France Denounces 'State Hostage-Taking' by Iran

It’s not clear who the “cyber actor” was, but US lawmakers have expressed concern about the possibility that it could have been related to Iran’s intelligence or Revolutionary Guards (IRGC).

Malley was placed on leave and had his security clearance suspended in April 2023. Iran International was first to report the incident in June of that year, but then the State Department blocked all attempts to find more information about Malley’s case.

“We remain deeply frustrated by the Department's lack of responsiveness to our requests for information needed to conduct appropriate oversight,” wrote top Republicans on the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs committees. “Due to the Department's evasiveness and lack of transparency, we have worked to glean information from other sources.”
This is in effect the first time in more than a year that a semi-official story has transpired on Malley’s sudden and complete disappearance from public life. Even then, the letter sent to Secretary of State Antony Blinken by Senator James Risch (R-ID) and Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX) raises many more questions than it answers.

“Did Mr. Mailey send or attempt to send these documents to anyone who lacked the proper clearance,” the two Congressmen ask. “Were any of these individuals affiliated with the Iranian government or the Iran Experts Initiative?”

Iran Experts Initiative –also made public by Iran International alongside Semafor– was an influence network initiated by Iran’s foreign ministry in 2014, recruiting young researchers and academics to “promote Tehran’s argument in the West.” At least three prominent members of the network were close associates of Malley.

Malley was appointed as Joe Biden’s Iran envoy in 2021 and immediately embarked on back-channel talks with Iran. For many years, he’s been an advocate of engagement –and not isolation– of the regime in Tehran. Two years after his appointment, Malley began to be noted by his disappearance.

It is now known that State Department officials had repeatedly lied to Members of Congress by claiming Rob Malley was on personal leave.

Risch and McCaul have sent Blinken 17 questions, including one to confirm that Malley’s security clearance was suspended because he ‘mishandled’ sensitive (or classified) documents. “What has been the impact on the administration's Iran policy,” Risch and McCaul ask in another question in their letter to Blinken. “Did Mr. Malley's alleged infractions affect the conduct of Iran policy?”

The Biden administration’s Iran policy has attracted a lot of criticism, especially since October 7. Joe Biden’s approach is seen as too soft, ‘appeasing’ even, encouraging the Iranian regime to be more aggressive as it sees no retribution for its gross violations of human rights at home and destabilizing activities outside.

Malley seems to have had a central role in devising and advancing President Biden’s Iran policy. And that –for those who see that policy as wrong or problematic– is more than enough to want to pursue his case to find out how (or if) US national interests or security has been affected.

“The allegations we have been privy to are extremely troubling and demand immediate answers,” the lawmakers’ letter to Blinken concluded. “These allegations have a substantial impact on our national security and people should be held accountable swiftly and strongly.”

For those in the Middle East, the day could mark anticipation and expectation seamlessly fused as a sense of “anticipancy.”

During his presidency, two fundamental features of Trump’s tactical foreign policy toolkit were “Transactionality” and “Unpredictability.” Both tactical tools ostensibly serve to preserve and promote Trump’s cardinal national security doctrine: “America First.”

The leaders of Egypt, Israel, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (EISQA) may already be preoccupied by a sense of informed anticipation, but they could also be keeping Trump apprised of their efforts towards a region wide peace settlement, i.e., a possible sequel to the Abraham Accords.

The most pressing question for the emerging EISQA peace quartet is how a new Trump administration would deal with an ever-unruly Iranian regime and its proxies. Whilst the response to this question may be in “Project 2025”, Trump’s tried and tested “temperamentality”has proven that he abides by no pre-ordained stratagem other than his idiosyncratic appreciation of how to fulfill the “America First” agenda.

It is imperative to note that many of Trump's domestic policies during his first term, such as the so-called “Muslim travel ban”, astonished many analysts of US public policy. Certainly, one can equally characterize Trump’s foreign policy decisions, such as abandoning the Iran nuclear deal or killing IRGC general Qassem Soleimani as abrupt or unpredictable. However, when viewed through the prism of “America First,” Trump’s actions were generally idiosyncratic for they did not comport with the precedents set by the previous administrations, and they thus caught most domestic and foreign observers by surprise.

Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 seems to offer a blueprint as to how Trump’s second administration would forge ahead in foreign policy, but equally makes allowances for Trump to act idiosyncratically based on a combination of personal rapport with world leaders and opportunism.

Trump’s First Presidency: A Catalogue of Disconformities

Trump inherited from Obama a Middle East in turmoil in his first term. In Syria, Russia and Iran supported the Assad regime against anti-Assad forces, consisting of those armed backed by US and Turkey, as well as the Kurdish peshmerga) and ISIS. In Iraq, Iran’s proxies, the Kurdish peshmerga, US advisors, and the Iranian IRGC advisors fought against ISIS, and in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and UAE were at war with Iran-backed Houthis. Trump also inherited the Iran Nuclear Deal, signed by Obama, that had lifted most sanctions against Iran.

Trump succeeded in reducing ISIS with minimal US intervention by early 2018. On this score, and only a week after US backed Syrian Democratic Forces launched an attack to vanquish ISIS in its last stronghold in Syria, Trump pulled out of the nuclear deal with Iran on 1 May 2018 and introduced “maximum pressure” comprehensive sanctions against the Iranian regime.

Feeling betrayed, Iran sought to retaliate using its complex network of proxies in Iraq and Syria. To Trump the Iranian proxies’ attacks on American bases warranted a severe retaliation, the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the IRGC top commander who was the godfather of the many militia proxies of the Iranian regime in the region and a mastermind of asymmetrical warfare.

In addition to its military achievements, the Trump administration signed extensive aid packages with Israel and Egypt, and spearheaded negotiations with the Taliban, mediated by Qatar, to begin the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan.

Trumps crowning diplomatic achievement was the Abraham (peace and normalization) Accords signed between Israel and Bahrain, UAE, and Morocco, through US guarantees and mediation. The Accords were propitious to engage Israel and Saudi Arabia in intense normalization negotiations.

Promises and Perils of Project 2025

In terms of foreign policy, Project 2025 is a voluminous 920 page policy paper consisting of proposals for the incumbent nominee of the Republican Party, Donald Trump, that correspond to Trump’s first term presidency. The report resonates with Trump’s vision of “America First” but also accords with him in identifying China as the greatest threat to US national security, devoting over 200 pages to it. The report states that “The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine, as well as from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism…”, (93) concluding that “In this light, US defense strategy must identify China unequivocally as the top priority for US” (125).

Project 2025 and US Foreign Policy in Action à la Trump

With Biden taking over the reigns of US foreign policy, his administration has faced upheavals that were unlike any that Trump had to face. Many in conservative circles across the globe believe that Biden’s disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan most likely emboldened Putin to attack Ukraine, which in turn provoked Western sanctions against Russia and led to mass Western military aid to Ukraine.

Trump’s administration will inherit a world totally remade by Covid and Russia-Ukraine War, and Project 2025 seeks to supply the upcoming Republican administration with a menu of options that would reverse many of the Biden’s foreign policy decisions. The project clearly relies on Trump’s vision of a transactional foreign policy.

It considers the President indispensable as the final arbiter of US foreign policy decision making, toeing the traditional line of “imperial presidency” in foreign policy (181). The prime directive, according to Project 2025, that Trump shall follow in executing his role as the captain of the US foreign policy is “America First”: “Rather each foreign policy decision must ask: What is in the interest of the American people? US military engagement must clearly fall within US interests; be fiscally responsible; and protect American freedom, liberty, and sovereignty, all while recognizing Communist China as the greatest threat to US interests.” (182)

Project 2025 assesses Iran to pose a dual threat to Middle East stability, first, through its network of regional armed clients and, second, through its highly expanded weaponization threshold nuclear program. It thus proposes the promulgation of an Arab-Israeli entente with the full support of the US military industrial complex. Such advice accords with what former Trump advisors still see as the most viable options to confront and contain Iran. Second, it calls for sanctions and pressures to contain Iran’s nuclear program (185).

However, Project 2025 remains ambiguous as to how the US should deal the final blow to Iran’s nuclear program or eliminate Iran’s armed proxies. In realpolitik terms, Iran functions as a Gordian knot that binds itself at once to China and Russia in an awkward security, military, and economic arrangement.

To decouple Russia from this arrangement through whatever incentives that Trump can “unpredictably” muster would help neutralize Iran’s threat. This means that Trump would have to somehow decouple Russia from China before he can make any strides against Iran. Decoupling Russia from China and Iran would mean that Trump would have to somehow break the deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Being “unpredictable” could mean that Trump may decide not to implement many anti-Russia sanctions in violation of all special Russian sanctions act and would demand the Congress to repeal such acts as an incentive to Russia in a Trump mediated peace round with Ukraine.

Trump’s intervention on Russia’s behalf through easing sanctions would sway Putin to support him against Iran, and enable him to start a process to contain Iran’s nuclear program without resorting to threats of military strikes; a possibility that cannot be discounted if Trump becomes the commander-in-chief once again. In effect, in his most unpredictable, transitional minded logic, Trump could perceive winning Putin to his side is worth isolating China and dealing with Iran at once.

Biden’s Euro-American sanctions and massive military assistance to Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s invasion have drastically changed the world that Trump had to deal with during his first term. During Trump’s first term “America First” policies provoked closer Sino-Russian military and economic relations under the Shanghai Security Organization and Euro-Asian Economic Union (EAEU). Yet, such relations completely transformed into an de facto Sino-Russian entente in the wake of Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion.

To complicate matters, since 2022, Iran has advanced itself to the level of a junior partner to both Russia and China as a dependable source of military ammunition and arsenal logistics, as well as being a reliable strategic oil supplier to China. Iran, Russia, and China have effectively formed a mutually beneficial de facto pact over the past four years that can be characterized as an unofficial military-economic triple entente. To contain and neutralize Iran’s threat would thus require decoupling Russia from both Iran and China.

It would come as a surprise if in his effort to deal with Iran, Trump would introduce a new version of his first term’s “maximum pressure sanctions.” However, with the complex sanction evasion networks that the Iran has developed on a global scale in tandem with Russia, “maximum pressure sanctions” would not be sufficient. Trump’s administration would have to use all the power of the US navy and its allies to stop Iran’s oil exports to China. Whereas Biden has refused to meaningfully enforce sanctions on Iran’s oil exports to China, as it is wary of a surge in oil prices that can infuriate the American consumer at the gas pump, a Trump administration will be bent on expanding US oil production in contravention of all “green” concerns of Biden democrats.

Nonetheless, not enforcing the Russian sanctions would not be sufficient to bring Putin onboard against Iran. Nor would mediating between Russia and Ukraine in and of itself decouple Putin from Xi. Trump would need to offer an invaluable prize to Putin. The only bargaining chip available to Trump is to force Ukraine to sign away some of her eastern provinces to Russia. Do the Project 2025 authors believe that Trump could offer Ukraine as a sacrificial lamb, for all intents and purposes, to Putin so that it would successfully decouple Russia from China? If one is guided by the America First directive, such an interpretation is not too far-fetched.

Furthermore, Trump may seek to arrive at a compromise with Putin over Iran. In all the 57 instances that Iran appears in Project 2025, it is abundantly clear that the authors are taking more than a cue from the precedent set by the first Trump administration’s treatment of the Islamic Republic. They are in fact rigorously applying the America First directive: “What is in the interest of the American people?” No international commitment to anyone is more sacrosanct to Trump than America First.

On a last note, one cannot discount Trump’s idiosyncratic inventiveness and spontaneity in foreign policy. If Trump’s first term is any guide, Trump may still send, say through Oman, all manner of secret messages to sway Tehran Mullahs to cut a deal with him. He is on record to have dispatched messages to that effect to Iran Supreme Leader Khamenei; especially one for direct talks through the late Japanese PM Abe Shinzo. None can put it past Trump that he would seek make a deal with the Mullahs, especially if Putin seeks to drive a hard bargain before he joins Trump against Iran.

Despite Trump’s characteristic unpredictability, four contours of Trump’s approach to foreign policy seem to have remained constant from his first administration to date: his distrust of China, his affinity for Putin and Russia, his eagerness to forge an everlasting rapprochement between Arabs, chiefly the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Israel, and his unflinching adherence to “America First” as his realpolitik compass.

The late Henry Kissinger, who counselled Trump during his presidency, quipped with much insight during an interview with the Economist last May that: “’I have never met a Russian leader who said anything good about China, and I’ve never met a Chinese leader who said anything good about Russia. They are not natural allies.” Of everything that Kissinger could have whispered in Trump’s ear, these insights must still echo in Trump’s head. Neither a territorially intact Ukraine nor a democratic Iran fair more prominently in Trump’s vision than “America First.” Accordingly, sacrificing both Iran and Ukraine at Putin’s altar is a small penance, especially if they could secure the greatest prize of all: sowing division between Russia and China.

Brian Nelson, Treasury's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, was speaking during a four-day visit to Singapore and Malaysia, which the department said aimed to advance its work in countering financing and revenue generation by Iran and its proxies.

The trip comes as Treasury increases its focus on financing for militant groups routed through Southeast Asia, including through fundraising efforts and illicit sales of Iranian oil.

Nelson told reporters the United States was trying to prevent Malaysia from becoming a jurisdiction where the Palestinian militant group Hamas could both fundraise and then move money.

He said the United States saw Iranian oil being transferred near Singapore and throughout the region.

Last December, Treasury imposed sanctions on four Malaysia-based companies it accused of being fronts supporting Iran's production of drones.

Nelson also said sanctions and export controls against Russia were seeing progress, saying the Russian oil price cap was reducing Moscow's capacity to profit from oil sales while preserving the stability of global energy markets.

Singapore is a major shipping hub. Insurance and other maritime service providers operating in Singapore have warned of evasion of the price cap on Russian oil, complaining that it is difficult to confirm that paperwork promising oil is bought at or below the $60 cap is accurate.

(Reporting by Reuters)

During Grossi’s last visit to Iran in March last year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Iranian government agreed on a statement on how Tehran can increase cooperation with the IAEA. Despite Tehran's sweeping assurances to the UN nuclear watchdog, little progress was made.

Iran committed to cooperating with a long-stalled investigation into discovering uranium particles at undeclared sites and reinstalling removed monitoring equipment. However, IAEA reports to member states indicated that these assurances did not translate into significant actions.

Amidst intense media questioning, Grossi explained his two-day visit to Iran: “My intention was twofold, to re-engage, to have a serious conversation, and to start analyzing a number of concrete proposals that could fit into the different areas that this joint statement covers.”

“There is this expectation that there will be a touch of a magic wand. And we will solve issues. I'm sorry, it's impossible,” he told the press conference.

Without going into the details of Iran’s and IAEA’s expectations, Grossi confirmed that lifting sanctions is one of Iran's demands to cooperate with the agency but that he is: “not the one who has the key to solving these issues” because those problems are outside the scope of his responsibilities.

Hours before Grossi returned to Vienna, he also held a news conference with Iran's atomic chief, Mohammad Eslami, who called the talks “positive and productive.”

Iran's apparent satisfaction with IAEA visits, while failing to keep any promises, is becoming so repetitive that a journalist asked Grossi whether Iran was selling him the same horse again.

Since the end of November, Iran has been enriching uranium to a purity of up to 60%, which is close to around 90% of weapons-grade uranium. The IAEA estimates that this material could be used to make two nuclear weapons if it were enriched further.

Iran has also hindered the IAEA's ability to perform its duties. The IAEA faces numerous challenges, including Tehran's failure to explain uranium traces discovered at undeclared sites and its exclusion of almost all its top enrichment experts.

However, this isn't the first time Iran has enriched uranium to this level. In April 2021, Iran, as a first, began enriching uranium to this level - its highest purity ever and a technical improvement.

Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed in 2015 between Iran, China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, and Germany, Tehran curbed its nuclear program in return for lifting international sanctions.

Iran gradually began to move beyond the nuclear restrictions of the JCPOA after former US president Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018 and reimposed sanctions that crippled its economy.

As part of his criticisms of the deal, Trump stated that it wasn't permanent; the restrictions on Iran's nuclear program began to relax about ten years after the agreement was signed (although the commitment not to develop nuclear weapons is permanent). Moreover, the deal did not address Iran's other problematic activities, including its development of ballistic missiles and its support for violent militias in the region.

After Joe Biden defeated Trump in the 2020 US presidential election, he attempted to revive the deal through indirect negotiations in Vienna, but without any significant success, except a short-lived slowdown of Iran’s enrichment in May last year. That was when the Biden administration, through a Qatar-mediated deal, swapped five detainees with Iran and released $6 billion of Tehran's funds in South Korea.

The Biden administration's cautious stance on Iran casts doubt on the strength of the IAEA's position regarding Iran's unfulfilled promises, as Tehran continues to enrich Uranium at high levels and refuses to cooperate with international measures to curb its nuclear activity.

According to a Pakistani intelligence report spanning 44 pages, "Smuggling of Iranian Oil," sheds light on a long-standing illegal trade that escalated following US-imposed sanctions on Iranian oil exports a decade ago.

The sanctions pushed Tehran to seek alternative markets, significantly boosting the smuggling operations across the 900-kilometer Iran-Pakistan border.

The report reveals that last year alone, approximately $1.02 billion worth of Iranian petrol and diesel was illegally transported into Pakistan, making up about 14% of Pakistan’s annual fuel consumption.

The smuggling has led to significant financial losses for the Pakistani exchequer, estimated at around $820 million in lost taxes and duties, and has negatively impacted local petroleum businesses.

Daily, around 2,000 vehicles are involved in smuggling barrels of fuel across the border, a practice that has continued despite heightened military tensions between Iran and Pakistan, including reciprocal strikes earlier this year.

The socioeconomic implications of potentially halting the trade are profound, especially for the residents of Balochistan, Pakistan's poorest region, which has been plagued by a violent separatist insurgency.

The report indicates that nearly 2.4 million people in Balochistan depend on this illicit trade for their livelihood, with few other economic opportunities available.

Moreover, the report, leaked to local media, names over 200 individuals involved in the smuggling operations, including government and security officials, highlighting widespread corruption and collusion at border checkpoints.

"The culture of bribes and connivance of [security] officials with smugglers continues at almost all [border checkpoints]," it said.

An official, speaking on condition of anonymity, hinted that the leak of the report might be a strategic move by the government to justify an upcoming crackdown on the smuggling operations. However, skepticism remains about Islamabad's commitment to fully addressing the issue, given past inconsistencies in enforcement efforts.

The scarcity of job opportunities and governmental neglect in the impoverished Sistan-Baluchestan province of Iran are significant factors driving Baluch citizens to engage in fuel smuggling. For many in the border area, selling fuel to Pakistan has become a vital source of income, offering higher returns than the domestic market provides. This trade serves as one of the few available means for residents to earn a livelihood.

Every year, the shooting of fuel smugglers by Iranian military forces results in the deaths of hundreds. Reports indicate that from March 20 to March 30 alone, 27 fuel smugglers lost their lives due to actions by security forces, road accidents, and vehicle fires. The victims were predominantly young, aged between 18 and 28 years old.

In 2023, it was reported that at least 172 Baluch fuel smugglers died, with another 42 sustaining injuries.