Immediately following Masoud Pezeshkian's victory over Saeed Jalili in Iran’s heavily manipulated presidential election, most Western media outlets and news agencies labeled him as a “reformist” and “moderate.”
The media also described Jalili as a “hardliner,” “conservative,” or “ultraconservative.”
But do these labels, often used to dramatize politics and create a "devil and angel" narrative, accurately describe these two individuals and their supporters? Many Iran observers would say no.
Like Jalili, Pezeshkian announced during the campaigns that he fully adheres to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei’s, policies and has "melted into Khamenei’s leadership."
To most, there is no doubt that both of them are staunch Islamists.
On certain issues, it would appear challenging to portray Pezeshkian as a libertarian and individualist politician who respects individual rights.
First, considering the “reformist” label: Pezeshkian has neither claimed to be a reformist nor been a member of reformist parties or groups in the last three decades.
During the debates, he referred to himself as a "principlist reformist," which was seen by many as merely spin.
Pezeshkian was a minister in former President Mohammad Khatami's cabinet two decades ago, but that was a multi-party and multi-sectarian government, including participants from across the political spectrum.
Pezeshkian’s membership in Khatami's administration, can therefore not be seen as evidence that he is a reformist.
Additionally, during the campaigns, he did not mention any of the reformist programs and policies from the Khatami era, such as media freedom, increasing the power of elected institutions compared to appointed ones, empowering civil society institutions, and canceling the Guardian Council’s power to disqualify candidates.
And, when it comes to being a “moderate”, Pezeshkian’s track record has shown that he is no different from Jalili and the other candidates.
He has been a strong advocate of compulsory hijab and cancel culture, even stating that he enforced these policies in a hospital and university under his management right after the 1979 Islamic takeover, before they were mandated. His complaints about officials being harsh on women are inconsistent with his voting record for laws restricting women's rights during his tenure in the parliament (Majles).
Another issue discussed in the 2024 election was internet filtering. During the debates, Pezeshkian repeatedly defended shutting down the internet, as was done for a week during the repressions of November 2019, and filtering social networks in the context of public protests. Security forces killed at least 1,500 civilians during that week, as the government shut off the Internet to prevent news of the atrocities reaching the outside world.
In the case of the murder of Iranian-Canadian journalist Zahra Kazemi in 2003 while she was in custody in Evin prison, Pezeshkian, as an investigating physician, did not describe her death as unusual. This was despite the fact that her body was buried without her family's knowledge, and her grave was completely cemented to prevent an autopsy and subsequent investigations.
To many, Pezeshkian is as conservative as Jalili and cannot be portrayed as a liberal or libertarian.
In the Iranian context, being conservative or ultra-conservative typically means believing in Sharia law and implementing its verdicts in society using the government’s coercive power.
During the Khatami and Hassan Rouhani administrations, Western media also described these two leaders, who were Islamists committed to implementing Sharia law like Khomeini, as liberal and moderate, thereby misleading their readers.
Khatami and Rouhani sought de-escalation with the West to preserve the Islamic system and implement Sharia laws within it; for this reason, they can be considered non-anti-Western. However, in their stance on erasing Israel off the map, anti-Semitism, anti-Bahá'íism, negating the rights of the LGBT community, limiting women's rights, and denying social and cultural freedoms, they believed and acted like the founder of the Islamic Republic.
For this reason, using the term "liberal" to describe them or their administrations could be considered a form of deception of Western public opinion.
Given the context and political background of Muslim-majority societies, particularly those with Islamists in power like Iran and Afghanistan, using labels such as left and right, conservative and liberal, and moderate and radical can be misleading and problematic.
Labeling high-ranking officials, whose government engages in torturing opponents, imprisoning writers and journalists, violating the basic rights of Jews and Christians, and supporting the killing of street protesters, as "liberal" or "moderate" misrepresents their actions and undermines the experiences of victims of totalitarian regimes.
Pezeshkian's political, social, and cultural positions are closely aligned with those of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Lebanon's Hezbollah; otherwise, he would be rejected by the Guardian Council.
The new president aligns himself closely with Hezbollahi principles – some might even call him a Hezbollahi personified.
If one considers Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah to be moderate and reformist, the same descriptors could be applied to Pezeshkian.
This alignment is further evidenced by Nasrallah's congratulatory message to Pezeshkian: "We are by your side and, God willing, we will continue this way until we reach the final victory, the axis of which is the mighty, dear, and powerful Iran."
The enlargement of the sites follows an October 2022 deal in which Iran agreed to provide missiles to Russia, which has been seeking them for its war against Ukraine. Tehran also supplies missiles to Yemen's Houthi rebels and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah, both members of the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance against Israel, according to US officials.
Images taken by commercial satellite firm Planet Labs of the Modarres military base in March and the Khojir missile production complex in April show more than 30 new buildings at the two sites, both of which are located near Tehran.
The images, reviewed by Reuters, show many of the structures are surrounded by large dirt berms. Such earthworks are associated with missile production and are designed to stop a blast in one building from detonating highly combustible materials in nearby structures, said Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.
The expansions began at Khojir in August last year and at Modarres in October, Lewis said, based on images of the sites.
Iran's arsenal is already the largest in the Middle East, estimated at more than 3,000 missiles, including models designed to carry conventional and nuclear warheads, experts say.
Three Iranian officials, who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to speak publicly, confirmed that Modarres and Khojir are being expanded to boost production of conventional ballistic missiles.
"Why shouldn't we?" said one official.
A second Iranian official said some of the new buildings would also allow a doubling of drone manufacturing. Drones and missile components would be sold to Russia, drones would be provided to the Houthis and missiles to Hezbollah, the source added.
Reuters was unable independently to confirm the Iranian officials' comments.
Iran's mission to the United Nations did not respond to a Reuters request for comment on the expansion of the complexes. Tehran has previously denied providing drones and missiles to Russia and the Houthis. Hezbollah's media office did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam said a boost in Iran's weapons manufacturing would not have any impact in Yemen because the Houthis develop and manufacture aircraft independent of Iran.
Lewis analyzed the Planet Labs imagery with Decker Eveleth, an associate research analyst at CNA, a Washington thinktank, as part of a Middlebury project that monitors Iranian missile infrastructure.
"We know that Russia is on the hunt for low-cost missile capabilities, and it has gone to Iran and North Korea," said Lewis.
Moscow and Pyongyang have denied the transfer of North Korean missiles to Russia. The Russian embassy in Washington and North Korea's mission to the United Nations did not immediately respond to requests for comment for this story.
The two U.S. researchers said in separate interviews that it was not clear from the photos what kinds of missiles would be produced at the new facilities, which still appeared to be under construction.
Any increase in Tehran's missile or drone production would be concerning to the United States, which has said that Iranian drones help sustain Russia's assault on Ukrainian cities, and to Israel as it fends off attacks from Iran-backed groups, including Hezbollah.
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment on the reseachers' analysis.
A U.S. National Security Council spokesperson declined to confirm their assessment, adding that the United States has implemented various measures, including sanctions, intended to constrain Iranian missile and drone production and exports.
Reuters in February reported that Iran had sent surface-to-surface ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine. Iran denied providing the weapons. Washington said it could not confirm the transfers but it assumed Tehran intended to provide missiles to Moscow.
New buildings, dirt berms
Shahid Modarres and Khojir are overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the elite paramilitary organization that plays a central role in Iran's missile and nuclear programs. It controls large segments of the Iranian economy and answers directly to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The complexes have long been associated with the development and production of Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and rockets for the country's space program.
On November 12, 2011, a massive explosion destroyed a large swath of Shadid Modarres associated with solid fuel missiles, killing 17 IRGC officers. They included Gen. Hassan Moqaddam, regarded by Iran as the "architect" of its ballistic missile program.
Construction at Shahid Modarres, which began again after the 2011 explosion, accelerated last year, the second Iranian official said.
"I think the Iranians may have chosen not to berm the buildings (before the explosion) because they didn’t want to draw attention to them," said Lewis. "They learned the hard way."
Eveleth and Lewis said the sites' long history with Iran's missile program – Shahid Modarres is considered by some experts as its birthplace - and the numerous dirt berms support their assessment that Tehran is expanding ballistic missile production.
"When we see where you basically have an entire production line that is bermed like that, that's usually missiles," said Eveleth.
(Report by Reuters)