Doubt and praise as Tehran arrests top cleric’s kin for corruption

Hosseinnejad, a nail technician from Eslamshahr, south of Tehran, vanished on May 25 after leaving work to care for her younger brother.

Her disappearance quickly drew attention after her family raised the alarm on social media, prompting thousands to share her photo in hopes of locating her.

Instagram posts by Hosseinnejad show a determined young woman supporting her family, expressing sympathy for executed protesters and backing the Woman, Life, Freedom movement.

On June 5, police arrested a man in his early 30s in connection with her death. Authorities said he operated an unlicensed taxi and had a criminal record.

Public reaction

The response was immediate. Messages of sorrow poured in from citizens, artists, and public figures.

“One murder victim and 90 million wounded,” many posted on social media.

Zahra Behrouz-Azar, vice president for women and family affairs, wrote on Telegram that the reaction sent a clear message: preventing violence against women is a national demand.

She cited “cultural and economic crises, weaknesses in preventive infrastructure, and gaps in legal and support systems” as causes.

State and police criticized

After her disappearance, many accused the authorities of systemic failure to protect citizens—especially women.

“How is it that thousands of agents and surveillance cameras are present across cities to harass Iranian women for improper veiling, but no measures (are taken) to ensure the safety of citizens, especially women?” activist and former political prisoner Hossein Ronaghi asked on X before Hosseinnejad’s body was found.

Hours after the arrest, police released two videos of the suspect’s interrogation and confession.

In the footage, he admits to trying to steal Hosseinnejad’s phone, stabbing her when she resisted and abandoning her body near Tehran’s airport. One video shows him on the floor during interrogation, recoiling after being slapped.

“The videos of the arrest and interrogation of Elaheh Hosseinnejad’s murderer are enough on their own to make me lose all hope in the improvement of security in this country,” digital rights activist and entrepreneur Nima Namdari posted on X.

“Justice will never be established in a country where the rights of the accused and the principles of fair trial are not respected. As long as there is no justice, there will be no security,” he added.

Legal inequality under scrutiny

The case has revived debate over Iran’s gender-based legal discrimination.

Murder is punishable by death, but if a man kills a woman, the victim’s family must first pay half the value of full blood money (diyeh)—set annually by judicial authorities—to the killer’s family before the execution can proceed.

This does not apply when both victim and perpetrator are male, reinforcing what activists call a system that devalues women’s lives.

“Why should the victim and their family bear the cost of the inequality in the law?” user @mynamefarshad posted on X.

Supporters of Sharia-based laws say the system allows flexibility. In high-profile cases, the state can pay the blood money itself to proceed with execution under Islamic jurisprudence.

Police released Hosseinnejad’s body to her family on Friday. Citizen reports say she was buried immediately, under strict security, without a public announcement in Eslamshahr.

People in Iran are often accused of contributing to the country’s economic woes through wasteful habits—not just by officials, but by one another. But how much truth is there to these claims?

One common claim is that Iranians use far more electricity than other nations. But data from Iran’s Energy Ministry shows that per capita household electricity consumption is about 1,100 kilowatt-hours per year—40% lower than the EU average, and well below usage in the US, Canada, Japan, or even many neighboring countries.

It’s the same story with food.

Iran’s agriculture minister recently criticized Iranians for “excessive consumption” of sugar and cooking oil, asserting that government subsidies are being squandered.

But that assertion appears to contradict data from the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which shows that Iran’s per capita consumption of both items is below the global average and significantly lower than in nearby countries like Turkey.

Last year, Iranians consumed 2.3 million tons of cooking oil, compared to 3.5 million tons in Turkey, which has a similar population. On a per capita basis, Iranian consumption is 30% lower than the global average.

The minister also claimed that 90% of Iran’s cooking oil is imported at subsidized rates, yet FAO data puts the figure closer to 56%, with imports steadily declining over the past three years.

Sugar tells a similar story. Iranians consume about 10% less than the global average, and nearly half as much as Turks. Far from being excessive, these levels reflect increasing constraints on household consumption.

Chasing the basics

These accusations also overlook a crucial fact: food inflation in Iran is out of control. The price of cooking oil surged 20% in just three months, according to a report by economic outlet Tejarat News on Monday. 

Iran’s Statistical Center reports annual inflation of 31% for cooking oil and 41% for sugar.

Such price spikes make basic goods increasingly unaffordable for most households. And the toll is visible in declining food security.

FAO data shows that per capita meat consumption in Iran has fallen by 40% over the past decade, while dairy consumption has dropped by 30%.

A senior food industry official said last week that the average Iranian now consumes 7–10 kilograms of meat per year—consistent with FAO’s estimate of just over 8 kilograms, down from 12 kg just a few years ago.

“Meat consumption in Iran is deeply unequal—some eat nothing, while others manage 20 kilograms a year,” said Masoud Rasouli, secretary of the Meat Production and Packaging Association, adding that the global average is 32 kilograms.

The figures don’t lie: Iranians are not consuming too much—they’re getting by with less.

Contrary to the official line—and even public opinion—excess is not a national trait. It’s an alien concept to the majority chasing the basics.

The two were detained by the Revolutionary Guard's Intelligence Organization two weeks ago on charges of misconduct and collusion, the IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported.

"The case of the accused is being pursued with great care and sensitivity, and the judiciary will handle the case in a fully professional and independent manner," the report said citing an informed source. "The violators will receive a firm response, and the final results will be officially announced after the completion of legal procedures."

Sedighi, known to critics as “the weeping sheikh,” was accused last year of illegally appropriating public land in northern Tehran.

Leaked documents indicated that he and his associates had seized a 4,200-square-meter garden originally owned by a seminary. The property, estimated to be worth $20 million, was reportedly transferred to an entity controlled by Sedighi and his family.

After initially denying the allegations and claiming that his signature on the documents had been forged, Sedighi’s defense unraveled as more evidence emerged.

Eventually, he issued a public apology addressed to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, revealing that the land had been returned to the seminary. Despite the scandal, Sedighi continued serving as the interim Friday Prayer Imam of Tehran.

In the case of Sedighi's son and daughter-in-law, "have the collusions taken place independently of their father's position as the Friday Prayer Leader appointed by the Supreme Leader and head of the Promotion of Virtue Headquarters"? asked BBC Persian journalist Hossein Bastani.

"What happened to Kazem Sedighi’s own 1,000-billion-toman land grab case?" Bastani added in a post on X.

Sedighi’s case has triggered widespread backlash, particularly on Iranian social media platforms. Many Iranians have expressed frustration over what they see as a lack of accountability and transparency among high-ranking officials and clerics.

Hamid Aboutalebi, former political director of the presidential office, issued a forceful warning in a post on X Sunday, highlighting the layered diplomatic pressures Iran faces in preventing the referral of its case to the UN Security Council and avoiding a European snapback of 2015 nuclear deal sanctions.

“It appears that Iran has only one path forward to prevent its nuclear case from being referred to the UN Security Council,” he asserted, “(coming to) an understanding with the United States and establishing diplomatic relations with that country.”

Such a thaw would mean that Washington does not back any resolution against Iran in the Board of Governors meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), he added.

If the IAEA determines Iran to be in serious breach, it could refer the case to the Security Council, which may impose sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as it did in 2006 under Resolution 1737.

Aboutalebi also warned that withdrawal from the NPT—advocated by some hardliners, including the Supreme Leader–appointed Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari—would deepen the crisis and trigger severe economic and social turmoil.

Hardline outlet Jahan News—affiliated with Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani—accused Aboutalebi of using a “disrespectful tone” and condemned his call for ties with the US

“This anger stems from the president’s commendable stance toward the Americans,” the outlet wrote.

IAEA concerns, stalled talks

In a confidential May 31 report, the IAEA outlined Iran’s use of undeclared nuclear material at three sites and noted a rise in its 60%-enriched uranium stockpile—now at 408.6 kilograms since February.

This is enough for roughly ten nuclear weapons if further enriched to weapons-grade.

No date has been set for the next round of US-Iran talks, and both sides remain at odds over enrichment.

On Monday, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said Iran would not accept any deal that denies its right to peaceful uranium enrichment.

President Trump, posting on Truth Social, reiterated that the US will not allow any enrichment by Iran. The UN Security Council is set to review Resolution 2231—the 2015 nuclear deal’s legal backbone—on June 24.

Criticism of Pezeshkian

Aboutalebi also took aim at Pezeshkian’s recent remarks that Iran has not been brought to its knees by sanctions or failed talks. He likened them to counterproductive slogans from the past.

“Your statements resemble preaching,” he wrote, referencing the slogan “Nuclear energy is our inalienable right,” which, he said, led to “failure and plunged the country into the abyss of Security Council resolutions.”

Although Pezeshkian heads Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, his influence over the nuclear file is limited.

According to senior lawmaker and IRGC general Esmaeil Kowsari, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has appointed a special team that sets overall nuclear strategy.

“Before each round of talks, Iranian negotiators meet separately with that team and with Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee,” said Kowsari.

Axios and The New York Times reported earlier this week that US negotiator Steve Witkoff has proposed creating a regional consortium to break the deadlock in stalled nuclear talks.

In a June 4 speech, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected the US proposal—delivered by Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi on May 31—saying a halt to enrichment inside Iran was “out of the question.”

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei had earlier said Tehran would welcome a nuclear fuel consortium “if it were proposed,” but added: “It cannot be a substitute for enrichment within Iran.”

Details of the proposal

According to Axios on June 2, Witkoff’s proposal would, restrict enrichment to civilian-grade levels (3%), suspend underground enrichment for a negotiated period, limit above-ground enrichment to reactor fuel standards under IAEA guidelines and require Iran’s immediate adoption of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol

On June 3, Axios quoted a senior Iranian official as saying Iran might accept a consortium based in Iran—but not if enrichment occurred elsewhere.

Qeshm, Kish or some other island?

A New York Times report on the same day noted that Omani and Saudi officials had discussed placing the facility on a Persian Gulf island.

“This would potentially give both sides a talking point,” the Times wrote, with Iran claiming enrichment is still happening and the US saying it isn’t on Iranian soil.

Israel Hayom cited an unnamed Arab source suggesting the facility might be built on one of three disputed islands: Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb or Abu Musa. All are controlled by Iran but claimed by the UAE.

The outlet described the idea as a “diplomatic sleight of hand,” sparking backlash on Iranian social media, where critics warned it would undermine Iran’s sovereignty claims.

Alternative: the Oman model

Some nuclear experts, including former Iranian negotiator Hossein Mousavian, have promoted a model where Oman would host the facility, operated by Iran under IAEA supervision.

In this setup, ore would be processed in Saudi Arabia, enriched product would be stored there and a commercial office based in the UAE.

Possible participants

Axios reported the consortium could include the US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and possibly Turkey. Other outlets have mentioned Oman, Egypt, and Russia.

A June 3 editorial in Arman-e Melli argued Egypt’s inclusion would offer both regional legitimacy and diplomatic utility.

“Egypt’s good relations with the US and Europe could serve as a bridge between Iran and the West,” it noted.