Iran International
Syria's new ruling Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has appointed a deputy for Iranian affairs known for his jihadist sermons as the group builds ties with Iran's Sunnis in a bid to reduce Tehran's influence in the country.
The appointee, Abdulrahman Fattahi—an Iranian-born Sunni cleric and former imam—brings a history of Salafi activism and ideological influence that could help shape HTS’s strategy toward Iran and the Kurdish regions.
Sources close to Fattahi, who withheld their identity for security reasons, told Iran International that his early influence drew criticism from Iranian authorities and eventually led to multiple arrests, culminating in his imprisonment before his departure to Syria in 2015.
Shaped by Salafi teachings
Fattahi’s religious education began in mosques in Mahabad, where he studied Islamic theology under Kurdish clerics. His leanings toward Salafi ideology deepened after he traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1992 to study under Abdulqader Tawhidi, a leading figure in the Tawhid Movement for Iranian Sunnis. Tawhidi’s teachings, rooted in emulating the practices of Salafism, shaped Fattahi’s doctrinal beliefs.
Fattahi, also known as Abu Safiya al-Kurdi, has spent decades advocating Salafi-jihadi ideology. Born in Sulgheh, a village near Mahabad in Iran’s Kordestan Province, his early life and religious studies set the foundation for a trajectory that led from local leadership to regional prominence.
After completing his studies in 1996, Fattahi joined the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, which maintained ties with Iran’s government. He returned to Iran in the late 1990s, where he became the imam of Ziveh, a village near Mahabad. His Salafi views gained him followers but also drew scrutiny, with Iranian authorities repeatedly detaining him. His last arrest in 2011 resulted in a three-year sentence in Rajaei Shahr Prison near Tehran.
Rise in Syria’s jihadist networks
After his release in 2014, Fattahi left Iran and joined jihadist groups in Syria, where he became a prominent figure in the Movement of Sunni Migrants of Iran. This HTS-aligned faction, formed in 2019, consists of Iranian Sunni jihadists who pledged allegiance to HTS’s predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra.
In HTS-controlled Idlib, Fattahi rose to senior positions, serving as a Sharia judge and Mufti. Video footage shows him delivering fiery sermons in Kurdish, praising figures like Osama bin Laden and denouncing Iran’s Shia rulers as “Rawafid” (rejectors). In these speeches, he vowed to “liberate Iran’s Sunnis from occupation.”
The source who spoke to Iran International detailed Fattahi’s ability to inspire Kurdish jihadists. His rhetoric, the source said, “combines religious authority with political strategy, making him a key figure in HTS’s evolving regional plans.”
Fattahi’s reported appointment as deputy for Iranian affairs to HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Joulani signals a potential shift in the group’s regional strategy.
Al-Joulani recently described Iran’s presence in Syria as a significant threat. He said: “We were able to end the Iranian presence in Syria, but we are not enemies of the Iranian people.”
Fattahi’s Kurdish roots and ideological stance position him to influence HTS’s approach to both Iran and the Kurdish regions. His prominence suggests that HTS is leveraging Iranian Sunni dissidents to consolidate its control in Idlib while countering Tehran’s influence in Syria.
For Tehran, Fattahi’s role represents a direct ideological and strategic challenge. His leadership highlights the enduring influence of transnational Sunni jihadist networks and highlights the vulnerabilities posed by Iranian Sunni dissidents.
As HTS seeks to balance its Salafi roots with pragmatic goals in Syria’s fragmented conflict, figures like Fattahi demonstrate the group’s adaptability.
His ascent could also further complicate Iran’s efforts to maintain its foothold in Syria - a key smuggling route to its military allies in the region and trade route amidst sanctions - while countering the resurgence of Sunni militancy on its borders.
Salafis, an ultraconservative branch of Sunni Islam, emphasize a return to the practices and beliefs of the early Muslim community (the Salaf Salih or pious predecessors) and often view later interpretations of Islamic teachings as deviations.
Their rigid adherence to this ideology has historically put them at odds with Shia Muslims, whom they label as Rawafid (rejectors) for not recognizing the legitimacy of the first three caliphs and for their veneration of Imams. Salafis accuse Shias of deviating from the core principles of Islam, regarding many of their rituals and beliefs as innovations (bid’ah) forbidden in Islam.
This animosity has fueled sectarian tensions in regions where Salafis seek influence, often leading to violent clashes. Militant Salafi-jihadi groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, have taken this opposition to an extreme, targeting Shias in their campaigns, excommunicating them (takfir), and justifying violence against them as part of their broader ideological and political objectives. This sectarian divide continues to play a significant role in the dynamics of conflicts across the Middle East.
Having lost Syria in a dramatic and unexpected turn of events, Iran’s hardliners find themselves with little to defend their position. They have shifted their focus to heavily campaigning for the implementation of a restrictive new hijab law, while attempting to deflect blame for the insurgents' victory onto their long-time ally Assad. Some hardliners argue that Assad lacked sufficient commitment to Tehran’s “axis of resistance,” yet they struggle to explain why the Revolutionary Guard did not make greater efforts to defend him.
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to address the issue on December 11, claiming that the United States and Israel had blocked all land and air routes to Syria. However, this explanation was widely viewed as unconvincing, particularly given Tehran’s long-standing boasts of regional supremacy.
On Saturday, the country’s national security council decided to shelve the hijab law, bowing to public opposition as well as criticism from numerous current and former officials, along with commentators permitted to speak through tightly-controlled media channels.
Despite this, hardliner Foad Izadi sparked widespread backlash on social media and Iranian news websites by arguing that the insistence on hijab enforcement serves a political purpose for the Islamic government. He claimed that supporters of the political system expect religious laws to be taken seriously by officials, warning that failing to do so risks eroding the Islamic Republic’s base of loyal supporters.
"The Islamic Republic does not see its benefit in giving in, because it believes the locomotive of the train it is riding on consists of a hard core of supporters who are loyal precisely because of these [policies]. If the Islamic Republic compromises on a few principles, this core of loyalists will be the first group to step off the train,” Izadi said during a video discussion published online.
Ironically, Izadi, who has become a staunch ideologue for Iran's hardliners, was educated in the United States from an early age and holds a PhD from the University of Louisiana. This apparent contradiction was not lost on a commentator from the reformist Aftab News website, who criticized Izadi for advocating hardline policies after benefiting from an education abroad.
Meanwhile, the relatively moderate Rouydad24 published a scathing article on Sunday targeting Izadi and his peers, accusing them of exploiting the hijab issue to tighten their control over the government. Matin Ghafarian, writing for Rouydad24, argued that these ultra-hardliners are not solely focused on enforcing stricter hijab regulations but are also intent on imposing broader counterproductive policies.
The article warned that such policies would further alienate the public, destabilize the Islamic government, and make it increasingly reliant on hardliner support. Rouydad24 wrote, "These individuals embody their own words—they are not easily satisfied. After making the establishment dependent on themselves, they begin to conquer the system step by step."
The website went even further, accusing ultra-hardliners of using political issues, such as the hijab, as a pretext to expand their influence for financial gain. By pressuring the government to adopt more extreme policies, they have exacerbated economic sanctions and deepened Iran’s isolation. This, in turn, has allowed them to leverage their influence to gain control over key economic sectors under the guise of rescuing the economy, often benefiting from government subsidies in the process.
Rouydad24 concluded, "The demands of this small group will not end until they have fully taken over the country’s economy. This group effectively traps the government in a cycle of decline—creating crises and feeding off them. In reality, we are not dealing with a fanatical and hotheaded group, but rather a cunning mafia intent on seizing control of all the country's economic resources."