Iraqi militias admitted to Tehran university without entrance exams
The University of Tehran has announced an increase in the admission of members of Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq, without the need for entrance exams.
The University of Tehran has announced an increase in the admission of members of Hashd al-Shaabi, the Iranian-backed Shiite militia in Iraq, without the need for entrance exams.
Mohammad Moghimi, President of the University of Tehran, announced Thursday that these students do not receive military training at the university and instead study management though it is widely known that Iraqi militias are trained in Iran.
The Hashd al-Shaabi, or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), was established in 2014 following a religious decree to combat ISIS, which at the time had taken control of four Iraqi governorates and threatened Baghdad.
While the Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization is largely composed of Shia Muslim groups, it also includes Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi factions with an estimated 128,000 fighters across 67 different armed factions.
The University of Tehran's decision to welcome the militia members without standard academic requirements signals a concerning trend. Official reports last year highlighted a "cooperation and agreement" between the Hashd al-Shaabi and the University of Tehran to facilitate the education of these fighters.
Moghimi disclosed in his Thursday interview with the IRNA news agency that Iraqi officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the "insufficient quality" and low standards of some Iranian universities educating PMF students. To address the concerns, Iraqi authorities have requested the University of Tehran step in and help "repair this reputational damage."
He said the influx of the Hashd al-Shaabi members into Iranian universities, particularly the University of Tehran where admission for Iraqis has doubled, is part of a broader plan.
These students, according to Moghimi, many of whom are relatives of active, deceased, or wounded militia from the so-called "resistance front," are being groomed with the help of substantial Iraqi government funding to assume leadership roles back home.
Moghimi paints a rosy picture of the Hashd al-Shaabi members, describing them as deserving individuals committed to "advancing Islamic ideals."
Moghimi claims that there are also economic benefits behind admitting the Hashd al-Shaabi members, stating that they pay almost 1,200 euros per semester for undergraduate studies, compared to 80 to 90 million rials (130-150 $) for Iranian students.
In late July of last year, a group of student activists at the University of Tehran issued a statement condemning the presence of the Hashd al-Shaabi forces and similar individuals at Iranian universities as a "military invasion of the university."
They vowed to resist such admissions, emphasizing that the university has already been emptied of genuine students through "dismissals, suspensions, and repression," and turned into a stronghold for "so-called affiliated professors and Basij militia members."
Last year, Moghimi dismissed protests against the admission of the Hashd al-Shaabi members as "the anger of traitors." Now, he tries to justify these admissions by pointing out that "the education of individuals, managers, and regional officials" has always been a practice at the university, citing Nechirvan Barzani, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region and an alumnus of the University of Tehran, as an example.
Over the past year, the Iranian rial has lost 20% of its value, and in the past three years under President Ebrahim Raisi, it has plummeted by 60%.
The crisis in the stock and real estate markets has discouraged people from investing in these sectors, leading to the withdrawal of over 1,600 trillion rials ($2.6 billion, based on the current USD rate in open markets) from the stock market over the past three years.
In just the first week of August, approximately 20 trillion rials ($33 million) were withdrawn from the Iranian stock market. The real estate market is also in a severe recession, exacerbated by Iran's chronic electricity shortages in the summer and significant gas deficits in the winter. These energy shortages have particularly impacted the construction sector, with power cuts in cement factories causing cement prices to double and halting construction and housing projects nationwide.
With the worsening economic conditions, particularly in the industrial and construction sectors, citizens are increasingly investing in gold, foreign currencies, or moving their capital abroad to preserve their assets. According to the World Gold Council, Iranian citizens’ purchases of gold coins and bars have surged from 25.5 tons in 2011 to nearly 42 tons in 2022, and 44.4 tons last year. In the first half of this year alone, they have purchased more than 22 tons of gold coins and bars.
On the other hand, data from the Central Bank shows that capital flight from the country has been on an upward trend since the imposition of US sanctions against Iran in 2018, rising from $350 million in 2018 to $15 billion last year. In the first nine months of the last fiscal year (March 2023–January 2024), capital flight reached $20.1 billion, a historical record.
No official reports have been published on Iranians' foreign currency holdings, but it appears that government restrictions on the supply of hard currencies like the euro and US dollar have not deterred people from converting their rial assets into foreign currencies. Despite a government ban on holding more than 10,000 euros or dollars, many citizens feel compelled to convert their rial savings into foreign currencies to protect their wealth.
Lotfollah Siahkali, a member of the Parliament’s Industries Commission, stated last year that Iranian citizens held $60 billion in foreign currency reserves, while the Central Bank's governor cited a much lower figure of $16 billion. This discrepancy suggests that even the government may not have an accurate understanding of the amount of foreign currency held by the public in Iran’s chaotic financial system.
Regardless of the exact figure, the presence of even $16 billion in foreign currency stored in people's homes poses a significant challenge for the Iranian economy, which is already grappling with a liquidity shortage in the industrial and construction sectors. This amount is equivalent to half of Iran’s oil export revenues from last year. If the $60 billion estimate is accurate, it would represent approximately 16% of Iran’s GDP.
The core issue is that Iranians lack trust in the Islamic Republic and its flawed economic policies, making it unlikely that people will reintegrate their foreign currency assets into the country’s economy. It's important to note that these figures represent the savings of a small segment of Iran’s affluent population. According to official statistics, more than half of the population lives below the poverty line, struggling to afford basic necessities.
Meanwhile, the government faces a massive budget deficit each year and is forced to borrow from the Central Bank and other financial institutions, exacerbating liquidity issues and further devaluing the rial. Central Bank data shows that from 2021 to 2023, government debt to the country’s banks has more than doubled, exceeding 13,000 trillion rials ($22 billion). Additionally, the Iranian government owes $100 billion to the National Development Fund. As a result, liquidity has also doubled, and the rial has lost 60% of its value.