Embassy closures in Tehran trap thousands of Iranian passports

“It heated up after the start of the war, and it’s still going on,” one Israeli official told the FT.

Since the June 24 ceasefire, Iranian-aligned groups have attempted to exploit a recently identified Microsoft server software vulnerability to attack Israeli companies, according to chief executive of Israeli cyber threat intelligence company ClearSky, Boaz Dolev.

While the missiles stopped following the ceasefire that ended the 12-day war which saw massive destruction both sides, Iran's cyber war has continued at full pace, as reported by Iran International last month.

“Although there is a ceasefire in the physical world, in the cyber arena, [the attacks] did not stop,” Dolev added.

Spear-phishing messages purporting to be from diplomats and the prime minister’s office have also surged, cyber security company Check Point told the FT.

During the June conflict, Israel-linked hackers carried out some of the most disruptive strikes of the campaign. Gonjeshke Darande, a group widely regarded as aligned with Israel, claimed responsibility for destroying $90mn from Iran’s Nobitex cryptocurrency exchange and crippling services at Bank Sepah and Bank Pasargad by disabling their main and backup data centers.

While Iran’s capabilities were not to be underestimated, none of the wartime attacks on Israel had dramatic impact, Moty Cristal, a crisis negotiator and lieutenant colonel in the Israeli military reserves, told the FT.

Dolev said Iranian-linked groups had retaliated with hack-and-leak operations against about 50 Israeli companies, alongside attempts to plant malware aimed at destroying computer systems.

While they appeared unable to penetrate the defenses of Israel’s military or largest firms, he said, the attackers targeted smaller, more vulnerable businesses in their supply chains.

These included logistics and fuel providers as well as human resources firms, with hackers later releasing the CVs of thousands of Israelis with defense and security backgrounds.

The United States intensified enforcement of sanctions on Iranian oil exports in October 2024 after Iran’s second missile strike on Israel, though broader measures have been in place since the Trump administration.

Despite these efforts, exports remain substantial, but a growing gap between crude loaded in Iran and volumes discharged in China suggests mounting logistical challenges.

According to energy consultancy Vortexa, Iran’s crude exports fell by 480,000 barrels per day (bpd) in July from June, to 1.5 million bpd.

Data from Kpler, which separately tracks loadings from Iranian terminals and discharges at Chinese ports, confirms the volatility.

Since January, Iran has on average loaded 200,000 bpd more than has been offloaded in China, swelling floating storage from 5 million barrels in early January to 33 million barrels by late July.

China remains the only major buyer of Iranian crude.

Crackdown: limited impact

The United States has in recent months targeted dozens of tankers from the so-called “ghost fleet” and blacklisted front companies.

The US Treasury also sanctioned a major sales network run by the son of former national security chief and supreme leader adviser Ali Shamkhani.

Claire Jungman, Director of Maritime Risk & Intelligence, said that despite expanded enforcement, Vortexa data shows little immediate impact on July volumes.

“Iran’s crude continues to flow via shadow fleet operations involving disabled AIS tracking systems, falsified vessel identities, and ship-to-ship (STS) transfers,” Jungman explained.

“On August 1, Malaysian authorities announced a crackdown,” she added. “While this may complicate Iran’s logistics and raise operational costs, similar measures by Malaysia and Indonesia in the past have had only limited and temporary effects.”

Vortexa expects exports to remain resilient in the short term, supported by Chinese demand and adaptable logistics.

Opaque trade, sanctions costs

Still, sanctions are costly: central bank, customs, and tanker-tracking data suggest roughly one-fifth of oil income is lost to evasion costs, including discounts.

In mid-July, delivered Iranian crude to China traded at $4/b below Brent, compared with $2/b in May.

Official trade figures remain murky.

Iran’s customs agency counts gas condensate as a “non-oil” export, reporting $3.5 billion in such exports to China in spring 2025—nearly equal to imports from China in that period. But Chinese customs data for the first half of 2025 lists only half that figure from Iran—with oil imports officially at zero.

The discrepancy likely reflects China omitting sanctioned goods such as petrochemicals and metals from official tallies, while Iranian authorities include them.

Ali-Akbar Velayati, a senior foreign policy advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, on Saturday called Hezbollah disarmament "a dream that won't come true", describing it as a policy dictated by Israel and the United States.

The Lebanese foreign ministry in a statement on X condemned the remarks as "a flagrant and unacceptable interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs," saying it will not tolerate such "unacceptable conduct under any circumstances."

"This is not the first such interference. Some senior Iranian officials have repeatedly overstepped by making unwarranted statements regarding Lebanese domestic decisions that are of no concern to the Islamic Republic," it said.

It also said that the Arab country "will not permit any external party, whether friend or foe, to speak on behalf of its people or to claim any form of tutelage over its sovereign decisions."

Velayati said on Saturday that Tehran "is definitely opposed to disarming Hezbollah; because Iran has always supported the Lebanese people and the resistance, and continues to do so now."

The decision to disarm Hezbollah "is only the desire of the US and Israel. The US and Israel think they can bring another puppet to power in Lebanon; but this dream will never come true, and Lebanon will stand firm as always."

Lebanon's cabinet instructed the army earlier this week to develop a plan by the end of the year aimed at creating a state monopoly on weapons—an implicit challenge to Hezbollah, which has resisted disarmament since last year’s war with Israel.

Hezbollah decried the move as a "grave sin" and vowed to ignore it.

On Thursday, senior Iranian military official Iraj Masjedi said efforts to disarm Hezbollah will fail. “They are seeking to disarm the resistance in Lebanon, but they will take that wish to the grave."

'Mind your own business'

The Lebanese foreign ministry "reminded the leadership in Tehran that Iran would be better served by focusing on the issues of its own people and addressing their needs and aspirations, rather than involving itself in matters that do not concern it."

"Lebanon’s future, its policies, and its political system are matters decided solely by the Lebanese people, through their democratic constitutional institutions, free from any interference, dictates, pressure, or overreach," it added.

"The Lebanese state will remain steadfast in defending its sovereignty, and will respond, in accordance with diplomatic practice, to any attempt to undermine the authority of its decisions or to incite against them."

The Lebanese government has long been under international pressure to assert monopoly over arms, particularly from Western states who view Iran-backed Hezbollah’s military structure as a parallel force within the state.

“After the approval of Iran’s accession to the Palermo Convention, the FATF deadlock has been resolved after seven years, and Iran has now been invited for talks,” Ali Madanizadeh said in a Friday interview on state television.

The Financial Information Center, part of Iran’s Supreme Council for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, confirmed the news on its website, saying that Hadi Khani, secretary of the council, had been invited to take part in the negotiations.

The direct talks in Madrid will address the process of normalizing Iran’s case, suspending countermeasures, and removing the country from the FATF blacklist, according to Tehran’s official statement.

Iran’s UN ambassador Saeed Iravani wrote to Secretary-General António Guterres on August 5 announcing that, on government orders, the ratification document for the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime—signed by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi—was being submitted.

Iran’s parliament passed the bill to adopt the convention in 2017, but the Guardian Council blocked it until the Expediency Council approved it in May this year. The years-long failure to ratify it left Iran unable to establish normal financial links abroad, even after the 2015 nuclear deal offered partial economic relief.

Joining the FATF and related conventions was a campaign pledge of Masoud Pezeshkian in the 2024 presidential election.

On May 21, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf formally notified President Pezeshkian of the law’s enactment, enabling Iran’s accession to the Palermo Convention, one of the FATF’s four core treaties.

Tehran has already joined two others: the Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the UN Convention against Corruption.

The only outstanding FATF instrument is the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), designed to curb funding for armed groups and improve cross-border cooperation in tracking and cutting such flows.

The Islamic Republic has for years provided financial support to groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which are designated as terrorist organizations by much of the international community.

In May, Expediency Council spokesman Mohsen Dehnavi said the CFT would be addressed in upcoming sessions.

Even if Iran secures removal from the FATF blacklist, the looming prospect of UN sanctions snapback could render the move moot.

The snapback mechanism, which European parties to the 2015 nuclear deal have threatened to trigger if no deal is reached with Iran by the end of this month, would restore UN sanctions lifted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from which the US unilaterally withdrew in 2018.

International banking tools may be available, but renewed sanctions could block trade even with long-standing partners such as China and Russia.

The aftermath of Israel’s strikes, which dismantled parts of Iran’s military command structure in hours, continues to reverberate through the Revolutionary Guards.

The targeted attacks killed over 20 senior commanders, including Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces; Hossein Salami, IRGC Commander-in-chief; and Gholamali Rashid, Head of Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

Some commanders died in their homes, others in a secure bunker during an urgent meeting said to be convened after a cyber-generated fake message.

In the immediate response, the system moved quickly to announce replacements — Abdolrahim Mousavi as new Chief of Staff of Iran's Armed Forces, Mohammad Pakpour as IRGC Commander-in-chief, and Ali Shadmani at Khatam al-Anbia.

Within five days, Shadmani was killed in what his daughter described as a car chase by an Israeli hit team.

The daily Kayhan wrote another commander had been appointed but withheld the name for security reasons, a report officials have neither confirmed nor denied.

Iran International’s review shows that other key posts remain vacant: the Armed Forces’ Deputy for Operations, previously held by Mehdi Rabbani; the Deputy for Intelligence, formerly Gholamreza Mehrabi; the IRGC Aerospace Force Intelligence post left by Khosro Hassani; and several regional intelligence commands.

Many of the 30 senior officers killed have yet to be replaced.

The attacks on June 21 also struck the IRGC’s external arm, killing Mohammad Saeed Izadi, who oversaw Palestinian operations, and Mohammadreza Nasirbaghban, the Quds Force’s deputy for intelligence. No successors have been named, even as Tehran seeks to rebuild its regional alliances after the conflict.

Silence surrounds IRGC navy chief’s absence

IRGC Navy chief Alireza Tangsiri has been absent from public view for nearly two months.

Tangsiri, who between late-March and early June appeared in over 20 official interviews and speeches in nearly 75 days and repeatedly issued harsh warnings to the US and Israel, has had no public or media presence for almost two months, since just before the war began.

On August 8, state media published a written message under his name for National Journalists’ Day, but it remains unclear if he authored it.

A source familiar with the matter, speaking anonymously, said Tangsiri has cancer and that his deteriorating health has kept him out of public events.

His absence, coupled with the unfilled naval command posts, is costly for the armed forces’ structure.

Attempted fixes and lingering risks

In an effort to restore coordination, the Islamic Republic has formed a Defense Council comprising representatives from the army, IRGC, intelligence ministry, and general staff. Chaired by the president, with Supreme Leader envoys Ali Shamkhani and Ali Akbar Ahmadian as members, the council is intended to bridge operational gaps.

Still, without permanent appointments to critical posts — especially in operations, intelligence, the Quds Force, and the navy — Iran’s military command remains in flux.

The continuing vacancies, layered over the unprecedented loss of top brass, point to more than a temporary disruption. They suggest a deeper challenge to the Revolutionary Guards’ ability to maintain both strategic direction and battlefield command.