Backlash grows over move toward 'class-based' internet in Iran

According to the UN International Organization for Migration, nearly 700,000 Afghans were deported from Iran in the first half of 2025. A full 130,000 were expelled within just one week after the 12-day war between Iran and Israel. Many had lived in Iran for decades.

Far from an aberration, the recent wave of arrests, public humiliation and mass expulsions of Afghan migrants is a continuation of Tehran's decades-old political manipulation of one of the most vulnerable populations in the region.

The Islamic Republic's founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini famously declared that "Islam has no borders" and welcomed Afghan refugees fleeing a Soviet invasion in 1979.

But beyond this ideological gesture, Tehran never offered a clear legal or humanitarian framework for integration. Millions of Afghans entered Iran, only to be denied citizenship, legal employment or access to education and healthcare.

Over the decades, Afghan migrants have been treated as expendable tools in Tehran’s shifting policies in the region.

They were recruited to fight in Syria as part of the “Fatemiyoun” Brigade, exploited as cheap undocumented labor inside Iran and periodically threatened with mass expulsion in bouts of official populism.

During moments of domestic discontent, Afghan migrants became convenient targets to deflect public anger.

Under President Ebrahim Raisi, the policy of exploitation took on new dimensions. In the wake of the Taliban's return to power in 2021, a massive influx of Afghan refugees entered Iran and as many as around two million Afghans crossed the border within two years.

Rather than developing a comprehensive migration policy, Tehran allowed its border regions to turn into chaotic transit points run by smugglers and corrupt officials.

Xenophobia

In the aftermath of Israel’s devastating strikes on Iranian military and nuclear sites, domestic frustration reached boiling point.

The Islamic Republic, seeking to redirect the public's discontent, amplified xenophobic narratives portraying Afghans as a threat to national security.

Despite isolated claims of rising crime among Afghans, official figures show otherwise.

Iran's judiciary reports that Afghan nationals comprise only about 6% of the prison population—roughly in line with their proportion of the total population. The majority of these arrests are for undocumented entry or labor violations, not violent or organized crime.

Ghosts of policies past

In 2001, following the fall of the Taliban, I traveled to the border town of Taybad and the nearby Islam Qala crossing and I was able to personally witness the brutal consequences of this policy.

There, I saw mass graves of Hazara refugees who had been forcibly returned by the Islamic Republic and summarily executed by Taliban fighters in the deserts surrounding the town.

Tehran knew that these Shia Hazaras were at extreme risk, yet still arrested them in Iranian cities, detained them in camps in the east and deported them into the hands of their eventual killers. This memory haunts me to this day.

The recent expulsions have also generated heartbreaking testimonies. Haajar Shademani, a 19-year-old Afghan born in Shiraz, told AFP she was forced to leave the only home she ever knew.

Denied access to Iranian universities and now blocked from education under Taliban rule, she faces an uncertain future.

The Islamic Republic’s interference in Afghanistan has extended far beyond its borders. Over the past two decades, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), through its Ansar Corps based in eastern Iran, has pursued an interventionist policy in Afghan affairs.

Military and intelligence advisors operated on the ground while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a dedicated Afghanistan Affairs Office, often in conflict with the IRGC’s goals.

These interventions disrupted Afghanistan’s internal balance and forced thousands more civilians to flee.

Moreover, Tehran deliberately resettled the families of Afghan political and military elites inside Iran, creating dependencies that undermined Afghan sovereignty.

This too was part of a broader strategy: open-door policies were never humanitarian in intent—they were designed to serve Iran’s strategic interests.

As Tehran continues to wage psychological warfare against Afghan migrants, reports of mob violence, arson, and public beatings have become more frequent.

In this climate of state-sanctioned hostility, ultra-conservative media figures portray any defense of Afghan rights as treason.

Policymakers and human rights advocates in Washington and European capitals should call out Tehran's exploitation of Afghan refugees.

This community is not a plaything—Afghans are survivors of a conflict-plagued country, and their dignity must not be sacrificed for political expediency.

Afghan migrants deserve justice, protection, and the chance to live free from fear—not another generation of displacement and death.

Following the recent twelve-day war with Israel, many Iranians are asking: What truly happened? Where do we stand now? And what is the realistic path forward?

Prevailing narratives misdiagnose the crisis. They fall into three categories:

The government’s narrative casts Iran as victorious. Yet the facts suggest otherwise.

Iran suffered serious losses: senior military figures were killed, defense systems degraded, and critical parts of its nuclear and missile infrastructure were hit. In return, Iran’s retaliatory strikes did not shift the balance.

Misrepresenting this as triumph only reinforces poor decisions.

Regime-change advocates imagine foreign military pressure will fracture Iran’s security apparatus and cause collapse. But this view underestimates the cohesion of Iran’s coercive institutions and the self-interest of foreign powers, who are unlikely to commit to regime change.

The assumption that mass defections would yield democratic transition lacks grounding.

Structuralist perspectives also misplace blame.

One variant cites imperialism and calls for confrontation with the West. Another urges nuclear armament to balance power. But both ignore domestic dysfunction and corruption, and the risks of pursuing nuclear weapons now.

National strength requires more than deterrence—it needs capable, legitimate governance.

Understanding the crisis

The Islamic Republic has become a driver of national weakness. Two trends define this: a confrontational US posture and a disrupted power balance weakening Iran.

Decades of mistrust between Tehran and Washington—rooted in the 1953 coup and 1979 hostage crisis—have been worsened by missed diplomatic openings.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei consistently rejected efforts by moderate president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and others to improve ties, viewing diplomacy as infiltration.

Even after the 2015 nuclear deal, his stance blocked normalization. Similarly, Iran’s hardline stance on Israel has drained resources and diplomacy, disconnected from national interests.

Key missteps have weakened Iran's power since the theocracy's inception: from purging the military after the revolution to abandoning arms deals, and taking aggressive anti-Western positions.

The "Look East" strategy, replacing Western ties with China and Russia, has brought limited gains.

These ties emerged from isolation, not strategy. Russia withheld arms and reversed support for Iran’s enrichment rights. China has complied with sanctions and avoided defense ties.

These partnerships reflect weakness, not strength.

The core of the problem

Iran’s political structure is inseparable from the Supreme Leader.

Khamenei has shaped nearly all key decisions for over three decades. Velayat-e Faqih concentrates power in an unelected cleric, undermining accountability.

Why should governance belong to clerics? Democracies allow voters to remove failed leaders. In Iran, the Supreme Leader claims divine legitimacy beyond electoral scrutiny.

The 1989 constitutional revision gave him unchecked power, while the Assembly of Experts is functionally powerless.

Khamenei has deepened internal divisions—between loyalists and critics, and between state-enforced norms (like forced hijab) and citizens who reject them.

The state spends resources policing women and dissent rather than addressing threats. The result: emigration of skilled professionals, unqualified loyalists in office, and decisions made by an isolated circle.

This erodes Iran’s capacity and sovereignty.

A path forward?

Recent gestures in Tehran—nationalistic concerts and reformist figures, recently reappearing on state TV after years of exclusion—don’t address the crisis’s roots. Iran needs internal transformation and rebuilding of national power through institutional change.

Change must come from within—via elite and popular pressure—not foreign intervention, which would prolong the crisis and invite geopolitical rivalry.

One path is sustained pressure compelling Khamenei to step down and transfer power to a transitional authority.

During this interim period, a constituent assembly could draft a democratic constitution. That authority could then oversee a national referendum and free elections.

Institutions that block broad participation—like the Guardian Council—should be dissolved. Only fully open elections, inclusive of all political currents, can restore national sovereignty.

Democratic governance—paired with efforts to rebuild military, economic, and institutional capacity—offers a viable path.

A legitimate, inclusive state can deter threats, foster cohesion, and let Iranians shape their future.

Iran doesn’t need another myth. It needs a transformation grounded in realism, responsibility, and renewed commitment to national power through democratic means.

At a virtual event hosted by CIJA, the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, diplomats, lawmakers and rights advocates marked the anniversary and criticized Tehran.

“That morning I lost three friends of mine... Nunca lo voy a olvidar. I will never forget them,” said Nico Slobinsky, a Jewish Argentine Canadian and survivor of the attack.

“I still remember... and I shake a little bit when I talk about this,” he added.

The 1994 AMIA bombing, which killed 85 and wounded more than 300, remains the deadliest attack in the country's history. An Argentinian prosecutor ordered ten people including several Iranians to stand trial for the attack last month.

Argentinian, US and Israeli authorities have long accused Tehran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah of organizing the attack - charges they deny. Iran on Friday again rejected accusations it was involved and urged a search for the real killers.

Former Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird called the Iranian establishment's presence in Canada a “direct and urgent” threat.

“The life of a past elected official is under threat here in Canada today,” Baird said, referring to fellow panelist Irwin Cotler, Canada’s former Justice Minister.

Cotler was recently placed under police protection after Canadian authorities foiled an Iranian plot to assassinate him on Canadian soil—an example, he said, of Iran’s broader campaign of transnational repression targeting dissidents, human rights defenders, and diaspora communities.

A 2023 Global News investigation uncovered more than 700 Islamic Republic-linked associates operating on Canadian soil.

In June 2024, the Canadian government designated Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) a terrorist group—a move some critics say came too late, especially after the IRGC shot down a passenger plane over Tehran in January 2020, killing dozens of Canadians with two surface-to-air missiles.

“We cannot forget as we remember tragedy ... we cannot ignore today the massive domestic repression in Iran, which is intensifying as we meet, and which conflates with the transnational repression and assassination,” Cotler said.

"They're not separate issues. There is a nexus between the two, and both regrettably mandate us to combat the culture of impunity.”

'No refuge'

Josefina Martinez Gramuglia, Argentina’s Ambassador to Canada, reaffirmed Argentina’s position that Iran and Hezbollah were responsible for the bombing and outlined the country’s new efforts to pursue justice—including trials in absentia.

“Those who commit acts of terror will find no refuge,” said Ambassador Gramuglia.

Just weeks earlier, on June 26, Argentine federal judge Daniel Rafecas formally ordered that ten people—including several former senior Iranian officials—stand trial in absentia for their alleged roles in the bombing.

Among those charged are Iran’s former intelligence minister Ali Fallahian, former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati, former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaee, former ambassador to Argentina Hadi Soleimanpour, and additional Iranian embassy staff.

The defendants are considered fugitives, many since 2003, and will be tried under a new law passed in February allowing long-term fugitives to face justice even if absent from court.

Argentina’s President Javier Milei has been a vocal diplomatic and rhetorical ally of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump—both of whom have long clashed with Iran, a feud that has sharply intensified since the 12- day-war.

Argentina, home to Latin America’s largest Jewish community, has seen its case complicated over the years by allegations of cover-ups, shifting judicial leadership, and even political interference.

Israel’s official Farsi-language X account on Friday posted a photo of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei embracing Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader of Hezbollah whom Israel assassinated late last year over what appeared to be the ruins of the AMIA site.

"The perpetrators of this crime: one has been dispatched to hell, and the other is hiding in an underground hell," the post said, referring to reports that Iran's Supreme Leader was transferred to a bunker during the Israeli attacks.

Iran, however, has rejected the accusations as baseless.

In a statement released on Friday, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said the charges against its citizens lack credibility and accused Argentina of politicizing the case under pressure from Israel and third-party actors.

“Iran has called for the real masterminds and perpetrators of the explosion to be identified,” the statement read, adding that the Islamic Republic reserves the right to respond to “any inappropriate and unreasonable action” taken against its citizens.

Iran's ministry also criticized what it called a “show trial,” and urged Argentina to uphold principles of transparency, fairness, and independence in its judicial proceedings.

While Tehran continues to deny involvement, the panelists at the CIJA event argued that justice—though delayed—must not be denied.

For them, the AMIA bombing is more than a tragic memory. It is a warning about the enduring threat posed by the Iranian government—one they say must be confronted, in courtrooms, in policy, and in public awareness.

From murals of Cyrus the Great to patriotic songs at Shia mourning ceremonies, Tehran is now leaning into pre-Islamic imagery it once viewed as anathema.

For a theocracy built on the rejection of monarchy and secular nationalism, the shift is a dramatic reversal, but one analysts say could reflect desperation, not strength.

“The total failure of the Khomeinism and Islamism as a sort of transnational ideology has meant that if there's anything to fall back upon, it’s version of nationalism,” said historian and author Arash Azizi.

“They understand it's a very foolish game to try to rule Iran and not be beholden to this Iranian patriotic idea that is so widely held," he said on this week's episode of Eye for Iran podcast.

Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies called the move political, not ideological. “This is not an organic phenomenon,” he said.

“It’s the state trying to create more political room for itself by co-opting elements of society by simply changing the discourse of security.”

The shift has accelerated in the aftermath of Iran’s 12-day war with Israel, which exposed serious weaknesses in the country’s military and cyber infrastructure.

No street protests occurred during or after the conflict, but nationwide strikes earlier this year pointed to simmering discontent, and Tehran appears eager to forestall any unrest.

Back to the future

Among the most visible signs of the change in tone was Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s invitation to his eulogist to perform a patriotic ballad during a July 5 mourning ceremony usually dominated by religious chants.

Jonathan Harounoff, Israeli diplomat and author of Unveiled - A Book About Protests in Iran in 2022 - said Tehran's move was fueled by desperation.

“The Islamic Republic for the past 46 years has tried to expunge, tried to minimize and tried to supplant (pre-Islamic history) with this new version of history,” he said.

“Now that the regime has its back against the wall... you see a very clear attempt not to lose the people of Iran," Harounoff added. “I think many observers saw right through it. It was an attempt of trying to save face.”

Nationalistic to the core

But Tehran’s nationalist turn is unlikely to succeed, according to Professor Mehrzad Boroujerdi of Missouri University of Science and Technology, who has studied the Islamic Republic's uneasy relationship with Iranian identity since its inception.

“The regime has tried to de-emphasize any type of the iconography and symbols of Iranian nationalism ... the unease with pre-Islamic traditions like Nowruz, Charchand Besuri and others have continued,” he said. “And yet, Iranians' infatuation with those symbols ... continues to this day.”

Boroujerdi argues this tension has existed since the 1979 revolution, when Ayatollah Khomeini tried to replace Iranian identity with pan-Islamic ideology—and largely failed. “Despite the animosity toward the state that average citizens have,” he said, “Iranians... remain nationalistic to the core.”

Even Iran’s own power brokers, Azizi said, have begun to shift their rhetoric. “They make their arguments almost purely on the basis of Iranian national interest,” he said. “Transnationalist Islamist Khomeini theology has been such a total defeat".

At the funeral of two young men recently killed by security forces, mourners spontaneously broke into chants of Ey Iran—a patriotic anthem once sidelined by the Islamic Republic.

“There is no rally-around-the-flag effect,” Taleblu said. “And if you do see a rally, it's short lived and it's not as sticky.”

You can watch the full episode of Eye for Iran on YouTube or listen on any major podcast platform like Spotify, Apple, Amazon Music and Castbox.

During the 12-day war with Israel, many inside Iran stood by their country under fire, moderates argue—but not by its ruling establishment.

“If anyone assumes that public support stems from satisfaction with the status quo, they are making a strategic mistake—one that could discourage the people and embolden the enemy,” prominent reformist Saeed Hajjarian told Ham-Mihan daily.

Hajjarian emphasized that the wartime unity was born of “patriotism, not nationalism,” and warned it may not be sustainable.

“Nationalism is the product of a state that genuinely cares about its nation,” Hajjarian said. “We have not yet reached that stage. The state must win the hearts of the people.”

Some exiled opposition groups had anticipated mass unrest during the conflict. It did not transpire, moderates say, due to fear, exhaustion, and alienation from both the state and its challengers—not support for the Islamic Republic.

Call for concessions

Ali Soufi, another senior reformist, said the burden now lies with the ruling establishment.“Just as the people and political factions stepped in unconditionally, the system must not turn a blind eye—it must carry out reforms.”

A key demand is the release of political prisoners. From Mir Hossein Mousavi—still under house arrest—to jailed figures like Mostafa Tajzadeh, their continued detention is seen as a barrier to unity.

In a recent statement, Mousavi renewed his call for a referendum to convene a constitutional assembly, arguing Iran’s current political structure no longer represents all of its people.

Political analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi warned that unity forged under external threat cannot survive if critics remain silenced. Days later, Tajzadeh’s sentence was extended by another five years, bringing his total to 17.

Public skepticism runs deep

It remains unclear how much traction these reformist demands have among ordinary Iranians. In recent protest waves, a popular slogan has been: “Reformist, hardliner, the game is over.”

For many, the chant reflects rejection of the entire political spectrum, including moderates.

Reformists point out that even long-detained Green Movement leaders joined the call to defend the country during the war. Their gesture, they argue, shows reconciliation is still possible—but only if the state takes bold steps.

While reformists frame prisoner releases as a national imperative, many Iranians appear more focused on daily hardship, corruption, and social restrictions.

Independent analysts echo this gap, warning of widespread “chronic distrust.”

“Unless the government addresses discrimination, injustice … corruption, lack of transparency, and social inequality … national cohesion will remain fragile and conditional,” political analyst Hadi Alami Fariman wrote in Arman Melli.

Even some within the establishment are issuing similar warnings.

“The mistaken belief should never arise among our officials that ‘whenever an attack occurs, the people will still be present on the scene,’” conservative politician Abolghasem Raoufian cautioned.