Iran International
Unlike previous election debates where foreign policy was barely addressed, the debates on Monday and Tuesday focused mainly on this issue, thanks to a conservative candidate who is the only cleric in the group.
Mostafa Pourmohammadi repeatedly brought up the 2015 nuclear deal with the West, the two-decade-old Crescent deal controversy, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklisting of Iran that has seriously impacted foreign trade alongside US sanctions.
Pourmohammadi also urged the most hardline and anti-West candidate, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, to speak about his achievements in negotiations with Western powers.
Pourmohammadi, a former intelligence and judicial official, scores very low in opinion polls but stands out as the most clear and methodical candidate.
The pro-reform candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, held hardliners to task for storming the embassies of the United Kingdom in November 2011 and Saudi Arabia in January 2016, insisting that were not held responsible for these incidents and their consequences.
Two other hardliners, Alireza Zakani and Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh, relentlessly targeted the pro-reform Masoud Pezeshkian and Pourmohammadi, both of whom are highly critical of Jalili’s isolationist views and the claim that the Iranian economy can improve only by relying on domestic resources and potentials.
“For an eight percent economic growth, we need $200 billion of foreign investment. This is not possible without fixing our relations with the world,” Pezeshkian said.
Many believe Zakani and Ghazizadeh were only approved by the election watchdog, the Guardian Council, to play a supporting act to Jalili and withdraw in his favor after the debates. Pourmohammadi and Pezeshkian voiced such suspicions in the debates.
Jalili and other hardliner candidates also attacked the moderate former President Hassan Rouhani and his government. They accused him of making a disadvantageous nuclear deal, failing to address the problem of US sanctions after Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA, bad relations with neighboring countries, failing to procure Covid vaccines in a timely manner, as well as internet censorship.
They repeatedly dubbed Pezeshkian’s potential government, if he were to win, as "the third Rouhani administration," presumably to associate him with the numerous shortcomings and even alleged treacheries they have attributed to Rouhani and his administration.
Pundits say two separate events before and after the Tuesday debate are likely to affect the turnout. First was a speech by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei where he enumerated the characteristics of a desirable president and stated the path of foreign policy the future president is expected to take.
Many believe that in thinly veiled terms he gave his blessing to Saeed Jalili who “does not look beyond” the Iranian borders for solving the country’s problems and values its “inherent capacities.” To a lesser extent, Khamenei's remarks could also be seen as a nod to Ghalibaf, who has attempted to appear less aggressive than Jalili and his two "supporting candidates."
His speech, many say, also ruled out Pezeshkian who has already allied with pro-engagement former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif, considered as the architect and most ardent advocate of the 2015 nuclear deal and negotiation with the United States and other Western powers.
The second event was the release of a video by former reformist President Mohammad Khatami which may convince some hesitant Iranians to vote for Pezeshkian, whom he described as an honest politician, as they did for Hassan Rouhani in 2017 when Khatami appealed to them.
Khamenei also said high turnout in Friday’s elections would “bring honor” to the Islamic Republic and strengthen it.“Enemies wag their tongues whenever turnout is low in elections,’ he said.
Khamenei’s insistence that high turnout is proof of the legitimacy of the ruling establishment may backfire and instigate a lower turnout because many Pezeshkian supporters do not wish their votes to be interpreted as an endorsement of the establishment or Khamenei and his leadership but will not hugely affect the turnout of the supporters of the four hardliner candidates, except Ghalibaf to some extent, who rarely need any encouragement to vote.
In the absence of accurate and unbiased polls and surveys, predicting what might happen—even in the short term—is always challenging. This lack of reliable data makes it difficult for anyone to have a clear understanding of imminent events.
A few days before the voting day in Iran's snap presidential election, it remains uncertain who will stay in the race. Four of the six candidates—Majles Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, and Martyrs Foundation Chief Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi—are from the same camp. If they all remain in the competition, no one in the conservative camp is likely to win.
None of them is meaningfully more popular than others in the same camp, although Ghalibaf and Jalili are the two forerunners. The other two are so sure about their unpopularity that they do not do any campaigning, other than the free campaigning the state television offers all candidates.
Although none of the polls and surveys can be fully trusted at this time, all available figures—both genuine and fabricated—indicate that turnout will significantly impact the candidates' standings. Most suggest that a lower turnout increases the likelihood of a conservative victory, while a high turnout would favor the pro-reform candidate, Massoud Pezeshkian.
A turnout under 40 percent gives Jalili a strong chance of winning, potentially even in the first round. A 50 percent turnout puts Ghalibaf, a slightly less hardline candidate, in a better position. A 60 percent turnout would likely ensure Pezeshkian's victory in the first round, eliminating the need for a runoff election.
The reason is that over 60% of voters have shunned the ballot box in the last two elections due to deep disillusionment. The more this disillusioned majority votes, the more support relative moderates are likely to receive.
However, despite all the fuss about a consolidated conservative camp, they are badly divided. Their combination in the election, shows that it is every man for himself. Some journalists say there will be a conservative figureheads' gathering on Tuesday or Wednesday and three of the conservative candidates will withdraw in the interest of the more popular individual. No one yet knows for sure whether Jalili or Ghalibaf will remain in the race.
From the perspective of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Ghalibaf is the preferable choice because, unlike Jalili, he lacks an ideological agenda and political party affiliation. Jalili's domestic and alleged foreign connections make him a suspect in Khamenei's eyes, as he leaves no room for doubts regarding his men's loyalty.
During the past days, while mudslinging against Ghalibaf has been diminishing, videos surfaced on social media in which former presidents Ebrahim Raisi and Hassan Rouhani showed Jalili in a bad light. Raisi said in his video that he offered many jobs to Jalili but he did not accept any one of them. These comments are extremely damaging as Raisi' is being treated like a saint following his death.
Rouhani on the other hand said that all members of the Supreme Council of National Security endorsed Former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's way out of the diplomatic impasse over Iran's nuclear deal with big powers, but Jalili obstructed the plan and the negotiations failed.
The two videos could have not surfaced in a worse time. Many social media figures believe that they ruined Jalili's chances and brought Ghalibaf to a position to be one of the main two contestants in the upcoming election.
Current estimates of a low turnout might prove wrong. As Qom Seminarian Mohammad Taqi Akbarzadeh has noted, if officials misinterpret the people's votes as wholehearted support for government policies and fail to implement necessary changes, the public is likely to express their opposition through street protests and rebellion.
In the letter, a copy of which was obtained by Iran International, the political prisoner asserts that Iranians now recognize the ruling power in the Islamic Republic seeks votes "only as a decoration for its authoritarian religious regime," with the president serving merely as a "facilitator for implementing orders."
Haeri is currently jailed in Ghezel Hesar Prison in the city of Karaj, serving a three-year, eight-month sentence. He received an additional prison sentence of about three months last July for his human rights activities during imprisonment.
A special election will be held on June 28 to replace former President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash in May. Six candidates, who have been handpicked by the Islamic Republic's Guardian Council, are vying to replace Raisi.
In his letter, Haeri pointed to the decline in electoral legitimacy and public support for the current regime, referring to the record-low voter turnout in the recent parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections. According to the state news outlet IRNA, about 25 million of Iran's 61 million eligible voters cast their ballots.
"The grandeur of this massive non-violent struggle for the right to self-determination has permanently changed the political landscape of the country," Haeri wrote.
Haeri emphasized that from 1997 to 2017, the “oppressed people of Iran” went to the polls out of fear and desperation to bring about change, but their participation yielded no lasting benefits.
According to a new survey, conducted by the Netherlands-based Gamaan Institute, 22% of respondents in Iran confirmed they would definitely vote, while 12% remain undecided.
The survey highlighted deep-seated dissatisfaction with the current political system, with roughly 68% of respondents citing "opposition to the overall system of the Islamic Republic" as their primary reason for not voting. Other notable reasons included "the limited power of the president".
Voter participation has been on a steady decline in Iran, with over 50% of eligible voters staying home for the election of now-deceased President Raisi in 2021. That election saw about 3.7 million invalid ballots cast, that were likely to have been mostly blank or protest votes.
Meanwhile, hundreds of teachers, union activists, and prominent cultural figures in Iran have publicly announced their decision to abstain from voting in the upcoming presidential elections. They assert that participation is futile and risks legitimizing the government while intensifying the suppression of dissent.
Haeri was released from Greater Tehran Prison in October 2020 after serving a previous sentence and receiving 74 lashes. In December last year, he was handed arbitrary new charges for writing letters against the death penalty, sham elections, and violations of fair trial rights for prisoners, and spent time in solitary confinement in June.
Other prisoners who have spoken out against participation in the upcoming elections include Nobel-laureate Narges Mohammadi and Golrokh Iraee.
Mohammadi wrote from Tehran’s Evin Prison that she would not participate in the "illegal elections of the oppressive and illegitimate government." Iraee criticized the factions of the so-called reformists for encouraging participation, calling it a betrayal, writing that "Reformists should know that we, the people of Iran, remember their betrayal from the beginning and will not forget."