Iran's acting FM champions Pezeshkian's 'new' foreign policy at UN

Vance, who went from an Ohio Senator to Trump's running mate, has undergone a self-admitted significant shift—from a "never-Trumper" to a staunch ally. With their squabbles now seemingly behind them, Vance, by some called a "real Donald Trump junior," will serve as a perfect complement on the presidential ticket.

Given the current global landscape and their publicly stated positions, the reality of Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea forming a powerful bloc challenging the existing world order presents a serious challenge.

Will the Trump of 2016 reemerge in his next term, or will his approach adapt to the new set of today’s complexities?

Trump, who is widely believed to become the 47th president, will have to navigate a new reality: the ongoing war in Ukraine, China's growing influence, and conflicts in the Middle East.

While Trump became known for his “maximum pressure” policy on Iran and the assassination of the notorious Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani, it is unclear how he will approach Tehran during another term.

Vance has previously outlined his views on Iran on several occasions. Speaking before he was chosen as the VP candidate, Vance stated that he doesn’t see the use of force on the Iranian mainland as an option "right now."

He has criticized President Joe Biden’s handling of Iran and its proxy forces, advocating for a de-escalatory approach with Tehran - or strong retaliation in the event of any attacks on US interests. He has also critiqued the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal as a “disastrous” foreign policy decision, praising Trump’s move to withdraw from it as the best course of action.

Tehran, meanwhile, is relentlessly pursuing its destabilizing agenda in the Middle East. The Iranian state has also been implicated in assassination plots against opponents on American soil, including reported plots to kill Trump himself. Escalating its nuclear program, Tehran is violating international agreements and provoking global concern.

Tehran’s agenda, which is likely to persist under the country’s newly elected president, underscores the regime's determination to exert its influence and destabilize the region.

This not only heightens regional tensions but also pressures Trump to address a rapidly escalating geopolitical threat – that may require him to redefine his foreign policy strategy.

In a stark illustration of the wide array of national security threats posed by Iran, Russia, and China to the US, state-sponsored hackers from these nations have also targeted the country’s water utilities. These cyberattacks aimed to exploit vulnerabilities, creating strategic disruptions and sowing widespread panic.

Vance has also argued for more aid to Israel, stressing that Washington and the American taxpayers should not be funding both sides of the conflict, ensuring aid does not end up in Iran-backed Hamas' hands instead of the Palestinian people.

Arguing that Israelis and Sunni Muslims should manage their own region, Vance’s view of the world sees Europeans handling their region, and that Washington is then able to concentrate more on East Asia.

Yet, the challenges posed by Tehran have become increasingly complex for the US, as Iran has strengthened its position within the "axis of upheaval," also dubbed by some as the "Axis of Evil 2.0."

As a staunch ally to Russia in its war on Ukraine, Tehran has significantly bolstered Moscow's efforts by supplying destructive drones and other military aid. This support has been instrumental in Russia's continued aggression, further solidifying the strategic alliance between Tehran and Moscow.

Both Vance and Trump have expressed a strong desire for the war in Ukraine to end swiftly, hinting at a willingness to make concessions to Moscow. Vance's perceived indifference toward Ukraine's fate and Trump's interest in resetting relations with Russia raise alarm among European nations, who fear the message it sends to Putin.

If Trump and Vance push Ukraine to make peace with Putin through concessions, it could be seen as a victory by the members of the "axis of upheaval"—including Iran, encouraging it to continue its behavior.

This move might be perceived as a significant win by Russia and embolden China, which is already eyeing Taiwan, to take bolder actions.

Vance has also been forceful in arguing that aid to Ukraine should instead go to Taiwan, which has feared an invasion by Beijing for years. Trump recently argued that Taiwan should pay the US to defend it, likening the US to an insurance company and stating that Taiwan "doesn't give us anything."

In Vance's worldview, China is the paramount threat to the US, a position he made clear in one of his first interviews as Trump’s vice-presidential candidate. However, both Vance and Trump's approach to China appears to be largely trade-focused, with the possibility of high tariffs on imports potentially launching a more intense trade war between the nations.

In short, there are apparent contradictions in the Trump-Vance foreign policy, which seems to miss the point that Russia-China-Iran are one block when it comes to challenging US interests.

The threat of the "axis of upheaval" is not solely the US's problem. Recently, Lord Robertson, the former UK Labour defense secretary and ex-NATO chief, issued a stark warning that Britain's armed forces must be prepared to confront a "deadly quartet" consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

The major question remains: Can a Trump-Vance administration signal to Russia that its behavior is accepted while trying to contain China, which they have identified as the biggest threat?

Furthermore, can the US appear lenient toward Russia, one of Iran's biggest allies, while simultaneously deterring Tehran’s nefarious behavior?

Will their isolationist and seemingly incoherent approach, which involves withdrawing from certain conflicts, reinforce US power internationally or weaken it overall – and ultimately fail in making the US strong again on the global stage?

According to a detailed report by cybersecurity firm Check Point, MuddyWater has employed BugSleep malware to allow hackers to execute remote commands and transfer files between infected systems and their servers with targets including government organizations, media outlets, and travel agencies.

International organizations, including the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, have attributed MuddyWater to Iran's ministry of intelligence. MuddyWater, also known as APT34 and OilRig, has been active for several years, focusing on cyber-espionage against private and governmental organizations in the Middle East and Western countries.

Their activities are characterized by a mix of strategic intelligence gathering and disruptive cyberattacks, aiming to further Iran's geopolitical interests.

The primary and most successful method of the new malware so far, also targeting countries such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, has been through phishing emails.

Since February 2024, over 50 such emails have been distributed to hundreds of recipients, crafted to deceive recipients into clicking malicious links or downloading infected attachments.

Cybersecurity company Sekoia has also highlighted a surge in MuddyWater's activities. One of the significant findings from Sequoia's investigation is a shift in the hackers' tactics.

Instead of embedding infected links directly in the text of phishing emails, MuddyWater now places these malicious links in PDF files attached to the emails, an attempt to bypass security filters that scrutinize email contents for suspicious links.

Iran has a long history of using cyberattacks, not least on its archenemy, Israel, targeting entities like the Israel Electric Corporation.

These attacks have stepped up since the outbreak of the Gaza war. In November, just weeks after the war began, a group going by the name of “Cyber Toufan” targeted Israeli companies and organizations and dumped huge troves of data online that it claims to have stolen.

Israel's National Institute for Security Studies says Iran was one of the first countries to develop a national cyber strategy. It has developed the institutions and infrastructure to ensure its proxy war could disrupt, sabotage and even destroy civil and commercial targets, critical national infrastructure and military capabilities.

Speaking on behalf of the coalition of reformist factions in Iran, Secretary Azar Mansouri’s statement did not signify merely avoiding undue interference in the executive branch's work.

Instead, it implies a refusal to take responsibility for an administration that came into office with the reformists' support, but falls short of addressing their demands from three decades ago.

Are the reformists now abandoning their quest for influence within an administration they heavily invested in, both materially and politically, and staked their remaining political capital on? The question remains: Why did they support Pezeshkian if they now choose to remain political spectators?

Reformists and the Khatami administration

Former President Mohammad Khatami's administration (1997-2005) was the first to receive full support from the reformists.

Despite some members, such as the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, commerce, information, and education, not being reformists, they did not openly oppose reformist agendas.

Consequently, reformist parties and the “Reform Front” regarded this administration as their own and felt obligated to defend it. They continue to defend its record despite failures that have been much discussed in the past two decades.

Reformists and Rouhani's administration

None of the prominent reformist parties and figures considered former President Hassan Rouhani to be a reformist, nor did he claim to be one.

As a member of the Moderation and Development Party, Rouhani presented himself as a moderate, particularly in foreign affairs.

For this reason, reformists saw his administration as a "surrogate womb," allowing them to remain within the establishment's structure with the hope of regaining power in the future. They adopted this tactic after forces loyal to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sidelined them during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second term, leaving them little chance of taking back the presidency.

Reformists and Pezeshkian’s administration

Now, as Pezeshkian's administration is about to be formed, the question arises: What do prominent reformist parties and figures like Mohammad Khatami expect from this administration, and what were their expectations when they supported him in the election?

The Pezeshkian administration does not have the stature of Khatami’s, which was backed by a massive social movement and 23 million votes.

Nor does it match Rouhani’s, who was one of the founders of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, they do not expect the new president to be a channel for the reformists to rise to power as they did in 1997.

The two finalists for the Vice President position are Mohammad Reza Aref, who served as Khatami’s VP, and Mohammad Shariatmadari, a minister in both the Khatami and Rouhani cabinets. Both candidates are loyal to and trusted by Khamenei.

The inclusion of former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and other so-called "reformists" and "moderates" in the transitional council responsible for introducing ministerial candidates to Pezeshkian highlights the likely composition of the new cabinet.

Several working groups have been established to compile a list of candidates for each ministry, allowing for reasonable predictions about the final selections. The future ministers, supposedly younger and without prior ministerial positions, will in all likelihood be drawn from five distinct groups:

One natural group would be officials personally chosen by Khamenei. Typically, the ministers of foreign affairs, intelligence, Islamic guidance, and the interior are chosen by Khamenei himself.

Another group would include the ministers of defense and justice, who are selected by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) and the Judiciary, respectively.

People from the opposite faction will be added to the cabinet so that Pezeshkian can show that his cabinet is multi-factional.

The economic ministers will be determined according to the demands of Khamenei and the IRGC’s economic empires.

The remaining few will likely be determined by individuals who identify as “reformists” or “moderates” – though, the “reformist” social base in Iran typically does not view these individuals as good representatives of their agenda.

Based on Khamenei’s recommendation, Pezeshkian’s administration will follow Raisi’s path rather than pursuing a national unity agenda.

It would appear that “reformists” do not and cannot expect the new president to do much beyond offering them minimal support to keep their movement alive.

Thus, if the first week after the elections has not disappointed some of his supporters - with his meetings with military commanders and having night tours of religious mourning ceremonies – they will in near future when his admin will be introduced to Parliament.

In an op-ed, Rouhani's political advisor called the Pezeshkian’s foreign policy map "confused, without priority, dreamy, incoherent, with a lot of generalizations about everything and anything".

If the "We Regret" campaign of Rouhani's voters emerged six months after his second inauguration, it will likely arise much sooner for Pezeshkian. The composition of his cabinet is expected to reveal that no significant changes are forthcoming.

This time, the anticipated regret from the supporters of the new administration will be conveyed through silence and harsh criticism. Their regret won't be used as a tool to pressure the administration for change, unlike before, but rather to express mere hopelessness.

Recent human source intelligence obtained by US authorities indicated a potential threat from Iran against Trump. However, there is no evidence linking Thomas Matthew Crooks, who attempted to assassinate the former president on Saturday, to the alleged plot.

Ali Bagheri-Kani admitted that Iran is still seeking justice for the assassination of IRGC Commander Qasem Soleimani, killed in a drone strike in Iraq ordered by Trump in 2020, through legal channels.

"I told you explicitly that we would resort to legal and judicial procedures and frameworks at the domestic level and international level in order to bring the perpetrators and military advisers of General Soleimani’s assassination to justice," he told CNN’s Fareed Zakaria.

Iranian authorities, both political and military, have continued to issue threats against Trump and his administration to avenge the death of Soleimani, responsible for Iran's proxies across the region. For example, in February 2023, Amirali Hajizadeh, the head of the Revolutionary Guards aerospace force directly stated that the Islamic Republic intends to kill Trump.

In January 2022, Iran's former President Ebrahim Raisi vowed revenge for Soleimani's killing unless former US President Donald Trump was put on trial.

"If Trump and (former Secretary of State Mike) Pompeo are not tried in a fair court for the criminal act of assassinating General Soleimani, Muslims will take our martyr's revenge," Raisi said in a televised speech.

Spokesperson for Iran's Foreign Ministry, Nasser Kanaani, also refuted the claims of Iran’s involvement in any recent armed attack on Trump. “Iran strongly rejects any involvement in the recent armed attack on Trump or claims about Iran's intention for such an action, considering such allegations to have malicious political motives and objectives," Kanaani stated.

The Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations echoed the denials.

“These accusations are unsubstantiated and malicious. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Trump is a criminal who must be prosecuted and punished in a court of law for ordering the assassination of General Soleimani. Iran has chosen the legal path to bring him to justice,” a spokesperson for the mission told CNN.

In 2022, the US Justice Department announced charges against an IRGC member for allegedly plotting to assassinate John Bolton, Trump's former national security adviser, likely in retaliation for Soleimani's death.

Similar threats have been made against other former Trump administration officials, including Mike Pompeo and Robert O'Brien, who have maintained security details due to ongoing risks.

Soleimani was instrumental in Iran's external military and intelligence operations involved in hostilities against US forces in the region.

Despite Iran's denials, the security concerns for those involved in the decision to kill Soleimani remain significant, with ongoing protection measures in place.

It was the second attack against US forces in Iraq since early February when Iranian-backed groups in Iraq stopped their attacks against US troops. In January, the United States launched retaliatory air strikes against Iran-backed militias who were targeting its forces in Iraq and Syria. Since then, only a few incidents had been reported.

An Iraqi military official said defense systems downed one drone near the base perimeter.

In April, two drones were shot down near Ain al-Asad base, according to a US official.

No casualties have been reported, said the sources.

The latest reported attack comes after Masoud Pezeshkian, who is presented as a “moderate” won the presidential election in Iran, raising some expectations in the West that he might restart nuclear talks. However, the United States has dismissed such suggestions, giving little credence to major changes under the new president.

Iraqi army stepped up patrolling the areas around the base to prevent possible further attacks, said an Iraqi army official.

The attack came less than a week before an expected visit by a high-level Iraqi military delegation to Washington to continue talks on ending the US -led military coalition in the country.

Washington and Baghdad in January initiated talks to reassess the draw-down of the US-led coalition in Iraq, formed in 2014 to help fight Islamic State after the extremist Sunni Muslim militant group overran large parts of the country.

A US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said a projectile appears to have targeted the base, but without causing casualties.