Iran International
Iran's new President Masoud Pezeshkian’s has admitted to alarming educational disparity between the wealthy and the poor and the decline of the educational system.
Critics say the chances of admission to good universities are very low for those who study in public schools, where the quality of education is inferior. Therefore, the children of privileged families who study in private and expensive semi-public schools for “gifted children” make up most of the top 3,000 in the standardized university entrance examinations (Concours).
According to a 2023 study conducted by the Poverty and Inequality Think-Tank , over half of all twelfth-grade students studied in public schools but less than ten percent of these were among the top 3,000 in the Concours.
Pezeshkian, who says “educational justice” is one of the top issues on his reform agenda for the country, addressed the problem in a speech last week at the inauguration ceremony of the new education minister and again in his first televised interview later in the week.
“It is not acceptable for the child of someone who doesn’t have money and connections to study in a school where he may not get a good education … All schools must meet a satisfactory standard. It is unacceptable that all who get to go to university come from families whose children can study in special and private schools,” he said at the ceremony.
In his televised interview he spoke about how his own family could not afford paid education when he and his late wife, both residents at the time, moved to Tehran from Tabriz to study for their sub-specialisation in surgery in the early 1990s. “They wanted money wherever we went [to enroll them],” he said, adding that this made him think deeply about educational disparity.
The performance of students from underprivileged families has hugely dropped in recent years. Speaking to Ham-Mihan newspaper, Pirouz Nami, a teacher from Khuzestan Province, argued that the educational failures result from the country's general economic circumstances.
“Students must help their families with expenses. They work as apprentices and peddlers. Many of them fall asleep in classes. They say they work in cafes and shops until four in the morning. They drop out of school when they fail. We are facing an increase in school dropouts,” he said.
According to a former education minister, Yousef Nouri, over eight million Iranians, nearly 10 percent of all Iranians, are illiterate.
There are several different categories of schools in Iran including public, ordinary semi-public (Heyat Omanayi), semi-public for ‘gifted students’ (SAMPAD), private (khosusi), and special public schools for children of ‘martyrs and veterans’ (Shahed).
Besides good educational opportunities, students who study in Shahed schools also benefit from preferential admission to universities which paves their way to higher positions in the government.
Huge sums from the education budget is spent to promote the Islamic ideology in all schools but ideological training is the most intensive in Shahed schools.
The minister of education in Pezeshkian’s cabinet, Alireza Kazemi, who is one of the ministers most objected to by Pezeshkian’s supporters, said in a speech Sunday that he considered the promotion of religious values including Quranic lessons and holding prayers at the top of the list of his priorities.
Admission fees to all schools other than public schools can be very costly or even unaffordable for ordinary families. Privileged students' families also often spend a fortune on entrance exams preparatory classes and private tutoring to get their children into SAMPAD and some semi-public schools which ordinary families cannot afford as well as preparation for the Concour.
One of the reasons that the government is reluctant to give up the schools for the ‘gifted’ is the propaganda opportunities that these schools provide. Students from these schools have earned over 750 medals for the country since 1987 when Iran took part in international Olympiads for the first time.
Abbas Araghchi, the new foreign minister approved by Khamenei, was one of the original negotiators in the Iran deal talks. He has chosen as his deputy another member of that negotiating team, Majid Takht-Ravanchi. Both men possess the experience and skills to resolve technical issues related to a potential deal. The problem is that their loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is absolute. They believe in the 'principles' of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, chief among them, focus on the Axis of Resistance.
Araghchi, compared to Javad Zarif, has fewer differences with hardliners and stands somewhere between Zarif and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s former foreign minister who was killed along with President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. So far, Araghchi’s public statements have been in line with the agenda set out by Pezeshkian in an open letter he wrote shortly after his election. There is very little to separate this new agenda and that of Raisi’s, apart from a softer tone.
Pezeshkian did speak about the need for sanctions removal and the normalization of relations with the world during his campaign. Since assuming office, however, he has shifted toward blaming the US for imposing "unjust sanctions" and defending the expansion of strategic ties with Russia and China. This shift negatively impacts his administration’s ability to open a new chapter in the longstanding conflict. The biggest obstacle is, of course, Khamenei, who determines foreign policy. Without a change in his stance, it’s difficult to see a different outcome from the failure of the two previous administrations to revive the Iran deal.
Although Araghchi has retreated from his initial stance on the irrelevance of the JCPOA and the need for a new agreement, this shift reveals a stark reality: the JCPOA, due to the broken commitments of both the US and Iran, no longer exists—it is effectively dead. According to the most recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has added cascades of centrifuges at its main uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow. Even the IAEA chief has suggested that the JCPOA may have expired.
Iran has significantly reduced the breakout time to just a few months by gradually advancing its uranium enrichment levels and increasing its stockpile over the past six years. It now claims the capability to make atomic bombs, though Khamenei's religious order (Fatwa) supposedly prevents them from doing so. However, it seems their ultimate goal is to use their advanced nuclear program as leverage to pressure the US and EU into reviving the JCPOA or forging a new agreement without substantial changes or additional demands.
Any agreement would be a tall order since the conditions now are far less favorable than 2015, when the nuclear deal was announced. The areas of conflict have expanded after the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Now, a stronger deal is needed to mitigate instability in the region and the world. And Iran is known to be quite hostile to any suggestion of additional demands.
It is worth noting that the Biden administration initially pushed for a new JCPOA. Iranian leaders may not be opposed to the idea in principle, but the gap between the two sides seems too big to bridge. Iran under Pezeshkian will continue its support for armed groups in the region while managing the scope and scale of its tensions with US and Israel. This policy is inherently problematic and may be unsustainable. At best, it could lead to a temporary reduction in tensions.
The Biden administration has so far shown little enthusiasm for engaging with Iran’s new administration. The upcoming US election could be the main reason for both sides’ caution. A Trump victory would likely complicate Pezeshkian’s position. It could mean further escalation of tensions even. It’s not impossible that Trump may seek a stronger deal eventually, humiliating Iran along the way. A Kamala Harris win would therefore look like the more favorable outcome for Iran. But the fundamental issues and obstacles will persist whoever the president.
Another factor complicating the potential for a new agreement is the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia. If Iran sends Russia ballistic missiles, as reported recently, tensions could reach new heights, given NATO's repeated warnings to Iran. It’s not impossible that Germany, Britain, and France would seek snapback sanctions—a provision in the JCPOA to reimpose suspended UN resolutions against Iran and essentially dismantle the JCPOA. That would be catastrophic for Pezeshkian who taunted his hardline rival for ruining the chances of a JCPOA revival.
An optimistic scenario hinges on new calculations within Khamenei’s court, which could lead to renewed negotiations with the US over the nuclear issue and ultimately result in a new agreement with controlled setbacks—yet another Heroic Flexibility, as Khamenei named his previous retreat. This scenario could be complicated too. China’s purchase of Iranian oil at reduced prices has weakened US leverage and the effectiveness of sanctions. Europe, on the other hand, wants to contain Russia and manage the oil market, which might require offering concessions to Iran to reduce its military aid to Russia.
It is too early to predict where Iran is headed under Pezeshkian. It can be said with some confidence, however, that a strategic change in Iran’s foreign policy is unlikely. Any change would most likely be tactical or symbolic. A scenario somewhere between the two outlined here could also emerge, potentially allowing for an interim agreement that initially breaks the current deadlock by having the US lift some sanctions in exchange for Iran halting some of its nuclear activities that violate the JCPOA framework.
For now, due to increased tensions amid the Gaza war, confrontation continues, with the US enforcing and expanding unilateral sanctions while Iranian proxies attack American military and diplomatic centers in Iraq. Barring a near miraculous turn of events, there will be no easing of tensions in the months to come.
The strike, now in its second month, has spread to more than 50 cities, marking the largest professional protest by nurses in a century. Nurses and emergency medical technicians are protesting against long working shifts, low wages, and mandatory overtime.
Fereydoun Moradi, a member of the Supreme Council of the Nursing System, recently highlighted the issue of unpaid nursing service fees which have not been deposited into nurses' accounts for over a year.
Meanwhile, Health Minister Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi admitted that the government owes nurses more than 70 trillion rials (over $116 billion). Although he said that these dues would be paid promptly, no action has been taken, leaving nurses determined to continue their industrial action.
The situation is further exacerbated by the Iranian government's mismanagement of the National Development Fund (NDF) which was intended for long-term national investments. In a Saturday interview on state TV, President Masoud Pezeshkian announced that, with the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, funds from the National Development Fund will be allocated to pay nurses, farmers, teachers, and for essential medicines.
The crisis has also led to a increase in the migration of nurses. Ahmad Nejatian, head of the Nursing Organization, reported that the average annual migration of nurses has doubled between 2021 and 2023. With approximately 20% of nursing students now seeking to leave the country, the trend is expected to worsen, particularly as countries like Germany and Denmark have made it easier for Iranian nurses to migrate.
The exodus, combined with low wages and harsh working conditions, has weakened Iran's healthcare system. The country currently has only 1.5 nurses per 1,000 people, compared to the global average of three. Many nurses report burnout and an inability to provide adequate care to patients, further straining an already fragile system.
Samira Rahi, a journalist based in Turkey who specialises in Iranian social issues, criticized the Iranian government's lack of resolve.
"When nurses demonstrated their dedication during the pandemic, the system took advantage of them. The Islamic Republic relies on temporary fixes to address the issue superficially, but as long as the underlying structural problems remain unresolved, all these measures will be ineffective," she told Iran International.
As the government continues to neglect the demands of its healthcare workers, the future of Iran's nursing profession—and the quality of care available to its citizens—remains uncertain.