Activists Sound Alarm On Rise Of Global Authoritarianism

Restaurants and eateries, in the already struggling hospitality sector, will be allowed to maintain their usual operating hours to serve customers, the country’s police said.

However, there's a caveat: they must cover their windows to shield the interior from the view of fasting passersby.

The pre-Islamic Persian New Year or Nowruz has been celebrated in Iran for at least 2,500 years, marking the first day of Spring.

Women in the southern port city of Bushehr welcome Nowruz with song and dance.

The lunar Islamic year is shorter than the official solar calendar year, so this year, Ramadan, a month of fasting and reflection for Muslims, begins on March 11th in Iran, just nine days before Nowruz.

The last time these two occasions coincided was in the early 1990s.

While the exact rationale behind the authorities' decision to ease the rules remains uncertain, it comes at a time of unprecedented and widespread discontent with the country's religious regime.

Punitive Ramadan Rules Remain

Despite this year’s ease in regulations, Iranians, including those exempt from fasting, are required to abstain from eating, drinking, and smoking in public, even if they are inside their cars.

Implemented about 12 years after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Article 638 of the country’s Islamic Penal Code exacts a punishment of 10 to 60 days or up to 74 lashes on those who violate Ramadan fasting regulations. This applies to everyone irrespective of their religion.

During Ramadan, eateries, including restaurants, cafes, and street food vendors, have typically been prohibited from serving customers from dawn to sunset, aligning with the fasting hours. This restriction has confined business hours to evenings exclusively – though in recent years, some establishments were allowed to provide cold food options or takeaway services during fasting hours.

In addition to the hospitality industry, Ramadan restrictions have a direct or indirect impact on various businesses including cinemas, concert halls, and beauty salons.

Some restaurants along the roads were permitted to remain open due to exemptions outlined in the country's Shia rules. These exemptions apply to individuals traveling approximately 45 kilometers away from home and intending to return within ten days, as well as to frequent travelers such as drivers, who are exempt from fasting.

Widespread Discontent, Economic Turmoil ?

At least 60 percent of eligible Iranian voters displayed their discontent with the regime and loss of hope in the government’s ability to improve their livelihoods when they boycotted the dual March 1st elections for Parliament and the Assembly of Experts.

Adding to that, the escalating depreciation of the national currency, soaring inflation reaching almost 50%, and discontent over social restrictions like hijab enforcement – the police seem to have eased their typically stringent Ramadan measures to prevent further unrest.

The hospitality and tourism sectors, along with various other industries, are grappling with the impact of high inflation, with little hope for improvement in the foreseeable future. Implementing stricter measures during their peak season could significantly disrupt their operations and profitability, at one of the busiest times of the year.

Nowruz Tradition Defies Hardliner Resistance

Religious hardliners in the Islamic Republic consider Nowruz and other ancient festivals pagan and favor the Islamic calendar and its holidays, but have not succeeded in changing Iran's ancient calendar to an Islamic one, so far.

Most Iranians – even those with strong Muslim beliefs – celebrate and cherish Nowruz and other pre-Islamic festivals such as Yalda which marks the Winter Solstice and Charshanbeh Souri bonfire night on the last Tuesday of the year as well as Islamic occasions such as the birthdays of the Prophet Muhammed and Shia imams.

The popularity of Nowruz among Iranians is so profound, that even the country’s ruler, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei makes an annual live speech immediately after the Spring Equinox – a moment precisely calculated by astronomers.

Though, notably, Khamenei used last year’s remarks to claim that the recent anti-regime protests that swept Iran were part of a global conspiracy aimed at weakening the Islamic Republic.

The struggle for this coveted position commenced months prior to the next parliament's convening. Meanwhile, due to the remarkably low turnout in the capital, more than half of the lawmakers representing Tehran are yet to be determined in April, as many candidates failed to secure at least 20 percent of the total votes in the city.

Amidst this lull, several politicians are fiercely vying for the opportunity to occupy the prestigious Speaker's green seat. Among the most ardent contenders is the incumbent Speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who perceives his presence in the Majles (parliament) as inconsequential unless he assumes the role of Speaker.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has at least twice warned the winners of the election to avoid controversies and attacks on each other. However, with his influence waning, the power struggle persists both within and outside the parliament. It appears that he has relinquished the idea of intervening in the matter, once being the ultimate authority on all issues. While he continues to express his viewpoints, there seems to be a lack of receptiveness from others to heed his counsel.

However, Some media outlets in Iran contend that a last-minute intervention, often referred to as "blessings in disguise," by Khamenei could aid Ghalibaf in retaining his position. Despite experiencing a significant decline in popularity among voters, with his 2024 vote count dropping to around 400,000 compared to over 1.2 million in 2020, Ghalibaf may still benefit from Khamenei's support. This perspective is underscored by his staunch political rival, the fundamentalist Hamid Rasaei.

Other contenders for the position include ultraconservative Mahmoud Nabavian, a member of the Paydari Party and a prominent anti-US figure, who garnered the highest number of votes. Additionally, there's Morteza Agha-Tehrani, another influential member of Paydari. Former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki is also in the running, speculated by the press to capitalize on the rivalry among ultraconservatives.

Leading up to the election, Ghalibaf faced a significant smear campaign from his rivals, aided by conservative propagandist Ali-Akbar Raefipour, who reintroduced Rasaei to the political arena after four years of isolation. Meanwhile, Ghalibaf finds himself with minimal support in the new parliament, as all his aides must participate in the run-off election before they can exert any influence.

Ghalibaf is expected to vie for the Speaker position without relinquishing all other positions at the presidium of the parliament to Paydari, as he did in the previous Parliament. However, Paydari's influence and astuteness have increased since 2020. Ghalibaf's prospects for this position rely heavily on whether Khamenei, as both a relative and an old ally, is capable and willing to support him. In the meantime, while Rasaei spent Saturday lobbying at the parliament, some of the new members of the Majles appear to be adamant to reject his credentials when the new legislature convenes. In short, the hardline winners have never been as divided as they are now.

Conservative newspapers including Khorasan, Farhikhtegan and Kayhan, joined the IRGC-linked Javan daily to attack Rasaei, but he is still defiant and continues campaigning against Ghalibaf alongside his fundamentalist patrons.

The conflict, at the same time, reveals younger politicians' competition with the old guard. Relatively younger MPs such as Rasaei wish to bring about a change in the government's rigid structure and to open their way to financial resources and political power. That is unlikely to happen unless Khamenei chooses to allow them access to power.

Many in Iran await his traditional [Iranian] New Year address on March 20 to look for a change and a roadmap out of the current and other long-standing crises.

In a commentary in Etemad newspaper and his own Telegram channel, veteran reformist commentator Emadeddin Baghi pointed out that "the low turnout in the recent election had a clear message for Iranian officials [including Khamenei], which has not been taken seriously by them. Ignoring that message will have fateful and punishing repercussions."

In 2011, the real wage stood at $243, but it has since plummeted to a mere $88, marking a staggering 64% decrease over 12 years.

The concerning trend coincides with the closely linked issue of consumer purchasing power, heavily influenced by the fluctuating US dollar rate, currently at 600,000 rials. The anticipation of further depreciation of the rial in the upcoming year, poses a significant challenge, potentially eroding the minimum wage's value against the dollar.

Persistent inflation and a sluggish economy have severely weakened the purchasing power of average Iranians, pushing tens of millions into the category of "working poor." Experts indicate that the poverty line for Tehran residents hovers around 300,000,000 rials ($500) per month, approximately three times the current minimum wage.

Recent reports reveal that workers' wages now cover only about 60 percent of their monthly household expenses. Despite Article 41 of the Labor Law mandating the Supreme Labor Council to annually determine the minimum wage, the government maintains discretionary power to adjust wages based on its interests, sparking widespread labor protests in recent years.

While minimum wage increases aim to alleviate financial burdens for workers, concerns mount over their impact on overall business costs. Such hikes often lead to layoffs or reluctance in hiring new employees, further complicating the delicate balance between economic stability and workers' rights.

Published Monday, the report says the state in Iran has undergone only a single supreme leader transition in its 45-year history and is mired by “elite factionalism.”

Khamenei –who will be 85 next month– has held the ostensibly elected position by a small group of clerics since 1989. He still seems to have a tight grip on power, despite widespread discontent in the country over corruption, injustice, antediluvian social restrictions, and what many people see as utter incompetence in solving the array of issues they face.

“Iran’s economy continues to struggle amidst high inflation,” reads the 2024 US intelligence community report. ”Most wages are unable to keep pace with the higher prices, leading to declines in households’ spending power.”

But these don’t seem to affect Ali Khamenei who ignores or demonizes the dissenting populace, speaking and tending only to his shrinking group of loyal supporters who prop up the regime by brute force.

Many experts believe that it’s only a matter of time before the regime and its supreme leader come up against another round of widespread protest, like the ones that shook Iran in 2022 after a young woman called Mahsa Amini was stopped on the street for her ‘improper’ outfit and later died in hospital due to a head injury she had sustained in custody.

The ensuing protests –in which more than 550 civilians were killed and at least 20,000 arrested– widened the rift between the regime and the people, leading to an almost complete rupture, illustrated by an historically low turnout in the most recent parliamentary elections that were held early March.

Facing a crisis of legitimacy in Iran, the supreme leader seems to have turned his focus outwards, acting as the leader of non-Iranian armed groups fighting against his most favorite enemies: the US and Israel.

“The resistance is still standing strong and will rub the nose of the Zionists to the ground,” Khamenei said Tuesday, meeting the Quran enthusiasts on the eve of Ramadan –the Muslim month of fasting and self-reflection.

Curiously, his words seemed to be in line with Israel’s assessment that there may be an “increase in terror during Ramadan”, especially in the West Bank. “Iran is working to up the severity of attacks by smuggling in many weapons,” Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant said Monday in a meeting with Israel’s elite Duvdevan unit.

Iran’s regional ambitions and adventures have also been reflected at length in the US intelligence community’s annual report.

“Iran will remain a threat to Israel and US allies and interests in the region well after the Gaza conflict,” the Threat Assessment reads, “and probably will continue arming and aiding its allies to threaten the United States as well as backing Hamas and others who seek to block a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.”

“While Iran will remain careful to avoid a direct conflict with either Israel or the United States, it nonetheless enabled scores of militia rocket, missile, and UAV attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria; Hizballah exchanges of fire with Israel on the north border with Lebanon; and Houthi missile and UAV attacks, both on Israel directly and on international commercial shipping transiting the Red Sea.”

The report continues: “Tehran will try to leverage recent military successes through its emboldened threat network, diplomatic gains, its expanded nuclear program, and its military sales to advance its ambitions, including by trying to further bolster ties with Moscow.”

In an interview with Faraz Daily, Zarif said the question of the Taliban's legitimacy in Afghanistan remains a highly debated issue both domestically and internationally. He added that “if Iran remains passive in the face of regional dynamics involving the United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan, the matter of Taliban legitimacy could escalate into both an opportunity and a threat for the Islamic Republic.”

He further stated that should the Taliban establish legitimate rule in Afghanistan, Iran would ultimately need to cooperate with its neighbor.

Zarif's remarks come in the wake of his previous welcoming of the Taliban delegation in 2021, where he hailed them expressing solidarity with their fight against "foreign" occupiers.

Tensions persist between Iran and the Taliban, particularly regarding water issues. An Iranian parliamentary delegation's visit to Kabul in August aimed to address concerns about the Taliban's alleged obstruction of the Helmand River flow, affecting Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan region. The Taliban has denied the allegations, exacerbating the water crisis dispute.

In January, the Taliban's foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi, visited Iran and advocated for increased economic collaboration. Muttaqi met with economic activists from Iran and Afghanistan, urging Iranian traders to capitalize on opportunities in the Afghan market.

Nevertheless, critics within Iran have raised concerns about the government's open borders policy, speculating about potential hidden agendas. Some suggest that authorities might be facilitating illegal Afghan immigration to address population decline or to strengthen the military by recruiting young Shiite Hazara Afghans.