Lufthansa Extends Flight Cancellations To Tehran Amid Security Concerns

It took the Islamic Republic of Iran until the early hours of April 13 to respond to Israel’s April 1 air strike that eliminated 7 of its top brass in Damascus. Although the Iranian regime’s supposed “retaliatory” response that thrust over 300 drones and missiles from its soil directly unto Israel was in effect suspenseful affair with underwhelming physical impact, it has been foreboding of immense foreseen and unforeseen consequences. The rapid succession of EU-NATO leadership condemnations in the wake of the Iranian retaliation was the acknowledgement the potential destruction the Iranian strike could have wrought; had it not been successfully offset by a de facto entente of British, American, French, Israeli, Jordanian, and Saudi Arabian air defenses and air forces.

It was upon the comprehension of this reality that came the EU’s April 17, 2024 new sanctions against the drone manufacturing sector of the Iranian regime’s military-industrial complex. Promptly thereafter, Canada, UK, and US followed upon the EU sanctions with coordinated and correspondingly targeted identical suite of sanctions.

However, the question is, first, how these new sanctions figure in the greater scheme of sanctions that have already been set in place by EU, US, and their G7 allies against Iran. And second, whether there exist measures that can tangibly enforce them.

The Many Different Types of Sanction Regimes

Over the past thirty years, major world powers, particularly US and EU, have increasingly resorted to sanctions as a major “non-military” leverage against “adversaries” or states that are held in violation of international conventions and treaties. The US sanctions are the broadest and oldest anti-Iran sanctions ever devised dating back to the 1979 US embassy hostage crisis. After the US, EU countries have the second largest sanction regime. The EU’s sanction regimes against Iran have never been as consistent as the US ones due the many ups and down in EU-Iran relations. The third regime of sanctions are those of UK and Canada sanctions, along with those of Australia, Japan, and South Korea.

EU-US Standoff and Collaboration over Iran Sanctions

The US boasts the broadest sanction regime in the world that encompasses over 26 countries and ten thematic sanction regimes, from counter narcotic and nuclear non-proliferation to cyber crimes and Global Magnitsky sanctions. Hence, as the EU has often sought to cajole a regime like that of Iran’s, it should come as no surprise that the EU-US have often clashed as to the path forward and disagreed over sanctions over many other aspects of their diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran.

A bone of contention over sanctions between EU and US arose in 2018 when President Trump abruptly left JCPOA, aka, Iran Nuclear Deal, and brought forth the “Maximum Pressure” sanctions upon Iran by 2019. To EU’s chagrin, the entirety of US sanction regime included secondary sanctions that forced many EU enterprises to “wind down” their ties with Iran. EU’s historically “complicated” relations with Iran made it to part ways with the US on this occasion, which caused much tension in the EU-US relations during the Trump presidency. In fact, the EU chief mandarins sought to introduce swift measures to shield EU enterprises from the wrath of US secondary sanctions.

Nonetheless, the Iranian regime’s mass repression of popular protests in 2018 and 2019 culminated to the statewide crackdown of 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, and forced the EU to adopt up to ten packages of human rights-based sanctions against various Iranian regime individuals and entities between 2018 and 2023. It was at this juncture that the EU’s resistance in joining the US comprehensive sanctions against Iran began to erode.

As the Tehran regime became a major supplier of drones and missiles to Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war, the EU became host to millions of Ukrainian refugees. Alarmed by Tehran’s increasingly supporting role for Russia’s war effort, the EU introduced the first set of sanctions against the Iranian missile and drone manufacturing in 2023.

It should be highlighted that although the Biden administration maintained the Trump-era sanctions on Iran’s oil exports as it was negotiating a revival of the JCPOA, enforcement became a secondary concern since January 2021. This allowed Iran to more than double its oil exports to China by 2023 and weaken the sanctions regime.

With the escalation of the conflict in the Middle East post-October-7, the Iranian government continued to supply both its proxies in the region and Russia further afield with projectiles of various kinds becoming a brazen global arms supplier undeterred by any measure of sanctions. The EU looked on warily and Josep Borrell, EU foreign policy chief, struggled to avoid slapping sanctions upon it but to no avail. The last episode that consolidated EU-US collaboration on coordinated sanctions against the Iranian drone and ballistic manufacturing was the Iran-Israel conflict of 7-13 April 2024.

Sanctions: Enforcement and Effectiveness

Whether or not the US and EU would exert the will to enforce the sanctions remains the sticking question. In the last package of sanctions, including the Mahsa Act, passed by the Congress and signed by President Biden, there indeed exist many a set of measures to stop the Iranian petroleum exports, which constitute a major source of revenue for the Tehran and its military-industrial complex.

However, many experts have cast doubt unto whether Biden administration would be willing enforce them in this election year. Evidently, administration fears such a rigid enforcement may cause the price of oil to skyrocket globally and may thus refrain from the enforcement of such sanctions. Whereas Biden administration is loath to enforce the oil sanctions on Iran, the US Treasury is seeking new authorizations to counter the Iranian regime’s abuse of bitcoin and the dark web to circumvent sanctions.

Such contradictions have been Biden’s foreign have not gone unnoticed and the mullahs in Tehran have certainly tried to take advantage of it. Over the past several years, both Iran and Russia have shown much dexterity in circumventing sanctions, from dark web and bitcoin to shadow commercial fleets and overland routes. Prescient studies reveal that Iran’s shadow fleet of tankers ship oil to Malaysia which gets rebranded as Malaysian oil and then exported in China. Absence of appropriate sanction enforcement measures have similarly enabled Iran to smuggle arms to the Hezbollah of Lebanon using EU ports.

Enforcing so many sanctions targeting so many countries is no small feat. It requires much investment in digital and physical infrastructure as well as human resources. Neither the US nor the EU appear to be fully equipped with the requisite tools and human resources to enforce their ever-expanding sanction regimes; especially, vis-à-vis Iran. Since February 2024, the Biden administration is yet to appoint a permanent official to oversee the enforcement of the ballooning sanctions against Iran at the US Treasury. As to the EU, the problem of sanction enforcement has been even more complicated. Still, not until after several consultation rounds between the EU Council and the EU Parliament did the latter finally manage to pass rules that crack down on member state’s failure to enforce EU sanctions on March 12 of this year, whilst the broadest set of EU wide sanction against Russia dates back to February 2022!

Today, sanctions have become a permanent fixture in the global foreign policy and international trade establishment. A growing literature is focusing on sanctions and their effectiveness. Amongst the many works that have been published on the topic, there exist ostensibly academic volumes such as How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare(Bajoghli, Nasr, et al, Stanford University Press, 2024). Such “studies” illustriously correspond in authorship and stance to those of “Iran Influence Network”, and it is thus no wonder that authors of such works are increasingly forced to tread a fine line between lobbying and consultancy. Other stakeholders concerned with the growing sanction regimes are globally active enterprises who have built comprehensive databases that catalogue “risky individuals and entities” to help them in compliance with the global sanction regimes. Such works may be a good starting point to verify governments’ commitment to sanction enforcement.

In the end, if the EU and US fail to substantially implement the many sanction regimes that they have created over the past several years, they may lose much in prestige in credibility in the eyes of the world community where Russia and China have been jockeying to replace them as global powers. The last curtain in this segment is yet to draw.

“We’re focused on addressing the greatest threat to regional stability and regional security: Iran. …[Iran’s attack on Israel] highlights the acute and growing threat from Iran, but also the imperative that we work together on integrated defense,” Blinken said at Monday’s meeting with Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States.

Blinken is on his inaugural leg of what some are calling a Middle East "crisis tour," making a stop in Riyadh to meet with Arab leaders to try and push for an Israel-Hamas ceasefire and humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.

The visit marks Blinken’s first time in the region since tensions between Tehran and Jerusalem began to ramp up.

The Secretary of State said that an upcoming meeting would enhance defense collaboration between the US and Persian Gulf states in response to Iran’s attack on Israel and the wider threat posed by Tehran.

“​​That’s the focus of the meeting that’s coming up in a few weeks with the US-GCC Working Group on Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Maritime Security,” Blinken said.

This month, Iran launched over 300 projectiles, including over 100 ballistic missiles, in its first direct attack at Israel.

The IDF has reported that it has, along with its allies, stopped 99% of the projectiles Iran fired on the country.

The attack followed the killing of seven senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) personnel in a strike on what was claimed to be Tehran’s consulate building in Damascus – an action widely attributed to Israel.

Israel’s retaliation, several strikes targeting the city of Isfahan, were largely downplayed by Tehran.

According to reporting from The Economist, new satellite imagery indicates that Iran responded by replacing a destroyed air-defense radar with a new one, effectively saving face while de-escalating tensions with Israel.

The strike took place near Mokha, Yemen, escalating tensions along a crucial maritime corridor that is pivotal for global shipping.

Iran-backed Houthi militants have escalated their attacks on shipping lanes in allegiance with Islamist group Hamas, with a particular focus on vessels linked to Israel or its principal allies, the US and Britain. The heightened risk has led several shipping companies to avoid the waters.

Security firm Ambrey indicated that the Malta-flagged container ship was targeted by three missiles while en route from Djibouti to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

“The vessel was targeted due to its listed operator’s ongoing trade with Israel,” Ambrey said.

In a statement, CMA CGM, a shipping company based in Marseille, stated that their Malta-flagged vessel, CMA CGM Manta Ray, was not affected as it was docked in Djibouti during the attack.

US Central Command (USCENTCOM) reported the successful interception of five unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over the Red Sea.

“These actions are taken to protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for US, coalition, and merchant vessels,” read the statement by CENTCOM.

The Houthis did not immediately claim responsibility for the attack, though suspicion was directed at the group. It is common for the rebels to take several hours to acknowledge their operations.

The US Maritime Administration has recorded over 50 incidents involving Houthi disruptions since November, including vessel captures and sinkings. A recent downturn in such incidents coincided with a US-led airstrike campaign targeting Houthi strongholds in Yemen, which allegedly reduced the group’s capabilities.

The listing of Khomeini's name sparked criticism from India's Shia Muslim community, who hold him in high regard as a religious leader and Islamic scholar.

This perspective sharply contrasts with the sentiments of many Iranians, especially the younger generation, who view Khomeini as a dictator responsible for the regime’s egregious and numerous human rights abuses.

Videos often show young Iranians tearing Khomeini’s images out of textbooks, setting fire to his photos or trampling on them– and in some cases, replacing his images with that of former monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The description in the Indian textbook, which caused outrage stated that: "During his reign, [Khomeini] did many evil deeds. He used to kill people who didn't believe in 'Allah'. People had to face brutality even if they listened to music. He was the culprit behind the Iranian revolution (1979) and also the Iran-Iraq war, making him responsible for the deaths of millions of people."

The controversy, fuelled by India’s Muslim community, gained further traction when the “Khomeini For All” X page tweeted about the book, stating that the "Indian publisher insults Imam Khomeini…We urge authorities to take swift and stern action. Failure to do so will provoke community outrage." The group running the page called for action from the Meerut and Delhi police against the publishers.

Following the 1979 revolution and with the help of a non-legitimate referendum, Khomeini and those close to him created the Islamic Republic in Iran.

Khomeini’s subsequent rule was marked by suppression of political dissent, the establishment of a theocratic government with no civil liberties, and the initiation of purges targeting political opponents and intellectuals.

The early years of the Islamic Republic saw the execution of former government officials and army leaders, with 1981 marked by a particularly brutal massacre following a Fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini. The period targeted a wide range of political opponents and is remembered as one of the darkest chapters in Iran’s modern history.

The mass killings of political prisoners in 1981, which extended into early 1982, were methodical and have been categorized as crimes against humanity by countries like Canada. These acts were part of a larger strategy to consolidate power by the newly established Islamic regime, which publicly listed the names of the executed and defended its actions in face of international criticism.

Following the onslaught of criticism over the book by India’s Muslim groups, Acuber Books International issued a statement, saying that they will “rectify [the] error swiftly and unequivocally.”

“It has come to our attention that labeling him among the ‘most evil men in history’ is not only inaccurate but also deeply offensive to many individuals and communities,” the letter received by Kashmir Observer states.

Mapna Group, a major Iranian conglomerate involved in constructing power plants and oil facilities, is under scrutiny for its connections with the Islamic Republic's political elite.

The British government raises even more serious suspicions. Mapna Europe GmbH appears to be on an European list of international companies suspected of being involved in the production or procurement of weapons of mass destruction, Bild said.

Bild's investigation suggests that the Islamic Republic may use Mapna Europe, along with its subsidiaries in Dubai, China, and Turkey, for conducting suspicious transactions, thereby evading international sanctions. The allegation is worrying as Mapna is listed under US sanctions.

According to Bild, Abbas Aliabadi, who served for fifteen years as the CEO of Mapna until his appointment as Iran's Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade in Ebrahim Raisi's government in 2023, continues to influence the operations of Mapna Europe discreetly.

“The mullahs from Iran are building a nuclear bomb and want to destroy Israel - but are doing millions in business in Germany,” writes Bild.

It also highlights that according to experts, there are hidden company networks, especially in Düsseldorf and Hamburg, with which Iran is trying to circumvent sanctions. The Mapna network stands out here because of its prominence: the name Afshin Rezaei is on the mailbox next to Economics Minister Aliabadi.

Aliabadi, a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and a veteran of Iran’s defense educational institutions, stepped down from his role at Mapna shortly after taking office in the government.

“Mapna Europe operates in an office complex between the main train station and the old town with an unadorned entrance, and dark staircase. Not a place where you would expect a state-run company. Only one name on the mailbox might say who is at work here: Abbas Aliabadi – Iran's Minister of Economy, member of the Revolutionary Guard, confidant of the mullahs,” read the report by Bild.

The name Afshin Rezaei, who manages Mapna's Dubai branch and previously faced a six-month US prison sentence for violating anti-terrorism laws, is also listed on the company's mailbox.

The report also ties other high-profile Iranian figures to Mapna Europe, including Tahmasb Mazaheri, former Economy Minister and ex-Governor of the Central Bank of Iran. Mazaheri was reportedly managing several businesses in Düsseldorf as of 2018, and in 2013, he was found with an undeclared check worth 54 million euros at Düsseldorf Airport. The Islamic Republic claimed that the check Mazaheri carried was for the costs of residential construction in Venezuela.