Two Candidates Say Nothing About Foreign Policy on Iran TV

Israel has intensified covert strikes in Syria against weapons sites, supply routes and Iranian-linked commanders, seven regional officials and diplomats said, ahead of a threatened full-scale assault on Tehran's key ally Hezbollah in Lebanon.

A June 2 air raid that killed 18 people, including an adviser with Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards, targeted a clandestine, fortified weapons site near Aleppo, three of the sources said. In May, an air strike hit a convoy of trucks headed to Lebanon carrying missile parts and another raid killed Hezbollah operatives, four said.

Israel has for years struck militant groups backed by arch-foe Iran in Syria and elsewhere, in a low-level campaign that burst into open confrontation after Israel and Palestinian group Hamas - another Iranian ally - went to war in Gaza on Oct. 7.

Israel has since killed dozens of Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and Hezbollah officers in Syria, from just two last year before the Oct. 7 attack, according to a tally by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a think tank.

The battle hit fever pitch in April when Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing the top IRGC commander for operations in the Levant. In retaliation, Iran fired some 300 missiles and drones at Israel, almost all of which were shot down. Israel then attacked Iranian territory with drones.

This direct confrontation, a first for the two countries, stopped there. Israel also briefly reduced the number of strikes it was carrying out against Iranian proxies, said Selin Uysal, a French diplomat seconded to the Washington Institute, citing the tally, which counted publicly-known attacks in the weeks immediately before and after.

"There was a slowdown" after the face-off in April, she said.

"But they are picking up again because of suspected Iranian weapons transfers to Lebanon. There is a kinetic effort in Syria and Lebanon to disrupt the supply chain between Iran and Hezbollah."

Reuters interviewed three Syrian officials, an Israeli government official and three Western diplomats about Israel's Syria campaign. The officials asked not to be named to talk freely about sensitive matters.

The Syrian officials gave previously unreported details of the targets of Israeli strikes around the cities of Aleppo and Homs in recent months, including the June 2 attack.

All those interviewed said Israel's moves suggested it was gearing up for a full-scale war against Hezbollah in Lebanon, which borders Syria, that could begin when Israel dials down its campaign in Gaza.

"The statements of our leaders have been clear that escalation could be imminent in Lebanon," the Israeli government official said.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last week that his country was prepared for "very strong action" at its frontier with Lebanon, where it has been fighting a so-far limited battle with Hezbollah since October 8.

War in Lebanon is not inevitable. Israel has also indicated openness to diplomatic efforts being brokered by Washington and France. The Israeli government official said the campaign in Syria was also aimed at weakening Hezbollah and thus discouraging it from a war with Israel.

The Israeli government and military did not respond to questions for this article. Israel rarely publicly acknowledges targeted killings overseas and has not commented on the recent strikes in Syria. A senior Israeli official said last year Israel was determined to prevent Syria becoming part of a new front.

The IRGC and a Syrian government spokesperson did not respond. Hezbollah declined to comment.

KILLING COMMANDERS, STRIKING SUPPLIES

Syria, a longtime Iranian ally, became the key conduit for Tehran's arms supplies to Hezbollah after Iran deployed military personnel and thousands of allied paramilitaries from around 2013 to help President Bashar al-Assad during his country's ongoing civil war.

Some weapons parts are smuggled into Syria while others are assembled there, the three Syrian officials said.

Israel's Syria campaign aims to make sure Hezbollah, Iran's most loyal ally and the linchpin of Tehran's projection of regional power through militant proxies, is as weak as possible before any kind of fight begins, the Syrian officials and Israeli official said.

The June 2 killing of Saeed Abyar, described by Iranian state media as an IRGC adviser, showed Israel's reach in taking out key personnel and targeting equipment even when Iran has tried new methods of protecting weapons and parts bound for Hezbollah, the Syrian officials said, including moving the manufacture of weapons to more hidden or fortified locations.

Abyar was visiting a manufacturing plant for missiles for Hezbollah that was hidden inside a stone quarry east of the city of Aleppo when he was hit, the Syrian officials said. "The facility was in an area designed to be hard to find and hard to hit," said one of the officials, an intelligence officer.

Iran blamed Sunday's strike on Israel and the head of the IRGC has vowed to retaliate.

The officials said the strike killed 17 other people, including Iran-aligned militiamen. It was the first targeting of an IRGC official since Israel bombed the Iranian consulate, they said.

But it is not the only attack it has carried out since then.

An air strike near the Syrian city of Homs on May 29 targeted a vehicle carrying parts for guided missiles from Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian intelligence officer said. Another strike on May 20 targeted members of Hezbollah, the officer said.

Before the Iran consulate attack, a series of air strikes in late March around Aleppo hit warehouses storing high explosives for missile warheads, the officer said.

Other attacks have targeted Syrian air defence systems that had in recent years given Hezbollah and Iranian military personnel some security to operate, including Russian-made Pantsir air defence systems, mobile missile launchers that the Syrian military uses, a Syrian military official said. Other strikes had targeted early-warning radar systems, the official said.

"In some cases Israel is hitting even before we install our equipment," the official said.

The Israeli government official said Israel's targets were advanced anti-aircraft weapons, heavy rockets and precision-guidance systems for missiles.

ISRAEL TIPPING THE BALANCE?

The number of Israeli attacks in Syria jumped dramatically after October 7, when Israel and Hamas went to war.

"The frequency has doubled," said the Washington Institute's Uysal.

Israel carried out 50 air strikes in Syria in the six months after the Gaza war began, she said. "These included attacks on Aleppo airport, the Nairab military airport, Damascus airport, and the Mezzeh military airport, which are key in weapon transfers. Weapons caches were also among the targets."

The strikes have included the killing of some 20 IRGC officials and more than 30 Hezbollah commanders, Uysal said. Between January and October of 2023, two IRGC officials and no Hezbollah commanders were killed by Israeli strikes in Syria, Uysal said.

"The attacks in Syria certainly stop arms and ammunition deliveries and damage the ability of Hezbollah or Iran to organise," said Lior Akerman of Reichman University, a former Brigadier-General in Israel's domestic security service.

Iran sends limited numbers of advisers to Syria, such as the senior IRGC officials killed in the consulate bombing. Hezbollah has deployed thousands of fighters there.

Hezbollah official Nawaf Musawi told the Iran-aligned Al Mayadeen TV channel in March that the group was opening new ammunition depots "and getting more precision missiles and better quality weapons by land, sea and air."

Farzan Sabet, a senior researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute who specialises in Iranian foreign policy, said attacks on Israel by Hezbollah and Iran's allies in Iraq and Yemen during the Gaza war had taken a toll on Israel.

"But it has killed many more Hezbollah operatives and senior figures including IRGC personnel in Syria, so on balance it's a bigger loss" for Iran's allies, Sabet said.

(Report by Reuters)

The Guardian Council, which vets candidates, approved only six out of more than 80 who registered to run. Key figures, including former parliament speaker Ali Larijani and former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, were disqualified.

Ali Larijani, the former Speaker of Parliament, whose qualification for the presidential election was rejected for the second consecutive term, said the Guardian Council's mechanism is "non-transparent." At the same time, two former senior officials Es’haq Jahangiri and Abbas Akhoundi have called on the Guardian Council to explain their disqualifications.

Over the past three decades, the Guardian Council has rejected hundreds of candidates in presidential and parliamentary elections. However, the practice has become more notorious since 2020, as the Council has barred non-hardliners from running in two parliamentary and one presidential vote. In 2021 also, key candidates were blocked, paving the way for hardliner Ebrahim Raisi from winning in a low-turnout election.

On Monday, Larijani published a message, the full text of which was posted on the social media platform X, stating that despite positive opinions from responsible institutions and a ruling from the judiciary dismissing some of the council’s past claims, the Guardian Council, with a "non-transparent mechanism," prevented his re-nomination.

In his protest letter on Monday, Larijani wrote: "What prompted me to enter the election was the prevailing critical situation, especially in the realm of the harsh economic conditions and Iran’s sensitive international position, particularly the oppressive sanctions impacting the livelihoods of our dear people. I hoped that with your help, we could overcome these obstacles and pave the way for Iran's national development."

Previously, Larijani, as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, played a role in negotiations on the Islamic Republic's nuclear issue with global powers. He also contributed to the formation of the long-term agreement between the Islamic Republic and China.

Former President Hassan Rouhani’s top aide and vice president Es’haq Jahangiri also protested the rejection of his qualification in a post on X. He demanded that the Guardian Council should disclose the reasons behind its decision. In previous elections, Jahangiri’s candidacy for the presidential election had been approved.

Abbas Akhoundi, a former minister, and another disqualified candidate, addressed the chairman of the Guardian Council, 97-year-old Ahmad Jannati in a statement on the social media platform X. He wrote, "I suspect that some reports received by the Council may have created ambiguities in the minds of some esteemed members of the Council."

He added, "I wish to defend my legal rights and those of the voters in an official session of the Council. Therefore, I request to be present at the Council's meeting within the legally prescribed timeframe to provide the necessary explanations."

So far, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has not issued a statement about his own disqualification. He was considered a key candidate with a potential large voter base among ordinary people. Ahmadinejad, who was also barred from the 2017 presidential elections, has become a vocal critic of the top echelons of the regime, and promised major changes if elected president.

Ali Beitollahi, the head of the Risk Section at the Research Center of the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development revealed in an interview with ILNA on Monday that "In Mashhad, the subsidence rate in the northwest of the city has reached 20 centimeters per year and will gradually affect the city center and the shrine of the eighth Shia Imam."

On May 1, Shargh newspaper published an article reporting that Tehran, Khorasan Razavi, and Isfahan provinces—home to the highest population densities in the country—are grappling with a land subsidence crisis.

An annual subsidence rate exceeding 10 percent is recorded in only three to five percent of subsidence areas worldwide. Comparing the statistics with the subsidence rates in Tehran, Khorasan Razavi, and Isfahan underscores the critical situation in these provinces.

Land subsidence, where the ground surface gradually sinks unevenly, typically occurs due to the depletion of underground resources such as water, oil, and gas, leading to the compression of soil layers. Excessive extraction of groundwater depletes aquifers, causing the soil layers, which were previously supported by water, to compress and sink. The process results in cracks in buildings, roads, bridges, and even extensive geographical changes, leading to significant infrastructural damage.

In such conditions, even months of continuous rainfall cannot restore the dried-up groundwater areas, a concerning situation for the residents of Mashhad, Tehran, Isfahan, and many other cities in Iran.

Ali Bagheri made the remarks at the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, on Monday following an announcement last week by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors to pass a resolution censuring Iran for its lack of cooperation with nuclear inspections. It said Iran had failed to address questions about undisclosed nuclear activities. The resolution, backed by Western powers, calls on Iran to provide access to sites and information necessary for verifying its nuclear program.

During his Monday speech, Bagheri also accused the US of using dollar dependence as a weapon and claimed that Iran will not allow regional stability and security to be disrupted by what he termed "occupying aggressors."

"We will continue our cooperation with the Agency within the framework of our rights and obligations under the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and the Safeguards Agreement," he added, raising concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities. Just weeks ago, the UN's nuclear chief said Iran was "weeks not months" away from a nuclear weapon as its enrichment levels had been found to exceed the international limits.

Former Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani, who has an extensive resume across different organs of the Iranian system, was disqualified for the second time since 2021. This represents another humiliation for Larijani and speaks to his family’s growing ostracization from power. His brother Sadegh Larijani, while chairman of the Expediency Council, was so disgusted by the Guardian Council’s decision to disapprove of Ali’s candidacy in 2021 that he resigned as a member. Among the concerns of the system is likely that Larijani’s daughter Fatemeh Ardeshir Larijani has been living in the United States for years and is now an assistant professor at Emory University School of Medicine.

In the end, the Guardian Council approved the candidacies of six men: Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Saeed Jalili, Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, Alireza Zakani, Mostafa Pourmohammadi, and Masoud Pezeshkian. All are conservative, aside from Pezeshkian, who is a ‘reformist.’ This is a similar dynamic to the seven 2021 presidential finalists, where the Guardian Council allowed one token reformist Mohsen Mehralizadeh, a former vice president under Mohammad Khatami’s administration, to run as well as pragmatist former Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati in a heavily-choreographed win for Raisi, the system’s favored candidate.

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf

Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has been preparing for the presidency for years. He has occupied multiple senior command positions in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including as deputy commander of the Basij, head of its Khatam Al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, and commander of the IRGC Air Force. During student protests in 1999, Ghalibaf signed onto a letter with other IRGC commanders threatening then-President Mohammad Khatami if more force was not used to suppress the demonstrations.

Later, Ghalibaf became head of Iran’s police, which is a position traditionally occupied by an IRGC commander. An audio recording emerged where Ghalibaf bragged to the Basij that he beat protesters with wooden sticks on the back of a motorbike in 1999 and that he ordered police to fire at protesters during campus demonstrations in 2003.

Afterwards, he became mayor of Tehran and rebranded himself as a technocratic manager. During his tenure, Ghalibaf hobnobbed with world leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2008. While there he told The New York Times, “We don’t need any atomic weapons or unconventional weapons” and was marketed as an “authoritarian modernizer.” He sought to distance himself from his old rival Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was then a firebrand president, by expressing a willingness for dialogue with the United States.

Ghalibaf has run unsuccessfully for president for years. When he campaigned for the office in 2005, leaked U.S. cables circulated about how the Supreme Leader’s son Mojtaba Khamenei, who is now considered a contender to succeed his father as supreme leader, “was reportedly the backbone” of Ghalibaf’s bids for political office. One indicated, “Mojtaba is said to help Ghalibaf as an advisor, financier, and provider of senior-level political support.” Although Mojtaba later convinced his father to switch his support to Ahmadinejad at the last minute, viewing him as more reliable—a prediction he would likely later regret given Ahmadinejad’s falling out with Khamenei.

But this shows Ghalibaf still enjoys a strong relationship with Khamenei’s inner circle, especially as he is reportedly a relative of the supreme leader. Both hail from Khorasan in the northeast, with Ghalibaf being born in Torqabeh near Mashhad, where Khamenei hails from.

In 2020, Ghalibaf became speaker of parliament. During his tenure, he presided over parliament’s passage—despite President Hassan Rouhani’s objections—of the Strategic Action Law to Lift Sanctions and Safeguard the National Interests of Iran, which mandated aggressive steps to accelerate Iran’s nuclear program and restrict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring.

He has been implicated over the years in spectacular corruption scandals. An audio recording emerged in 2022 of Ghalibaf being engaged in a cover-up of embezzlement during his time as mayor of Tehran of around $3 billion. Ghalibaf suggested signing a fake contract to conceal its disappearance. Photos also emerged in 2022 of Ghalibaf’s family returning from a shopping trip in Turkey with a large layette set which generated controversy given his previous criticisms of a candidate for president of buying baby clothes in Italy and at a time when Iranians were struggling under crushing economic mismanagement. Ghalibaf’s son Es’haq was also denied a permanent residency application in Canada. Leaked documents emerged which showcased hundreds of thousands of dollars in his bank accounts abroad. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf himself has been sanctioned by Canada.

Thus far in this cycle, powerful elements in the IRGC are promoting Ghalibaf’s candidacy, with Tasnim, an IRGC-affiliated outlet, defending him. Journalists who revealed Ghalibaf’s corruption were also conveniently arrested this week as Ghalibaf entered the presidential contest. If successful, Ghalibaf would be the first president under Khamenei to have served as a senior career commander of the IRGC. Having Ghalibaf in the presidency would thus ensure IRGC equities are protected in a succession process should Khamenei, at 85 years old, pass away during his tenure.

Saeed Jalili

Saeed Jalili has been nicknamed “a living martyr” after losing one of his legs during the Iran-Iraq War as a member of the Basij. Like Khamenei, he was born in Mashhad, and holds a Ph.D. from Imam Sadegh University, an ideological training ground for the regime. His dissertation was entitled “The Foundation of Islamic Political Thought in the Quran.”

Jalili has held a series of positions spanning the Office of the Supreme Leader, Iran’s Foreign Ministry, and on the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). They include head of Iran’s Foreign Ministry’s Inspection Office, head of the Foreign Ministry’s US Affairs Office, a senior director in Khamenei’s office, deputy foreign minister for European and American Affairs, secretary of the SNSC, and later the supreme leader’s personal representative on the SNSC.

CIA Director Bill Burns once described Jalili in his memoir as “stupefyingly opaque” and that he did not envy his students. Jalili in 2022 reportedly advocated for Iran increasing uranium enrichment to 90%, which is weapons-grade. He is an ideologue, steeped in the theocracy’s revolutionary ethos. Like Ghalibaf, Jalili is sanctioned by Canada. But Ghalibaf has reportedly been trying to sabotage Jalili’s chances—positioning himself as a more pragmatic hardliner.

Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi

Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi is a physician by training. A former member of parliament, he served as a member of its presidium and first deputy speaker. He ran for the presidency in 2021 but lost. Ebrahim Raisi later named him as a vice president and head of the Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation. This Iranian parastatal foundation is under sanctions for directing financial resources to terrorist organizations, particularly Hezbollah. It has numerous businesses, especially in Lebanon, which are directed by Hezbollah’s Executive Council, whose holdings across various sectors provide the terrorist organization with vital funding. Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation officials also took part in Hezbollah operations against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War.

Alireza Zakani

Alireza Zakani has held a series of posts in the Islamic Republic, including as head of the IRGC’s Student Basij Organization (SBO), a member of parliament, president of the Parliament’s Research Center, and currently mayor of Tehran. He is under UK sanctions for the commission of serious human rights abuses in Iran and generated controversy when he visited Brussels in 2023 given his record. When he was a legislator, Zakani headed a parliamentary commission on the nuclear deal, where he emerged as a leading critic of the negotiations with the P5+1. As mayor of Tehran, Zakani has spearheaded the Noor Plan to forcibly enforce the hijab on Iranian women. His tenure in Tehran has witnessed multiple scandals, including around $336 million missing. Zakani reportedly has multiple wives, with embarrassing personal revelations recently emerging on the subject. His decision to support construction of mosques in public parks also generated controversy.

Zakani ran unsuccessfully for president in 2021. Ahmadinejad rose from mayor of Tehran to become president in 2005. However, Zakani faces an uphill climb with more established conservatives like Ghalibaf and Jalili on the field. That is not to mention that Zakani, who was Ghalibaf’s campaign manager in his unsuccessful 2005 presidential bid, now running against his old boss will make for an awkward dynamic.

Mostafa Pourmohammadi

Born in Qom, Mostafa Pourmohammadi is the sole cleric to be approved to run for the presidency in 2024. He attended the Haqqani Seminary and served in a series of positions including as revolutionary prosecutor in Masjed Soleyman, Hormozgan, and Khorasan; deputy intelligence minister and the Intelligence Ministry’s representative in Evin Prison; head of the social-political bureau in the Office of the Supreme Leader; and head of the General Inspectorate Organization. He later became interior minister in the conservative Ahmadinejad presidency and justice minister in the pragmatic Rouhani administration. Thus, Pourmohammadi has a considerable bureaucratic pedigree across political factions, Khamenei’s office, the judiciary, and executive branch. He shares career overlaps with Jalili, who also was a member of Khamenei’s staff and Ebrahim Raisi, who likewise served as head of the General Inspectorate Organization.

Pourmohammadi is notorious to Iranians given his service with Raisi on a Death Commission which greenlighted the executions of thousands of political prisoners in 1988. He is cognizant, however, of waning public support for the Islamic Republic, admitting in 2023 that “popular satisfaction has declined” and that “the young generation has distanced itself from us.” Yet he was disqualified from running for the Assembly of Experts, the chamber that will choose Khamenei’s successor, in 2024. This is despite Pourmohammadi having proved loyal to Khamenei in disclosing electoral irregularities to him without Ahmadinejad’s knowledge, prompting his dismissal as interior minister in 2008.

Masoud Pezeshkian

Masoud Pezeshkian is the sole ‘reformist’ permitted to run in this election. A heart surgeon by training, he previously served as health minister in the administration of Mohammad Khatami. In 2003, the parliament tried to impeach him unsuccessfully, citing incompetence in his appointments, inappropriate use of a loan, and other issues. His experience during this time tracked with other Khatami ministers who were targeted by conservatives for the reformist tendencies of his presidency. Later, Pezeshkian was elected to parliament and rose to become a deputy speaker.

He has been outspoken in criticizing the government over the issue of hijab enforcement. After the murder of Mahsa Amini in 2022, he told an interviewer that “we want our children to be modest, but if our behavior makes them hate our religion, we should at the very least refrain from continuing with this method.” He has been critical of parliament members chanting death to certain countries, arguing “we need to tolerate others and work and collaborate with the world.” He has also been a supporter of the Iran nuclear deal.

Yet Pezeshkian, while condemnatory of the Raisi administration as being incapable of solving Iran’s problems, has not crossed the line in publicly complaining about Khamenei. He has also championed core regime principles that the United States is the root cause of tension in the region and hailed cooperation with Russia as both countries are subject to sanctions.

Pezeshkian will make a bid to generate excitement and voter turnout given his ‘reformist’ roots—his campaign motto is already “For Iran,” which likely seeks to exploit the Shervin Hajipour song ‘Baraye’ that became the anthem of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. He is already copying gimmicks of Abdolnaser Hemmati, who lost the 2021 presidential race. Back then, Hemmati pledged to make Javad Zarif the first vice president or foreign minister again. During this cycle, Pezeshkian has hinted about his intention to include figures like Zarif in his administration if he wins. Zarif has in turn endorsed him. But the failed experience of Khatami’s presidency looms large in the memory of many Iranians, who believe the Islamic Republic must end, and that reformists and conservatives are two sides of the same corrupted, incompetent, and repressive coin.