the digital era, the feasibility of sustaining these manipulations is dwindling.
The lowest turnout ever delegitimized the next Majles (parliament) and Experts Assembly when the government desperately needed more legitimacy after its image became badly damaged in 2022-2023 repressions against the Mahsa Movement. The figures provided by the Ministry of the Interior and government propaganda channels regarding eligible voters (61 million instead of 65 million), disqualification of hundreds of candidates, and total turnout (40 or 41 percent compared to a more realistic 16-34 percent) have raised considerable doubts among the populace.
Materials related to these doubts are still being published in Iran, although the IRGC spokesman ordered news websites to stop discussing the elections three days after the vote and even before announcement of the official results.
Continued skepticism about statistics
Not only the opposition and the people in the streets and bazaars, but also former officials who are still in contact with government personnel, do not believe the official results. "Based on the calculations of the voting in Tehran and the most votes obtained, it seems that there were more than 500,000 invalid votes in Tehran," says Ali Rabi’i, a former high-ranking member of the Ministry of Intelligence in three administrations, and Minister of Labor. He is aware that he will be prosecuted if he does not have reliable sources. The government claims that well over 1.5 million votes were cast in Tehran without announcing the exact number, so blank or invalid protest votes were at least 25-30 percent of the total.
Glorious elections
Iranian officials called the election a miracle and epic. However, the candidates with the highest votes in 31 provinces won an average of 5% (from 2% to 17%) of votes according to the manipulated statistics of the Ministry of Interior from the 18-year-old and above population. Despite the non-participation of 59%, according to the official statistics, the many Reformists are still trying to prove their loyalty to the regime and their followers despite the fact that the regime barred them from the elections. Former President Mohammad Khatami did not even mention that he was not going to vote before the election day, which could have reduced participation even more.
The hardliners who engineered and carried out the now failed elections try to justify the low turnout by an inverted logic and strange excuses, while at the same time boasting about “good elections.” One of the excuses is the impact of US sanctions on voters, while according to their own logic of popular anti-American support, participation should have been higher. They also argue that if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s guidelines and policies were fully implemented, more people would have voted. In fact, the current economic crises and the harsh repressive policies that drove away the voters are the direct results of Khamenei’s policies. His foreign policy, for example, has brought on the economic sanctions and lack of normalcy in Iran’s international ties that have impoverished the voters.
A court in Tehran ruled Monday that German-Iranian Sharmahd and the United States government should pay the amount as compensation for the families of the victims of a terrorist attack in Iran, of which Sharmahd is accused.
Sharmahd, a 68-year-old software developer and California resident, was abducted by Iranian agents during a visit to the United Arab Emirates in 2020 and forcibly taken to Iran. In February 2023, the Iranian judiciary sentenced him to death on charges of endangering national security a verdict upheld by Iran's Supreme Court. Sharmahd was convicted of heading a pro-monarchist group named Tondar accused of a deadly bombing incident that occurred in 2008 at a religious center in Shiraz, killing 14 and injuring 215 more. However, many years ago other people were already arrested and convicted for the bombing.
However, Sharmahd along with his family and lawyers have denied the charges and Iran has provided no evidence to support its allegations. Amnesty International has condemned the trial as a sham.
The US-based activist whose group Tondar purportedly aims to restore the overthrown monarchy, toppled in the 1979 revolution, is believed to have been forced to confess to the charges against him, in a typical fashion of forced confessions.
Iran’s change of approach towards the case seemed like a detour to gain concessions from the US in exchange for reducing Sharmad's death sentence. The Biden administration last year agreed to release at least $6 billion in frozen Iranian funds for the release of five hostages similarly convicted in sham trials. The Qatar-brokered deal to free up frozen Iranian funds in South Korea in exchange for five US citizens, led to allegations that the Biden administration is playing a dangerous game encouraging the hostage-taking of yet more dual nationals abroad.
The recent ruling by the Islamic Republic's judiciary is seen as a way to pressure the United States and Germany to pay what amounts to a ransom for Sharmad's release. The Islamic Republic has a history of taking hostages and using them as bargaining chips in negotiations.
Many former officials and experts from the US and other countries, as well as Iranian dissidents, had warned that the prisoner release deal with Iran would set a “dangerous precedent” and would only encourage the regime for taking more hostages. "This will only encourage more hostage taking by the Iranian terrorists” the former US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, said.
Richard Goldberg, a senior adviser at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and former White House National Security Council director for countering Iranian weapons of mass destruction, had echoed such fears. “President Joe Biden’s decision to trade $6 billion for five American citizens unlawfully detained in Tehran isn’t just the largest hostage ransom payment in American history—it’s also the second phase of an unacknowledged agreement with Tehran that strengthens the ayatollah’s position in the Middle East and frees the regime to cross the nuclear weapons threshold at a time of its choosing. Americans need to brace themselves for the consequences of both realities.”
It is not the first time Iran has won in the hostage diplomacy stakes. In 2015, President Barack Obama agreed to pay Tehran $1.7bn for the release of four Americans as part of the broader negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal.
Iran took more hostages in the months and years thereafter, believing it could get an even better price from a future US president. While the Trump administration turned to pressure instead of ransoms and won the release of two hostages without paying any money, under President Biden, ransom payments have returned at multiple times the cost. While the Obama administration paid $425 million per American in 2015, the Biden administration agreed to pay $1.2 billion.
Iran's crude oil production stood at an estimated 3,163,000 barrels per day as of January 2024, showing a slight decrease from December 2023's output of 3,168,000 barrels per day. This is notably lower than the 4,376,194 barrels per day Iran was producing in 2016.
Data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicates that Iran produced 2.93 million barrels of crude oil per day in the third quarter of 2023, excluding condensates. However, in November 2023, Iran's oil minister, Javad Owji, stated that the country was producing 3.4 million barrels of oil per day, suggesting potential for increased production capacity.
Bijan Zanganeh has expressed optimism about Iran's ability to raise its output to 7 million barrels per day within five to six years, at a cost of less than $70 billion. He argues that the projected revenues from expanded oil sales justify the relatively modest investment.
Despite Zanganeh's positive outlook, significant challenges confront Iran's petroleum sector, including the impact of global sanctions. Sanctions have severely curtailed Iran's oil output and hindered international investment in the industry, with production expected to hit a 30-year low in 2020. Additionally, geopolitical tensions and proposed legislation in the United Statestightening sanctions on Iranian oil further complicate Iran's prospects for oil exports.
The World Bank has noted that Iran's heavy reliance on oil revenues makes it vulnerable to external shocks and sanctions. While Iran has sought to enhance domestic crude oil processing and diversify its trading partners, sanctions continue to hinder access to foreign capital and technology necessary for increasing production capacity.
Consequently, even while Zanganeh's projections show potential for Iran's oil sector, they fail to consider the major obstacles provided by geopolitical dynamics and sanctions, which make it more difficult for the nation to meet its output targets.
Iran faces significant challenges in increasing its oil production capacity
Iran's efforts to boost its oil production face serious obstacles, including international sanctions that severely limit its capacity to export oil. This has led to a decline in revenue and deterred foreign investment and technological transfer necessary for expanding production.
Budgetary constraints and limited access to advanced foreign technologies further impede progress. Additionally, Iran's lack of natural gas needed for oil production poses a challenge to sustaining and increasing production levels.
Geopolitical issues such as market competitiveness and escalating sanctions complicate Iran's export prospects. Balancing domestic energy consumption with export requirements requires effective resource management to meet both objectives.
Obtaining funding, strategic resource management, and navigating global dynamics are crucial for overcoming these challenges and expanding Iran's oil production capacity.
While recent trends suggest room for growth, future production levels depend on efficient resource management and domestic economic policies. Economist Masoud Nili warns of a possible economic downturn and loss of competitiveness without significant reforms to the financial framework and investment incentives.
Despite Zanganeh's optimism, Iran's oil potential is constrained by sanctions, limiting exports and access to vital resources. However, technical advancements, administrative reforms, and strategic positioning offer hope for resilience and growth in Iran's oil sector amid challenging conditions.
Iran's efforts to boost its oil production capability is beset with serious obstacles. Iran's capacity to export oil internationally has been severely limited by international sanctions, especially those imposed by the US. This has resulted in a steep fall in revenues and deterred foreign investment and knowledge transfer, which are essential for expanding production.
Further impeding advancement are budgetary limitations and restricted access to cutting-edge foreign technologies. Iran has plenty of natural gas reserves, but it is unable to extract the natural gas needed to produce oil.
Another problem is balancing domestic energy consumption with export requirements, which requires effective resource management to satisfy both objectives. In general, obtaining funding, strategically managing resources, and skillfully navigating global dynamics are necessary to overcome these challenges.
Although recent patterns suggest room for expansion, it is unclear how much oil Iran will be able to produce over the next five years. Even though exports, mostly to China, reached a record level of 1.29 million barrels per day, efficient resource management and domestic economic policies will have a significant impact on future output.