Iran's president Masoud Pezeshkian leaves a cabinet meeting with a bodyguard, Tehran, Iran, October 8. 2025
Hardline lawmakers in Iran have once again turned to impeachment, targeting four ministers in President Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet, in what critics say is a bid to stall the government rather than to offer alternatives.
On Thursday, Ahmad Bigdeli, a member of parliament from Khodabandeh, told Khabar Online that hardliners had tabled motions against Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi, Roads and Urban Planning Minister Farzaneh Sadegh, Agriculture Minister Gholamreza Nouri and Labor Minister Ahmad Maydari.
Bigdeli called the move “untimely and most probably ineffective and symbolic,” echoing the outcome of the only successful impeachment to date during Pezeshkian's term: that of Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati in March.
The move against Hemmati was widely viewed as pointless, as he was replaced by Ali Madanizadeh, whose economic policies closely mirror his predecessor’s.
‘Destabilizing’
Over the past year, hardliners have made their presence felt in scattered episodes—from the ousting of Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif to parliamentary scuffles over leadership—but have repeatedly disappointed their grassroots by settling for short-term wins.
Lacking both strategy and leadership, they now appear more intent on limiting Pezeshkian’s room to maneuver than on offering alternatives.
“Hardliners are using impeachment as a tool to pressure the Pezeshkian administration,” moderate journalist and politician Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar said. “Such moves destabilize the government while the country is at war.”
Moderate political activist Ali Bagheri added a warning: “Impeaching four or five ministers will break the government’s back,” he told the moderate daily Etemad. “When the administration is destabilized, even local officials in small towns cannot fulfill their responsibilities.”
Even some conservatives distanced themselves from the move against the executive.
“Radical MPs are targeting the administration for political gain,” conservative MP Jalal Rashidi Kochi said. “There’s no doubt some ministers are unfit for their roles, but I wish Pezeshkian would take the initiative to replace them.”
‘Costly for people’
The episode underscored how hardliners appear to lack a coherent plan of their own.
The renewed brinkmanship also reflects a deeper struggle within the conservative camp, which has failed to reclaim dominance since the death of hardline president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash last year.
Its cohesion further eroded after the death of ultraconservative cleric Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, founder of the influential Paydari Party.
His would-be successor, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, largely avoids the spotlight, leaving the faction without a unifying figure.
“Hardliners thought Raisi’s administration would last forever and keep them in power,” moderate journalist Hamidreza Jalaipour told Khabar Online.
Condemning their rhetoric—including threats to exit the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and shut down the Strait of Hormuz—he said: “They are victims of their own illusions, for which the country pays a high price.”
A political prisoner’s letter from jail has sparked fresh outrage over Iran’s long-running use of televised confessions to discredit detainees and justify stiff sentences.
The latest controversy began when Amir-Hossein Mousavi, a social media activist known online as James Bi-din, described in a prison letter how a televised admission he had spied for Israel was coerced under duress and manipulated by Iran’s state TV.
“Almost every sentence I uttered in the interview was the result of the interrogator’s prompting and coercion,” Mousavi wrote. “Even those statements were later broadcast by the Islamic Republic’s state television with much distortion.”
Mousavi was arrested on December 18, 2024, at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport while traveling to Kish Island. Nearly a year later, he remains behind bars and was recently told his trial would begin in about a month.
The goal of the highly edited documentary-style program, he alleges, was to make the public believe that Iranian intelligence agents had captured a “Mossad spy” after the twelve-day war and to "shift blame for their failure to identify real spies onto someone who has been languishing in prison for nearly a year without due process.”
Fabricated timeline
Mousavi revealed that the interview was recorded months before the twelve-day war with Israel, but edited to make it appear as if he had provided intelligence to Mossad during the conflict.
The recording, he added, took place after nearly 150 days in solitary confinement, during which he said he endured severe physical and psychological torture, including threats that his wife would be arrested.
In the broadcast, it was alleged that Mousavi had provided “information on sensitive military facilities” to a user named “Avi,” who supposedly forwarded it to Mossad.
Mousavi rejects the accusation, saying he never shared any information, not even general knowledge, and welcomed the publication of any evidence to the contrary.
He said he first became acquainted with Avi after another user, Elaheh, described him as an ordinary Israeli citizen critical of his government.
Mousavi described Elaheh as one of hundreds of ordinary friends he had on Twitter, saying their chats were casual and unrelated to any government, and that a record of the chat introducing Avi exists.
A systemic practice
From politicians to rappers women who defied compulsory hijab rules, foreign nationals, dual citizens, and environmental activists, the Islamic Republic has long used televised confessions as a propaganda tool.
Detainees are often shown “admitting” to crimes after torture sessions, prolonged isolation, and threats against family members. These confessions serve to discredit the victims, suppress dissent and legitimize state repression.
A 2020 report by rights groups Justice for Iran and the International Federation for Human Rights said Iran’s state television broadcast the coerced confessions of at least 355 people over the past decade to suppress dissent and intimidate activists.
Outrage on social media
Activists and users on X widely condemned the broadcast. “Confessions obtained under pressure, threat, or torture have no credibility,” wrote one, urging others not to repost the footage: “Let us not be complicit by sharing these coerced and unlawful confessions.”
Another post read: “A forced confession is not the hearing of truth—it is the witnessing of a broken soul.”
Others echoed the same sentiment: “Ordinary citizens who have no access to classified documents cannot be spies; the spies are among your own high-ranking officials.”
Human-rights advocate Emadeddin Baghi, a former political prisoner who has done extensive research on forced televised confessions, concluded in a post: “Even for someone whose guilt has been proven, broadcasting televised confessions is impermissible. (Even) if a person is guilty, the law itself should suffice.”
Former Iranian chief negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif said on Wednesday that a deal with Donald Trump is possible if it preserves Iran’s dignity and the US president’s ego.
“If we can design a dignified deal that protects Iran’s interests and satisfies Trump’s sense of self-importance, that could mark the end of the hostilities—and such a thing is possible,” Zarif told foreign-policy experts and reporters at a Tehran seminar on Wednesday.
The former foreign minister, who negotiated the 2015 nuclear agreement, suggested both Tehran and Washington sought to avoid a full-scale conflict in the June war with Israel, and defused it through back-channel communication.
“In the end, one side called at four in the morning and said, ‘We’re not going to strike,’ and the other replied, ‘We won’t strike either,’” Zarif recalled. “Wars end through dialogue, but it’s better if that dialogue happens when we still have leverage.”
His comments appear to counter hardliners’ calls to abandon diplomacy following US attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites and the Europeans’ snapback of UN sanctions last month.
Israel, not the US, wants Iran 'collapse'
Zarif argued that while Israel and the United States share interests, their strategic goals differ.
“America’s policy is not to bring about Iran’s collapse, but Israel —even during the Pahlavi era—believed that Iran was too big and must be broken apart,” he said.
The veteran diplomat said the continuation of the conflict could have led to Iran's collapse, in rare wording for a prominent former official.
“Continuing would either expand the war or lead to Iran’s collapse,” he said. “Both outcomes would have trapped America further in the region, which contradicts its policy.”
'People more important than missiles'
Zarif is President Masoud Pezeshkian’s closest aide and the moderates’ most prominent voice on foreign policy. Still, he holds no official position after he resigned as vice-president in March and is loathed by Iran's ascendant hardliners.
Yet he, like many others, avoided mentioning the role of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who on the eve of Pezeshkian’s trip to New York ruled out any talks with the Trump administration.
He only alluded to Khamenei’s control when saying he was not authorized to negotiate beyond the nuclear issue during his tenure.
“Trying to solve the nuclear problem purely through the nuclear file is no longer possible. Back then it was, and that opportunity was wasted,” Zarif added, calling for “a broader framework” for other discussions, without elaborating.
Those “other discussions” may refer to Iran’s missile program—an issue Tehran has repeatedly said is off the table in any future talks.
“Missiles are important,” he said, “but people are more important. It’s the people who have kept Iran alive through the centuries.”
The ruling to confiscate the National Iranian Oil Company’s last European headquarters is yet another sign of the country’s shrinking global footprint and deepening isolation.
NIOC House, located on Victoria Street in central London overlooking Parliament and Westminster Abbey, was Iran’s last base in the Western hemisphere for managing oil contracts and sales. Brutalist in style, the 1975 building is valued at around £100 million ($125 million).
Iran lost its Rotterdam office in 2022, and Crescent may now seek additional Iranian assets in the UK or elsewhere, including frozen funds, though international sanctions could complicate enforcement.
NIOC still has the option to appeal to the UK Supreme Court—a process that could take up to two years.
The Calamitous Crescent
The Monday ruling upholds a 2021 decision ordering NIOC to pay damages, lost profits, interest, and legal costs, with interest continuing to accrue. A 2014 judgment had already confirmed that Iran breached a 2001 gas-supply contract with Crescent.
The 25-year Gas Sales and Purchase Contract (GSPC), signed under President Mohammad Khatami, envisioned Crescent processing up to 500 million cubic feet per day from Iran’s offshore Salman field and reselling it near the UAE border.
By 2005, however, NIOC halted deliveries, citing technical delays, and later accused Crescent executives of corruption before unilaterally terminating the contract. In subsequent proceedings, Iran failed to substantiate its claims.
Crescent began arbitration in 2009 under the International Chamber of Commerce. The ICC issued its first award in 2014 confirming Iran’s breach, and a final award in 2021 ordering NIOC to pay $2.4 billion. English courts later dismissed NIOC’s challenges.
In 2024, a UK court ordered the seizure of NIOC House, describing NIOC’s attempt to transfer ownership to the Oil Industry Pension and Welfare Fund as a “sham” maneuver to evade creditors.
Experts estimate the total cost to Iran — including legal fees and lost revenue from flared gas—at more than $7.25 billion.
Timeline
2005—NIOC halts gas deliveries, terminates contract
2009—Crescent files ICC arbitration
2014—ICC rules Iran breached contract
2021—Final award: $2.4 billion
2022—Dutch court seizes NIOC Rotterdam office
2023—UK High Court dismisses NIOC challenge
2024—UK orders seizure of NIOC House
2025 Sep 30—High Court enforces full award
2025 Oct 6—Court of Appeal rejects NIOC appeal
Reactions in Tehran
Iran’s state media framed the court ruling as “political interference,” linking it to sanctions despite the dispute predating them.
Former lawmaker Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh urged authorities to identify those responsible and “arrest those who make a fortune by exploiting their power and the nation’s assets.”
Political commentator Ahmad Zeidabadi lamented: “It is a shame that after 23 years, the people of Iran still do not know what happened, why the contract was terminated, and why the country must now pay such a steep price.”
For over two decades, hardliners and moderates have accused each other of wrongdoing and undermining the national interest over the Crescent deal.
But Crescent is not an exception in the Islamic Republic of Iran; it is the norm. And so would be the potential loss of NIOC House.
When Iran purchased the London building in 1975, it symbolized the country’s expanding reach in the global oil market. Today, Iran’s oil is traded through ghost fleets, and revenues flow through opaque networks tied to regime insiders.
NIOC House now stands as an emblem of Iran’s stunted growth and deepening isolation—the last remnant of an ambitious past, and a window into a despondent future.
Iran’s parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf ramped up pressure on the government to issue ration coupons for essential goods, invoking Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s warnings about the deterioration of the economy.
His initiative appeared to be a thinly-veiled rebuke to the relatively moderate president as Iran's ruling classes resort to traditional infighting as diplomatic isolation and sanctions mount.
“The livelihoods of various social groups are under duress. Once again I stress the urgent need for officials to implement the electronic coupon scheme,” Ghalibaf told lawmakers on Sunday.
“This is not the first time I have raised this point from this podium,” he added, in an implicit jab at President Masoud Pezeshkian — who defeated him in the 2024 election.
Ghalibaf’s call highlighted the depth of hardship and the absence of a coherent strategy from the cabinet, but also the continued factional attempts to score points.
The president has indeed acknowledged the severity of the crisis, but his responses remain vague and reactive, prompting critics to see him as resigned rather than decisive.
Blame game
Recent measures such as removing four zeros from banknotes are widely dismissed as superficial attempts to patch a sinking economy.
Several economists have warned in recent weeks that while such steps may cosmetically reduce exchange rate figures, they do little to address underlying problems of inflation, unemployment or a growing budget deficit.
But Iran’s crisis is not only economic. Its roots are political as well, shaped by fundamental foreign-policy choices that fall far outside Pezeshkian’s remit.
Both Ghalibaf and the Supreme Leader he invokes know this, yet they continue the blame game rather than confront the structural causes.
Khamenei’s intervention at last month’s cabinet meeting served mainly to bolster his image as a defender of the poor.
Television bulletins and newspaper front pages were saturated with his concern over rising prices, portraying him as attentive to ordinary people’s plight even as implementation of solutions lags.
For the Supreme Leader, the messaging is as much about maintaining legitimacy as it is about practical policy.
Priorities lost
The Pezeshkian administration does not help itself, offering almost daily reminders it is out of touch.
Last week, Beheshti University of Medical Sciences announced it was renaming its “Office of Vice Chancellor for Student and Cultural Affairs” to “Office of Vice Chancellor for Cultural and Student Affairs,” a cosmetic change that amused and angered many Iranians on social media.
In Manjil, northern Iran, local officials staged a ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new staircase at the regional power authority headquarters, just ten meters from an existing one.
A photo of the local Friday Imam inaugurating the stairs ran in conservative outlet Ghatreh News, sparking public frustration and ridicule, with many questioning priorities and the government’s will to address real problems.
The expletive-laden jibes on social media point to a deeper truth that neither Ghalibaf nor Pezeshkian are willing to admit: inefficiency in Iran’s theocratic system is not incidental, but systemic.
A senior conservative’s assertion that Iran’s Islamic system is “softly reforming” its stance on the hijab has triggered furious backlash from ultra-hardliners demanding full enforcement of the Hijab and Chastity Law suspended earlier this year.
The remarks by Expediency Council member Mohammad-Reza Bahonar come as Iran’s leadership struggles to contain public discontent while facing renewed UN sanctions.
The fierce subsequent backlash underscores deepening fractures within Iran’s conservative establishment over how far the state should go in policing morality and religious codes.
Speaking to reporters on October 3, Bahonar said the Hijab and Chastity Law—quietly shelved by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in May—is “no longer legally enforceable.”
Mohammad-Reza Bahonar, member of Iran's Expediency Discernment Council
It was likely shelved due to concerns it would inflame tensions after the 2022 death of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, in morality police custody sparked nationwide protests which were quashed with deadly force.
“The paradigms of the Islamic Republic are being gradually and softly reformed,” Bahonar said, adding there is currently no binding or enforceable law regarding hijab. “The system’s general decision is that there is no compulsory hijab law in force.”
The veteran conservative bashed ‘Hezbollahis’—hardline Islamist loyalists—for attempting to dictate their preferences to the 90 percent of Iran's citizenry who “want to live” as they choose.
‘Savage, naked' West
At Saturday’s heated parliament session, ultra-hardline lawmakers launched a coordinated attack.
“Which system’s interests are you defending in the Expediency Council—the Islamic Republic’s or that of the savage, naked Western system?” senior MP Ahmad Rastineh said, addressing an absent Bahonar.
“Those who promote and defend nudity and say there is no hijab law are no different from those who frighten the nation with the shadow of war. Both target the Islamic system,” he added.
Amirhossein Bankipour, one of the law’s architects, blamed Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf and President Masoud Pezeshkian for blocking its enforcement, saying on state TV that both men had “failed to communicate Parliament’s decision to executive bodies.”
In a recent Fox News interview, Pezeshkian reaffirmed his opposition to coercion, saying he “does not believe in forcing women to wear the hijab.”
Bankipour invoked Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s position, insisting: “The Leader has stated several times—publicly and unambiguously—that there will be no retreat on the issue of chastity and hijab.”
Hossein Shariatmadari, editor of the hardline daily Kayhan, denounced Bahonar’s terminology, saying the phrase “compulsory hijab” was “fabricated by the enemies of Islam and the Revolution.”
“Mr. Bahonar has not explained what he means by using the term ‘compulsory hijab,’” Shariatmadari wrote. “If the hijab is a legal requirement—and it is—why should it not be enforced?”
Quiet retreat
Khamenei last forcefully touched on the issue in an April 2023 when he declared that disregarding the hijab was both “religiously and politically haram (forbidden).”
Meanwhile, the reformist outlet Ensaf News reports that Iran’s urban landscape has already moved past the old debate.
In Tehran and some other cities, the number of women wearing headscarves has markedly decreased, while many others wear loose scarves on their shoulders and the back of their hair.
The once-ubiquitous manteau coat has nearly vanished, replaced by long blouses and trousers. Crop tops and open shirts have become increasingly visible among young women—a quiet but unmistakable shift in daily life.