Iran's Exiled Prince Urges Global Support for Iranians Over Military Action

According to a report from the rights group Human Rights in Iran, a recent visit by the 54-year-old's mother revealed that her daughter is experiencing psychological issues due to her imprisonment conditions.

The group claims, "The prosecutor and the Ministry of Intelligence have opposed the conditional release of the Christian convert. Given the circumstances, there is an urgent need for her to be sent to a medical center for specialized neurological examinations."

Arrested in February, Sa'ati was sentenced in March to two years in prison and a two-year travel ban, convicted of "acting against national security through association with Zionist Christian organizations."

The trial was conducted without the option for Sa'ati to choose her own lawyer, charges based on her religious activities after returning to Iran in 2017 from Malaysia, where she converted and sought refugee status. Evidence found on her mobile phone such as a baptism video and participation in church activities abroad was used against her.

In 2021, 53 Christian converts were arrested, according to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Javaid Rehman, with numbers rising ever faster in the wake of the 2022 uprising.

The 2023 annual report from London-based Article18 shows a rise in the arrests of Christians in Iran, either for the practice or spreading of the faith, increasing from 134 in 2022 to 166 last year. 

In Iran, where Shia Islam predominates, only the Abrahamic faiths—Christianity, Islam, and Judaism—are officially recognized. However, under Sharia law, it is illegal in Iran for Muslims to convert to Christianity.

"The images of cracked roads and collapsed streets are just the surface manifestations of deeper geological processes that might not be immediately apparent," Javdaneh explained, recent scientific assessments showing that subsidence is not merely an above-ground occurrence but happens deep within the earth.

He says the phenomenon, often underestimated in its impact, “could pose challenges even at minimal rates such as two centimeters per year", with approximately 380 cities and 9,200 villages throughout Iran under threat.

The ancient archaeological site of Naqsh-e Rostam in Iran's Fars Province also faces imminent danger. The site, which houses the tombs of prominent Achaemenid kings like Darius the Great and Xerxes, has seen extensive damage due to recent heavy rainfall exacerbating the subsidence. Fissures as deep as 70 centimeters have been reported near the historical monuments, threatening their stability.

The broader implications of subsidence are severe, potentially leading to a depletion of water resources, reduced agricultural outputs, and transformation of fertile lands into barren deserts. The phenomenon has worsened over the past five years, with the affected area in Iran reportedly tripling in size. The situation is so precarious that even a minor earthquake could trigger significant disasters, especially in areas like Isfahan, which supports a population of over 2.7 million.

The advocacy group United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) has disclosed through satellite imagery that two vessels, HECATE and ELVA, are involved in the unloading of sanctioned Iranian oil at Dongjiakou port in China.

According to Claire Jungman, Chief of Staff at UANI, "HECATE was loaded from the Iranian tanker DOVER on March 25 and was designated as an SDGT (Specially Designated Global Terrorist) entity on April 4. ELVA, known for previous sanctions violations, loaded oil from Kharg Island, Iran, on April 2."

Jungman added, "China's continued disregard for counterterrorism sanctions is enabling Iran's financing of terrorism."

Iran utilizes a complex network of entities and intermediaries to sell its oil to third parties, thereby evading the imposed sanctions. Iran reportedly channels some of its oil revenues to state organizations such as the Revolutionary Guard to support their budgets indirectly, circumventing direct financial allocations.

The transactions are typically managed by state entities and business figures closely linked to the regime, generating significant profits.

Despite international sanctions, Iran's oil exports have seen a considerable increase, from 400,000 barrels per day post-2019 US sanctions to over 1,500,000 barrels per day currently.

Behrouz Mohebbi Najmabadi, a member of parliament’s budget committee, said in December, "By utilizing the capacities of neighboring and special allied countries such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and regional agreements, today Iran's crude oil sales have exceeded 1.5 million barrels per day."

During his visit, Barzani engaged with key figures of the government, including the Supreme Leader, heads of executive and legislative bodies, the commander-in-chief of the IRGC, the foreign minister, and the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

The timing and nature of Barzani's visit, coming months after the IRGC's missile attack on the Kurdistan Region, raise questions about its motives. The high-profile meetings suggest that the discussions likely focused on mutual security concerns.

This trip took place against a backdrop of three significant issues: Firstly, Iran's missile and drone attacks on targets within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, purportedly aimed at Israeli agents, elicited protests from both Kurdish authorities and the Iraqi central government. Secondly, the upcoming parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region, scheduled for June 10, 2024, face controversy as the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) has announced its intention to boycott the elections. Lastly, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has made a request for the disarmament and complete expulsion of Iranian Kurdish armed groups sheltering in the Kurdish regions of Iraq.

The backdrop of recent events provides context for the objectives of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders' trip to Iran, though the outcomes remain uncertain due to the reticence of both parties involved.

This visit aimed to achieve three main objectives: 1) renegotiate mutual security arrangements, 2) mitigate threats posed by Tehran against the Iraqi Kurdish region, and 3) facilitate mediation by the Islamic Republic among conflicting political entities to reduce regional tensions.

In the realm of security, the Kurdistan Regional Government, whose high-ranking members have maintained long-standing relationships with Tehran, seeks to halt the regime's missile attacks. For this purpose, President Barzani aimed to reassure Iranian authorities that the regional government would not permit any group, faction, or country to launch actions against Iran or other neighboring nations. Additionally, following the unsuccessful independence referendum in 2017, the Kurdish authorities are attempting to mitigate Iranian threats through dialogue, promoting a narrative of a united Iraq.

In terms of political mediation, the Kurdish authorities are seeking Iran's intervention to reconcile differences between the two major Kurdish parties—the Iraqi Kurdistan Patriotic Union and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—and the Iraqi central government, particularly concerning disputes over regional elections.

Which objectives can be achieved?

The first goal—re-establishing a stable security relationship—seems attainable given the generally tension-free relations between the regional authorities and the Islamic Republic, unless the latter opts to demonstrate its strength by targeting structures within the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. However, there are significant doubts regarding the Iraqi Kurds' ability to fully avoid provocations from the Iranian regime, which sometimes launches attacks on its neighbors for reasons of prestige and maintaining its image.

Regarding the third objective, Tehran’s influence is constrained; it tends to favor military actions over diplomatic engagements with countries like the United States and Israel, and often does not take steps towards easing regional tensions. This preference for military approaches over diplomacy underscores the challenges in achieving mediation and conflict resolution in the region.

Reactions

Two prominent reactions to Barzani’s visit to Iran have emerged on social media. The first comes from Kurds who oppose Iran’s Islamic government; they expressed their discontent with Barzani for seemingly disregarding Tehran’s attacks on Kurds in the region and accused him of pandering during his meeting with Khamenei. Additionally, some Iranian opposition constitutional monarchists are also displeased with the visit, perceiving it as potentially encouraging separatist sentiments among Iraqi Kurds, which they fear might influence Iranian Kurds as well.

In another development, Iraqi journalist Ahmad Abdulsadeh reported that during the visit, Barzani provided a written commitment to the Iranian authorities, wherein Erbil officials pledged to disarm "terrorist groups" and ensure their removal from the Kurdistan Region. This commitment reportedly also includes a promise to curb attacks on the Iranian regime by media outlets like Rudaw and Kurdistan 24, and to control their coordination with foreign media entities. However, implementing these commitments could prove challenging and may lead to internal tensions within the region.

A fatwa by Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei says it is Makrooh (disliked but not sinful) to urinate while standing or on a hard surface, forcing men to use the pit latrines instead.

The move has sparked widespread discourse and critique on social media. One user expressed frustration, remarking, "This is ridiculous! If they'd spend more time worrying about the economy, the starving people, the water shortage, they wouldn't have to worry about how men urinate."

Another user sarcastically said, "I hope the level of your demands always remains this profoundly high, and that your minds never get bogged down with demands for trivial matters like city beautification, increased security, or economic improvements. Demands should only be for issues like hijab and the Islamic way of dressing, as these are what truly elevate people's quality of life."

The removal of urinals is just one example of how the Iranian regime continues to exert control over the minor details of the population's personal lives, from dress codes and family planning to restroom habits.