Iran International
Iran is set to deliver ballistic missiles to Russia "imminently", Bloomberg reported on Monday, amid warnings by Ukraine's allies that the shipment will have serious consequences for the Islamic Republic.
The move, if accurate, could be seen as yet another sign that Russia and Iran are strengthening their strategic partnership on a basis of their shared anti-Western rhetoric.
Russia's access to Iranian ballistic missiles could devastate civilian populations, marking a turning point in the conflict, said Farzin Nadimi, a Senior Fellow with the Washington Institute.
"When I wrote an article about the delivery of Shahed drones to Russia I warned against delivery of ballistic missiles. That it would be the main game changer for the Russians if they take large number of Iranian precision-guided ballistic missiles," said Nadimi, who made the dire warning in August of 2022.
He said some of these missiles will have enough range to hit Western Ukraine and strike important targets like railway stations.
"It's going to have a really bad effect on civilians."
Moscow’s current ballistic missile arsenal reportedly includes Russian and less precise North Korean hardware.
Bloomberg reported that their sources would not give a specific timeline or scope of the transfer, but did state it was 'imminent.' Reuters had reported in February of this year that Iran reportedly sent Russia hundreds of ballistic missiles.
That 'imminent' timing could prove to be useful to Russia, said Nadimi, who believes Moscow wants make gains in Eastern Ukraine in the battle for Donbas before the harsh Eastern European winter approaches.
Iran on Monday neither denied nor confirmed the Bloomberg report. "There is no information about what you said," Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told EU Foreign Policy Chief Josep Borrell when asked about Bloomberg's report, according to a Wall Street Journal report.
Such a deepening partnership could further isolate Iran from the West and worsen an economy already in crisis mode. Ballistic missile transfers to Russia would likely be met with additional sanctions on Iran by Western powers, as promised by Ukraine's western allies. Iran International reached out to the US State Department but did not receive a comment in time for publication.
The G-7 has already imposed several sanctions on Iran and North Korea for supplying Russia with weapons.
Alex Vatanka, the Middle East Institute’s Iran Program director, said the timing of such a deal doesn't add up with recent remarks made by Iran's president Masoud Pezeshkian.
"The timing is puzzling. It comes as Pezeshkian speaks of reducing Iran's international isolation. This sort of missile transfer only hampers Iran's ability to seek possible detente with the Europeans, which is exactly what Pezeshkian and Araghchi have mentioned, and Khamenei indirectly approved," said Vatanka.
Nadimi said the deal was likely a couple of years in the making and wouldn't have likely involved Iran's current president.
Moscow has already received hundreds of Iranian-made drones that have been used in its war against Ukraine after the two anti-Western, "rouge" countries formed a relationship following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
This is a relationship that is based on necessity and benefits, said Gregory Brew, a US analyst with the Eurasia Group on the Eye for Iran podcast.
"Russia's war in Ukraine and Russia's increasing isolation from the international community, the weight of Western sanctions, US support for Ukraine, and Russia's need for weapons, increased arms for its war in Ukraine has offered Iran a way to increase its leverage, get a closer relationship with Moscow largely through by serving as Russia's sort of new source of armaments," said Brew during the podcast episode.
Brew told Iran International that Tehran has been making threating moves since October 2023, when the UN embargo on Iran's missiles/drones' sales expired.
"But if Iran does start sending missiles to Russia, it would not only increase its involvement in that war, but threaten worse relations with the EU, which has signaled it will sanction Iran more heavily in the event it starts selling missiles."
While Iran and Russia have a complicated past, with Moscow once having occupied Iran during the second World War, Iran has to decide whether further deepening itself in the war against Ukraine is part of its long- term goals, and does it serve to benefit.
"Iran has to decide which one is more important: rehabilitation of Iran's badly performing economy, which requires detente with the West; or prioritizing the struggle against the West with likeminded partners like Russia," said Vatanka.
Baku has been demanding the corridor in southern Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan enclave separated by Armenian territory. Moscow and Baku want Russia to monitor and control the corridor, but Yerevan and Tehran are opposed to such a scheme and argue that even if a transport route were to be established, Armenia should have control over it.
In a Monday "meeting" with Russia's ambassador to Tehran, the director-general of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's Eurasia Department expressed Iran's opposition to "any geopolitical changes in the Caucasus".
The Iranian official told Russia's envoy that "respecting national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mutual interests of countries is the guarantor of lasting peace and a foundation for regional cooperation in the Caucasus," according to the Foreign Ministry's readout of the talks.
"In this meeting, opposition to changes in recognized international borders and geopolitical alterations in the region, as well as the necessity to consider the legitimate interests and concerns of all regional countries, was emphasized," the statement said.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently angered Iran by expressing his support for the establishment of the controversial Zangezur corridor during Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to Baku.
Iran has always opposed the establishment of the transport corridor which will eliminate Iran's direct access to Armenia, if the corridor is not controlled by Yerevan.
In a meeting with Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan on July 30, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reiterated Iran's opposition to Zangezur corridor which he said the Islamic Republic considers it “detrimental” to Armenia’s interests.
Last month, Iran congratulated the “government and people of Ukraine” on their Independence Day, in a move that was interpreted by some as a response to Russia’s recent shift of policy about the corridor.
In December 2023, Moscow also sparked outrage in Iran by repeating its support for negotiations between Iran and the UAE over the three disputed Islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb, and the Lesser Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran summoned the Russian envoy after Moscow signed a joint statement with Arab nations calling for negotiations.
Russia’s long delay in signing a 20-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with Iran despite the aid Iran has offered to Russia in its war against Ukraine has also irritated the Islamic Republic.
Owji, who led what is arguably the most critical ministry in Iran, is accused of having “misled” the public with “fake statistics and concocted data.”
Rouydad24 did not mince words last week, suggesting that the former Minister's behavior could cause some “to question [his] mental stability.” The publication lambasted Owji for wasting four years of resources with no tangible achievements, describing his tenure as one filled with empty rhetoric.
Following the death of Iran's former President Ebrahim Raisi and the apparent exit of the ultraconservative Paydari Front—the radical party that gained prominence during his term—some observers note that the press is seizing this moment with newfound assertiveness, though it's uncertain how long this will last. With a seemingly reduced fear of repercussions compared to Raisi's presidency, the media are now more openly exposing the shortcomings of the previous administration’s oil policies.
In his final remarks as Oil Minister, Owji claimed that his ministry had made fundamental strides in addressing the gas imbalance and managing the country's growing energy consumption.
Rouydad24, however, cited experts who challenged the validity of Owji's statement. “Not a single word in his speech corresponds to reality. The Raisi administration’s performance in the gas industry was a complete failure, even according to official statistics,” one critique stated.
Weighing in on the criticism, Nasrollah Zarei, a former deputy in the oil ministry under President Hassan Rouhani, offered his analysis of Owji’s claims.
“The key elements in the discussion of the imbalance in energy products or carriers are, most importantly, natural gas and gasoline. When Owji boasted about increasing natural gas production, the truth was quite the opposite—natural gas production in Iran actually decreased under his watch,” Zarei stated.
He further added, “The claimed increase in natural gas consumption due to industrial and residential growth was nothing but a lie. The reality is that there has been no significant increase in these sectors.”
Zarei also pointed out that the imbalance in natural gas was due not to an increase in consumption, as Owji suggested, but to a decrease in production—a direct result of unmet plans, unexecuted projects, and the failure to implement necessary measures on time.
“This issue is particularly true for gas fields like South Pars, where natural declines in pressure were not adequately managed,” Zarei explained, underlining the systemic failures of the previous administration.
The former administration’s claim to have completed Phase 14 of South Pars, a key gas project, using domestic capabilities, was another point of contention. Zarei criticized this narrative, stating, “The majority of the work on Phase 14 had been completed during Rouhani’s presidency. What Owji did was merely superficial. It had no real impact on production.”
The daily Entekhab also took aim at the former administration's oil sales policies.
The outlet detailed how Iran’s oil exports, particularly to China, were carried out under heavy discounts due to sanctions. While Owji said that Iran was exporting oil to 17 countries, the reality was that China remained the primary, if not the only, significant buyer. Even then, these sales were heavily discounted, with Iran selling its oil at $15 less per barrel than Omani oil, leading to significant financial losses for the country.
Majid Ansari, a member of the Expediency Discernment Council, disclosed in July 2024 that, under international sanctions, the Islamic Republic was offering daily discounts of $26 million to its sole oil buyer, China. In a video published by the Jamaran website, Ansari stated, “We asked at what price are you selling? They give a discount of 15 to 30 dollars per barrel, with an average of 20 dollars per barrel… That means $26 million a day from the money of the Iranian people.”
That sentiment was echoed by Masoud Daneshmand, a shipping industry expert, who elaborated on the scale of Iran’s losses in an interview with Entekhab.
“We are currently selling oil to China and giving a discount of 8 to 10 dollars per barrel, but they say they will buy our oil, but keep the money in yuan, which we must use to buy goods from them. If we want to free our money and buy from another country, there will be about a 16% currency transfer cost. With the discount we give on oil, this results in about a 25% loss in our transactions with the Chinese,” Daneshmand explained. He further confirmed Ansari’s estimates, stating, “The number Ansari mentions—at least $10 billion a year—is the loss being imposed on the Iranian people.”
Despite Owji’s efforts to downplay the extent of the discounts, the data indicates otherwise. Under the previous administration, Iran’s oil sales were not merely about offering discounts; they symbolized a broader failure to seize investment opportunities, resulting in reduced production and the decline of the country’s oil industry infrastructure.
Another industry expert who talked to Entekhab commented on Iran’s daily losses from oil sanctions back in February 2022.
Seyed Hamid Hosseini explained to the outlet, “We have a daily loss due to the inability to sell oil, and some of it is also the costs imposed on us because of the sanctions. The combination of these two determines the loss. We have an annual financial turnover of $100 billion through imports and exports, and we pay about 10 to 20 percent in additional costs for transportation, money transfers, discounts to customers, and other expenses; therefore, we lose about $10 to $15 billion this way.”
The media’s post-Raisi revelations, bolstered by expert analysis, paint a stark portrait of Owji’s tenure as Oil Minister.
As Iran navigates an uncertain future, with the potential for stricter sanctions enforcement hinging on the results of the upcoming US elections, the shadow of the previous administration’s failed oil policies is poised to linger --- casting its influence over both Supreme Leader Khamenei's leadership and the newly elected President's term.