Gunboat diplomacy: US seeks coercion without war on Iran

Israeli military intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder met senior officials at the Pentagon, the CIA and the White House on Tuesday and Wednesday, according to US officials and other sources familiar with the discussions, as Israel shared intelligence it says could inform potential targets inside Iran, Axios reported on Thursday.

Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman was expected in Washington on Thursday and Friday for meetings at the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House, including with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and US special envoy Steve Witkoff, sources said.

Saudi officials have been urging de-escalation and have passed messages between Washington and Tehran in recent days, according to the same accounts.

The visits came as Reuters reported on Thursday that President Donald Trump is considering military options against Iran that range from targeted strikes on commanders and security forces blamed by Washington for a violent crackdown on protests, to broader attacks against Iran’s missile and nuclear infrastructure.

Trump has not made a final decision, Reuters reported, citing multiple sources, including US officials familiar with the deliberations.

Trump on Wednesday again warned Iran about possible strikes while also urging Tehran to “come to the table” on a nuclear deal, saying any future attack would be “far worse” than a June bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear sites.

He described US naval forces in the region as an “armada,” language he has used repeatedly in recent days.

Washington’s military posture has been shifting at the same time.

The arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier and supporting warships in the region this week broadened Trump’s options.

Open-source tracking and public statements over the past two weeks have pointed to a wider buildup of air, sea and air-defense assets, including deployments designed to support sustained air operations and defend US forces and regional partners against retaliation.

The question of whether a second major naval force could follow has added to the sense of escalation.

A separate carrier strike group, the USS George H.W. Bush, departed Norfolk on January 13, though its destination has not been publicly confirmed.

Analysts tracking force movements have said the Bush’s movements could determine whether the United States intends to maintain one carrier in the region as a deterrent, or assemble a larger package capable of prolonged operations.

Behind the high-level diplomacy and military deployments is a rapidly deteriorating crisis inside Iran that has reshaped Washington’s calculations over the past month.

Protests erupted on December 28 after strikes and demonstrations began in Tehran’s bazaars and spread nationwide, driven initially by economic pressures and rapidly escalating into wider political demands.

Iran’s authorities responded with mass killings and arrests as well as communications restrictions, while the Trump administration warned Tehran against lethal repression.

Trump publicly threatened military action if Iran carried out large-scale executions of protesters, and in mid-January said – without providing evidence – that killings had paused.

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  36,500 deaths in context: How Iran’s toll compares with wars and crackdowns

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  Over 36,500 killed in Iran's deadliest massacre, documents reveal

The situation then worsened sharply. More than 36,500 Iranians were killed by security forces during the January 8-9 crackdown on nationwide protests, making it the deadliest two-day protest massacre in history, according to documents reviewed by Iran International

Iranian authorities have not released a comprehensive breakdown of protest-related deaths. They have, however, acknowledged several thousand fatalities.

In Tehran, Iranian officials have warned the United States and regional states against military action. Ali Shamkhani, a senior adviser to Iran’s top leadership, said on X that any US military action would be treated as an act of war and would prompt immediate retaliation, including against Israel and what he called those supporting an attack. Iranian officials have also said US bases in the region could be targeted in response.

At the same time, Iranian officials have signaled that indirect diplomacy remains possible even as they reject Washington’s terms.

Trump has not publicly laid out his terms. Past U.S. negotiating demands have included a ban on Iran enriching uranium, limits on long-range ballistic missiles and curbs on Tehran’s network of allied armed groups in the region. Iran has rejected preconditions and says it will negotiate only on equal footing.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that Iran was preparing for a potential military confrontation while also using diplomatic channels, but said Washington was not showing openness to diplomacy.

Regional reactions

Regional governments are split between fear of Iranian retaliation and concern about Iran’s internal trajectory.

Persian Gulf states that host US forces have pressed Washington against strikes, wary that they would be the first targets in any escalation, according to Reuters.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman told Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian that Riyadh would not allow its airspace to be used for an attack, according to state news agency SPA. Qatar, Oman and Egypt have also lobbied for restraint, Reuters reported.

Israeli officials, while sharing intelligence and planning closely with Washington, have also cautioned that air power alone is unlikely to produce political change in Iran, Reuters reported, and that any transition would depend on internal fractures and organized domestic forces.

“If you're going to topple the regime, you have to put boots on the ground,” a senior Israeli official told Reuters, adding that even if the United States killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran would "have a new leader that will replace him."

For now, US officials say the military buildup is nearing completion and Trump has not closed the door to diplomacy.

But the convergence of high-level visits, an expanded US force posture and the White House’s increasingly explicit linkage between military options and Iran’s internal crackdown has turned a once-remote contingency into an imminent choice for Washington.

Financial woes helped spark anti-government protests late last which which were crushed with deadly force, in a bloody crackdown in which security forces killed thousands.

The political uncertainty and a threat of attack by the United States has only deepened

Several economic publications, including Donya‑ye Eghtesad, the state‑run ISNA, and Tejarat News, published guidance on Tuesday advising citizens on how to protect their assets from devaluation, how to plan purchases to minimize the impact of price hikes and when to buy essential goods amid market volatility.

Reports indicate that many people are stockpiling non‑perishable items, viewing goods as safer than cash amid relentless inflation.

Those with savings, they noted, have increasingly turn to gold in any form, seeing it as a hedge against currency devaluation and a liquid asset that can be converted into cash at any time.

At the same time, households are keeping only small amounts of cash on hand, enough to cover basic needs in the event of internet outages that could disrupt ATMs and banking services.

The outlets warned that persistent inflation was fuelling panic buying of basic necessities that was distorting normal spending habits.

Economic malaise has festered as the Iranian rial currency again hit a new low this week and the internal crackdown suggests no near resolution to deep US and international sanctions along with persistent corruption and mismanagement.

US President Donald Trump on Tuesday suggested Iran would face a harsh attack if it did not accede to demands by Washington over its nuclear program and military posture.Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi responded that Tehran was ready with “fingers on the trigger.”

The Shargh newspaper wrote that foreign policy news and not economic it is not economic fundamentals were driving market behavior and fears assets would devalue further.

The Economic dailies predicted that the impact on food and essential goods prices would be sharp and unavoidable.

As Donya‑ye Eghtesad observed, Iran’s economy is effectively in a state of suspended animation, with the key to stability lying in the hands of diplomats.

This prolonged uncertainty, the paper argued, is creating chronic anxiety among the public: a volatile mix of fear, despair, and anger that increasingly blames authorities deemed responsible for managing the crisis.

Iran’s US- based former ambassador to Germany Hossein Mousavian said that the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian should invite Trump to Tehran as a step toward de-escalating tensions which could crescendo into an attack that threatens the Islamic Republic’s rule.

“Trump genuinely wants direct talks with Iran,” he told outlet Ensaf News in an interview.

“Pick up the phone and speak to him. Do not waste time as the situation is critically dangerous … I repeat: if you do not act immediately, Iran may face military confrontation with the United States, Israel, and NATO.”

In a more sober assessment, Iranian political commentator Reza Nasri warned “unlike his predecessors, Trump can wage a swift and clean war against Iran without imposing additional costs on US taxpayers or repeating past mistakes.”

Nasri warned against complacency about some Trump’s more conciliatory messaging, saying “any premature optimism about de-escalation can lead to dangerous miscalculations by lowering the state of alert and imposing heavy costs on Iran’s security.”

The US threat comes after Trump vowed to come to the defense of protestors before authorities unleashed one of the deadliest crackdowns on unrest in modern history, killing thousands.

Nasri, cleaving to the theocracy’s official discourse, described the demonstrations as “one of the most difficult and complex threats in Iran’s recent history and a project aimed at disintegrating the country and collapsing its political system.”

“This project has failed for now,” he added. “But a combination of domestic crisis, foreign threats and economic and psychological warfare still looms.”

Meanwhile, hardline Tehran commentator and social media personality Ali-Akbar Raefipour raised the alarm to an even louder pitch, saying without providing evidence that foreign preparations for a complex armed attack were already underway.

“Mutiny and targeted assassination cells may be activated if Iran is attacked. Their goals include killing prominent individuals and seizing sensitive centers,” he wrote on X.

“In recent days, we have seen equipment flowing into Iran for these groups.”

Iran, in this view, is a buffer—a state whose continued cohesion has helped secure Turkey’s eastern borders for decades, whatever its internal circumstances.

The prospect of that buffer weakening alarms Ankara far more than the nature of the demands driving Iran’s unrest.

That approach was underscored on Thursday, when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian in a phone call that Turkey opposed any foreign intervention in Iran and valued peace and stability in the country.

The message echoed a broader pattern in Ankara’s response: caution, restraint, and a clear preference for preserving the status quo over endorsing political change.

Since the protests began, Turkish officials have framed developments in Iran as the erosion of central authority driven by outside forces.

Senior figures, including Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, have described the unrest as a “scripted scenario” and warned against what they portray as foreign efforts to push the region toward chaos.

At the core of this stance lies a long-standing fear that instability in Iran could open space for militant groups along Turkey’s eastern and southern frontiers, even as a peace process with Kurdish militants has made historic progress after decades of combat.

The Syrian precedent

This security-first reading of events reflects a fear expressed from corners of Turkey’s media and academic establishment that if the Islamic Republic were to collapse, Turkey could be next.

As a result, Iran’s protests are often explained away through the language of conspiracy—foreign plots rather than expressions of domestic discontent—making meaningful democratic solidarity between the two societies more difficult at a moment of profound crisis.

Years of economic strain at home and unresolved entanglements in Syria have further heightened Ankara’s sensitivity to instability beyond its borders.

Few Turkish policymakers are eager to risk a scenario that could trigger new refugee flows after the epic out-migration of Syrians fleeing that country's civil war strained Turkey's domestic cohesion and stoked bitter arguments with Europe.

Support for armed insurgents in that war did not render the hosting of millions of Syrian people on Turkish soil any easier, and Turkey has shown no such fondness for any anti-state elements in Iran.

Ankara’s caution has also been shaped by its regional calculations since the war in Gaza. Turkish officials are acutely wary of being seen as aligned with Israel, particularly as Israeli leaders have spoken openly in favor of regime change in Iran.

In Ankara’s reading, Western rhetoric about democracy masks a broader realignment that would ultimately strengthen Israel’s regional position at Turkey’s expense. Weakening Iran, they fear, could expand Israeli influence in ways that leave Turkey strategically exposed.

Some Turkish analysts have warned in recent days that the government should be less concerned about Iran losing a conventional conflict than about what might follow. A weakened Iranian state, they argue, could rely on proxy forces and non-state actors to drag the region into a prolonged, asymmetric struggle.

Fear of what may come next

From this perspective, preventing war in Iran is a strategic necessity. A collapse of authority inside Iran could empower Kurdish groups such as the PKK or its Iranian affiliate, PJAK, and test Turkey’s security more severely than the Syrian civil war ever did.

The fragmentation of Syria remains a vivid reference point: a power vacuum, the emergence of armed enclaves, and a long-term security burden that Ankara is still struggling to manage.

These fears help explain why the refrain “if Iran falls, Turkey is next” has gained traction in Turkish media.

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, has largely aligned with the government’s cautious approach. Even media outlets critical of Erdoğan have, at times, reinforced narratives that external actors are driving the violence in Iran.

The relative absence of support from Turkey’s secular movements for protesters in Iran also reflects the limited reach of Iranian opposition groups in neighboring countries.

Turkish officials often say they would prefer an Iran that is more developed and better integrated into the international system. But the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s political trajectory—and the perceived costs of a turbulent transition—continue to outweigh that aspiration.

For now, Ankara’s overriding objective remains stability: not because it approves of Iran’s system, but because it fears what might come after it.

Over the weekend, as the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group moved closer to the Persian Gulf, US Central Command Commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Israel—a visit widely interpreted as evidence of intensified coordination ahead of a potential move against Iran.

Trump has framed the possibility of intervention in explicitly humanitarian terms, warning Tehran against the killing of protesters and asserting that US pressure has already halted hundreds of planned executions.

Yet despite naval deployments, repeated warnings, and unmistakable signaling, no kinetic action has followed.

This restraint has endured even as credible estimates from human rights organisations and the United Nations place civilian deaths from the crackdown at over 20,000. Iran International’s editorial statement of January 25 cites a figure of 36,000 killed, making this the bloodiest episode in the Islamic Republic’s history.

Jurists and international lawyers have argued that the scale and systematic nature of the violence may fall within the jurisdictional scope of the International Criminal Court under the Rome Statute.

Washington’s response has followed a different rhythm: maximalist language paired with deliberate restraint. Carrier deployments have provided leverage; sanctions and tariffs have expanded; diplomatic and military signaling has intensified. But strikes—despite the scale of civilian killing—have not materialized.

Restraint as policy

What, then, is actually holding President Trump back?

Humanitarian concern looms large in Trump’s public messaging. But this framing sits in visible tension with the administration’s broader strategic doctrine.

The National Security Strategy of November 2025 reiterates an America First approach, prioritizing US interests while explicitly seeking to avoid committing American forces to conflicts that risk metastasizing into “endless wars.”

The 2026 National Defense Strategy adopts a markedly harsher register toward Iran. It accuses Tehran of having “American blood on its hands,” framing it not only as an abusive authoritarian regime but as an enduring strategic adversary.

And yet, in a notable departure from Trump’s instinctive aversion to foreign entanglement, he has drawn explicit red lines around the execution of protesters and the use of lethal force against demonstrators. Any prospective action, he has suggested, would be framed not as conquest or regime change, but as rescue.

The evidence, however, suggests that humanitarian imperatives function more as legitimizing rhetoric than as decisive drivers of policy. Had halting mass killing been the primary determinant, intervention might plausibly have followed the peak of repression in early January.

Instead, Trump has oscillated between “locked and loaded” warnings and expressions of hope that force will not be required.

Strategic calculations

The deeper constraints lie elsewhere—in hard strategic and political realities that humanitarian language alone cannot dissolve.

First, escalation risk dominates the calculus.

Tehran has made clear that any US strike would trigger retaliation across multiple theatres: Israel, American bases in the region, and potentially global energy routes. The prospect of asymmetric escalation—through ballistic missiles, proxy warfare, cyber operations, or disruption of the Strait of Hormuz—carries profound economic and security consequences.

Regional partners, including Israel, are widely reported to have urged caution, acutely aware that even a limited strike could spiral into a broader conflagration.

In this context, the “armada” functions less as a prelude to war than as a tool of coercive signaling: capability without commitment. Trump’s repeated insistence that he “would rather not see anything happen” reflects not humanitarian restraint, but an aversion to cascading costs that could rapidly exceed any political or strategic gain.

Second, domestic political calculations weigh heavily.

American fatigue with Middle Eastern military entanglements remains deep-seated. Polling consistently shows majority opposition to new wars, even when framed around humanitarian catastrophe.

Trump’s political identity remains rooted in rejecting the interventionist excesses of the post–Cold War era. Forceful rhetoric projects resolve, carrier deployments demonstrate action, sanctions impose pain—all without exposing U.S. forces to open-ended conflict.

Third, strategic leverage without war remains attractive.

The current posture weakens Iran indirectly. Pressure on the nuclear program intensifies. Economic isolation deepens through secondary sanctions and tariffs on third-party trade. Internal regime fissures may widen as elites confront the costs of isolation without the rallying effect of a foreign attack.

Humanitarian language helps justify this approach publicly, but the underlying strategy prioritizes containment, deterrence, and attrition—not Responsibility-to-Protect-style intervention.

All tabs open

Taken together, Trump’s posture reflects a president operating within a narrow corridor between moral outrage, strategic constraint, and political risk. Restraint, however, should not be mistaken for permanence.

The current alignment keeps open a range of options that could be activated rapidly should circumstances shift.

A limited, precision strike aimed at degrading Tehran’s capacity for internal repression would suggest a convergence between humanitarian rhetoric and coercive deterrence. A broader campaign would signal that strategic imperatives had finally eclipsed restraint.

For Iranians facing repression, this uncertainty itself exerts pressure—on the regime no less than on Washington.

For policymakers, the lesson is neither complacency nor inevitability, but clarity: intervention, if it comes, will arrive not as a moral reflex, but at the moment when humanitarian catastrophe, strategic threat, and political risk briefly align.