Experiencing tightly controlled and unfree elections for five decades, most voters in Iran have realized since 2020 that they do not have a meaningful role in electing their president or members of parliament.
The most significant reasons for the declining trust include the mass disqualification of candidates by the unelected 12-member Guardian Council, the use of tens of thousands of mobile ballot boxes (up to one-third), voting in military barracks, and the involvement of dirty and non-transparent money.
Although many were aware of the undemocratic nature of elections long before, participation rates in some periods reached more than two-thirds of eligible voters, such as in 1997 and 2013. One of the main reasons for this high participation was the government’s propaganda machine, which effectively "heated up the election."
There are three main methods. The first is dedicating significant airtime on state TV and radio stations, which have dozens of networks, to election-related content to encourage participation. This includes debates between candidates, interviews with them, and election roundtables, all orchestrated by government outlets. For the 2024 elections, the candidates and their consultants have dozens of introductory interviews, and panel discussion programs, other than five collective debates.
The second method involves billboards and banners funded by public resources, displayed throughout cities and along roads across the country. These advertisements use quotes from Shia saints, leaders of the Islamic Republic, and celebrities who cooperate with the government to encourage voter participation. These ads are displayed alongside the individual advertisements of the candidates.
However, the most effective method of attracting silent majority voters is to amplify the voices of university professors (especially those residing in Western countries), non-conformist celebrities, and figures occasionally critical of regime policies. This approach helps bring a segment of the undecided population to the polls. Typically, the opinions and positions of these figures, which are not necessarily independent, are not featured by government-controlled outlets during ordinary times.
However, the effectiveness of these methods has waned since the February 2020 parliamentary elections, followed by the presidential vote in 2021 and the second parliamentary election in March 2024. Turnout in these elections was significantly below 50%, according to official figures, which many believe are inflated to portray a more favorable picture.
“A new wave of hope”
During electoral campaigns, supporters of the Islamic Republic have employed three tactics both inside and outside the country to encourage voter turnout.
The first tactic involves instilling misleading hopes in a society desperate for change. "With the announcement of the names of the approved candidates, a new wave of hope has flowed through Iranian society. If political groups use it correctly and follow the right principles, we will have one of the most refreshing choices in the history of Iran since Mr. Khatami," said Saeed Leilaz, a high-ranking member of a 'reformist' party within the Reform Front, supporting the 'moderate' candidate Masoud Pezeshkian.
President Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005) aimed to reform some notorious characteristics and undemocratic practices of the Islamic regime but was stopped by conservatives supported by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard. The same scenario repeated itself during the eight years of relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani (2013-2021), who was constantly pummeled by hardliners.
Leilaz believes 40 million people may participate in this election. Of course, according to the IRNA news agency, based on the content analysis of people's posts on Instagram pages of "about 31 million active users" the electorate has not become mobilized for the election.
Abbas Abdi, one of the leftist figures of the Khomeini era and a leading figure among the students who took the American Embassy staff hostage for 444 days, also repeated the above hope: "The elections of June 28, 2024, can create a social wave with over 60% participation," Abdi predicts, though he does not specify which poll supports this claim. He emphasizes Pezeshkian’s personality rather than his executive performance or experience, which is not particularly notable: "The most important and outstanding feature of him... is that he is an honest person who does not lie, and this is a rare quality among Iranian officials, and people are very hungry for that."
Abdi and Leilaz spent time in prison just for expressing their views in the past, which has made their voices to be heard outside the ruling elite.
“Surprising decision of the Guardian Council”
The second tactic used to stir up election enthusiasm is to portray the Guardian Council's decision to approve Pezeshkian as a surprising move, framing him as a reformist candidate to attract those who still believe in reforms within the regime.
Pezeshkian, who is known more as a ‘reformist’ than a conservative is the only non-hardliner candidate approved by the Guardian Council. All sorts of regime supporters, including some individuals in the United States, portray his candidacy as a good omen showing the Islamic Republic’s goodwill. However, in the past eight days after his candidacy was approved, Pezeshkian has come across more as a conservative loyal to Ali Khamenei than a reformist.
“Not voting is not a political act”
The third tactic is to frame non-participation not as a protest, but as an apolitical act. "I don't consider not voting to be a political act," an American-Iranian supporter of the Tehran government said on social media. This viewpoint fails to distinguish between democratic and totalitarian regimes. In totalitarian regimes, not voting can lead to the loss of certain rights, such as employment in government affairs. Therefore, abstaining from voting is a costly political act. In fact, the decline in election turnout in the past four years has shaken and weakened Islamic Republics claims of legitimacy.
The opinions expressed by the author are not necessarily the views of Iran International.
Pirhossein Koolivand, the head of the Iranian Red Crescent, confirmed on Tuesday that an additional 26 pilgrims are currently receiving medical treatment in Saudi hospitals in addition to those who have died at the annual religious event.
Koolivand said the pilgrims' health status is "good and suitable", claiming that medical staff dispatched from Iran to accompany pilgrims attended to over 11,000 cases.
On Sunday, Mohammed Al-Abdulaali, a spokesman for Saudi Arabia's Health Ministry, said in one day, over 2,760 pilgrims experienced sunstroke and heat stress at the Hajj attracting around 1.8 million to Mecca in Saudi Arabia.
To combat the mass of yearly deaths that occur, Saudi officials have implemented several safety measures, such as climate-controlled environments and extensive medical services, mitigating the health dangers associated with the extreme heat.
Last year, the pilgrimage saw as many as 240 deaths, with temperatures soaring to about 48 degrees Celsius.
The three-hour long debate on Monday among six hand-picked candidates was focused on “controlling inflation and growth of production”. Three of the five televised debates planned before the June 28 elections will focus on economy. The next debate is scheduled for June 20.
In the debates and interviews, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, incumbent Mayor of Tehran Alireza Zakani, and hardliner Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh-Hashemi defended the “achievements” of Raisi’s administration. They faced opposition from pro-reform Masoud Pezeshkian, moderate-conservative Mostafa Pourmohammadi, and at times Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, who criticized the administration's performance in veiled terms.
Hardliner candidates are acutely aware of the Raisi administration's disastrous economic performance, yet they refuse to take responsibility for it and sometimes even praise it, according to France-based journalist Seraj Mirdamadi. “But they blame [the pro-reform Masoud] Pezeshkian unfairly for the performance of [Hassan] Rouhani’s government.”
Speaking in vague and difficult to understand terms, Jalili, insisted that sanctions did not matter, and that the state of the economy could be improved by relying on “domestic potentials,” an argument often made by loyalists of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. According to him, an economic growth rate of eight percent as prescribed by the 7th Development Plan is feasible, while others argue that tens of billions of dollars is needed to achieve such a high rate.
Ghalibaf, however, prescribed negotiations to lift the sanctions if for every step that Iran took, presumably to limit its nuclear program, the Western side was prepared to provide adequate incentives in return.
Ghalibaf has been criticized for calling the removal of sanctions a priority for his government, while the parliament in December 2020 under his leadership approved a bill hardening Iran’s negotiating position. “Why did you approve the catastrophic ‘Strategic Action Plan to Lift the Sanctions’ to prevent the revival of the JCPOA?” reformist commentator Abbas Abdi asked Ghalibaf in a tweet.
The December 2020 legislation called for reducing Iran's commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal and obliged the government to escalate the nuclear crisis.
All of the four hardliners, including Ghalibaf, insist that the sanctions are “unfair” and “cruel” but also argue that Iran has succeeded in circumventing them and is selling its oil without much trouble.
In a tweet after the debates, political commentator Reza Nasri contended that hardliners’ claims were contradictory. “How can sanctions which ‘are not a problem anymore’ and have been neutralized be ‘cruel’ at the same time?” he asked.
However, there is a major divide between Ghalibaf and Jalili who is the candidate of ultra-hardliners. Their supporters have been highly intolerant of each other, insisting that one must withdraw in favor of the other to ensure the presidency remains within the "revolutionary front."
Zakani and Ghazizadeh-Hashemi, neither of whom has a realistic chance of winning, appeared to play a supporting role for Jalili in the debate. They may withdraw in his favor after the debates, similar to how Jalili withdrew in favor of Raisi in the 2021 elections.
In contrast to the hardliners, pro-reformist Pezeshkian and moderate-conservative Pourmohammadi emphasized the crippling impact of sanctions. They called for improving relations with the international community as a means to help Iran overcome its economic difficulties.
Many observers noted that Pourmohammadi, who spoke more clearly and openly than the other candidates, appeared to be the strongest contender in the debate. But there are no independent opinion polls in Iran, and it is impossible to gauge the impact of the debate.
Pezeshkian emphasized the detrimental impact of sanctions and strained international relations on the country’s economy, asserting that all political groups must collaborate to effectively implement existing economic plans. He argued that what his rivals term 'circumventing sanctions' has often led to corruption.
For the first time in the history of election debates, candidates were shown participating in a group prayer before heading to the studio, where they took their seats assigned by a draw.
Candidates largely avoided seriously challenging each other or criticizing the economic failures of the Raisi administration, following the "recommendation" of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The state broadcaster had warned the candidates beforehand that any mudslinging or discussion of irrelevant topics during the debate would result in immediate and direct intervention by the Election Campaign Regulation Committee.
According to a telephone poll conducted by Shenakht, a polling agency claiming to be private, between June 15-16 with a sample of 1,000 respondents, Ghalibaf secured the support of 29 percent of voters who were certain or undecided about voting. He was followed by Masoud Pezeshkian with 21 percent and Saeed Jalili with 18 percent. However, different polls conducted by different government or political groups reveal different results. Overall, none of these polls can be considered fully reliable.
Some politicians indicate that discussions are currently taking place between the Ghalibaf and Jalili camps to decide whether one of them should withdraw to counter Pezeshkian's competition.
In response to a question during one of his televised interviews about the possibility of one or more “revolutionary” candidates withdrawing to boost another's votes, Ghalibaf claimed he was “more prepared” than the other candidates, hinting that he expected Jalili to withdraw.
However, on Monday, Jalili’s campaign manager Mohsen Mansouri refuted any possibility of withdrawal unless they determine there is “a candidate better than Mr. Jalili.”