Pezeshkian faces political siege, but real power lies beyond his grasp

In the 1975 conversation with celebrated Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, then editor of Al-Ahram, the Shah boasted about Iran’s military buildup, including air defenses capable of striking targets a few hundred kilometers beyond Iranian airspace.

“We wish to be powerful in the region where we live,” he told Heikal, adding that “no government would base its defensive policy” on appearing weak—a line that now echoes in the rhetoric of Iran’s current leadership.

The interview was republished by the Khabar Online news outlet, which is close to Ali Larijani, a veteran political insider, Iranian security chief and confidante of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Tehran has stepped up visual references to Iran's mythical and pre-Islamic past since a punishing June war with Israel in the United States, in a move once unthinkable for the imagery's association with the ousted monarchy.

Likely a bid to bolster popular support, the strategy had previously stopped short of outright references to the royal family.

“The military force we are building is meant to confront those who threaten us,” the Shah, who was dethroned in the 1979 Islamic Revolution, said.

“I do not want Iran to have a nuclear bomb for two reasons,” he continued. “One is the cost, and the other is that we do not have the means—such as ships or missiles—to carry the bomb to its target.”

Yet he added pointedly: “If someone comes out of the bush and wants to have a nuclear bomb in this region, Iran should undoubtedly have one of those bombs too.”

Curious timing

Khabar Online said the remarks were part of a broader exchange reflecting Iran’s growing self-assertion during the oil-boom years.

Like other encounters between the late Shah and media figures such as Mike Wallace, Oriana Fallaci and Barbara Walters, Heikal’s questioning was probing—and the Shah relished the opportunity to rebut his interviewer.

At one point, he scolded Heikal for misnaming the Persian Gulf and “misstating facts” about Iran, a scene that captured his combative, self-assured style.

“The Shahanshah was very serious in his statements and he believed in what he said,” Heikal later recalled, deploying a term meaning king of kings. “I did not expect that, and I did not have an answer to convince him.”

The Shah, aware of Heikal’s ties to Egypt’s late president Gamal Abdel Nasser and his sympathy for Iran’s ousted premier Mohammad Mossadegh, used the interview to frame Iran as a regional power surrounded by covetous rivals.

“We wish to have good ties with the Arab world,” he told Heikal, comparing Iran’s armed forces to “a lock on a door” and describing deterrence as “an opportunity for our friends and anyone else who wishes to help us.”

On Israel and Iran’s future

In another passage that might resonate in Tehran today, the Shah dismissed Israeli criticism while cautioning its leaders against overreach.

“The Israeli press are the only ones that heavily attack us,” he said. “But we are not bothered by that. We have told Israeli leaders they cannot occupy the entire Arab world … but the Israelis do not take any advice.”

In the West, the interview is remembered less for its atomic undertones than for the Shah’s sweeping ambition.

“I want the standard of living in Iran in ten years’ time to be exactly on a level with that in Europe today,” he said. “In twenty years’ time we shall be ahead of the United States.”

Half a century later, its selective resurrection serves as a reminder that Tehran’s language of power transcends time—and the ruler’s outfit.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry on Thursday reaffirmed its support for ending what it called the “genocide in Gaza,” urging the withdrawal of Israeli forces, unhindered humanitarian access and the realization of Palestinian rights.

The statement also called for “global vigilance against Israel’s actions,” stressing that ending the war does not absolve the international community of its duty to “pursue justice and prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza.”

Hardline media its their supporters have largely portrayed the peace deal as a triumph for Hamas and Iran’s armed allies in the region.

‘The Resistance has won’

“The myth of Israel’s deterrence has been shattered,” conservative journalist Mehran Karimi wrote on X. “Despite its crimes, the enemy has been forced to accept the Resistance Front’s conditions, and Palestine has become the world’s foremost issue.”

Another user, Mahmod Sakavandi, argued that the agreement was a sign of the Palestinians’ upper hand. “Israel was forced to sit at the table, he wrote, “and every time the enemy negotiates out of weakness, the resistance has won.”

Others, however, see Hamas’s actions as reckless and catastrophic.

“Gaza has been destroyed; over 70,000 people killed, hundreds of thousands injured or disabled, and a million displaced,” activist M. Yousefinejad posted on X. “Was Hamas’s move on October 7 rational?”

‘Ungrateful’

Some also criticized Hamas for failing to acknowledge Tehran’s support in its post-agreement statement.

“Iran bore the greatest cost for Palestine and Gaza,” financial consultant Mohammad-Hossein lamented on X. “Hamas in its statement thanked Egypt, Turkey, Qatar and even Trump—but not Iran. Why did we involve ourselves with these vile ingrates?”

A different camp drew lessons from Hamas’s shift toward negotiation.

“If Trump’s Gaza peace deal is being called a victory for the Resistance, then our government too should reach a direct deal with the United States and bring such a victory to the Iranian people,” reformist journalist Amir-Hossein Mosalla wrote on X.

Blaming Khamenei

A user going by the name Mohammad-Hossein commented that “the courage required for peace is greater than the bravery needed for war.”

“But fools turn the likes of Yahya Sinwar and Saeed Jalili into heroes, and the likes of Khalil al-Hayya and Mohammad-Javad Zarif into traitors,” he added.

A growing number of users placed responsibility for Gaza’s devastation—and the region’s broader instability—on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

One wrote: “Hamas accepted Trump’s peace plan. What remains is Khamenei’s utter humiliation for his direct and indirect support of the October 7 operation, which led to death, displacement, and suffering for thousands.”

Another, identifying as Saman, went further: “As long as the Islamic Republic exists and Ali Khamenei is alive, there will be no peace—not in Gaza, not in Yemen, not in Syria.”

On Thursday, Ahmad Bigdeli, a member of parliament from Khodabandeh, told Khabar Online that hardliners had tabled motions against Energy Minister Abbas Aliabadi, Roads and Urban Planning Minister Farzaneh Sadegh, Agriculture Minister Gholamreza Nouri and Labor Minister Ahmad Maydari.

Bigdeli called the move “untimely and most probably ineffective and symbolic,” echoing the outcome of the only successful impeachment to date during Pezeshkian's term: that of Economy Minister Abdolnasser Hemmati in March.

The move against Hemmati was widely viewed as pointless, as he was replaced by Ali Madanizadeh, whose economic policies closely mirror his predecessor’s.

‘Destabilizing’

Over the past year, hardliners have made their presence felt in scattered episodes—from the ousting of Vice President Mohammad Javad Zarif to parliamentary scuffles over leadership—but have repeatedly disappointed their grassroots by settling for short-term wins.

Lacking both strategy and leadership, they now appear more intent on limiting Pezeshkian’s room to maneuver than on offering alternatives.

“Hardliners are using impeachment as a tool to pressure the Pezeshkian administration,” moderate journalist and politician Mohammad Sadegh Javadihesar said. “Such moves destabilize the government while the country is at war.”

Moderate political activist Ali Bagheri added a warning: “Impeaching four or five ministers will break the government’s back,” he told the moderate daily Etemad. “When the administration is destabilized, even local officials in small towns cannot fulfill their responsibilities.”

Even some conservatives distanced themselves from the move against the executive.

“Radical MPs are targeting the administration for political gain,” conservative MP Jalal Rashidi Kochi said. “There’s no doubt some ministers are unfit for their roles, but I wish Pezeshkian would take the initiative to replace them.”

‘Costly for people’

The episode underscored how hardliners appear to lack a coherent plan of their own.

The renewed brinkmanship also reflects a deeper struggle within the conservative camp, which has failed to reclaim dominance since the death of hardline president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash last year.

Its cohesion further eroded after the death of ultraconservative cleric Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, founder of the influential Paydari Party.

His would-be successor, former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili, largely avoids the spotlight, leaving the faction without a unifying figure.

“Hardliners thought Raisi’s administration would last forever and keep them in power,” moderate journalist Hamidreza Jalaipour told Khabar Online.

Condemning their rhetoric—including threats to exit the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and shut down the Strait of Hormuz—he said: “They are victims of their own illusions, for which the country pays a high price.”

The latest controversy began when Amir-Hossein Mousavi, a social media activist known online as James Bi-din, described in a prison letter how a televised admission he had spied for Israel was coerced under duress and manipulated by Iran’s state TV.

“Almost every sentence I uttered in the interview was the result of the interrogator’s prompting and coercion,” Mousavi wrote. “Even those statements were later broadcast by the Islamic Republic’s state television with much distortion.”

The program aired earlier this week during prime time on the 8:30 PM special news segment, a slot regularly used for publicizing forced confessions.

Mousavi was arrested on December 18, 2024, at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport while traveling to Kish Island. Nearly a year later, he remains behind bars and was recently told his trial would begin in about a month.

The goal of the highly edited documentary-style program, he alleges, was to make the public believe that Iranian intelligence agents had captured a “Mossad spy” after the twelve-day war and to "shift blame for their failure to identify real spies onto someone who has been languishing in prison for nearly a year without due process.”

Fabricated timeline

Mousavi revealed that the interview was recorded months before the twelve-day war with Israel, but edited to make it appear as if he had provided intelligence to Mossad during the conflict.

The recording, he added, took place after nearly 150 days in solitary confinement, during which he said he endured severe physical and psychological torture, including threats that his wife would be arrested.

In the broadcast, it was alleged that Mousavi had provided “information on sensitive military facilities” to a user named “Avi,” who supposedly forwarded it to Mossad.

Mousavi rejects the accusation, saying he never shared any information, not even general knowledge, and welcomed the publication of any evidence to the contrary.

He said he first became acquainted with Avi after another user, Elaheh, described him as an ordinary Israeli citizen critical of his government.

Mousavi described Elaheh as one of hundreds of ordinary friends he had on Twitter, saying their chats were casual and unrelated to any government, and that a record of the chat introducing Avi exists.

A systemic practice

From politicians to rappers women who defied compulsory hijab rules, foreign nationals, dual citizens, and environmental activists, the Islamic Republic has long used televised confessions as a propaganda tool.

Detainees are often shown “admitting” to crimes after torture sessions, prolonged isolation, and threats against family members. These confessions serve to discredit the victims, suppress dissent and legitimize state repression.

A 2020 report by rights groups Justice for Iran and the International Federation for Human Rights said Iran’s state television broadcast the coerced confessions of at least 355 people over the past decade to suppress dissent and intimidate activists.

Outrage on social media

Activists and users on X widely condemned the broadcast. “Confessions obtained under pressure, threat, or torture have no credibility,” wrote one, urging others not to repost the footage: “Let us not be complicit by sharing these coerced and unlawful confessions.”

Another post read: “A forced confession is not the hearing of truth—it is the witnessing of a broken soul.”

Others echoed the same sentiment: “Ordinary citizens who have no access to classified documents cannot be spies; the spies are among your own high-ranking officials.”

Human-rights advocate Emadeddin Baghi, a former political prisoner who has done extensive research on forced televised confessions, concluded in a post: “Even for someone whose guilt has been proven, broadcasting televised confessions is impermissible. (Even) if a person is guilty, the law itself should suffice.”

“If we can design a dignified deal that protects Iran’s interests and satisfies Trump’s sense of self-importance, that could mark the end of the hostilities—and such a thing is possible,” Zarif told foreign-policy experts and reporters at a Tehran seminar on Wednesday.

The former foreign minister, who negotiated the 2015 nuclear agreement, suggested both Tehran and Washington sought to avoid a full-scale conflict in the June war with Israel, and defused it through back-channel communication.

“In the end, one side called at four in the morning and said, ‘We’re not going to strike,’ and the other replied, ‘We won’t strike either,’” Zarif recalled. “Wars end through dialogue, but it’s better if that dialogue happens when we still have leverage.”

His comments appear to counter hardliners’ calls to abandon diplomacy following US attacks on Iran’s nuclear sites and the Europeans’ snapback of UN sanctions last month.

Israel, not the US, wants Iran 'collapse'

Zarif argued that while Israel and the United States share interests, their strategic goals differ.

“America’s policy is not to bring about Iran’s collapse, but Israel —even during the Pahlavi era—believed that Iran was too big and must be broken apart,” he said.

The veteran diplomat said the continuation of the conflict could have led to Iran's collapse, in rare wording for a prominent former official.

“Continuing would either expand the war or lead to Iran’s collapse,” he said. “Both outcomes would have trapped America further in the region, which contradicts its policy.”

'People more important than missiles'

Zarif is President Masoud Pezeshkian’s closest aide and the moderates’ most prominent voice on foreign policy. Still, he holds no official position after he resigned as vice-president in March and is loathed by Iran's ascendant hardliners.

Yet he, like many others, avoided mentioning the role of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who on the eve of Pezeshkian’s trip to New York ruled out any talks with the Trump administration.

He only alluded to Khamenei’s control when saying he was not authorized to negotiate beyond the nuclear issue during his tenure.

“Trying to solve the nuclear problem purely through the nuclear file is no longer possible. Back then it was, and that opportunity was wasted,” Zarif added, calling for “a broader framework” for other discussions, without elaborating.

Those “other discussions” may refer to Iran’s missile program—an issue Tehran has repeatedly said is off the table in any future talks.

“Missiles are important,” he said, “but people are more important. It’s the people who have kept Iran alive through the centuries.”