Iran’s gasoline smuggling crisis has reached unprecedented levels, with new estimates suggesting that up to 50 million liters of fuel are being illegally exported from the country every day.
This volume of fuel being siphoned out has cast doubts over the Islamic Republic’s narrative, which for years has placed the blame for smuggling on small-scale operators along the country’s borders. Instead, recent revelations point to a systemic operation involving high-level complicity.
Economist Mousa Ghaninejad ignited this debate in October 2024 when he provided an updated figure for the amount of gasoline being smuggled from Iran. Drawing from official statistics, Ghaninejad estimated that of the 120 million liters distributed daily across the country, only 70 million liters are actually consumed domestically.
“The rest is smuggled out of the country,” Ghaninejad said, pinning the figure at roughly 50 million liters per day—an amount that dwarfs previous estimates of around 20 million liters.
Transporting such an enormous quantity of gasoline would be a logistical feat beyond the capacity of the small-time fuel carriers the Islamic Republic often claims are responsible.
Hossein Raghfar, an economist, in an interview with the Eghtesad 100 news outlet on Wednesday went ahead with official figure of 20 million liters, saying: “This volume of smuggling cannot be the work of small time smugglers in border regions. It is definitely done by government entities.”
These smugglers, who typically use 2,000 to 2,500-liter tanks mounted on Nissan Junior pickup trucks, would need a convoy of at least 20,000 fully loaded trucks to move 50 million liters of gasoline in a single day. If these 4-meter-long trucks were lined up end to end with a three-meter gap between them, the convoy would stretch over 140 kilometers, highlighting the implausibility of small-scale smugglers being solely responsible for this volume of fuel trafficking.
Even if one considers the lower-end estimate of 20 million liters, which has been consistently cited by insiders and the state media for years, a fleet of around 8,000 Nissan trucks would still be required to transport the fuel.
Larger tanker trucks, which can hold up to 40,000 liters, would still need to operate in significant numbers, requiring at least 500 tanker trucks to move 20 million liters and over 1,250 trucks to handle the 50 million-liter figure.
Systemic smuggling networks
Economic journalist Reza Gheibi explained that this volume of fuel smuggling is unlikely to be carried out by individuals or even small groups. "This huge volume of smuggling is for sure systematic, and we can find some signs of it as well,” Gheibi said. He pointed to cases in which underground gasoline pipelines have been discovered, particularly in southern provinces, and added that fuel is also being smuggled via small ships operating from ports controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
“There is no monitoring over them, and they work totally clandestinely,” he added. “So, part of the expense of IRGC’s trans-border activities is made through the fuel smuggling.”
Gasoline in Iran is sold at a subsidized price of around two cents per liter, but the government is forced to buy millions of barrels of fuel at a price of nearly 60 to 70 cents per liter. Smugglers can then sell the fuel on the black market for as much as 40 cents per liter, creating a massive profit margin. For those behind the operations, this translates into millions of dollars of profit every day.
According to experts the sheer scale of the operations suggests the involvement of larger and more organized networks.
Smuggling networks within the system
The involvement of officials in fuel smuggling operations has become apparent over recent years, as investigations and arrests have revealed a network of corruption within government centers. In December 2022, Aref Akbari, the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Hormozgan Province, southern Iran, announced the arrest of six rural mayors, three employees of the Ministry of Industry, and two members of the Engineering Organization on charges of collaborating with fuel smugglers. These individuals allegedly issued fraudulent certifications to heavy machinery owners, enabling them to receive subsidized fuel without actually operating the machinery.
In another high-profile case, the Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor of Iranshahr in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, Saeed Rashki, announced in May 2021 that the head of a local parliamentarian’s office had been arrested on fuel smuggling charges. Nearly all employees of the local oil company were also taken into custody, with only one or two individuals spared.
These cases provide a glimpse into the extent of officials’ involvement in fuel smuggling. In May 2023, Mohammad Jafari, Deputy Head of the Headquarters for Combating the Smuggling of Goods, stated: “We estimate that a total of 25% of the fuel allocated to power plants is being smuggled.” While Jafari’s comments did not specify which power plants or the type of fuel involved, they point to large-scale smuggling operations embedded in the country’s fuel distribution infrastructure.
Such reports have consistently pointed to the complicity of government employees, while there is little evidence to support the idea that small-scale fuel carriers are responsible for smuggling gasoline on this scale. Instead, the available data suggests that lower-level government workers, many of whom have direct access to fuel distribution networks, play a central role in diverting fuel from the official supply chain into the black market.
Involvement of armed forces
One of the concerns surrounding the gasoline smuggling crisis is the role of Iran’s armed forces, particularly the IRGC, in facilitating or even directly participating in the operations. The IRGC controls a significant portion of the country’s transportation networks and border crossings, which according to Gheibi, makes it difficult to imagine that such large volumes of fuel could be smuggled out of the country without the IRGC’s knowledge or involvement.
With an average of 35 million liters of gasoline being smuggled daily, the theft appears to be organized through a network of actors linked to supervisory bodies, with the IRGC controlling much of the oversight of both the transportation network and the borders, as suggested by economic expert Gheibi.
The appointment and several others involving figures freighted with accusations of human rights abuses may belie Pezeshkian's campaign pledges to ease government repression.
Journalist Noushabeh Amiri reacted on X, stating: “The notorious and anti-Semitic judge of Shiraz received his bonus and became the Fars governor. How nice that Pezeskian was elected!”
Under Amiri's rule, was the 1999 arrest of 13 Jews on charges of espionage for Israel amid an era marked by heightened tension for religious minorities in Iran.
In Shiraz, 13 Jewish citizens were accused of spying for Israel—a charge that the Islamic Republic has frequently used against both Jews and Baha'is since the 1979 revolution.
Due to pressure campaigns and secret negotiations, the prisoners were gradually released in small groups, with the final group freed on February 19, 2003.
Initial reports surfaced online on March 18 but went largely unnoticed amid the 2003 Iraq invasion. All the individuals released later emigrated to Israel, where they now live with their families.
Amiri’s tenure in Shiraz also coincided with a separate case in the 1980s, when 16 Baha’i men and women were executed in the city on similar charges of spying for Israel. The executions were carried out without transparent trials.
His return to Fars as the province's governor has reignited the trauma of his legacy, raising alarms among minority groups who fear a resurgence of similar state-backed oppression.
His reappointment by the Pezeshkian administration, despite his past record, may be a signal of the government’s ongoing commitment to targeting dissidents and religious groups.
Unofficial estimates suggest that over 300,000 Baha'is live in Iran, but the Constitution only recognizes Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism. This makes the Baha'i community the largest unrecognized religious minority, subjected to systematic persecution since the 1979 revolution.
“Iranian authorities deprive Baha’is of their fundamental rights in every aspect of their lives, not due to their actions, but simply for belonging to a faith group,” said Michael Page, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch in a report in April. “It is critically important to increase international pressure on Iran to end this crime against humanity.”
Amiri’s return coincides with the resurgence of another controversial figure in Fars Province: Asghar Torabpour, a former security chief known for his suppression of political prisoners and minorities during the 1980s. Torabpour served as head of prisons in multiple provinces, including Fars, and was directly involved in the mass executions of 1988, which saw thousands of political prisoners killed across Iran.
Torabpour now serves as Chief of Staff for the province’s blood money office.
Pezeshkian’s administration on Wednesday also announced the appointments of Mohammad Reza Babaei as governor of Yazd and Gholamhossein Mozaffari as governor of Khorasan Razavi.
Babaei, a top supporter of former president Ebrahim Raisi, was known for his criticisms of Hassan Rouhani's relatively moderate administration. He served as Deputy Planning Governor of Yazd under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but resigned when Hassan Rouhani took office, despite being retained.
Gholamhossein Mozaffari has also been introduced as Khorasan Razavi governor. He is the only reformist appointee.
Pezeshkian, from the early days of his presidential campaign, promised reforms with figures from Hassan Rouhani’s cabinet, such as Mohammad Javad Zarif and Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi, the former ministers of foreign affairs and communications, supporting him in the election.
However, in recent weeks, the new president's policies have led critics to accuse him of exploiting reformists and their voters during the presidential election. Earlier, he faced criticism over his cabinet picks, particularly for nominating Eskandar Momeni, who had an extensive military and law enforcement background and had played a role in suppressing popular protests in 2017, 2019, and 2022.
The attack, which took place in the Mezzah district of Damascus, resulted in the deaths of seven, and left 11 others injured, according to Syrian state media. The strike caused damage to nearby buildings, leading to widespread destruction in the area.
While Israel has not publicly commented on the incident, its military has conducted numerous strikes against Iran-linked targets in Syria in recent years. However, this latest attack comes amidst heightened tensions in the region following the October 7 Hamas assault on Israel, which triggered the ongoing Gaza conflict and Iran's proxies around the Jewish state acting in allegiance with the Iran-backed Palestinian group.
Hebrew-language media reports suggested the primary goal was to eliminate Fallahzadeh, with some pointing out the proximity of the targeted building to the Iranian embassy as possible evidence.
Syrian sources added further weight to the claims, noting that the building was only 500 meters from the embassy, a location that has long been seen as a hub of Iranian activity in Syria.
Israel's Channel 12 reported that the strike specifically targeted a meeting between commanders of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran's Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, with Fallahzadeh reported to have been present at the time of the attack.
The Terror Alarm X account that covers events in Israel also reported that General Fallahzadeh was the primary target of the airstrike, further stoking rumors of a targeted killing.
Denials from Iranian sources
Iran was quick to reject the reports, the Iranian embassy in Syria issuing a statement emphasizing that no Iranian nationals were among the dead or injured. It echoes the April 1 attack, allegedly by Israel, on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, in which senior commanders were killed, along with multiple high ranking IRGC officials.
The strike would be the trigger for Iran's first direct attack on Israel, two weeks later, when Tehran sent a barrage of 350 drones, missiles and rockets towards the Jewish state, mostly intercepted by Israel and a US-led international coalition.
This was not the first time General Fallahzadeh’s name has surfaced in connection with Israeli strikes. In September 2023, similar reports circulated after an Israeli airstrike in Lebanon, but were quickly dismissed by IRGC officials.
Meanwhile, the top commander of Iran's overseas military operations, Esmail Qaani, has also been absent for several days, intensifying speculation as to whether he too may have been killed by Israeli forces.
Who is Fallahzadeh?
Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh, born in the Yazd province of Iran in 1962, is a veteran commander in the IRGC. He gained prominence during the Iran-Iraq war and subsequently climbed the ranks of the IRGC, holding command positions in several provinces, including Fars, Isfahan, and Yazd.
Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Fallahzadeh served as the governor of Yazd province for six years, a political role that gave him additional visibility and influence within Iran.
Following the end of his gubernatorial tenure in 2013, he was transferred to Syria, where he became involved in military operations in support of Bashar al-Assad's regime during the Syrian Civil War. His role in key battles and his collaboration with Qassem Soleimani, the assassinated former commander of the Quds Force, killed by a US drone strike in 2020, earned him recognition.
During his time in Syria, Fallahzadeh was reportedly injured in an explosion, leading to his temporary return to Tehran for medical treatment. Despite this setback, he continued to rise through the ranks of the Quds Force and, in 2019, was appointed as its deputy coordinator. Following the death of his predecessor, Mohammad Hejazi, Fallahzadeh was promoted to deputy commander, making him the second-highest-ranking official in the Quds Force after Esmail Qaani.
Known by his battlefield nickname Abu Baqer, Fallahzadeh has become one of the most prominent figures in Iran’s extraterritorial military operations. His role within the Quds Force has involved coordinating Iran’s efforts across various regional conflicts, including supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, militias in Iraq, and other proxy forces in the region.