Witchcraft and war: claims of Israeli sorcery draw scorn

During and after the 12-day Iran–Israel war, several Iranian and international outlets reported that former President Hassan Rouhani and Hassan Khomeini—the grandson of the Islamic Republic’s first supreme leader—had joined forces to influence the succession process.

Some US media also revived earlier reports of a three-member committee within the Assembly of Experts, tasked with selecting the next supreme leader.

Senior clerics and analysts noted a key obstacle: although Iran’s Constitution does not require the leader to be a descendant of the Prophet (a sayyed), it is widely believed that a white-turbaned cleric like Rouhani would struggle to gain legitimacy.

Sayyeds, including Khomeini, wear black turbans as a symbol of their lineage.

A premature move in Qom?

In this scenario, Rouhani’s role would mirror that of former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who helped groom Khamenei to succeed Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founding leader.

But the theory lacks evidence.

What reportedly occurred was a trip by Rouhani and Khomeini to Qom, where they consulted senior clerics including Nouri Hamadani and Makarem Shirazi. Anecdotal accounts from clerics and political veterans suggest that this move—viewed as premature—deeply angered Khamenei.

On X and other platforms, many users argue that Khamenei will seek revenge against those they label the main perpetrators: Iran’s moderates and reformists.

“The reformists … believed Israel would carry out the assassinations of officials, creating space for their return,” activist Arashk Rajabpour posted on X.

“But Trump’s ceasefire left the project unfinished … it’s unlikely that those who pushed this project forward won’t face consequences.”

Revenge and the politics of martyrdom

Such accusations echo a recent Iran International report citing Khamenei’s military adviser Rahim Safavi, who allegedly claimed Israel attempted to orchestrate a coup during the war.

The report suggested that while Rouhani and Khomeini acted on one front, former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and several IRGC commanders operated on another—each seeking to steer the West toward accepting a controlled internal transition which would empower their respective camps.

They now stand accused of quietly celebrating Israel’s killing of IRGC commanders as political openings.

Saving the regime, not the people?

The concept of revenge carries deep resonance in Shi'ite culture. In Ta'ziyeh, the traditional passion play, vengeance for the martyrdom of the third Shiite Imam is a central theme.

Ironically, the alleged conspirators are now being condemned by some dissident Iranians for trying to rescue the very system they once criticized.

“Hassan Rouhani’s name is once again on people’s lips,” monarchist activist Ashkan Vahdat posted on X, “not to save the people, but to save the regime.”

“With a seemingly moderate face and a reassuring smile, they want to frighten the public with the threat of foreign enemies, to once again manufacture a threat and say, Take refuge in us,” he added.

His remarks—particularly his effort to distinguish between the United States and Israel—angered many in the hardline camp. Critics insisted he should have treated the two as a unified threat.

“He should have explicitly named ‘America’ and the ‘Zionist regime’ and treated them as one and the same,” said a commentary in Javan, a newspaper linked to the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).

The piece also mocked Pezeshkian for “maintaining a distinction between the real Trump and an imaginary one,” referring to his claim that Trump had the potential to “make the Middle East flourish and bring about a bright and peaceful future.”

Among his critics, Pezeshkian’s tone was seen not as strategic but submissive.

Lawmaker Meisam Zohurian argued the president should have portrayed Iran as a wronged but powerful nation, not “a wronged and beaten-down nation forced by fear to take refuge from one tyrant to its accomplice.”

No forgiveness for "God's Enemies"

Hardliners also attacked Pezeshkian’s denial of two recent fatwas against Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, issued after threats to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

“This is not specifically about the President of the United States or any other individual,” Pezeshkian told Carlson. “Religious scholars have expressed their scholarly views, but this fatwa in no way implies killing or threats.”

In contrast, the fatwas by Grand Ayatollahs Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Hossein Nouri-Hamedani invite Muslims worldwide to make those who threaten Khamenei and other senior clerics “regret their words.”

A provincial branch of Iran’s Organization for Islamic Propagation later offered a financial bounty for killing Trump.

Both fatwas declare anyone who threatens the Islamic umma (nation) and its leadership as muharib—an “enemy of God.” While not explicitly calling for execution, such a crime carries the death penalty under Iranian law.

Hossein Shariatmadari, Kayhan’s Khamenei-appointed editor-in-chief, dismissed Pezeshkian’s interpretation.

“Your information is flawed and inaccurate,” he wrote in an editorial on Wednesday. “Individuals such as Trump, Netanyahu, and some other U.S. officials fall under this ruling, and their punishment is execution.”

Forever "Death to America"

Pezeshkian was also condemned for softening revolutionary slogans.

Ultraconservative lawmaker Amir Hossein sabeti criticized him for detaching “Death to America” from U.S. leaders: “If this slogan isn’t directed at Trump, then who is it aimed at? A random employee at the New York tax office?”

“American officials issue orders to assassinate our people, officials, and scientists,” Sabeti added, “and you think you can win their hearts with such passive and romantic positions?”

Fereshteh Sadeghi, a hardline journalist, accused Pezeshkian of “degrading Iranian slogans, begging for recognition, whitewashing US crimes, and flattering Trump.”

Moderates' support

Not all responses were critical. Some reformists and moderates praised Pezeshkian’s outreach to the American public—especially Trump’s base.

“He exposed the gap between Trump's promises and performance, and debunked misconceptions in American society about Iranians’ hostility toward the American people,” wrote political analyst Ali Nasri, highlighting the interview’s anti-war message.

The silence of state broadcaster IRIB—dominated by ultraconservatives—also drew comment.

“If Ebrahim Raisi had appeared on Carlson’s show, the national broadcaster would have aired it multiple times across all channels,” said former advisor Abdolreza Davari.

The limited coverage of Pezeshkian’s appearance, he suggested, revealed the establishment’s unease.

Tepid support from the hardline establishment and deepening economic woes defined his first year, in which the Iranian currency lost a full half of its value.

Now after an Israeli-American military drubbing dealt the Islamic Republic its greatest ever challenge, his problems may only deepen.

His election was celebrated by Iran’s moderates, but rejected by some hardliners and many dissidents who had boycotted the election.

Pezeshkian narrowly secured victory in an election that saw the lowest voter turnout in the Islamic Republic’s 46-year history. Yet, the series of crises that unfolded over the following year may have rendered him the unluckiest president Iran has seen.

The night after his inauguration, senior Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran in a strike attributed to Israel.

The attack, which took place at an Revolutionary Guards-provided residence, deeply unnerved Tehran. A year on, the details remain murky.

The year that followed was dominated by an escalating cycle of threats, counter-threats, and the direct attacks traded between Iran and Israel.

Simultaneously, Pezeshkian faced relentless efforts by ultraconservatives to unseat him. Discussions about impeaching his cabinet ministers and ousting his vice presidents persisted throughout the year.

Enemies within and without

So far, his rivals have successfully removed Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif—the former foreign minister whose experience and charisma were key assets in forming Pezeshkian’s cabinet.

Pezeshkian's Economy Minister, Abdolnasser Hemmati, was impeached and removed, leaving his post vacant for nearly four months.

Eventually, one of Pezeshkian’s candidates, Ali Madanizadeh, was approved by the parliament—perhaps thanks to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who spoke against intra-regime infighting during the war with Israel.

Throughout the year, voices from across the political divide—including many ordinary citizens—insisted that Pezeshkian honor the promises he made during his campaign.

Chief among them was a pledge to improve Iran’s worsening economic conditions, marked by rampant inflation, high unemployment, and widespread financial hardship.

These crises were deeply entrenched well before the war with Israel, and following the conflict, the administration seems poised to use the war as justification for its failures.

Campaign rhetoric meets wartime reality

Another key promise—especially significant to women—was to dismantle the compulsory hijab patrols. This was not achieved, though a draconian new enforcement law lapsed amid broad public objections.

The patrols returned to the streets weeks before the war, once again harassing women. Their more recent absence owes more to women’s defiance and the outbreak of war than to any government action. Pezeshkian can claim little—if any—credit here.

A third major demand was the removal of censorship on social media platforms essential to the livelihoods of some 400,000 online businesses, according to government and Chamber of Commerce figures.

Despite an extensive publicity campaign, only WhatsApp saw its ban lifted. Yet as the war erupted, the state once again clamped down on digital freedoms, including renewed restrictions on WhatsApp.

The government blamed social media for enabling Israel’s apparent access to sensitive information about Iranian officials, sparking widespread ridicule from the public.

Roughly a week after the Tehran–Tel Aviv ceasefire, a slight easing of media restrictions allowed pro-reform outlets such as Etemad to resurface. They warned that ignoring campaign promises would only deepen public discontent.

“Dissent may return to the streets with renewed momentum,” an Etemad editorial cautioned, “especially as economic pressures mount.”

“For now, both the streets and skies are quiet. But neither calm is likely to hold—and Pezeshkian may be in for a rougher ride than the year he just survived.”

The pause shows a swift post-war drive to crack down on alleged Israeli spying is hitting some obstacles even in the hardliner-dominated establishment.

Iran's Guardian Council sent back the controversial bill to parliament for revisions, citing ambiguities in definitions and potential conflicts with Islamic law and constitutional principles.

The draft legislation seeks to impose harsher punishments—including the death penalty—for a broad range of alleged activities defined as espionage or collaboration with Israel, the United States, and other “hostile” states or groups.

The bill, titled the “Intensification of Punishment for Espionage and Cooperation with the Zionist Regime and Hostile States Against National Security and Interests,” was approved by Iran’s parliament late June but faced scrutiny from the Guardian Council, which is tasked with ensuring that legislation complies with Islamic law and the constitution.

"The necessity of precision in legal definitions is critical," said Hadi Tahan Nazif, spokesperson for the Guardian Council. "There is ambiguity in identifying who determines 'hostile states and groups.' It must be clarified which official institution makes that designation."

Tahan Nazif further warned that vaguely defined terms like “creating division” or “undermining national security,” as used in Article 4 of the bill, could infringe on constitutionally protected rights. “Such qualitative language may, in practice, restrict legitimate freedom of expression. These ambiguities must be resolved,” he said.

Among the most contentious points is the bill’s expansion of the crime of “spreading corruption on earth” (efsadfel-arz)—a charge that can carry the death penalty.

The Guardian Council objected to Article 2, which equates“any direct or indirect assistance”to Israel with corruption on earth. The Council said this could lead to capital punishment for acts that do not meet the strict criteria for that charge under Islamic law.

“In Islamic jurisprudence, the conditions for establishing the crime of corruption on earth are specific and strict. Broadening its scope without meeting these conditions is contrary to Sharia,” Tahan Nazif explained.

At the same time, the Council criticized the bill for limiting some cases—such as widespread distribution of unlicensed communications equipment used in organized opposition—to prison terms, when it argued they could meet the threshold for corruption on earth.

Another key concern centers on retroactive enforcement. Article 9 of the bill says that the law applies to offenses committed before its ratification, contradicting Article 169 of Iran’s Constitution, which prohibits retroactive criminal laws.

“No act or omission may be considered a crime under a law enacted after the fact,” Tahan Nazif emphasized, echoing the constitutional safeguard.

Despite its critique, the Guardian Council affirmed the importance of robust legal tools to defend national security, particularly in the wake of the 12-day Iran-Israel war, the spur of the latest emergency legislation.

“Our intent is not to obstruct legislation but to ensure laws are both enforceable and aligned with the constitution and Sharia, while also safeguarding citizens’ rights,” Tahan Nazif said.

Mohsen Dehnavi, the spokesperson for Iran’s Expediency Council, said on Wednesday that its supervisory board supports the general framework of the bill but some provisions in the draft were ambiguous.

A legal path to expanded crackdowns?

The bill follows heightened internal security measures and increased arrests, particularly since last month's war which saw devastation wrought on both sides of the conflict.

On Wednesday, Tehran’s prosecutor Ali Salehi confirmed that several cases involving alleged espionage, intelligence leaks, and smuggling of explosives are under urgent investigation.

“These cases involve individuals accused of sending maps and GPS coordinates to the Zionist regime, as well as transferring explosive materials,” Salehi said at an event in Tehran. “With full support from the judiciary and security forces, investigations are proceeding swiftly.”

Salehi also addressed allegations of espionage tied to the recent conflict: “Once investigations are complete, the public will be informed. The judiciary will not tolerate any actions that compromise national security.”

Escalating rhetoric

The bill and judicial statements come amid intensified rhetoric in Iranian state media. This week, Fars News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), published an editorial calling for the mass execution of detainees accused of collaborating with Israel and Western intelligence services.

“In the current conditions, those who enabled the killing of hundreds of Iranian citizens through espionage and weapons smuggling deserve to be executed in the style of 1988,” the editorial said, referencing mass executions of political prisoners. Amnesty International estimates that at least 5,000 people were executed during that period, often following secret trials without due process.

The article described the 1988 executions as “a brilliant chapter” in Iran’s history and saying that the public supports similar action today against what it termed “domestic terrorist networks.”

Definitions and penalties

The legislation, in its current form, criminalizes a broad range of activities under national security offenses.

It introduces the death penalty for espionage or intelligence cooperation with Israel, the United States, or their affiliated entities. The same punishment would apply to the manufacture, transfer, or import of drones for military or surveillance purposes, if deemed to involve "malicious intent."

The bill also imposes prison terms of 10 to 15 years for disseminating content—such as news, videos, or images—considered to harm national security or sow division.

Penalties ranging from six months to 10 years would apply to the use or distribution of unauthorized communication equipment, including satellite internet services like Starlink, depending on scale and intent.

Additionally, the bill allows for retroactive prosecution of offenses committed before its passage, a provision that legal experts say violates constitutional safeguards.

The draft is expected to return to parliament for clarification and possible amendment before undergoing a final review by the Guardian Council.

Last month, in the wake of the war with Israel, Iran arrested over 700 people in a mass roundup, accused of working for the Jewish state.

The request—made to Mahmoud Karimi, a hardline maddah closely aligned with Khamenei—capped not only ten days of mourning but two weeks of state-sponsored flag-waving to rally a war-worn people.

In processions that traditionally focus on the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, mourners this year chanted not just elegies, but songs about Iran and its ancient glory.

The one Khamenei called for begins with the line: “You remain in my soul and spirit, O homeland.”

Patriotism over piety

Muharram marks the death of the Shiites’ third Imam, killed in 680 CE at the Battle of Karbala.Iranians typically observe the month with processions, recitations, and rituals such as chest-beating or striking the back with chains. Events may be state-funded or grassroots.

This year, however, the ceremonies unfolded just weeks after the 12-day war with Israel and a fragile ceasefire.

State media and cultural institutions quickly moved to frame the mood, promoting a unified nationalist-religious narrative. A new slogan was emblazoned on banners, billboards, and public screens across cities: Iran, loyal to Hussein, will always prevail.

For the first time, patriotic anthems like O Iran—composed in 1944 and long associated with opposition movements—were performed during ceremonies. In previous years, such songs might have drawn censure or bans.

In many neighborhoods, the Iranian tricolor flew alongside the black and green standards of Karbala. Officials and local municipalities provided logistical and financial support to mourning groups that embraced the new tone.

State control, grassroots defiance

Khamenei’s Ashura appearance followed three nights of absence from the annual ceremonies held at his residence—an unusual break that had fueled speculation about his health.

His brief presence, and the seemingly spontaneous request for My Iran, was widely viewed as carefully orchestrated: a symbolic moment signaling that patriotic devotion now held equal standing with religious mourning in the Islamic Republic’s ideological framework.

The regime has long drawn on the defiance of Imam Hussein to frame its political posture, casting enemies such as Israel, the United States, and domestic critics as modern-day Yazids.

But Muharram has never been solely the regime’s domain. Despite increasing state choreography, it remains a space where protest and dissent can still break through.

During the widespread protests of 2022, some mourning groups adopted openly critical tones, invoking the deaths of young protesters at the hands of security forces. Echoes of that defiance surfaced again this year.