Trump says Iran could avoid past and future attacks with a deal

The government has bristled over Iran's defiant stance on a bid to disarm Hezbollah, badly mauled in a war with Israel in 2024, by year's end.

Youssef Raji declined Abbas Araghchi's invitation to visit Iran in a written reply on Wednesday. Without dwelling on the specifics, Raji said the circumstances were not right but that talks could occur in a "neutral third country."

Asserting the state's right to have a monopoly over arms on its territory, Raji cited what he called Lebanon's insistence on its sovereignty and independence.

Araghchi responded a day later, also on X, in remarks that clearly reflected Tehran’s irritation. Raji’s decision “not to welcome Iran's reciprocation of his warm hospitality,” he wrote, “is bemusing.”

He added that "foreign ministers of nations with brotherly and full diplomatic relations need no ‘neutral’ venue to meet," adding he would gladly accept his Lebanese counterpart’s invitation to go to Beirut.

Official Iran–Lebanon relations have been tense over Hezbollah and disarmament.

Contradictory Iranian statements have intensified the strain: Araghchi emphasized non-interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs in August, but four days later Ali Akbar Velayati, senior adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, declared Hezbollah “more essential than water and bread” for the Lebanese and reiterated Tehran’s support.

Core issue

Disarmament of Hezbollah lies at the center of current Tehran-Beirut relations. Last week, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced that the army must dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River by 2026.

The plan, approved by the Lebanese government, calls for disarming all militias. Hezbollah has refused. For Beirut, disarmament is seen as a way to ease Israeli pressure and rebuild the economy without the permanent shadow of war.

Tensions were evident during Supreme National Security Council Chief Ali Larijani’s visit to Lebanon last August, shortly after the ceasefire with Israel.

A Lebanese media report which was promptly withdrawn but never denied by Beirut said that former army chief turned President Joseph Aoun sharply criticized Larijani’s comments about supporting Lebanese Shia, prompting Larijani to leave angrily.

A second meeting request by Larijani was denied, the report added, and the Lebanese foreign minister refused to meet him, stating he would not have agreed even if time allowed.

'Deep humiliation'

Araghchi invited Lebanon’s Foreign Minister Youssef Raji to Tehran immediately after Israel and Lebanon appointed envoys for talks earlier this month.

Beirut delayed its response until after the Israeli and Lebanese representatives met on Lebanese soil.

Tehran is concerned these meetings could pave the way for normalization with Israel—or even Lebanese accession to the Abraham Accords.

Sara Kermanian, an international relations expert, described the decision as “deeply humiliating for Iran.”

She said Lebanon sees its relationship with Iran as a double-edged sword. The government wants to avoid negotiations that could jeopardize Western financial aid from the United States and the International Monetary Fund in return for agreeing to Hezbollah’s disarmament, while at the same time, it needs Iran’s consent to prevent the standoff from bubbling into civil war.

“Hence their proposal for talks in a neutral country.”

Political analyst Jaber Rajabi said the rejection “may reflect the fact that Lebanon is hearing the footsteps of the Islamic Republic’s collapse—or at least the end of its era of regional influence,” he added.

Strategic calculus in Tehran

Nearly all major media outlets, including the state media, have refrained from analysis, pointing to the possibility that the Supreme National Security Council instructed outlets to downplay the incident.

Most outlets appeared to misrepresent the news, using headlines such as “Lebanese Foreign Minister Issues Official Apology to Araghchi” or emphasized Raji’s call for “a new phase of relations with Iran.”

Some outlets such as the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) and the state-run Shafagh News Agency, however, republished a translation of an article by veteran Palestinian journalist Abdel Bari Atwan sharply criticizing Raji.

“Such a response could only come from the foreign minister of a country that is at war with another. Is Lebanon really at war with Iran that they must meet in a neutral country?” Atwan wrote.

The reformist daily Shargh was the only Iranian outlet to publish an analytical report, titled “Beirut’s Cautious Letter to Tehran without directly commenting on Raji's response to the Iranian foreign minister.

Shargh highlighted that Raji’s insistence that “the monopoly of arms must remain with the state and national army” signals to regional and Western actors that Lebanon’s new government is pursuing stronger state sovereignty and measured distance from non-state armed groups.

Raji’s approach, Shargh wrote, is an attempt to preserve Lebanon’s room for maneuver to maintain more distant ties with Iran while avoiding overt tension.

Testifying before the House Homeland Security Committee, the bureau’s operations director, Michael Glasheen, said the FBI has made more than 70 arrests tied to hostile foreign intelligence activity since January.

“Iran continues to plot attacks against former government officials in retaliation for the January 2020 death of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani,” he said.

“They also have continued to provide support to their proxies and terrorist organizations throughout the world, such as Lebanese Hizballah.”

Soleimani was killed in a US drone strike near Baghdad airport in January 2020.

The strike, ordered by President Donald Trump, became a defining rupture in the archfoes’ relations and has since been invoked by Iranian officials as justification for long-term retaliation.

Glasheen said the FBI has already disrupted several alleged plots, noting that in October 2024 federal prosecutors charged “an asset of the IRGC” who was allegedly tasked with directing a network of criminal associates to target US officials, including Trump.

The June War factor

Tehran's threat, Glasheen said, extends beyond targeted killings to “periodic surveillance of Jewish and Israeli facilities and individuals inside the United States.

“It is possible the Israel-Hamas conflict and ensuing strikes between Iran and Israel will provoke increased Iranian surveillance of US-based Jewish and Israeli persons,” he told lawmakers.

Israel struck targets inside Iran in June, triggering retaliatory missile and drone attacks that continued for 12 days before a US-brokered ceasefire halted the exchange.

The confrontation marked the most direct military clash between the two rivals in decades and elevated concerns in Washington over Iranian activity worldwide.

Glasheen also described Iran as one of the United States’ most capable cyber adversaries, operating in “a blurred space where criminal groups and state-directed actors often converge.”

He said the FBI’s Iran Threats Mission Center (ITMC) has intensified coordination across cyber, counterintelligence and counterterrorism units “to address the threat to US interests from Iran and its proxies,” but did not outline new, specific threats.

“Foreign ministers of nations with brotherly and full diplomatic relations need no ‘neutral’ venue to meet,” Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi posted on X, referring to his counterpart Youssef Raji proposal to meet in a third country.

“His decision not to welcome Iran's reciprocation of his warm hospitality is bemusing,” Araghchi added.

Raji announced on Wednesday that he had declined an invitation to travel to Tehran as Beirut moves forward with its plan to disarm the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement.

Israel’s punishing strikes on Hezbollah in the final weeks of the year-long war that ended in November left the group weakened but still ensconced in traditional support bases in the country's south and east.

Lebanon’s government has since tasked the national army with confiscating Hezbollah’s arsenal by 2026—a move Iran opposes, arguing that continued Israeli attacks justify what it calls the group’s resistance.

“Subjected to Israeli occupation and blatant ‘ceasefire’ violations,” Araghchi wrote, “I fully understand why my esteemed Lebanese counterpart is not prepared to visit Tehran. Hence I will gladly accept his invitation to come to Beirut.”

Hezbollah debate

Iran invited Raji to Tehran earlier this month to discuss bilateral ties, according to Iran’s foreign ministry, amid mounting debate in Lebanon over the future of Hezbollah—which Iran helped found in 1982—and rising calls for the movement to surrender its weapons.

On Wednesday, Lebanon’s foreign ministry said on X that Raji turning down the visit “does not mean rejecting discussion,” but that “the favorable conditions are not available.”

He renewed an invitation for Araghchi to meet in “a neutral third country” and said Lebanon was ready for “a new phase” in relations based on sovereignty, non-interference, and exclusive state control over arms and national security decisions.

“Building any strong state cannot happen unless the state alone, through its national army, holds the exclusive right to carry arms and the sole authority over decisions of war and peace,” he said, adding that Araghchi remained welcome to visit Beirut.

Its operating model is neither innovative nor cohesive, but a set of pragmatic mechanisms built on three pillars: sanctions-evasion finance, covert oil lifelines and proxy leverage.

Beneath these pillars sits a twin base: China, the economic enabler which buys its oil, and Russia, a fellow bearer of stiff sanctions whose alignment offers diplomatic cover but also commercial competition.

With the aid of these two powers, the Islamic Republic survives not through mastery but through continual manoeuvre.

Understanding this architecture matters because it now shapes a broader convergence in global security. As the United States expands its military buildup in the Caribbean, Iran faces the potential loss of a Western Hemisphere partner long utilised by the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force.

Should Washington succeed in pulling Caracas away from Tehran, one more long-alleged sanctions evasion route may be blocked.

Sanctions evasion

Tehran continues to move funds with notable agility despite the so-called snapback of UN sanctions triggered by Western Europe in October and successive US-led actions to interdict missile and drone procurement networks.

Dubai, Istanbul, Muscat and Baghdad have been named as transit points in US Treasury press releases. Exchange houses and front companies facilitate conversions that allow restricted revenues to re-enter circulation.

Some networks targeted by Western authorities are alleged to have funnelled substantial sums to Hezbollah through opaque trade and currency channels.

These mechanisms define the Islamic Republic’s financial landscape.

Even so, these flows are tributaries. The main current runs east.

Chinese lifeline

The economic centre of the Islamic Republic increasingly lies in Shandong, Shanghai and the harbors of southern China.

Analysts estimate that roughly 80–90 percent of Iranian crude exports ultimately land in China, often routed through ship-to-ship transfers, re-flagged vessels and blends labelled as Malaysian, Omani or others.

These operations appear in tanker-tracking data and in recent investigations highlighting the Revolutionary Guards tightening oversight of a global shadow fleet.

For Beijing, the rationale is straightforward: discounted supplies, insulation from Western price caps and evidence that sanctions enforcement is no longer uniform. For Tehran, the lifeline underscores deepening dependence on a far more powerful state.

Russia’s role differs. Also under sanctions, Moscow competes directly with Tehran for China’s crude demand while simultaneously normalising sanctions-defiance as a geopolitical posture.

Two sanctioned exporters move in parallel: rivals commercially, yet aligned in resisting Western leverage.

Armed allis

Armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen remain central to Tehran’s deterrence and diplomacy. They function, in effect, as strategic currency.

Western intelligence assessments circulated this year suggest Tehran transferred around one billion dollars to Hezbollah—an unusually high figure under any sanctions regime.

While details of the financial conduits remain incomplete, defence officials say Hezbollah is rearming despite the 2024 ceasefire, while Lebanon’s armed forces lack the capacity to enforce disarmament provisions. This comes as Israel maintains outposts in the country and launches deadly air strikes it says target militants.

In this environment, Iranian support is not merely financial but structural.

The Houthis continue to grow more assertive. Their maritime disruptions and drone activity reflect a movement whose operational confidence increasingly exceeds Tehran’s ability to shape or restrain it.

Europe’s reassessment

Europe, long divided over Iran, has entered a period of strategic recalibration. Tehran’s supply of Shahed-series drones to Russia has shifted its significance from a regional issue to a European security concern.

Western officials now warn that such transfers pose direct risks to continental defence.

Germany’s deployment of the Arrow-3 air-defence system—developed jointly with Israel—reflects the jitters. Senior officials from Ukraine and Israel met last week to coordinate responses to Iran’s expanding missile and drone proliferation.

European scrutiny has also grown over Iranian cultural, religious and financial centres suspected of facilitating sanctions evasion or money-laundering.

What was once treated as a bilateral nuisance is now cast as a collective security challenge.

A strained machinery

Thus stands the Islamic Republic in 2025: its revenues routed through offshore channels, its diplomacy reinforced by Russia, its economy dependent on China, its proxies potent but increasingly difficult to manage, and its domestic legitimacy fragile.

It survives on a framework effective in the short term but vulnerable in the long run.

Historical parallels caution that states relying on improvised economic lifelines and brittle alliances can appear stable until stresses accumulate beyond what the system can absorb.

These comparisons do not determine Iran’s trajectory, but they underline that a state held together by constrained revenues and external dependence is off balance and inherently unstable.

Haalvsh, a rights group that documents abuses and unrest in Sistan-Baluchestan, said the Jebhe-ye Mobaarezin-e Mardomi (People’s Fighters Front) claimed responsibility in a statement posted overnight. The group said it targeted a convoy of the IRGC’s Imam Hossein battalion, part of the Salman Brigade, in the Lar district on Wednesday.

A spokesman for the group said the attack was meant as retaliation for what it described as the role of security forces in suppressing residents in Sistan-Baluchestan. He said a vehicle carrying the unit’s commander was struck and that four members were killed and several others wounded.

State-linked media initially reported three dead and three wounded but later said the death toll had risen to four. Haalvsh cited local sources as saying the gunfire occurred as several IRGC vehicles were heading toward their base in the Lar area.

Iran’s southeast, bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan, has long experienced armed attacks on security forces and government sites. The region has seen repeated incidents this year, including a major assault on a courthouse in Zahedan earlier in which nine people were killed. A separate Baluch Sunni militant group, Jaish al-Adl, claimed responsibility for that attack.

Authorities said pursuit operations were underway following Wednesday’s shooting, but have released few details so far.