The untimely death of the Islamic Republic’s president and its foreign minister in a mysterious helicopter crash on May 19 has come at the worst time for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei but the best time for Iranian dissidents inside and outside the country.
The incident will have significant implications for Iranian domestic politics, although it is expected to have a much smaller impact on the foreign policy of the theocratic regime.
Whether the fatal crash in a remote, fog-covered mountainous region in East Azerbaijan was the work of the divine, or caused by a technical malfunction or even an act of sabotage involving foreign or domestic elements, one thing is clear:
The Islamic Republic has suffered yet another political setback. But, more than anything, it has suffered a consequential moral defeat as, contrary to the regime’s propaganda, the majority of Iranians were in a festive mood over the death of the “Butcher of Tehran” and foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian.
Meanwhile, speculations about the real cause of the incident and its near and long-term implications on Iran’s foreign and domestic politics are likely to continue.
As for the cause of the crash: three main scenarios are moot
Technical failure
In this scenario, given the significant toll that US-led sanctions have taken on Iran’s aviation industry, the aging Bell 212 helicopter carrying the 63-year-old Raisi might have encountered a serious mid-air malfunction, which was further complicated by poor weather conditions.
If you believe in karma or divine retribution, you might see the invisible hand of God at work here, suggesting that Raisi finally faced his comeuppance for his role in sending hundreds of Iranian political prisoners to the gallows as a member of the “death committee” in the 1980s.
Among Iranians both inside the country and in the diaspora abroad, conspiracy theories about the causes and consequences of the helicopter crash are flourishing. It is important to acknowledge that the helicopter crash could be attributed to various factors, such as bad weather or mechanical issues, just as easily as to external actors like Israel.
The realm of possibilities is vast, and only time will reveal which explanation is closest to the reality of what happened.
Act of sabotage by a foreign, and/or domestic element
In this scenario, the possibility of foul play and possible third-party involvement — be it Israel or one of its allies or a domestic actor — cannot be ruled out with certainty.
Israel’s Mossad has a track record of successful kinetic and non-kinetic campaigns inside Iran, including espionage, targeted assassinations, sabotage, drone strikes, and cyberattacks. The likelihood of Israel's involvement in assassinating Raisi and Amir-Abdollahian, however, is low for several reasons. Historically, the Mossad rarely targets political leaders of the country, instead focusing on military leaders of the IRGC or Iranian assets related to its drone, missile, and nuclear programs. There is little strategic benefit for Israel in targeting someone like Raisi, making it difficult to find a cogent explanation for such an action.
One can allude to a deliberate act of sabotage or a possible assassination plan by a domestic element, including a technician tampering the GPS system or turning off transponder prior to the flight, or a terrorist group as possible causes of the crash.
Mention must be made however that these are only hypothetical explanations over possible cause of the crash not final or definite conclusions.
Inside job
In this scenario, an act of sabotage might have been carried out by rival elements within the power structure. These could include factions associated with Khamenei’s son Mojtaba, a serious contender for the leadership; elements close to Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the hardline speaker of parliament with ties to the IRGC; or those linked to Housing and Transportation Minister Mehrdad Bazrpash, who was in one of the helicopters that returned safely. The point here is that Raisi was a potential successor to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, and a formidable rival to Mojtaba for the position.
Impact of the Crash on Iranian Politics
Without a doubt, the sudden death of Raisi and Amir-Abdollahian creates a temporary yet volatile power vacuum within the political structure. Yet, this vacuum is unlikely to significantly hamper the daily functioning of the state, either domestically or in foreign policy, because in Iran, it is the Supreme Leader who holds ultimate authority, not the president or any other government official.
Khamenei sits atop a highly nepotistic and corrupt political power structure that is more likely to frail or fall with the demise of the 85-year-old Supreme Leader himself, rather than the absence of Raisi or other officials.
However, to say that Raisi’s death has no meaningful impact on Iranian politics would be an overstatement.
The incident has two immediate and long-term impacts:
Concerning the near-term impact, the country unexpectedly finds itself faced with having no choice but to hold elections to appoint a successor and even form a new government. For the time being Iran's first vice president, Mohammad Mokhber, will take over as interim president with Khamenei’s approval, as per Article 131 of the Islamic Republic's constitution until elections are held in less than two months.
It is very unlikely that foreign and domestic policies undergo any ground-breaking changes in this period. Nor is it likely that people would seize on the opportunity and stage massive public protests in the country. It is unlikely, but not entirely impossible.
The state's sudden focus on hastily planning for an early election detracts from Tehran's bandwidth to address other pressing issues, particularly in foreign policy, such as its confrontation with Israel. This situation might inadvertently empower the Jewish state to escalate pressure on Iran regarding its nuclear program and regional interventions.
Regarding its long-term impact, it's crucial to recognize that the incident primarily inflicts a significant psychological and moral blow on the regime. The country is currently engulfed in deep-seated public anger and frustration towards the regime, stemming from its extensive suppression of women and its failure to address the socio-political and economic stagnation gripping the nation.
The populace harbors immense dissatisfaction with the regime, yet appears incapable of overthrowing it through street protests. Despite its apparent resilience against public demonstrations, the Islamic Republic is perceived as vulnerable and fragile in the face of average Iranian reactions to the deaths of its leaders and officials.
Raisi’s death sparked celebrations in Tehran with fireworks and social media was rife with jokes and humorous content over his demise. Lack of legitimacy is one of the symptoms of state decline, a major contributor to state fragility because it undermines an authoritarian state authority, and further aggravates the hitherto bellicose nature of relations between the state and society.
Another important long-term impact of the fateful helicopter crash is related to the succession crisis in the post-Khamenei era. With Raisi out of the picture, it appears that the road to power has been paved for Mojtaba to succeed his father once he is gone.
Nevertheless, Mojtaba’s power grab is no easy feat. Raisi’s death has a double-edged sword effect. On one hand, it can, at least on paper, give him an easier path to take up the mantle of Supreme Leader. On the other hand, Raisi’s absence can exacerbate the ongoing power struggle within the establishment among various rivaling actors who jockey for higher positions or even among the elements within the security and intelligence apparatus.
This dangerous power struggle is likely to evince itself in the medium to long term.
The assertion here is that such bitter infighting is dangerous for Khamenei and his kleptocratic structure of power he has managed to erect and consolidate in Iran. If this happens, this has the potential to impede an orderly power transition in Iran in the post-Khamenei era, resembling the chaos that followed Lenin’s and Stalin’s deaths in the Soviet Union.
In sum, the death of Raisi has presented the Islamic Republic with its most formidable and dangerous challenge since its inception 45 years ago.
While Khamenei was mulling over plans to create, in the best-case scenario, an orderly power transition after his death, the regime is now faced with twin succession crises.
The outcome of the initial crisis will determine the parameters of the subsequent one, and between these two crises lie numerous elements of surprise and a chain of unpredictable events that could unfold in an ever-turbulent Iran.
“I truly believe that the ayatollahs of Iran are promoting a campaign which is a threat not only to Israel. It's not just Israel's problem, it's a global threat,” said Sarit Zehavi.
While the world is familiar with ISIS and Al Qaeda as a radical form of Sunni Islam, what is lesser known is the Iranian ayatollahs – not the Iranian people – as a representation of radical Shiite Islam, according to Zehavi. She believes Iran wants to distribute its Islamic Revolution values around the world.
The Iranian regime, for example, has been militarily and diplomatically supporting Russia in its invasion of Ukraine. The alliance between Iran, Russia and China, forming to counter Western sanctions, is another threat to the economic and political basis of existing Western systems. Iran’s challenge to the West has only intensified with its controversial nuclear program. During this year's Iranian new year speech, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said the US will have no choice but to leave the Middle East.
The launch of October 7 with Iran as the so-called ‘boss’ of Hamas, as Zehavi puts it, was just the beginning.
“It’s under the same boss: the ayatollahs of Iran that planned this campaign and created the militias, the proxy militias in all over the region that will enable it to carry out the campaign,” said Zehavi.
Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles towards Israel on April 13, nearly two weeks after a suspected Israeli strike on an Iranian diplomatic compound in Syria that killed seven Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) members, including a very senior IRGC commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi - in his office adjacent to the Iranian embassy in Damascus.
Israel, along with the U.S. and its Arab neighbours intercepted 99 percent of the drones and missiles headed its way.
“This is a very interesting incident because Iran's main goal is to keep the conflict outside of Iran itself and use the proxy militia. I think that the fact that we don't understand completely why they decided to interfere by themselves, but it definitely can indicate the self-confidence of the ayatollahs of Iran that no one will put them at risk,” said Zehavi. ‘
Lieutenant Colonel Sarit Zehavi is the founder of the Alma Centre, which monitors and disseminates information about Israel's security challenges in the North to people outside of Israel. She briefs Washington officials, foreign delegations and policy makers from around the world.
Zehavi is living near the border with Lebanon where Iran-backed Hezbollah militants have increased their presence this past year. She said Hezbollah is so close they can see right into the homes of Israeli residents. Zehavi said she saw Hezbollah's outposts, towers and militants right at Israel's northern border line while out for a walk recently.
Zehavi said that October 7 was 'step one' in an execution by Iran to unify fronts to achieve its “goals to distribute the Islamic Revolution values all over the world and to eliminate the state of Israel.”
“What we experienced in the first seven months is the execution of the Iranian plan under the name unification of fronts. The Iranians wanted to create a multi-front campaign against the State of Israel and the Western presence here. It started from Hamas. We have Hezbollah launching missiles and drones as we speak,” said Zehavi.
Experts like Zehavi said Iran supports Hamas with $1 billion a year. The Islamic Republic also supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad with tens of millions and is providing Hezbollah with 70 per cent of its budget - and its ideology.
She refers to 'step two' as missile attacks from Hezbollah into Israel, Iran-backed Houthis attacking ships in the crucial shipping channel of the Bad al Mandab in Yemen, and attacks by Iranian-backed militia against U.S. military forces in Syria and Iraq.
As for a 'step three,' Zehavi said that based on statements from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Hezbollah, she believes Iran and its proxies will join a full-scale war if the fighting in Gaza reaches new levels.
She said Northerners in Israel are expecting a Hamas-style attack in the region. Zehavi said more than a decade ago, Hezbollah published its offensive plan for an attack on Israel - and she described its similarity to what Hamas did to southern Israel as “astonishing.”
“They [Hezbollah] continue to say in Arabic to their own people that they have plans to execute the offensive plan to occupy the Galilee, which is where I live, and many others here in Israel,” said Zehavi.
In an interview with Iran International near the Israel- Lebanon border, Zehavi said what has transpired between Iran and Israel is not just an escalation of tensions, but is rather - war.
“It's war. 60,000 Israelis don't know when they will be able to go back to their homes. You cannot tell them it's tensions,” said Zehavi.
In the wake of Raisi's death, the recently elected sixth Assembly of Experts for Leadership convened as scheduled on May 21.
The Assembly of Experts is the only constitutional body in Iran endowed with the authority to appoint and dismiss the Supreme Leader. Each term spans eight years, and given that Khamenei is 85 years old, it is highly probable that this assembly will be tasked with selecting his successor.
The body consists of 88 members, all Islamic scholars. President Ebrahim Raisi and Ali Al-Hashem, elected members of the sixth term, were both killed in a helicopter crash, resulting in two vacancies.
The Assembly of Experts operates like an enigmatic vault. Before 1989, its sessions were completely shrouded in secrecy. However, under Khamenei's leadership, detailed minutes from these sessions have been classified as either confidential or highly confidential.
The most important components of the structure of the Assembly of Experts are the Board of Directors, the Investigation Committee responsible for overseeing the Leader, and the Committee of Article 107 and 109 of the Constitution, tasked with determining the next leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In practice, the Investigation Committee has never challenged the Supreme Leader.
With no strong rivals, Raisi was in a prime position to become the president of the Assembly of Experts, making his future leadership a distinct possibility.
Raisi and Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's own son, were frequently regarded as the top candidates to succeed Khamenei.
Speculations Around Raisi's Sudden Death
Although not prominently, there have been some speculations surrounding the sudden death of Raisi.
Some argue that he may have been assassinated to clear the path for Khamenei's son to ascend to leadership. This argument aligns with the pattern of candidate disqualifications observed during Khamenei's tenure as Supreme Leader.
The trend of increasing disqualifications of candidates for the Assembly of Experts has been noticeable since Khamenei assumed leadership in 1989.
The impact of disqualifications has also affected high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic. Notable individuals whose eligibility to participate in the Assembly, which selects the next leader, was rejected include Hassan Rouhani, the former president and ex-member of the same Assembly, and Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic.
Until 1989, the eligibility of candidates for the Assembly of Experts elections was determined by senior Shia clerics.
After a revision of the Assembly's internal regulations during Khamenei's leadership, the authority to approve candidates became the exclusive domain of the Guardian Council. This 12-member body consists of six members directly appointed by the Supreme Leader and six selected by the head of the judiciary, who is also appointed by the Supreme Leader.
The revision exemplifies Khamenei's perpetual cycle of control in the so-called elections of the Islamic Republic.
Minimal Competition for Assembly's 88 Seats
These disqualifications have turned the Assembly of Experts elections into sham exercises.
In the most recent round of elections held in March, 144 candidates competed for 88 seats in the Assembly of Experts. On average, there were approximately 1.6 candidates contesting each seat. This indicates that many seats had only one or very few candidates running for them.
In essence, across all rounds of the Assembly of Experts elections, there has never been genuine competition between even two candidates. It is fair then, to say that these elections are the least competitive within the Islamic Republic.
Next chapter of the Islamic Republic’s rule
The Assembly of Experts has, in its history, elected a Supreme Leader only once. Following the death of Ruhollah Khomeini, Ali Khamenei was chosen as the next Leader of the Islamic Republic in June 1989.
The commencement of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, which will most likely select the next Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, began with a message from the current ruler, highlighting the selection of the future leader.
Read by his chief of staff, Khamenei’s message stated that “the selection of the leader according to Islamic criteria is the responsibility of [the] Assembly, which is itself elected and chosen by the people”.
Participation in the Assembly of Experts elections, according to the Islamic Republic's own statistics, has been decreasing. Furthermore, according to the law, the decision made by the Assembly of Experts to appoint the Supreme Leader is more authoritative and final than the majority opinion of the general population.
Now, a new chapter in the era of the Islamic Republic has begun. With the death of Ebrahim Raisi, one of the main contenders to succeed Khamenei, the country’s powerful players will enter a new and likely tense phase of political competition for Iran’s future leadership.