Iran executes every seven hours despite international outcry

In the decisive parliamentary Wednesday vote, Araghchi secured a substantial majority, garnering 247 out of 288 votes from the attending members. Thus, he was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Masoud Pezeshkian's cabinet.

Iran's official news agency, IRNA, on Thursday lauded Araghchi's approval and said his involvement in key diplomatic affairs across the last three administrations "has given him a unique opportunity to create new prospects for the nation's interests while avoiding past mistakes."

However both by his own admission and other evidence, his views do not diverge from the ideology of Iran's Revolutionary Guard.

Araghchi himself expressed his agenda under the banner of a "Comprehensive, Active, and Impactful Foreign Policy," emphasizing his commitment to "laying the groundwork for enhancing the wealth, power, and stature of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

It's not only Iranian media that have taken note of Araghchi; some Western outlets have also described him with terms such as “seasoned pragmatic diplomat” and “strong negotiator.”

Araghchi’s reputation largely derives from his close association with Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian Foreign Minister and widely regarded architect of the 2015 nuclear deal, later abandoned by then-US President Donald Trump in 2018, leading to the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. Zarif earned a reputation as a diplomat who delivered results.

Beneath the surface of the narratives surrounding Araghchi

Araghchi's diplomatic career extends well beyond his association with the moderate administration of Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif. His involvement in nuclear negotiations dates back to the era of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Additionally, though he served as Zarif's deputy, Araghchi also played a role in the hardline administration of President Ebrahim Raisi, advising Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who was killed in a helicopter crash in May along with Raisi.

Regarding the 2015 nuclear deal, Araghchi remarked in an interview in the same year published on Iran's state broadcaster IRIB's website that the nuclear program amounted to a "significant economic loss."

This interview was promptly removed from the site within hours of its publication, with IRIB attributing the deletion to a "misinterpretation error."

Reportedly, during a meeting with IRIB managers, Araghchi said that if Iran were to pursue nuclear weapons, the agreement with global powers would be deemed a "complete failure." Conversely, he asserted that if the focus remained on legitimate international enrichment and a wholly peaceful nuclear program, the agreement would be considered a "great victory."

He further emphasized, "If we were to evaluate our nuclear program solely by economic criteria, it would be a significant loss."

Araghchi was a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. While seeking parliamentary approval, he emphasized that his worldview remained steadfast since his IRGC days and made a pointed effort to distance himself from Zarif.

He asserted, "I consider myself a soldier of the Supreme Leader and have strived to remain steadfast on this path," underlining his loyalty. Additionally, he distanced himself from the so-called "New York gang," referring to Zarif and his associates, who Ali Khamenei disfavors.

During his parliamentary address, Pezeshkian disclosed that Araghchi had undergone personal vetting and received Khamenei's direct endorsement.

As part of his plans, Araghchi has also reiterated his commitment to bolstering Iran's "Axis of Resistance," the term used by Iran to describe its regional proxies. He stated emphatically, "We will not lose our way, and unwavering, continuous, and comprehensive support for the cause of Palestine and the Lebanese Resistance, as well as other resistance movements fighting against the oppressive and criminal policies of the Zionist regime, will be at the top of our agenda."

In alignment with Khamenei’s strategic vision, Araghchi also underscored his full support for strengthening alliances with China and Russia. He affirmed, "China, Russia, and other countries that have stood by us during difficult times and sanctions, as well as emerging powers and new arenas in Africa, Latin America, and East Asia, will be priorities in the foreign relations of the fourteenth government.”

Araghchi’s reach may extend beyond the IRGC to the elite Quds Force

In June 2016, statements made by Javad Mansouri, one of the founding commanders of the IRGC and a former Iranian ambassador to China, garnered significant attention due to his claims regarding Araghchi's alleged affiliation with the IRGC's extraterritorial Quds Force.

During an interview with the publication Ramz-e Obour, Mansouri asserted that Araghchi and several other Iranian diplomats were indeed members of the Quds Force. When the interviewer inquired whether Araghchi had a background in the Quds Force and was introduced to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the force, Mansouri unequivocally responded that they were "in fact members of that body."

Following the release of this interview, the state-funded IRNA news agency published a report citing an "informed source" within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who firmly denied Araghchi's involvement with the Quds Force. This unnamed source called Mansouri's assertions "unfounded and contrary to reality."

It remains to be seen how a figure whose public image is pragmatic yet deeply influenced by the IRGC can steer the Islamic Republic through the current sanctions—sanctions imposed due to the very policies he has vowed to uphold.

A member of the Parliament's Judicial Committee, Mousa Ghazanfarabadi, told the media Tuesday that the new hijab bill stuck in the legislative process, had been modified and sent to the constitutional watchdog, the Guardian Council, for approval.

If approved, the Pezeshkian administration will no longer be able to abide by its promise to voters to withdraw the bill.

Pezeshkian promised voters to stop hijab patrols and violence against women for failing to meet compulsory hijab standards. Still, Police officials insist that implementation of their hijab enforcement initiative, known as the Nour (Light) Plan, is to continue.

Under the Plan, thousands of businesses have been shut down for failing to ensure compliance among their customers. Similarly, tens of thousands of cars have been impounded for carrying unveiled passengers.

The Guardian Council's approval will also put Pezeshkian in a difficult position because he is legally required to sign and officially communicate the legislation to government bodies within five days of its approval.

In the past, presidents like Hassan Rouhani, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and others have repeatedly refused to acknowledge or enact legislation they opposed. In such instances, the responsibility to act falls to the Speaker of Parliament.

When Rouhani refused to sign the controversial "Strategic Action Law to Lift Sanctions" that the Parliament passed in December 2020, Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf took almost immediate action. This time he may be reluctant to do so despite his previous support of the bill. He seems to be forming an alliance with Pezeshkian against ultra-hardliners of the Paydari (Steadfastness) Party in the Parliament.

Bringing up the hijab bill amid a hectic time for the Parliament and the president, both elected this year, is quite significant, an activist close to Pezeshkian's campaign told Iran International.

The bill passed by the previous parliament was last returned to the legislature to resolve an issues the Guardian Council had discovered in the bill "based on Sharia and the Constitution" in late March. No further action was reported by the Parliament until Tuesday.

"The legislation has been shuffling back and forth between the Parliament and the Council for nearly a year. The Council has no fundamental objections to the bill, but they delayed its approval because they feared the backlash from the public while Raisi was in office. They have no such qualms about Pezeshkian," he said.

The legislation has been shuffling back and forth between them and the Council since September 2023. Very few issues that kept the Council from approving the bill have ever been disclosed to the public.

Ghazanfarabadi revealed on Tuesday that the last time the Council sent the legislation back to Parliament for amendments, it objected to a clause that made the police responsible for arresting women who refused to cooperate or identify themselves when stopped by hijab enforcers. The legislation has since been amended to require a prosecutor's arrest order, in accordance with the Council's demands, he added.

The bill, originally drawn up by the government of President Ebrahim Raisi in July 2023, is officially titled "Protection of Family Through Promotion of Hijab and Chastity Culture" and passed the parliament in September 2023.

Lawmakers mandated the Judicial Committee to review and amend the bill behind closed doors instead of putting it to debate on the floor which modified the bill to make it much tougher than originally intended and costly to the government.

Deducting cash fines immediately from hijab offenders' bank accounts when their "infringement" is recorded by traffic cameras, without their consent, is one of the most controversial parts of the legislation.

Akbari recounted the incident, writing on X Wednesday, noting that despite presenting all required documents, including her helmet, gloves, and international driver’s license, the officer dismissed them, stating, "None of that matters, you're a woman!"

In a sarcastic remark, Akbari suggested that the officer may have confused himself with the morality police, which typically enforces strict hijab laws in Iran, often through aggressive and violent measures.

Akbari also shared an image of the official document issued by the officer, which listed "Type of offense: female rider."

In Iran, a de facto ban on women riding motorbikes has been created by authorities to stop women from riding motorcycles. Legal and bureaucratic barriers, such as a note under Article 20 of the traffic laws specifying that motorcycle licenses are issued only for "men," effectively prevent women from obtaining licenses.

In Akbari’s case however, she noted that she did present the officer with an international motorbike license.

Iranian women have faced significant challenges in their efforts to ride motorbikes and even bicycles since the 1979 revolution and the inception of the Islamic Republic. While women are allowed to participate in motorcycle racing as a sport, they are not legally permitted to ride motorcycles on public streets. This restriction is part of broader societal and legal limitations imposed on women, reflecting the ongoing struggle for gender equality in Iran.

Although Iran's former Vice President for Women’s Affairs, Ensieh Khazali, announced in January this year that efforts were underway to address the issue of motorcycle licenses for women, Interior Minister Ahmad Vahidi stated in May that the matter is not currently on the government's agenda.

In the same month, Isfahan province's Police Commander, Hamid Alineghianpour, reinforced this stance by stating, "Any vehicle that is driven must have a legal permit, and since women do not have motorcycle licenses, riding motorcycles is against the law, and the police will take action against it."

Akbari’s case is not an isolated incident. There have been several similar cases in Iran where women faced repercussions for riding motorcycles.

In January 2017, two young women were arrested in Dezful, southwestern Iran, after being filmed riding a motorcycle. Ali Elhami, a local police commander, said the women “committed an action against revolutionary norms and values by riding a motorcycle.”

Despite the restrictions, however, much like the case with mandatory hijab laws, Iranian women continue to defy the ban on riding motorbikes and bicycles. Their acts of resistance, whether by riding in public or sharing images and videos on social media, highlight their ongoing struggle for freedom and equality in the face of stringent barriers placed against them by the Islamic Republic.

Iran’s extensive internet censorship, known as "filtering," began in 2001. Over the past two decades, countless websites and applications have been blocked under various pretexts. Popular platforms like WhatsApp, Telegram, and Instagram have all faced restrictions at some point. Yet, in a recent survey, nearly three-quarters of respondents named Instagram as their favorite app, and more than half reported using Telegram and WhatsApp daily.

On the surface, government filtering appears futile. But beneath that, it’s a thriving industry. People find ways to bypass these restrictions, but it comes at a literal cost: the price of a circumvention tool, typically a Virtual Private Network (VPN).

"83.6% of Iranian users rely on VPNs, with at least 30% spending up to 150,000 tomans ($2.50) per month on subscriptions," said a spokesperson for Masoud Pezeshkian during his presidential campaign, highlighting just the tip of a murky multi-million-dollar industry built on Iranians' need to stay connected. "Given the number of internet users in Iran, the VPN market is estimated to exceed 50 trillion rials ($85 million) annually," he added. The real figure is likely much higher, with the industry dominated by those connected to the regime.

The primary motivation behind Iran's internet censorship isn't profit, of course—it's control.

"One major but often overlooked consequence of filtering is that it makes accessing information even harder for low-income individuals," says Nasrin, a sociology student in Tehran. "You have to buy VPNs every week just to stay ahead of the government blocking the active ones. It’s a constant game of whack-a-mole, and not everyone can afford to play. Ironically, those excluded are the ones the regime fears the most."

It was this "feared" crowd that took to the streets in November 2019, protesting a sudden hike in gas prices. The regime’s response was brutal. They shut down the internet across Iran for nearly a week, and in that darkness, 1,500 protesters were killed. The internet blackout ensured that few reports or images of the massacre reached the outside world.

Since then, many Iranians are even more concerned about the Islamic government's plans to create a ‘national internet’, a domestic network cut off from the real internet. The blackout in 2019, many say, was just a ‘rehearsal’. I’d rather call it a drill, because shutting down the internet was –and still is– a policing operation.

“Almost 60% of the National Information Network is built,” said Sattar Hashemi last week. He is, mind you, the Communications Minister in Iran’s new ‘reform’ cabinet. Hashemi’s other landmark plan is to “organize” filtering. Organize, not eliminate, not even loosen. So much for all the pre-election promises and slogans: high-speed internet, dismantling the VPN mafia, respecting peoples’ choices. Just a load of hot air, as many expected.

“I spend many hours a week trying to connect to VPNs, switching from one to another to stay afloat.” Ehsan is 35 and works in a start-up. “To access my online banking, I have to disconnect the VPN. To access Google Play, I have to reconnect it. Why on earth would you block Google Play? Many useful websites are also filtered, cutting off people's access to free educational content. YouTube, for instance, is a valuable resource, especially for those who cannot afford tuition. But it’s now blocked. Yes, everyone uses VPNs. But those are not reliable, and slower amid a slow connection."

Even the more hardline candidates in the recent presidential elections spoke against an internet policy that they know people find not just draconian, but unfair. Because not everybody is affected by it equally. Almost every regime official has a presence on banned platforms such as X, including the Supreme Leader himself. So do journalists and activists with ties to the regime, who seem to not see—or more likely, choose to ignore—the irony of defending ‘filtering’ on a ‘filtered’ platform.

“They don’t care about the people,” says Kazem, a 67-year-old pensioner who is religious but has had enough with “all the mess” of the Islamic Republic. “It's not easy for me to keep searching for VPNs. I don't understand any of it and don't know where to buy it or how to install it. We’ve become like criminals who are constantly exchanging illegal goods. I've always told my children to obey the law. But when the law takes away our right to a simple life, what choice do we have but to break the law?"

This would resonate with millions of Iranians who get online not to protest but to earn a living. In 2022, the regime ‘filtered’ Instagram as part of its crackdown on the Woman Life Freedom uprising. Protesters were using it to organize and expose the brutality of the security forces. But many more relied on it—back then the only ‘unfiltered’ platform—to promote their products and services. With the economy in the abysmal state that it has been for a few years, small, ‘home-based’ businesses are many people’s only hope to get by.

According to Iran’s Ministry of Labor, over 80% of home-based businesses are owned by women, a big majority of whom operate on Instagram. “Before Instagram was filtered, I had regular customers and earned a living. I stopped promoting my handicraft during the uprising because there was an unspoken agreement among many users not to self-promote while young girls and boys were braving bullets on the streets.” This is Somayeh, a 34-year old woman from Birjand in northeast Iran.

“Life has become much harder since. Those weeks of inactivity lost me many customers. And the filtering of Instagram almost killed my business. I’m holding to what’s left and working double time to rebuild. I’m on Instagram nonstop, so VPN is like air to me. I’m always looking and asking for one—from family, friends, or others like me. I dread the ‘national internet’ though. If they get their way, there’ll be no Instagram and all I’ve done these years will go up in smoke."

President Pezeshkian constantly says he hasn’t made any promises that he would fail to keep. But he did repeatedly complain about the state of the internet during his campaign. He did criticize the restriction of social freedoms, and the suppression of dissenting voices. Those words, as little as they may have meant to him, have created expectations in people like Somayeh that will almost certainly go unmet. "A filtered, pasteurized ‘national’ internet will not prevent but hasten—and likely expand—the next round of protests that we all know is coming."

The overwhelming and unprecedented vote seems more a result of President Pezeshkian leveraging Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's influence than a genuine reflection of the parliament's confidence in the President or his ministers—many of whom were virtually unknown before being nominated by Pezeshkian, or rather, by Khamenei.

The vote of confidence followed Pezeshkian's pointed remarks at the Majles, where he revealed that all the ministers had been endorsed by Khamenei. He urged lawmakers, saying, "Do not make me say what I should not say. Just vote and let us form the cabinet!" Pezeshkian further disclosed that when Culture Minister Abbas Salehi initially refused to join the cabinet, Khamenei personally called Salehi and told him to accept the position.

Iranian observers in and out of the country concurred that this was Khamenei's cabinet. After these revelations some called Pezeshkian a prime minister rather than President of the country. Another observer said: "From reformists to hardliners, the entire regime—from top to bottom—rallied behind Pezeshkian's government. The ministers secured a vote of confidence from a deeply unpopular parliament, despite some members initially opposing them. The entire regime mobilized its resources to support the cabinet. The Pezeshkian administration now represents the full capacity of the regime. It is now their responsibility to prove that they can address the many problems they themselves have created.”

Many have pointed out that Khamenei will now be directly accountable for the new government's successes or failures. By publicly revealing that Khamenei handpicked the cabinet ministers, Pezeshkian has effectively ensured that the Supreme Leader cannot deflect blame onto others for any future shortcomings or failures.

Iranian journalist Hossein Saremi wrote: "Pezeshkian has placed the entire responsibility for the cabinet squarely on Khamenei's shoulders. If he lied, Khamenei's office should issue a denial. But if he told the truth, then those criticizing the cabinet and claiming to be more responsible or concerned for the government than Khamenei are merely deviants leveling accusations against the Supreme Leader."

Hardline lawmaker and a staunch critic of Pezeshkian, Hamid Rasai wrote that Pezeshkian's statement to gain support for his cabinet has been costly for the Supreme Leader. He added that according to Pezeshkian's remarks, the ministers must operate within the framework of higher laws, such as the Seventh Development Plan and the general policies of the regime and the Supreme Leader.

Cleric Mohammad Mohammadi Tabar warned the Majles that it will be your fault if these ministers make a mess of the country. You have been deceived by the President who wishes to blame the Supreme Leader for the ministers' [possible] failure. “Shame on Pezeshkian!"

During the past two months Pezeshkian has been distancing himself from issues such as continued violence against women defying the compulsory hijab, the nationwide protests by nurses and pensioners and the ongoing violation of human rights including tens of executions during this period by claiming that he did not have a government to take care of the matters of state. Now, he does not have that excuse any longer.

On the other hand, if Khamenei remains silent about Pezeshkian’s claims of his involvement in nominating the cabinet ministers, or if he doesn’t temper what was said, he risks, for the first time in his 35-year tenure as Iran’s leader, becoming a direct target for potential criticism and public protests. This would be especially true if the Pezeshkian administration fails to fulfill its promises, particularly in addressing the country’s long-standing economic crisis.