Iran's Pharmaceutical Industry In ‘Crisis’

Sedighi, a cleric trusted by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, found himself embroiled in controversy following the publication of documents in recent days revealing that he and his sons took over a 4,200-square-meter (45,200 sq feet) garden at a prime location in northern Tehran through a family company.

The lot, estimated to be worth approximately $20 million, is adjacent to a seminary that Sedighi founded about 20 years ago and has presided over ever since. The land was originally owned by the seminary and was transferred to the family company owned and led by Sedighi and his two sons. Other people from Sedighi’s close circle, including his daughter-in-law Rezvaneh Ghavam and the chief of his security detail Fazlollah Beigverdi, hold positions in the company, established in June 2023.

The documents were leaked by Yashar Soltani, a well-known whistle blower who has exposed numerous high-ranking officials of the Iranian government, ranging from Revolutionary Guard generals such as the slain Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, to lawmakers such as parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Sedighi has asserted that he was unaware of the land's title transfer, reopening an old wound that many Iranians know all too well from countless similar cases. The hardline cleric stated on Sunday that his signature was forged, sparking outrage online. People argue that a forged signature is used to obtain something from someone without their consent or awareness, rather than providing it to them.

Journalist Behnam Gholipour has dug up a series of Sedighi’s remarkable statements in the past about the metaphysical realm, pointing out that the cleric tells anecdotes beyond the physical world, but claims ignorance about a piece of land owned by him. Sedighi has famously claimed that Khamenei has contact with a figure in Shiite Islam believed to be in occultation since 941 CE. Sedighi also claimed that his late teacher, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, momentarily came back to life in the morgue.

Another argument circulating online is that even if he had no prior knowledge of the transaction that granted him the land, now he does. People question why he has not taken steps to return the land.

Iran's recent history is marked by myriads of corruption cases implicating a broad spectrum of the regime's top brass and dignitaries, who wield significant influence over the country's laws and regulatory bodies with impunity.

Sedighi is only the latest addition to the extensive roster of Khamenei confidants, who have acquired land, misappropriated substantial sums, and embezzled billions of dollars over the past decades, shielded by Khamenei's unwavering protection.

Last year, it was revealed that Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda -- the firebrand Friday prayer Imam of Mashhad and the father-in-law of President Ebrahim Raisi, who controls one of Iran's biggest religious endowments -- was pocketing a monthly cut of approximately $200,000 for at least seven years.

Another high-profile case was Ayatollah Kazem Nourmofidi, the representative of Khamenei in the northern Golestan province, whose control over the province’s forest exploitation has always been known among locals. He owns the largest wood businesses in the region and his offspring are involved in at least 20 wood companies. Nourmofidi, who is the brother-in-law of another great ayatollah Mohammad Fazel Lankrani, is pocketing hundreds of thousands of dollars per month for wood smuggling from the lush forests of northern Iran. Another Friday imam who is taking advantage of his relationship with Khamenei is Zeinolabedin Ghorbani, the former representative in Gilan province. He started a shopping mall project in the city and pre-sold the units but never delivered them. People who paid found no remedy in courts controlled by clerics. These were only a few cases revealed in 2023.

The Friday Prayer Imams, Khamenei's regional representatives pushing the regime's ideology and rhetoric, are infamous for enjoying immunity from the law. There are more than 900 Friday Prayer Imams across Iran, as well as 290 members of the parliament, 31 provincial governors, thousands of judges and thousands of senior IRGC members.

The group has sent a letter to the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, urgently appealing for assistance in addressing the ongoing human rights violations against the families of political prisoners and victims of atrocities.

Recent reports have revealed a disturbing escalation of actions by Iranian authorities, including the destruction of graves belonging to Baha'i citizens and the excavation of a large number of new graves at Khavaran Cemetery.

“These actions constitute blatant violations of fundamental human rights, including the right to freedom of religion, mourning, and peaceful assembly. The families of victims are subjected to intimidation, harassment, and emotional anguish, further exacerbating their trauma and suffering,” the letter stated.

Security forces obstructed the presence of families of political prisoners executed in the 1980s and the 1988 massacre on Friday, March 15, denying them their right to mourn and remember their relatives. Witnesses reported instances of security personnel demanding national identification from individuals attempting to access the cemetery.

The group requested an immediate and thorough investigation into the destruction of graves and the digging of new graves at Khavaran Cemetery and demanded that Iranian authorities cease all forms of harassment, intimidation, and obstruction against families of political prisoners and victims of atrocities.

Furthermore, the letter called for the protection of religious minorities, including the Baha'i community, and urged Rehman to pressure the Iranian government to respect its international obligations under human rights treaties and conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Despite increased dropout rates, including during the challenging times of the COVID-19 pandemic, where some students faced barriers due to limited access to communication tools and the internet, the dropout rate has continued to climb.

Economists attribute the increase to the parallel rise in poverty rates across the country. The worsening poverty situation has left many Iranian families struggling to meet their basic needs, directly impacting their children's ability to access and remain in education.

The Statistical Center of Iran released data in October 2023, revealing that at least 556,000 young Iranians were forced to abandon their education before reaching high school due to factors primarily linked to poverty and deprivation.

Furthermore, inflation trends paint a grim picture of economic stability, with inflation rates soaring over recent years. Inflation, which stood at around 10% in 2016 and 2017, skyrocketed to over 27% in 2018, and continued its upward trajectory, reaching 35% in 2019 and exceeding 36% in 2020.

The situation worsened in 2021, with inflation breaching the 46% threshold, a trend that persisted into 2022.

The diminishing value of education in terms of income generation has further exacerbated the situation, leading to a decline in students' motivation to pursue higher education.

Responding to Zarif's comments, Amir-Hossein Mosalla, chief editor of the reformist Ayat-e Mandegar bi-weekly, tweeted, "How disgraceful was the arrogance in Zarif’s recent remarks, leaked as usual! Blaming radical reformists or those advocating to limit the leader's powers instead of critiquing the dictator responsible for the status quo, is nothing but seeking a share in power?"

The remarks referred to by Mosalla were made at a private meeting with a group of citizens recently an edited recording of which was leaked to IranWire. He alleged that during the 1999 student protests, reformists sought to lead demonstrators towards Khamenei’s residence in Tehran, aiming to topple him.

“Reformists sought elimination in 1999. That is, they said they wanted to change the Constitution [to limit Khamenei’s powers] … Obviously realistic rules apply here, when you seek elimination, when you threaten someone’s existence, he will be driven to threaten your existence,” Zarif said at the meeting.

In a tweet Saturday, Zarif defended himself against critics and claimed that when making the controversial remarks he only meant “a few radical reformists” who he claimed were not even approved of by the “majority of Reformists and Reformists’ leadership”. The former foreign minister who faced constant criticism by hardliners for advocating a nuclear deal with the West, has been in political limbo since he left his post. At the same time, he is disliked by most dissidents in Iran and abroad for having relentlessly defended the regime against charges of human rights violations. They call him “white-washer in-chief” for his role in defending the Khamenei-led system.

Top reformist politicians and media have not yet publicly reacted to Zarif’s remarks but many including Paris-based reformist activist Taghi Rahmani, whose wife, the Nobel Peace Laureate Narges Mohammadi is in prison for her political beliefs, have taken to social media to respond to Zarif.

“In Zarif’s mind the Iranian people have no place… Khamenei pitched the system against the people,” Rahmani said in a tweet stressing Khamenei’s responsibility in creating the divide between the ruling system and people.

Expatriate political activist Ali Afshari, one of the leaders of the student movement at the time of the attack on Tehran University, alleges that it was the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) that created the rumor at the time that reformists were aiming at deposing Khamenei as Supreme Leader. “[The majority of Reformists and Khatami’s administration] had no role in organizing and managing the protests on Tehran University campus,” he wrote.

Afshari who was arrested after the incident also alleges that IRGC’s intelligence tortured him to accuse President Khatami’s chief of staff, Mohammad-Ali Abtahi, of trying to incite students to chant against Khamenei and to lead protesters towards his residence in downtown Tehran.

Others argue that Khamenei's opposition to reforms stemmed from his fear of losing power, rather than radicalism within the reformist movement, as Zarif suggested.

The protests that began at the campus of Tehran University were sparked by the closure of the reformist newspaper Salam by the hardliner judiciary’s Press Court. Protests spread to several major cities in the following days after riot police, paramilitary Basij and other vigilantes raided the campus on the evening of July 9 with many protesters demanding secular democracy.

The law enforcement was under Khamenei’s own command at the time as he had refused to grant any authority over the police to the reformist government as commander-in-chief of armed forces.

One student was thrown to his death from a rooftop and over two hundred others were seriously injured during the harsh crackdown on students in one night. Over 1,200 were arrested in the following days and several students vanished without a trace.

Following the protests, the press court shut down twenty reformist newspapers in one day and many of Khatami’s allies were persecuted and imprisoned under various pretexts in the coming months.

In a letter sent on March 10, Rouhani pointed out the Council's criteria for disqualification, criticizing them as "generally involving vague affiliations" and lacking evidence contrary to explicit law. He insisted that the documents supporting the claims be presented "fully, without omission or summary."

The hardliners controlling the candidate vetting process for the March 1 elections rejected Rouhani's candidacy, pushing him into political isolation along with other former Iranian presidents. Rouhani had registered and expressed eagerness to run for a seat in the Assembly, which holds the constitutional duty to select Iran’s next Supreme Leader in the event of Ali Khamenei’s absence.

The move highlights a broader pattern of manipulation in Iranian elections, where non-hardliners are systematically rejected from candidacy, consolidating power within ultraconservative circles. Such tactics were previously observed in the 2020 parliamentary and 2021 presidential elections, resulting in the dominance of ultraconservatives in both the outgoing parliament and President Ebrahim Raisi’s administration.

Despite the regime's efforts to control the electoral process, concerns persist over the legitimacy of the elections, exacerbated by economic crises and nationwide protests. Official figures reported a turnout of 41 percent out of 61.1 million eligible voters, but doubts linger over the accuracy of the numbers with some estimates as low as nine percent.