Iran International political analyst
On Friday, the Tehran division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is set to hold a military exercise involving 110,000 paramilitary Basij forces. According to an IRGC spokesperson, the drill is designed to prepare for any potential threats against the capital.
This raises the question: what kind of threat does Tehran face to justify such a large-scale exercise?
If we assume the drill is not aimed at countering an internal coup against the IRGC itself, only two other scenarios remain: an external ground invasion or an internal armed group - or a popular uprising in Tehran against the government.
External invasion or internal armed group
Evidence suggests that the possibility of an external ground invasion targeting Tehran is entirely ruled out. Neither the US nor Israel has the logistical capabilities or preparedness for such an attack.
US military personnel in the Middle East number fewer than 50,000, and Israel lacks the geographical and logistical resources to carry out such an operation nearly 2,000 kilometers from its borders. Similarly, there is no known internal armed group with the capability or plans to attack Tehran.
Uprising of Tehran’s population against the government
With external or internal armed attacks ruled out, the remaining concern is the fear of a popular uprising. By announcing the involvement of 110,000 Basij forces, the IRGC spokesperson has implicitly acknowledged the seriousness of this threat.
This exercise appears to be a drill aimed at countering widespread public protests that could threaten critical government institutions.
The timing of the drill coincides with political shifts in the US, including the return of Donald Trump to the White House, and a weakening of Tehran’s regional position, which have raised concerns within the Islamic Republic’s ruling circles.
As the entity responsible for securing Tehran and sensitive government sites, the IRGC fears that any external attack, if it occurs, could coincide with internal unrest, potentially leading to the collapse of the government.
Basij forces were heavily deployed during the 2019 and 2022 protests, where they were accused of killing hundreds of citizens and arresting thousands.
Signs of government fear
Description of the threat: The IRGC spokesperson described the threat as "man-made," a clear reference to urban uprisings.
Similar drills: Just two months ago, a similar exercise took place near Tehran in Telo Road and the IRGC's Al-Mohammad Security Brigade headquarters, focusing on suppressing urban protests.
Lessons from Assad’s fall: The sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad's government in Syria has deeply unsettled the Islamic Republic’s leaders. They fear a similar fate, particularly given the widespread public discontent and anger.
Economic crises: Concerns over the steep fall of the Iranian rial, the resulting economic repercussions, and the possibility of public uprisings if the government raises gasoline prices in the coming months are fueling these fears. An economic collapse could ignite widespread protests.
A reflection of deep-seated fear
These drills reflect the Islamic Republic’s profound fear of a popular uprising.
The publicized figure of 110,000 Basij forces is likely aimed at projecting large-scale strength and boosting morale within government ranks.
However, the reality remains that the primary threat to the Islamic Republic does not come from external borders but from the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities.
The hardliners' push began last week with a motion to impeach Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati. According to the conservative Nameh News website, after Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf opposed the move, the hardliners expanded their efforts to include three additional ministers: Labor Minister Ahmad Maydari, Oil Minister Mohsen Paknejad, and Energy Minister Abas Aliabadi.
However, moderate MP Gholamreza Tajgardoon suggested on Tuesday that Speaker Ghalibaf might still manage to persuade lawmakers to withdraw the impeachment motion.
The new government was barely a month old when Iran’s already weakened currency, the rial, began to plummet in September, losing 33% of its value. This sharp decline followed a series of consecutive regional setbacks for the Islamic Republic, including significant blows dealt by Israel to Hezbollah.
The ultraconservative daily Vatan Emrooz reported that "the motion for impeachment has been submitted to the Majles Presidium despite Ghalibaf's opposition." The newspaper noted that "the number of MPs supporting the impeachment of Hemmati exceeds those seeking to unseat the other three ministers." According to the report, while the motions to impeach the other ministers have been signed by around 10 MPs each, the call to impeach Hemmati has garnered over 70 signatories.
The new additions to the list of impeachments could be a tactic by hardliners to make sure that they can unseat at least one minister to demonstrate their power. That is important for hardliner majority as they have not been able to ratify any significant legislation since entering the parliament in May 2024.
Tajgardoon, chairman of the Majles Budget Committee, commented that "the calls for impeachment are rooted in factional motivations." He suggested that hardliners might be targeting the Oil and Labor Ministers, who only narrowly secured the parliament's vote of confidence. While recognizing that the primary target of the impeachment efforts is the Economy Minister, Tajgardoon expressed hope that the motion would not lead to Hemmati's removal from the government.
The conservative Nameh News has reported that "if successful, the impeachment would bring about a significant shift in the government and is likely to escalate tensions between the cabinet and parliament."
According to Nameh News, the hardliners have justified their impeachment efforts by stating that they are targeting Hemmati for the surging exchange rates, Paknejad for failing to supply fuel to power plants, Aliabadi for recurring power outages, and Meydari for his inability to improve workers' livelihoods or reduce unemployment in Iran.
However, none of these issues are new, as the newly formed government inherited longstanding shortages and structural problems from previous administrations, compounded by years of sanctions and ineffective governance.
The Alef website suggested that the true motive behind the impeachment push might lie in the economic interests of powerful insiders. As the rial plummeted, the government restricted access to cheap dollars previously supplied to influential importers—well-connected figures within Iran. According to Alef, "Eliminating the special lower exchange rate for importers and exporters, along with requiring exporters to repatriate their hard currency earnings to Iranian banks, has fueled the impeachment effort." The website supported its claims with statements from government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani and Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref, who defended Hemmati's foreign exchange policy reforms.
Reformist media outlets, including Rouydad24, have criticized the impeachment motions, noting that they come "during severe economic and foreign policy crises in Iran," while also citing "heightened international tensions in the region." Highlighting the factional motivations behind the push to impeach Hemmati, the website questioned, "Why was former President Raisi's economy minister never impeached, even after a 120-percent rise in exchange rates?"
While Ghaibaf has branded the impeachment as a "political show by hardliners," ultraconservative media such as Vatan Emrooz say "impeachments are a way of making the government accountable."
Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani said: “Stability in Syria is the key to stability in the region."
He called for halting foreign interventions and ensuring that Syrians decide their future without external influence.
“We are ready to work with all parties to achieve stability in Syria, ensuring that all Syrians and various groups participate in shaping the country's future,” he added.
The meeting came in the wake of the December collapse of long-time President Bashar al-Assad’s government, marking a pivotal moment for Syria and the wider region.
Since the outbreak of Syria's conflict in 2011, Iran played a central role in supporting Assad’s regime.
Viewing Syria as a strategic ally in its Axis of Resistance against Israel and the West, Iran deployed financial and military resources, including IRGC personnel and Shiite militias.
However, Iran’s extensive involvement came at a severe cost to Syria's sovereignty and economy, fostering widespread resentment among Syrians.
President Pezeshkian welcomed al-Sudani’s visit, expressing hope for accelerated development in bilateral ties.
“We hope this visit, combined with the mutual trust between the two sides, will accelerate the development of cooperation and lead to significant progress in relations between the two countries,” he said.
Pezeshkian also said, “Both countries share common concerns regarding Syria. These include ensuring stability and peace in Syria, preserving its territorial integrity, combating terrorist groups, the necessity of the Zionist regime's withdrawal from occupied territories, and respecting religious sentiments, particularly concerning Shiite holy sites.”
Iraq’s risk of Iranian influence
While Iran remains a key partner, its actions in Iraq parallel its approach in Syria, fostering Shiite militias under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). These groups, acting as extensions of Tehran’s interests, have strained Baghdad's authority and fueled fears that Iraq could face a fate similar to Syria.
“We invite all countries to engage in dialogue among the nations of the region to ensure peace, stability, and security. Since its victory over ISIS, Iraq has consistently worked towards fostering calm in the region. Iraq operates based on understanding and dialogue between nations," al-Sudani said.
He also held talks with Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the Iranian Parliament Speaker after the joint press conference in a bid to smooth out a pathway for the future without the risk of extensive Iranian involvement in Iraq.
While officials emphasize the strategic and economic advantages of the shift, critics have voiced concerns over likely enormous financial and logistical demands.
“The new capital will definitely be in the south, in the Makran region, and this matter is currently being worked on,” government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani said on Tuesday.
She highlighted Tehran’s growing ecological pressures, including water scarcity and announced the formation of two councils to examine the feasibility of the move and develop a sea-based economy in the Makran region.
“We are seeking assistance from academics, elites and experts, including engineers, sociologists and economists,” she added, while stressing that the issue remains in the exploratory phase and is not urgent.
A divisive, costly undertaking
President Masoud Pezeshkian reignited the debate over the location of the capital, advocating for a move by describing the imbalance between Tehran’s financial resources and expenditures as unsustainable.
Advocating for a shift closer to the Persian Gulf, he said last week, “transporting raw materials from the south to the center, processing them, and returning them south for export drains our competitive capacity.”
However, critics, including conservative journalist Ali Gholhaki, have lambasted the proposal.
“Rebuilding Azadi Stadium takes 18 months and costs 19 trillion rials ($23.75 million); how much time and money does relocating the capital require? Think over a century and hundreds of billions of dollars!” Gholhaki wrote on X, calling the idea unrealistic and risky for a country under severe economic strain.
Discussions about relocating Iran’s capital have persisted since the 1979 Islamic Revolution but have been consistently derailed by financial constraints, political inertia and logistical challenges.
Previous Iranian administrations have considered various versions of the idea, but financial limitations and political stagnation have repeatedly hindered progress.
The concept gained momentum during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, primarily due to concerns over Tehran’s vulnerability to earthquakes.
In the mid-2010s, President Hassan Rouhani revived the discussion, emphasizing the city's unsustainable growth and mounting environmental issues.
While proponents point to Makran’s strategic location and potential economic benefits, critics argue the move could cripple Tehran’s economy and take decades to complete.