Even President Masoud Pezeshkian's supporters criticize his cabinet choice, knowing key ministers, including Foreign, Intelligence and Defense Ministers were selected by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
More than a few Iranian analysts have noted on Sunday and Monday that the list of 19 cabinet ministers handed to Parliament reflect selections made by Khamenei, the IRGC, and other influential power centers. This includes key lawmakers who will review the ministers' qualifications and backgrounds before giving, or withholding, their vote of confidence next week.
At least six of the newly proposed ministers served in former President Ebrahim Raisi's cabinet, either as ministers or deputy ministers. This continuity is partly due to Pezeshkian's campaign pledge to carry forward Raisi's initiatives.
More than a few including Sports and Youths Affairs and Interior ministers are backed by Parliament (Majles) Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. Again, more than a few Iran analysts including Dariush Memar pointed out that the cabinet works like a private joint stock company whose board members are determined by stakeholders.
Referring to the ministers Ghalibaf has imposed on the cabinet, Memar remarked that Ghalibaf's share of appointments is so significant it feels as though he himself won the presidential election.
Farnoosh Amirshahi pointed out that the combination of the cabinet shows that rather than determining Pezeshkian's policies, they reflect shares of Iran's leadership and security organizations, and that there is very little sign to show that the President wants to deliver his promises to those who voted for him.
Nonetheless, Iranian sociologist Mohammad Fazeli, a supporter of Pezeshkian argued that 11 of the Ministers, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Economy Minister Abdolnaser Hemmati and Labor Minister Ahmad Maydari are strong and defendable choices. He also pointed out that some others including Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib, Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni and Justice Minister Amin Hossein Rahimi have been chosen by the hard core of the regime, meaning by Khamenei.
Journalist Faraj Sarkoohi wrote in a post on X that Pezeshkian had said clearly and repeatedly that he was going to carry out Khamenei's ideas and he did that. Meanwhile, Farzaneh Sadegh, the only woman in the list was harshly criticized by hardliners for being "an enemy of Iranian and Islamic architecture," adding that she is against mass housing projects and she was fired by the previous government for the same reason.
Iranian journalist Mazyar Khosravi wrote that although he believes the proposed cabinet is acceptable in view of the current political circumstances, he opposes some of the ministers and particularly thinks the choices of Intelligence and Interior Ministers are the government's weakest links.
Conservative journalist Mohammad Reza Mohajeri wrote that "The cabinet was supposed to become like a third cabinet for [former moderate President Hassan] Rouhani. They were carried away and they formed President Raisi's second cabinet!"
Although Pezeshkian won the presidential election thanks to Iranian Reform Camp's support, many say that there is only one known reformist figure in the cabinet: Health Minister Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi. The Reform Front's Leader Azar Mansouri and its spokesperson Javad Emam have criticized Pezeshkian for his choices and former reformist lawmaker Parvaneh Salahsouri wrote: "Pezeshkian failed in his first test. The cabinet is formed not based on merits and standards of the steering committee that was tasked to choose the ministers. It is rather formed by factional interests and "others'" intervention. Based on international experience, such cabinets are likely to be short-lived."
His words could signal a continuation of Iran's hardline approach in foreign policy, rooted in the anti-West and anti-Israel principles that have long guided the IRGC.
During the Monday session, Araghchi emphasized his nearly four decades of experience in foreign policy, including his role in various departments of the ministry. He proudly stated, "I consider myself a soldier of the Supreme Leader and have strived to remain steadfast on this path."
"My worldview remains the same as it was during my service in the IRGC and has not changed," he added, as reported by Ebrahim Rezaei, the spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Parliament.
This declaration underscores the influence of IRGC’s ideology on his approach to diplomacy, an approach that often conflicts with international norms and expectations.
Araghchi's deep ties to the IRGC are not just rhetorical; they are foundational to his identity as a diplomat. He served as a key figure in Iran’s nuclear negotiations, a role that began under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency and continued through Hassan Rouhani’s administration. Despite his involvement in the negotiations leading to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Araghchi’s stance has often been at odds with the more pragmatic elements within the Iranian government.
His refusal to engage in factionalism and his Monday claim of not being part of the "New York gang", which might be a reference to former FM Mohammad Javad Zarif, highlight his alignment with the IRGC’s more uncompromising factions.
Araghchi’s tenure has not been without controversy. During the final days of the Rouhani administration, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a harsh critique of Araghchi’s efforts to revive the JCPOA, labeling the final draft unimplementable. Khamenei’s rejection of the JCPOA revival, despite Araghchi’s efforts, underscores the limitations of even high-ranking diplomats in a system where ultimate power resides with the Supreme Leader.
On the day Raisi’s victory was announced, Araghchi was in Vienna, engaged in the final round of nuclear talks. Despite reports that the Biden administration was prepared to remove the IRGC from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Khamenei’s refusal to endorse the agreement marked the end of Araghchi’s influence in the foreign ministry.
As Iran’s international isolation deepened during Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency, Araghchi found himself increasingly marginalized.
Retreating into relative obscurity, Araghchi focused on activities like bodybuilding and was eventually appointed as secretary of the Strategic Council on Foreign Relations by Khamenei confidant Kamal Kharazi, a move that sparked criticism among conservatives.
Araghchi’s hardline approach extends to his views on nuclear weapons and Iran’s role in the Middle East. In a speech following an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Araghchi hinted that Iran might reconsider its nuclear doctrine, a veiled threat to pursue nuclear weapons if UN sanctions were reinstated.
As he faces a potential new role as foreign minister, Araghchi’s worldview, shaped by his IRGC background, raises concerns about the direction of Iran’s foreign policy.
His conservative, power-centric approach, coupled with his reluctance to challenge autocratic authority, suggests that Iran’s diplomatic efforts may continue to be driven by ideological rigidity rather than pragmatism.
The assailant, armed with a knife, rushed the stage and stabbed the renowned author multiple times, inflicting severe injuries. Rushdie, who had spent decades living under the shadow of a fatwa calling for his death, was once again fighting for his life. This brutal incident, occurring more than three decades after the initial controversy over his book “The Satanic Verses,” starkly reminded the world of the enduring dangers faced by those who dare to challenge religious and political orthodoxy.
The Satanic Verses was published in September 1988. Rushdie's magical realism novel explored themes of religious faith and identity and was met with immediate outrage from many in the Muslim community. Protests began in October 1988 in the United Kingdom and quickly spread across the globe. The book was condemned as blasphemous, leading to its banning in several countries.
By October 1988, the book had been banned in India, and by the end of the year, it was also banned in countries like Bangladesh, Sudan, South Africa, and Sri Lanka. Protests intensified, with public book burnings in the UK, including a high-profile incident in Bradford in January 1989.
The situation escalated dramatically on February 14, 1989, when Ruhollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, issued a fatwa calling for Rushdie's execution, along with anyone involved in the publication of the novel.
The fatwa posed a personal threat to Rushdie and represented a broader challenge to the principles of free expression. Rushdie was forced into hiding, living under police protection for years. The fatwa led to violence and fear, with translators and publishers associated with the book being attacked, and even killed, in some instances. The global response was mixed; while many condemned the fatwa as an attack on free speech, others supported the outcry against what they saw as an insult to Islam.
The issuance of the fatwa against Rushdie came on the heels of another atrocity orchestrated by Khomeini—the mass execution of over 5,000 Iranian political prisoners in the summer of 1988. These prisoners, many of whom had already served their sentences, were summarily executed following brief, sham trials. The international community largely remained silent, failing to condemn this gross violation of human rights. This silence likely emboldened Khomeini and his regime, leading them to believe they could similarly impose their will through the fatwa without significant global repercussions. Just as they had stifled dissent and eliminated opposition within Iran, they sought to extend their reach by suppressing freedom of speech beyond their borders.
The Tehran Times, a prominent English-language Iranian government newspaper, is closely linked to the Islamic Development Organization, a religious and cultural entity created by Khomeini in 1982 to promote the ideologies of the Islamic regime. During the controversy surrounding Rushdie, the Tehran Times played a pivotal role in spreading the regime's propaganda and fueling global outrage, particularly in advancing the Islamic Republic's objectives abroad.
The Tehran Times became a mouthpiece for the regime, fervently defending the fatwa and condemning Rushdie in line with the directives of the Islamic Republic, echoing its stance on religious and political issues. Its editorial board penned and oversaw numerous opinion pieces defending the fatwa and condemning Rushdie. The newspaper, reflecting the regime's stance, framed the entire affair as a "Zionist plot" aimed at discrediting Islam. One headline read, "Penguin head ‘Peter Mayer’ identified as a Jew. Whole Rushdie affair a Zionist plot to discredit Islam."
Following this, the Tehran Times editorial board published an opinion piece on March 7, 1989, arguing that Britain should ban the book, citing previous cases like Spycatcher, where books had been banned for much less: "If Spycatcher can be banned and condemned, then why not The Satanic Verses, which has hurt 1 billion Muslims and others who believe that the beliefs of others should be respected."
Statements from other Iranian leaders further reinforced the fatwa. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, declared that "only burning Rushdie’s book will diffuse the crisis." Tehran Times headlines echoed this sentiment, with proclamations like "Rushdie not forgiven, even if he repents" and "Rushdie is a dead author." The rhetoric was intense, with the Tehran Times reporting on the "rare solidarity" among Muslims worldwide and the increasing death toll in protests, such as the one in Bombay where 12 people were killed.
Despite the passage of time, the fatwa was never officially rescinded, and the threat to Rushdie's life remained. The attack in 2022 underscored that, even after decades, the tensions sparked by The Satanic Verses had not fully abated. The IRI’s hope of riding the wave of religious fervor backfired in the long term, as the protests eventually subsided, and the geopolitical costs became clear. The IRI had overestimated its influence, as demonstrated by headlines such as "European Economic Community (EEC), stand on Rushdie affair not to their interest" and "West losing over its defense of Satanic Verses," both of which reflected the regime’s frustration with the West's steadfast defense of free speech.
If Britain and other European countries had given in to Tehran’s threats, we would be living in a vastly different world today—a world less free, less tolerant, and more fearful. These nations' firm refusal to ban the book and defense of free speech upheld fundamental human rights. It prevented a dangerous precedent where violence and intimidation could dictate the limits of expression. Their refusal to capitulate preserved the principles of liberty and ensured that the forces of censorship and extremism would not easily silence dissenting voices.
Salman Rushdie's resilience in the face of sustained threats has been remarkable. His most recent work, Knife, published after the attack, is a testament to his unyielding spirit. The book explores themes of survival and the power of storytelling, offering a message of hope and defiance. Despite the physical and emotional scars left by the attack, Rushdie's commitment to his craft and the ideals of free expression has not wavered. Knife is more than just another novel; it is a declaration that neither the fatwa nor the violence it inspired can silence Rushdie's voice. Its hopeful message resonates deeply, especially in a world where the threats to freedom of speech continue to evolve.
Reflecting on the attack and the legacy of the fatwa, it's crucial to recognize the broader implications of Rushdie's experience. His story is not just about one man or one book; it represents the ongoing struggle for the right to speak freely, to question, and to create. The endurance of Rushdie's voice, despite numerous attempts to silence it, inspires all who believe in the power of literature and the necessity of defending freedom of expression. The attack on Rushdie in 2022 was a tragic reminder of the enduring dangers he faces, yet it also highlighted the strength of his resolve and the lasting impact of his work. His journey, marked by immense challenges and extraordinary resilience, continues to be a beacon of hope for those who value the freedom to express ideas, no matter how controversial.
Hossein Raghfar, an economist and professor at Al-Zahra University in Tehran, referred to various lists of potential top officials in Pezeshkian's administration, claiming that a group of politicians aligned with market speculators and profiteers are poised to receive key positions.
According to Rouydad24, Raghfar was one of the four Iranian economists who met with Pezeshkian immediately after his election to warn him against the political and social consequences of the government's decisions.
Raghfar told the website that at the meeting he and three other economists, Mohammad Reza Vaez Mahdavi, Farshad Momeni of the University of Tehran, and Gholamreza Hassantash warned Pezeshkian no to follow the policies of his predecessors and instead, pay more attention to the underprivileged people.
The academic who is a member of socialist economic group known as "institutionalists," is a proreform figure close to former Prime Minister and Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi. The members of this group believe that all Iranian governments that came to power after the 1980s Iran-Iraq war were under the influence of "capitalists" and that they simply enriched themselves by "plundering people's wealth."
He told the website that the Iranian economy is overwhelmed by financial corruption. Meanwhile, he charged that some 40 percent of the market for pharmaceutical products is controlled by security agents.
According to Rouydad24, the institutionalists are based at the Institute of Religion and Economics that used to be called "The Society of God-Worshipping Socialists" in the early 1980s.
Raghfar says that all the politicians who criticize the institutionalists are the followers of liberalism and market economy. Using reverse argument, the statement defines the school of thought of Raghfar and others who gather at the Institute of Religion and Economics.
The economist says he has warned Pezeshkian that trying to introduce a single rate of exchange for the US dollar is an impossible task and doing so is likely to push the people to take to the streets. The Iranian government provides cheap dollars for the import of essential goods, which itself has become a source of corruption. However, Raghfar and his like-minded socialists advocate keeping the system in place because it supposedly makes food cheaper for low-income people.
Raghfar and his friends have published three open letters to Pezeshkian in less than six weeks. In their third letter, they complained that the new president has not responded to their previous correspondence, adding that the new government does not seem to have any economic plan or any solution for the country's economic problems.
Speaking about the group's plan about the country's economy. Raghfar said: "Based on our calculations we can supply the essential needs of the population with $35 billion. We do not need to allocate foreign currency to the production of tomato paste or carpets. Previous governments have authorized the activity of 160 motorcycle manufacturing factories that consume foreign exchange but do not produce any added value. During the war in the 80s Iran had $7 billion revenue in foreign exchange. We spent $3 billion on the people's essential needs and $4 billion on the war and the society could function properly."
He added: "Today, decision makers have their own interests rather than protecting the people's rights. For years we have been giving billions of dollars to import oil seeds and no one asked why we do not produce this. "
However, Raghfar failed to mention that Iran’s total annual oil revenues is $35 billion and if it is all spent to provide daily necessities, there will be nothing left for investments.
Raghfar added: "What we call financial corruption is in fact plundering of the people's wealth. Controlling corruption is not an economic matter. The government is responsible for stopping it."
Meanwhile, Farshad Momeni, another institutionalist economist has warned the president that "If Pezeshkian continues to behave in the same way he has done so far, his government will end up with the same fate as the Raisi administration. Mr. Pezeshkian must make a strategic choice. Either he wants to make the economic intermediaries and profiteers fatter, or he should prioritize the housing, nutrition, education and health of the poor people."