The Pezeshkian administration's relationship with the media seems to be the weakest link in its efforts to connect with the Iranian public—a link that appears to have been broken from the very beginning.
When Pezeshkian assumed office in late July, some observers hoped for shifts in the media landscape that would provide the new president with greater influence over public opinion.
Throughout the presidential campaign, Pezeshkian’s supporters frequently claimed that state TV’s coverage was biased in favor of his political rival, Saeed Jalili, whose brother oversees the network. When Pezeshkian participated in his first televised interview following the election, his supporters once again criticized the state TV presenters, accusing them of asking questions that reflected Jalili’s agenda rather than addressing the concerns of the nation.
Some observers suggested that Pezeshkian should have allowed the public to submit their questions via social media, which could then be passed on to the TV presenters. Instead, the two state TV hosts repeated the same questions from the campaign debates, seemingly in an attempt to suggest that Pezeshkian had nothing new to offer. However, in fairness to state TV, it’s worth noting that Pezeshkian does have a tendency to speak repetitively.
Centrist website Entekhab also suggested that the state TV does not represent public opinion. It also pointed out that the state TV's questions were too general, too dull and too insignificant. It also suggested that Pezeshkian should have invited independent journalists to ask questions that matter to the people.
Pezeshkian not only appears to be excluded from utilizing state TV as a vital link to the nation but is also hindered by Iran Daily, the administration’s official newspaper. Journalists in Tehran have noted that individuals appointed by Jalili's team during former President Raisi’s tenure remain in place, continuing to push their previous agenda, which works against Pezeshkian's efforts.
While state TV and Iran newspaper remain unable to advance Pezeshkian's messaging, his two spokespersons have also struggled to make an impact. Elias Hazrati, his news dissemination officer and the managing editor of the reformist Etemad newspaper, has faced criticism from journalists and others for accepting the role, raising questions about his alignment and effectiveness. As a result, Pezeshkian’s administration faces significant obstacles in effectively communicating its message to the public.
Iranian journalist Zeynab Esmaeili wrote in a post on X: "Elias Hazrati's decision to accept a government position has exposed a deeper crisis within the Iranian media. The fundamental principle that an independent media outlet should remain separate from government influence has been compromised. The involvement of media figures in government roles suggests that the spirit of criticism and independent journalism has been significantly weakened, raising concerns about the erosion of journalistic integrity and the freedom of the press in Iran."
The government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani, has yet to formally speak on behalf of the administration, but her two social media videos reveal her speaking style. While she is articulate, her delivery resembles that of a preacher or schoolteacher rather than a politician skilled in addressing sensitive issues transparently. Her use of flowery language and an overly dramatic tone detracts from the clarity needed in her role. Additionally, her promises in the videos suggest she's responsible for executing government plans rather than effectively conveying its messages in a clear and credible manner.
This situation reveals that the government is not fully established yet. Some of its officials such as the spokesperson and Peseshkian’s labor minister do not seem to be clear about the boundaries of their responsibilities and official mandate.
While Pezeshkian appears to manage domestic affairs, excluding areas under the Interior and Intelligence Ministries, foreign policy is largely in the hands of ex-foreign minister Javad Zarif's former team, Abbas Araghchi and Majid Takht Ravanchi, who answer directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, Pezeshkian faces a lack of effective media tools, compounded by attacks from hardline newspapers like Kayhan.
The group is focused on advocating for policies they believe will strengthen US national security and promote a tougher stance toward the government of Iran.
During his administration, Trump’s foreign policy, especially regarding the Middle East, was characterized by a strong opposition to Iran. His administration withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2019, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, and imposed strict sanctions against Iran.
Iranians for Trump supports these policies, viewing them as critical measures to counter Iran’s influence. The organization emphasizes Trump’s previous administration’s role in addressing issues related to Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and its regional destabilizing activities, which the group argues threaten global security.
“While the Biden-Harris administration has struggled to effectively confront the threats posed by Iran’s regime, President Trump’s leadership is marked by unwavering commitment to safeguarding American national security and supporting the Iranian people in their struggle for freedom,” said Nasim Behrouz, Persian-language spokesperson for Iranians for Trump.
Iranians for Trump will focus on voter registration and advocacy to ensure that the Iranian-American community’s concerns, particularly regarding US foreign policy toward Iran, are considered by political leaders.
Sarah Raviani, the English-language spokesperson for the group, signaling the group' activism also in Congressional races added, “Our mission is to mobilize Iranian-American voters to support leaders who prioritize policies that protect US national security and promote democratic values both at home and abroad.”
According to figures from Iran’s High Council of Iranian Affairs Abroad in 2020, 47% of the Iranian diaspora (1,905,813 people) live in the Americas, with an estimated 1,500,000 living in the United States.
Meanwhile, according to data from the Migration Policy Institute citing tabulations from the US Census Bureau 2019 American Community Survey (ACS), the Iranian diaspora in the United States comprises more than 577,000 individuals born in Iran or reported Iranian ancestry.
Even considering the US Census Bureau, Iranian-American voters, have the potential to play a role in the November elections. While many Iran-Americans live in states like California and Texas, smaller but notable populations exist in swing states such as Virginia, Florida, Georgia, and Nevada.
Abbas Araghchi, the new foreign minister approved by Khamenei, was one of the original negotiators in the Iran deal talks. He has chosen as his deputy another member of that negotiating team, Majid Takht-Ravanchi. Both men possess the experience and skills to resolve technical issues related to a potential deal. The problem is that their loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) is absolute. They believe in the 'principles' of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy, chief among them, focus on the Axis of Resistance.
Araghchi, compared to Javad Zarif, has fewer differences with hardliners and stands somewhere between Zarif and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran’s former foreign minister who was killed along with President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. So far, Araghchi’s public statements have been in line with the agenda set out by Pezeshkian in an open letter he wrote shortly after his election. There is very little to separate this new agenda and that of Raisi’s, apart from a softer tone.
Pezeshkian did speak about the need for sanctions removal and the normalization of relations with the world during his campaign. Since assuming office, however, he has shifted toward blaming the US for imposing "unjust sanctions" and defending the expansion of strategic ties with Russia and China. This shift negatively impacts his administration’s ability to open a new chapter in the longstanding conflict. The biggest obstacle is, of course, Khamenei, who determines foreign policy. Without a change in his stance, it’s difficult to see a different outcome from the failure of the two previous administrations to revive the Iran deal.
Although Araghchi has retreated from his initial stance on the irrelevance of the JCPOA and the need for a new agreement, this shift reveals a stark reality: the JCPOA, due to the broken commitments of both the US and Iran, no longer exists—it is effectively dead. According to the most recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has added cascades of centrifuges at its main uranium enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordow. Even the IAEA chief has suggested that the JCPOA may have expired.
Iran has significantly reduced the breakout time to just a few months by gradually advancing its uranium enrichment levels and increasing its stockpile over the past six years. It now claims the capability to make atomic bombs, though Khamenei's religious order (Fatwa) supposedly prevents them from doing so. However, it seems their ultimate goal is to use their advanced nuclear program as leverage to pressure the US and EU into reviving the JCPOA or forging a new agreement without substantial changes or additional demands.
Any agreement would be a tall order since the conditions now are far less favorable than 2015, when the nuclear deal was announced. The areas of conflict have expanded after the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Now, a stronger deal is needed to mitigate instability in the region and the world. And Iran is known to be quite hostile to any suggestion of additional demands.
It is worth noting that the Biden administration initially pushed for a new JCPOA. Iranian leaders may not be opposed to the idea in principle, but the gap between the two sides seems too big to bridge. Iran under Pezeshkian will continue its support for armed groups in the region while managing the scope and scale of its tensions with US and Israel. This policy is inherently problematic and may be unsustainable. At best, it could lead to a temporary reduction in tensions.
The Biden administration has so far shown little enthusiasm for engaging with Iran’s new administration. The upcoming US election could be the main reason for both sides’ caution. A Trump victory would likely complicate Pezeshkian’s position. It could mean further escalation of tensions even. It’s not impossible that Trump may seek a stronger deal eventually, humiliating Iran along the way. A Kamala Harris win would therefore look like the more favorable outcome for Iran. But the fundamental issues and obstacles will persist whoever the president.
Another factor complicating the potential for a new agreement is the growing military cooperation between Iran and Russia. If Iran sends Russia ballistic missiles, as reported recently, tensions could reach new heights, given NATO's repeated warnings to Iran. It’s not impossible that Germany, Britain, and France would seek snapback sanctions—a provision in the JCPOA to reimpose suspended UN resolutions against Iran and essentially dismantle the JCPOA. That would be catastrophic for Pezeshkian who taunted his hardline rival for ruining the chances of a JCPOA revival.
An optimistic scenario hinges on new calculations within Khamenei’s court, which could lead to renewed negotiations with the US over the nuclear issue and ultimately result in a new agreement with controlled setbacks—yet another Heroic Flexibility, as Khamenei named his previous retreat. This scenario could be complicated too. China’s purchase of Iranian oil at reduced prices has weakened US leverage and the effectiveness of sanctions. Europe, on the other hand, wants to contain Russia and manage the oil market, which might require offering concessions to Iran to reduce its military aid to Russia.
It is too early to predict where Iran is headed under Pezeshkian. It can be said with some confidence, however, that a strategic change in Iran’s foreign policy is unlikely. Any change would most likely be tactical or symbolic. A scenario somewhere between the two outlined here could also emerge, potentially allowing for an interim agreement that initially breaks the current deadlock by having the US lift some sanctions in exchange for Iran halting some of its nuclear activities that violate the JCPOA framework.
For now, due to increased tensions amid the Gaza war, confrontation continues, with the US enforcing and expanding unilateral sanctions while Iranian proxies attack American military and diplomatic centers in Iraq. Barring a near miraculous turn of events, there will be no easing of tensions in the months to come.