Iranian Nurse Commits Suicide In Rising Trend Among Medics

The statement, released on Monday emphasized that “unauthorized individuals, particularly foreign nationals, will be repatriated.”

Amid an economic crisis, the ministry stated that there is no possibility of accepting further Afghan immigrants into the country as Iran faces growing discontent about rising numbers of both legal and illegal Afghans in the country.

The ministry's public relations department appended the statement with a note, attributing its issuance to certain websites' attempts to stir anti-Afghan sentiments, although no further explanation was provided.

The announcement follows recent remarks made by Ehsan Heidari, the acting head of the Department of Foreign Nationals and Immigrants Affairs of Tehran Province in which he warned of crackdowns on illegal immigrants. .

On March 21, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported the initiation of a police plan aimed at gathering and repatriating unauthorized immigrants from recreational areas in Tehran Province.

Reports of detention and expulsion of foreign nationals from Iran have become increasingly common in recent months. While the reports do not specify the nationality of those affected, it is widely understood that a significant portion of them are Afghan citizens.

The influx of Afghan migrants into Iran has sparked debate among citizens and officials alike, with differing opinions on whether their presence poses a threat or an opportunity for the regime. Estimates of the size of the Afghan diaspora population in Iran vary, with precise figures difficult to ascertain due to Afghans' reluctance to participate in official counts and registrations.

Approximately 780,000 Afghans residing in Iran possess official refugee status, leaving the majority without documentation. Over recent years, Afghan refugees have been crossing the border in significant numbers fleeing the Taliban regime, with estimates now suggesting their total population in Iran ranges between 6 to 7 million, as indicated by an expert from the Iranian Parliament's Research Center.

Alireza Marandi highlighted Ali Khamenei's active schedule in spite of his being 84, attributing it to “divine grace”.

Marandi said, "God has been very gracious to the Islamic Republic and all of us, keeping him healthy and well."

The decision to air such statements on a TV talk show has raised questions about the motive behind the sudden public discourse.

Speculation about Khamenei's health has been ongoing, sparking questions about potential successors. While discussions about succession remain taboo in Iranian political discourse, several names have been floated, with Khamenei's son, Mojtaba, emerging as a prominent figure believed to be groomed for the role.

However, experts caution that such an appointment could trigger instability within the regime, given competing power dynamics.

Reports of Khamenei's health issues have surfaced in the past. In 2022, the New York Times reported on his emergency surgery for bowel obstruction amid rumors of his deteriorating health.

Khamenei's subsequent public appearances were seen as attempts to dispel rumors of his death and reaffirm his leadership.

Khamenei has been Iran's supreme leader since 1989 and has been battling ill health for almost a decade. In 2014, he underwent a successful prostate cancer operation which also triggered fears for what would come next.

Reza Saberi said, "Currently, we have identified 10 entities engaged in buying and selling theses … most of them operate through illegal online platforms."

The proliferation of online platforms offering fraudulent academic services has posed a challenge to academic integrity in Iran. These platforms target people seeking shortcuts to academic credentials, exploiting loopholes in the system.

In recent years, degree seeking among students in Iran has escalated, reflecting a concerning trend that highlights broader systemic issues within the country's educational landscape.

While education is highly valued in Iranian society, the pursuit of degrees has increasingly become intertwined with socioeconomic pressures and political realities, leading to a culture of degree seeking that often prioritizes credentials over genuine learning.

One of the primary drivers behind the surge in degree seeking is the competition for limited opportunities in higher education and the job market.

With a large youth population and limited employment prospects, obtaining a degree is often viewed as essential for securing stable employment and socioeconomic advancement.

Moreover, the politicization of education has further complicated the landscape. Government policies, ideological biases, and censorship have shaped educational curricula and restricted academic freedoms, undermining the quality and relevance of education. This has fueled disillusionment among students and exacerbated the pressure to seek degrees as a means of navigating an uncertain future.

“We know that Iran has made very public threats against Israel itself,” John Kirby said in an ‘on-the-record press gaggle’. "And one of the things that the President said in his call with Prime Minister Netanyahu was that the Israeli government could count on the United States’ support for any self-defense needs against threats directly by Iran to Israel.”

The world has been anticipating an Iranian retaliatory operation, after a precision Israeli strike on its Damascus embassy killed two top IRGC generals and five other officers on April 1.

Iranian officials have been threatening retaliation and many observers have indicated that most likely, Tehran will use it proxy forces to target Israel instead of launching attacks from its territory. Another type of operation mentioned by some Iranian insiders is a possible attack on an Israeli diplomatic mission in a third country.

However, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, claimed Monday that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has decided that the response to Israel’s attack has to be "direct" as opposed to an operation “in another country.” This still does not necessarily mean an attack from Iranian territory, rather an attack directly on Israel.

“The Americans have accepted that there’ll be an Iranian response,” Nasrallah said in a televised speech, “even the Israelis have accepted that there’s an Iranian response. And the whole world has accepted that this is a natural right for Iran.”

This is the message that Iranian officials have been sending out more or less consistently: that there will be retaliation, even though some voices inside Iran have been calling for ‘patience’ and ‘strategic thinking’ and ‘not playing into the hands of Israelis’.

An unconfirmed report Monday suggested that the regime in Tehran has conveyed to the Biden administration that it would refrain from attacking Israel if the US could pressure Israel to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza.

“I don’t really have a comment to make on the report that Iran claims they would refrain from responding if there was a ceasefire,” Kirby told reporters Monday. “But if Iran is serious about a ceasefire, they’ll use the influence they have with Hamas to press for a positive response to that proposal…We want a ceasefire too. They can lean on Hamas. That would be the best outcome.”

It is not impossible that Iran could come up with such a proposal, given that a ‘direct’ attack on Israel –as Nasrallah has suggested– can have dire consequences for the Islamic Republic.

Not responding may not be an option for Khamenei, whose state propaganda machine has been built around the notion of standing up to Israel and the US. Giving up the right to respond in exchange for a ceasefire in Gaza could therefore be the face-saving formula he looks for. The risk, of course, is that if there’s no ceasefire, he’d be even more obliged to retaliate not to lose more credibility.

A CNN report Monday quoted sources ‘familiar with US intelligence’ that Iran’s retaliation against Israel will likely be carried out by Iranian proxy groups rather than by Iran directly.

“US intelligence assesses that Iran has urged several of its proxy militia groups to simultaneously launch a large-scale attack against Israel, using drones and missiles, and that they could attack as soon as this week," the CNN report read, contradicting previous reports in American media.

Last week, a New York Times report stated that both American and Israeli military analysts have reached the conclusion that “it is more likely that Iran would strike Israel itself than that it would have its proxies attack U.S. troops in the region, including in Iraq and Syria.”

It seems no one knows for a fact what a potential response from Iran may look like. Or if there would be any response after all.

"From Damascus, I declare loud and clear that Israel will be punished,” Iran’s foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said Monday. But even such a seemingly categorical statement is qualified. "The manner in which Iran will respond to Israel will become clear on the battlefield,” he said.

An examination of the data from the Central Bank of Iran unveils that his government is actually the largest debtor among them.

“You remember that in an election meeting, they handed the candidates the names of three [major debtors] in sealed envelopes, but now [Economy Minister] Mr. Khandouzi is releasing the financial information of 2,000 companies on [the Central Bank] website for everyone to see,” President Raisi said at a meeting with hardliner student activists on Saturday.

Raisi was referring to a highly sensational presidential election debate in 2021. During this debate, his rival, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, Naser Hemmati, handed him a sealed envelope purportedly containing a list of top debtors to the banking system. Hemmati later said that he had previously provided the names to the judiciary, which was headed at the time by Raisi, on multiple occasions – saying that action was taken. Hemmati added that he himself couldn't announce the names during the debate due to legal constraints.

It has long been an open secret that Iran's predominantly government-controlled banks face a shortage of capital and that their lending policies are influenced by insiders, such as Iran’s clerics.

The ministry of economy defines a 'major debtor' as persons or entities that hold loans worth at least 10% of a bank's total resources and defaulting on the payments. 

In November 2021, such loans were estimated to total around $10 billion but the value of these loans would have been 5-6-fold higher in dollar equivalents, at the time they were granted. The Iranian currency dropped significantly from mid-2018, but most of these loans were issued before that period.

Six months after an order by the economy minister mandated them to comply, four state-owned banks, including Bank-e Melli, Iran's largest bank, released their lists of major debtors in April 2022. Subsequently, the Central Bank published its list, encompassing 14 other banks along with their major debtors.

The data published at that time and subsequently has, however, been incomplete and vague.

“What interest rates were charged on the loans granted to major debtors? What guarantees were taken for the loans? How were the borrowers’ credit and guarantee assessed? How much of these debts can be recovered and [the collection of] how much is doubtful or impossible?” an editorial in the reformist news outlet Shargh asked after publication of the first set of lists.

Allegations have persisted that major debtors with poor credit utilize loans to speculate in housing, foreign currency, and gold markets rather than investing in production – contributing to higher inflation rates.

“What were these loans for? Were the loans spent for the purposes indicated on loan application forms? What assets were created by the money taken from the bank and how much added value was produced?” the editorial asked, referring to such allegations.

The public is often led to believe that major debtors to the banking system are individuals and private companies.

But, Iran International’s examination of the data provided by the Central Bank and other banks indicates that the private sector’s share of such loans is minimal.

Instead, entities such as the State Welfare Organization, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), and companies owned by banks, automakers, and several other government agencies emerge as the top debtors.

During his campaign Raisi promised that borrowing from the Central Bank was a “redline” his government would not cross. Government officials, accordingly, claim they are fulfilling this promise.

Experts assert that rather than borrowing directly from the Central Bank to address its budget deficit, the government has significantly increased its borrowing from other banks to obscure its financial activities.

This practice, in turn, puts pressure on the Central Bank to print more money in order to provide loans to these banks – leading to an increase in liquidity and higher inflation, according to these experts. According to Iran International's calculations based on periodic official statements, The Raisi government has been printing the equivalent of $460 million per month, adding to the monetary base.

“The government and government-owned companies’ debts to the banking system have doubled since August 2021 when Raisi assumed office,” Dalga Khatinoglu, an Iran economic analyst and oil expert, told Iran International.

“Debts to the banking system include bonds that the government has issued and forced banks to buy as payment of previous government debts. This is the reason the government’s debts to banks are continuously increasing despite payments claimed to be made,” he said.

“But the government’s debt to the banking system is only a fraction of its overall debts. It has also borrowed very heavily from the Central Banks and owes $100 billion to the National Development Fund. The total amounts to $118 billion, that is, equal to two and half years of the government [operating] budget,” Khatinoglu added.