Voices aligned with Tehran should not get a free ride in West

As a cyber espionage investigator focused on Iranian state-sponsored hacking, I’ve observed these operations evolve steadily—from initial reconnaissance to targeted intrusions.

Even when US agencies unmask these hackers, legal and enforcement actions often drag on for months or years, allowing adversaries to rebrand and operate under new aliases.

Yaser Balaghi Inalou, one of three Iranian hackers recently indicted by the Department of Justice for a hack and leak operation targeting the 2024 presidential election, was exposed as early as 2015 by the Israeli security firm Check Point.

Had US agencies exposed him at the time, it might have fractured his network and even disrupted the attack on Donald Trump’s 2024 campaign.

With President Trump’s second term underway and the possibility of deepened tensions between Tehran and Washington, a cohesive and decisive strategy to address this threat seems imperative.

Intelligence agencies may unmask hackers quickly. But those unmasked would regroup and evolve if legal and enforcement responses are delayed. Greater collaboration may be required between federal agencies like the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security, even with private cybersecurity firms, to ensure swift countermeasures such as targeted sanctions and asset freezes.

Also important would be rebuilding trust in US whistleblower programs. Insider intelligence from those with firsthand knowledge of Iranian cyber operations—whether from inside Iran or abroad—can be invaluable.

The current track record of the Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program discourages potential informants. Its FAQ page still highlights cases from 1995 and 2007, with no reference to payouts for whistleblowers in Iranian cyber operations.

Providing a recent example on its website or social media could restore credibility and encourage more people to come forward. As it stands, many of those engaging with the program on social media view it as more of a stunt than a serious incentive.

Public exposure of Iranian cyber operatives is another critical measure. Many operatives hide behind the guise of IT professionals. Publishing updated lists of identified operatives in English and Persian could help rid these groups of the secrecy on which they rely.

Sanctions and asset seizures also remain powerful tools. Iran’s cyber operations are largely directed by state entities like the Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), already designated as a terrorist organization by the US. Expanding efforts to track and freeze financial assets tied to these entities could significantly disrupt Tehran’s ability to fund its hacker networks.

The importance of swift and proportional countermeasures cannot be overstated. Delayed responses—sometimes by as much as a year—reduce deterrence and embolden threat actors.

Strengthening alliances and building a collective defense mechanism would also enhance deterrence by creating a more formidable response.

The United States relies on digital systems, from essential public services to financial networks. As the reliance grows, so does the threat posed by Iranian cyber operations, likely expanding as Tehran tries to avoid traditional military confrontation.

With the changing of the guards in Washington, new policies should be devised to protect the US digital infrastructure while holding Iran accountable for its online aggression. The implications of inaction are clear—continued vulnerability and escalating threats.

"We have no record of funding for the IEI or any departmental work with them," the UK Foreign Office said in response to an inquiry about funding for the Iran Experts Initiative (IEI), a network linked to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In late January, a report by Sweden’s TV4 revealed Roozbeh Parsi, the director of the Swedish Institute for International Affairs’ Middle East program, was involved in the IEI, a network formed by Tehran to expand its influence in the West.

Parsi denied any cooperation with the Iranian government, saying his participation in the Iran-led initiative was backed up by the UK government.

"I was doing this on behalf of the British Foreign Office," he wrote in a response published by Expressen, one of Sweden's most prominent dailies, on January 31. "For the British Foreign Office, which financed our participation, and other governments in the West, it was about strengthening their positions ahead of the negotiations on [Iran's] nuclear program."

The Swedish media's investigation, which cited emails provided by Iran International, followed a 2023 joint exposé by Iran International and Semafor that detailed Tehran’s efforts to cultivate relationships with academics and analysts abroad to expand its soft power.

Inquiry into allegations

In 2023, a spokesman for the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) also told Iran International that "the Iran Expert Initiative was a European-government backed initiative that ECFR staff sometimes took part in but did not lead on."

The ECFR spokesman declined to name the European government.

Samafor's Steve Clemons cited in 2024 a British government source as saying that the funding came from London.

Sweden's Foreign minister Maria Malmer Stenergard said on Thursday the country had launched an inquiry into allegations that Parsi was involved in the Tehran-led influence network aimed at shaping Western policy.

The top diplomat said the government had contacted the Swedish Institute of International Affairs for more information, calling the allegations “very serious.”

She warned that Iran, along with Russia and China, is conducting extensive intelligence operations in Sweden.

The long calls for listing the IRGC became too loud to ignore in 2022. Thousands of Iranians marched in Canada for weeks, denouncing the guards' brutality back home, they killed and maim to quell the uprising known by its central chant, Woman Life Freedom.

In April 2023, I helped organize Montreal’s first rally demanding the listing by the Canadian and UK governments. A year later, our efforts bore fruit with Parliament’s unanimous vote supporting the IRGC’s designation as a terrorist entity.

But the triumph that followed after the official listing yielded no solace. Within months, former conscripts were targeted. Branded as IRGC members, they saw their application for permanent residency (PR) denied. Procedural fairness letters piled up.

We had long warned about this and were assured by Canada’s government that the listing would be conducted with precision, ensuring that conscripts would not suffer.

Canada’s prime minister Justin Trudeau confirmed this publicly in a PS752 commemoration day. “We know there is more to do to hold the regime to account and we will continue our work, including continuing to look for ways to responsibly list the IRGC as a terrorist organization.”

The key word was “responsibly”. He signaled that his government understood that the designation could come with complications, particularly for conscripts, and was ready to tackle it.

That’s not how it’s turned out though. The debacle we see today is not what we fought for.

Forsaken at the edge

The listing has left countless individuals in ruins. Their accounts reveal a systemic thoughtlessness that is perpetuating this injustice.

Take Sina, a father of two, denied residency after five years of work in Canada. He was accused of being an IRGC-affiliated university lecturer during his military service. His documents, though, showed he served as a faculty member at Islamic Azad University, fulfilling mandatory service by law.

The irony is that all cards issued to conscripts completing their service in this scheme are categorized under the IRGC branch of Iran’s Military Service Organization. The IRGC’s security-oriented universities like Imam Hussain University, where real associations occur, have faculty who are career IRGC members or state affiliates, their identities largely concealed. The Canadian system, nonetheless, reduces everything to a conscription card, ignoring the realities of compulsory service.

The anatomy of compulsion

Each year, hundreds of thousands are conscripted into a mechanistic system, serving no more than two years. Assignments are normally not known in advance. A prospective conscript may be called to serve in the Army, Police, or IRGC. He would have to endure a few months of rough training followed by many more months of mundane work.

IRGC conscription—not to be mistaken with actual recruitment which leads to membership—is generally less rigorous than other military organizations, exposing the hollow grandeur ascribed to its service.

Mandatory conscription imposes duties on all conscripts, regardless of their past or branch. These typically involve administrative tasks, logistical support, or basic labor, with educated conscripts teaching or assisting in research but excluded from sensitive roles.

The banality of compulsory service is evident in the preferential treatment of those affiliated with the paramilitary Basij, who enjoy months of service reductions. Others, ordinary young men who are assigned to IRGC, are in some ways making up for the Basijis who remain fully active but in their own bases outside the conscription ecosystem.

The IRGC could never function if it relied on annual conscription or allowed the unwilling draftees to access to its modus operandi.

The importance of this fact cannot be overstated: no conscript in Iran qualifies as a member of a military organization in Iran, least of all the IRGC. Many IRGC conscripts are trained in civilian trades such as woodwork or plumbing, just as they do in the Army.

Conscription is a dated, largely unnecessary system, going back to 1925, when Iran wanted to fashion its first modern armed force. Conscripts do not join the IRGC, they are called to do their term. Conflating conscription with membership is wrong—and in Canada, at least, is destroying lives.

IRGC members arise through specialized domains, not brief, menial service often deemed the worst of youths’ lives.

The IRGC operates its own well-established, high-security universities and recruitment centers, with specialized training that prepares loyal individuals for service, be it in the Quds force, Cyber or Aerospace divisions.. To equate these members, the Sepahis, with conscripts who toil for two years to get an end-of-service card that’s required for any job, any transaction, to register marriage even, is a farce bordering on moral bankruptcy.

The Canadian government, long briefed on these matters, bears the responsibility to educate its immigration officers properly.

Guilty until proven innocent

Take another example: Alireza, whose PR application was denied because his two-year conscription with the IRGC was deemed membership. An immigration officer redefined his service as formal affiliation, claiming “membership does not have a temporal element.”

This argument, appearing in many cases, disregards the IRGC’s distinct recruitment process and its separation from mandatory military service. Even the federal court precedents referenced in refusal letters, such as Afanasyev v. Canada, 2012, are tenuous to conscription cases.

In Jalloh v. Canada, 2012, the court stated, “A person cannot be considered a member of a group when his or her involvement with it is based on duress.” That should apply to Alireza and others who had no choice but to do their time with the armed forces. Iran’s compulsory military service is by definition serving under duress.

Masoud, too, faced a refusal rooted in flawed interpretations. Despite detailing his basic training and mundane tasks like checking sign-in sheets, he received a letter that lectured him on the IRGC’s history, followed by a barrage of absurd questions: “If you are no longer involved with the IRGC, when and why did you leave?” or “Did you ever try to escape your duties?”

These betray a limited grasp of military service in Iran and severe punishments deserters face, including the loss of civil rights, acknowledged even in Canadian tribunal records.

Ironically, all those Iranians affected by the IRGC’s designation have declared their service voluntarily, while real IRGC operatives and affiliates—masters of covert operations and false identities—remain untouched. To date, no IRGC career member has been identified or penalized under current nebulous policies.

In refusal letters shared with me the individuals are accused of terrorism by a representative of the Minister of Immigration pursuant to IRPA. Shockingly, the same ministry denies targeting conscripts when speaking to Farsi-speaking outlets, cloaking itself in propaganda despite overwhelming evidence. This travesty, if deliberate, betrays any commitment to fairness and rectitude.

Trudeau’s government cannot feign ignorance of Iran’s conscription ecosystem. For years, advocates and victims laid the truth bare, only to see it dismissed. It is time to bring aspects of this truth to the forefront, demanding a fair reckoning.

The Fight for Redemption

Kaveh Shahrooz, a Canadian lawyer and advocate for listing the IRGC, likens conscripts to hostages of the regime. Freed at last, many are now finding their lives taken hostage again by their innocent past, by an immigration system that purports to be fighting their hostage-takers in Iran.

Some among the Iranian community in Canada—accused of sympathizing with the Islamic Republic—have sought to take advantage of the conscripts’ plight, demanding the removal of its terrorist designation. Former conscripts and families have condemned this move, stressing that they are “innocent individuals forcibly conscripted and enslaved by the IRGC.”

Feeling abandoned by Canada’s Liberal administration, they hope for reprieve through other legislative avenues. Bill C-350, introduced by Conservatives, serves as an example and proposes an exception for conscripts. Thousands have rallied behind it, motivated by Pierre Poilievre’s assurance of protection for those conscripted.

Resolving this issue is crucial for Canada’s standing and could set a precedent for nations like the UK and Australia. Failing to address conscripts’ suffering risks eroding diaspora support, already scarred by the IRGC’s brutality. Should this tragic course continue, there will be only one victor: the IRGC.

True accountability demands Canada hear the voices of innocent conscripts today and confront its failure with integrity and principle.

Nima Gholam Ali Pour, an Iranian-born member of Sweden’s Parliament, said on Saturday that Parsi, who heads the Middle East and North Africa program at the institute, should not be employed by an organization funded by taxpayers.

“I will continue to work on this issue in the Riksdag until Rouzbeh Parsi is fired. It is completely unacceptable that a person who has promoted the interests of the Iranian regime should work for a tax-financed organization in Sweden,” he wrote on X.

His remarks follow a report by Sweden’s TV4, which linked Parsi to a network established by Iran’s foreign ministry to influence Western policy. The network referenced emails shared by Iran International, which had earlier revealed Tehran’s attempts to influence foreign analysts in a 2023 collaborative investigation with Semafor.

Gholam Ali Pour highlighted Iran’s history of espionage and illicit operations in Sweden, writing, “The Iranian regime has been conducting espionage in Sweden for decades. The regime has also planned assassinations in Sweden and uses criminal networks in Sweden to carry out acts of violence against other states and individuals.”

His comments come months after Sweden’s Security Service and Israel’s Mossad warned that Tehran was leveraging criminal groups in Europe to target Israeli embassies and individuals.

According to Reuters, Sweden’s security agency announced in May that Iranian operations had extended to foreign diplomatic representatives as well as opposition figures within the Iranian diaspora.

In a reference to European efforts to designate Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, Gholam Ali Pour questioned Parsi’s role. “Should we expect the Institute of Foreign Policy to also employ “researchers” who support North Korea, Russia and China?” he asked.

Parsi has denied any cooperation with Tehran, saying that while Iran sought to shape Western perspectives, his participation was in the interest of foreign governments, including the UK’s Foreign Office.

His response followed a report by Sweden’s TV4 and an article by Expressen, one of Sweden's most prominent dailies, which accused him of involvement in a network linked to Iran’s ministry of foreign affairs.

On Tuesday, TV4 reported that Parsi, the brother of former NIAC president Trita Parsi, had been connected to an Iranian initiative aimed at shaping Western policies.

The investigation, which cited emails provided by Iran International, followed a 2023 joint exposé by Iran International and Semafor that detailed Tehran’s efforts to cultivate relationships with academics and analysts abroad to expand its influence.

Sophie Löwenmark, a columnist for Expressen, wrote on Friday that “Parsi has participated in an advocacy network for a brutal dictatorship that today is a threat to Sweden, Swedish-Iranians, and Jews.”

She argued that his engagement had been secretive, without disclosure to his employers, and concluded that “this is not how someone you have full confidence in acts, but rather someone who appears to be the mouthpiece of the mullahs in Sweden.”

Parsi rejected her remarks in a response published by Expressen, saying that he had no financial ties to the Islamic Republic. He emphasized that his role as an academic allowed him to engage with different parties without political consequences.

“Unlike states, I do not represent any party and can therefore speak to everyone,” he wrote.

He also said that he participated in the Iran-led initiative on behalf of the British Foreign Office, not the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, arguing that TV4 and Löwenmark had omitted that detail.

“Certainly, Iran's aim with the initiative was to influence the West, but the participants' motives were something else entirely,” Parsi noted, adding that Western governments used such interactions to strengthen their positions in nuclear negotiations with Iran.

He dismissed criticisms from some Swedish-Iranians over his alleged ties to the Islamic Republic, saying, “My ‘crime’ is that I refuse to follow their lead and don't paint everything related to the Middle East and Iran in bright colors consistent with their ideologies.”

Löwenmark responded in Expressen, challenging Parsi’s arguments. She argued that he acknowledged Iran’s intent to influence Western perspectives but failed to address leaked data showing that participants actively collaborated with Tehran’s interests through ghostwriting and other methods. She also noted his lack of transparency about how he joined the network or why he kept his participation hidden from colleagues.

“More importantly, he doesn’t seem to mind being part of a confidential circle convened by one of the world’s most brutal and repressive states,” she wrote. “It is inexplicable that he does not seem to realize the significance of the fact that the agenda of this secret network was not human rights, taxes, or welfare—but nuclear programs.”

Swedish MP says Parsi promoting Iran's interests

Swedish lawmaker Nima Gholam Ali Pour on Saturday accused Parsi of "promoting the interests of the Iranian regime", vowing to follow up his dismissal from taxpayer-funded the Swedish Institute for International Affairs at the Parliament as his employment is "completely unacceptable."

"If individuals like Rouzbeh Parsi—who sympathize with Sweden’s enemies—are to work at the Institute, why should the Swedish people fund such an organization? The Institute might as well reach out to the mullahs and ask for money," the Swedish MP of Iranian origin said in a post on his X account.